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PSSC's Travel Grants and International Linkages Program

FEATURED ARTICLES • FELLOWSHIP NEWS
A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP • TRIBUTES TO FILIPINO SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

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Lay-out and Book Cover	:	JENNIFER T. PADILLA
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TRIBUTES

In this issue...

We have made it a point to feature, in previous issues of the *PSSC Social Science Information* or *SSI*, some of PSSC's regular programs and/or special projects. Because a number of these were set up years ago, the features offer brief historical accounts of how these programs began, as well as updates on their present reach and coverage.

Last year, SSI's commemorative issue of PSSC's 40th anniversary featured the Council's National Social Science Congresses (NSSCs) in retrospect together with descriptions of the fellowship/scholarship grants administered by PSSC such as the Ford Foundation-International Fellowships Program, the ASIA Fellows Awards, and the Philippine Center for Population and Development Graduate Fellowship and Research Grant Program. In 2007, SSI featured the PSSC Research Award Program, arguably the Council's earliest and most enduring program.

This year's SSI highlights PSSC's Travel Grants and International Linkages Program and shares with readers papers prepared by two of PSSC's recent travel grantees under this program. "From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippines and East Timorese Policies of Integrating Former Insurgent Combatants into their Armed Forces" was prepared by Dr. Rosalie Hall and presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting in Toronto, Canada in September 2009. "Entrepreneurship and Economic Development" was written by Dr. Eric Vincent Batalla and presented at the American Asian Studies Annual Meeting in Massachusetts, USA in March 2007. Dr. Hall is with the Department of Political Science of the University of the Philippines-Visayas while Dr. Batalla is from the Department of Political Science of De La Salle University. On our request, both Dr. Hall and Dr. Batalla kindly agreed to revise their papers for publication in this issue of SSI.

Their papers are followed by a short description of how PSSC's Travel Grants and International Linkages Program began and how this has evolved over the years since the 1970s. The list of PSSC Travel Grantees featured in the SSI May 1976 issue has been updated to add to PSSC's directories of Filipino social science scholars and professionals.

The Travel Grants represent PSSC's contributions to and support for individual social science faculty members, graduate students and researchers who have been invited to present papers and participate in regional and international conferences. At an institutional level, PSSC has furthered Philippine participation and presence in regional/global social science fora and meetings through its affiliation with the Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils (AASSREC) which PSSC helped found in 1973, and the International Social Science Council (ISSC) which PSSC formally joined in 2005. PSSC's attendance in the 1st World Social Science Forum organized by ISSC in Bergen, Norway in May 2009, and in AASSREC's 18th Biennial General Conference on "Multiculturalism in a Globalizing World" in Bangkok in August 2009 are recorded in pages 65 to 67 of this SSI issue.

This issue also brings you fellowship updates on the Ford Foundation International Fellowship Program and the PSSC Research Award Program (pp. 68-70).

Likewise, it pays homage to dear colleagues and noted members of the Philippine social science community—Corazon B. Lamug, Finardo G. Cabilao, Raul P. de Guzman, Ledivina V. Cariño, Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler and Victoria A. Bautista—who have passed on to a new life.

Finally, with this SSI issue I bid goodbye to the post of PSSC's Executive Director and welcome Dr. Grace Gorospe-Jamon as the Council's 6th Executive Director (page 75). To mark the event, I was feted to a "surprise" retirement party cleverly organized by the staff in 17 December 2009 and attended by friends and former PSSC Chairs and Board Members who lent me much support during my years as Executive Director. The pictures on pages 71 to 74 show what an enjoyable and memorable affair the party turned out to be.

My years as PSSC Executive Director have been most fulfilling. The job afforded me the rare opportunity of matching the things/tasks I like to do with the kind of work that could strengthen PSSC organizationally or institutionally. Among the things I like doing for instance, is budgeting, which I attribute in part to my Ilocano parentage, and in part to my many years of preparing, defending and implementing all kinds of budgets in the places where I worked before coming to PSSC. Hence when faced with a task, my first instinct is to take stock of the resources at hand—time, people, talents, funds, and goodwill even—and think next of how to move all these to accomplish a given task while growing one's resources even more. The budgeting disposition has worked wonderfully at PSSC where programs and services have expanded, and operating funds and investments have grown.

I also love keeping and updating records of events and developments—preparing and writing reports, and organizing and classifying various data and documents—a predisposition which probably is the natural outcome of my training as a researcher. To researchers, records are important for analyzing trends and understanding how the past morphed into the present, and how the present may shape the future. At PSSC, we are proud of our records and

documents: we take time to prepare agendas and minutes of meetings; write various kinds of project, program and activity reports; produce the Council's annual accomplishment and financial reports; and publish conference and research papers drawn from PSSC-sponsored activities. All these records and publications give us a sense of institution and history.

Finally, I must mention here that I love gardening, beautifying and keeping neat and orderly the places I work in or live in. This liking for gardens and gardening must have come from being born and raised in Benguet where nature just made for invigorating views of mountains, trees and waterfalls, and a wide variety of vines, flowers and plants. Commenting approvingly of the upkeep of the PSSCenter and its grounds, a former mentor said it must be my gender that makes me attend to these so-called housekeeping tasks – gardening, cleaning, repairing, decorating etc. It may be so, though I never thought of it that way. What I know is that attending to the physical infrastructure of PSSC gave us all in the staff a big sense of accomplishment – of being able to clear rooms and transform spaces, fix broken windows and leaking pipes, and add color and light to our surroundings. In turn, having nice offices helped us meet PSSC's challenges with grace and greater ease.

To one and all therefore, thank you once again for the trust and the support. It was a pleasure and a rare privilege to have been PSSC Executive Director.

Virginia A. Miralao
Issue Editor

Featured Articles

From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine and East Timorese Experiences Integrating Former Insurgents/Combatants into their Military[1]

Rosalie Arcala Hall
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS

The Philippines and East Timor have both absorbed ex-rebels into their army as part of a peace agreement and as a security sector reform initiative. The Moro National Liberation Front integrees, composed of ex-combatants and proxies, were first organized as separate units then merged with the regular forces upon completion of their training. The former Falintil combatants were recruited and trained from their area of cantonment and comprised a separate battalion in East Timor's new military. The process in the Philippines was perceived as politicized because it drew unevenly from supporters of rival MNLF factions. In East Timor, it was seen as heavily favoring those from the Eastern commands and marginalizing female and other Falintil veterans. The integration project improved the Philippine army's capacity to undertake counterinsurgency operations but exacerbated weapons proliferation in Mindanao. In East Timor, the integration issue continues to drive political mobilization among disgruntled soldiers and veterans. Transforming former combatants into government soldiers carry differential material incentives and has redistributive implications, particularly to those left out either by choice or omission. A demobilization and disarmament scheme, generous international support to an inclusive and comprehensive reintegration package for all ex-combatants, and culturally-sensitive training policy are critical in ensuring success of the integration projects.

Some years back, the Philippines and East Timor embarked upon an unprecedented project of inserting into their military organizations the former insurgent/combatants from their countries i.e., the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) of the Philippines and Falintil of East Timor. In the Philippines, 5,750 MNLF fighters and their proxies were integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in line with the Final Peace agreement reached in 1996. In East Timor, the UN transitional authorities selected, trained and constituted 650 out of the 1,900 Falintil combatants at cantonment into the core battalion of the Falintil-Forcas de Defensa de Timor Leste (F-FDTL) in 2001. The processes underlying these integration/insertion projects were controversial

and were created despite consequences to the composition and performance of their respective armies.

This paper presents the findings of the research funded by Toyota Foundation's Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program (SEASREP) which examines the policies and processes (recruitment, selection, training and placement) and the corresponding impact on identity underlying the integration/insertion programs involving the MNLF and the Falintil.[2] The comparative study explores how international actors, the national government, the military and the movement representatives informed the content and trajectory of the said programs. It also probes into gendered and other cultural assumptions made by those who crafted the integration policies and their possible effects. A second set of broad inquiry relates to the impact of religion and ethnicity on the integrees' sense of identity inside the armed forces. Through personal interviews and focus group discussions with combatants-turned-soldiers, ex-combatants, ex-integrees and civilian cadres, both men and women, this report describes the human element of the integration/insertion policy straight from the narratives of those who were part of it.[3] The article attempts to relate the Philippine and East Timor experiences to four areas of inquiry surrounding the integration/insertion of ex-combatants into the state security forces: (1) the contribution to the prospect of long-term peace with the diminished capacity of the ex-combatants to regroup and mount potential threats; (2) the impact on the military's performance as a whole, that is, whether the one-time absorption of a unique set of personnel will improve or impair the military's capacity in achieving its missions; (3) the effects of gender, religious or ethnic particularities arising from the integration program to identities inside the armed forces; and (4) the implications to the democratic governance of the armed forces.

Military Mergers: Their Link to Peace, Nation-Building, Defense Capability, and Democracy

The case for the integration of former members of nonstatutory armed groups into the state security forces has been argued three ways: (1) as part of a post-conflict package; (2) as part of a broader effort to introduce diversity in the internal structure and composition of the armed forces; and (3) as part of defense reforms. Integration is defined as the amalgamation of previously-opposed military forces into a new state security force (Mills and Wood 1993) or the absorption of ex-rebels into an existing armed force. The impetus for integration could be endogenous (as in the case of post-apartheid South Africa) or externally-introduced as a part of a UN process after the conclusion of civil wars.

Military integration is often offered as a way to reduce the likelihood of conflict starting anew. By absorbing ex-rebels into the military, the movement's numerical strength is reduced alongside its ability to mount renewed threats against the government. Military integration is often provided as an option together with other livelihood opportunities extended to former combatants, which comprise what is conceptually referred to as reintegration. Reintegration refers to the broader social, political, and economic assistance to ex-combatants in transitioning to civilian life, and to prepare their communities in receiving them back. Often, reintegration programs include not just skills training for livelihood but also temporary financial assistance to cover immediate material needs, educational support as well as job and medical referrals. Reintegration often comes with disarmament and demobilization (also called "DDR"), which as a process is carried out sequentially.[4] DDR programs, either arising out of peace agreements or imposed as part of a UN peace support operations, involve the critical steps of disarming (voluntarily or by force) parties to the conflict by collecting and disposing their weapons and dismantling their units and command

structures. Note that disarmament and demobilization target combatants (although, in certain cases disarmament may also include noncombatants) who then became part of a registry, from which candidates for insertion into the state army (new or existing) are drawn.

The merger of militaries has also been advanced as a means of addressing identity-based conflicts. As "school for the nation," the military is widely seen as an institution where men and women, by their collective experience of combat, regimented living and patriotic values, learn a national identity (Zirker, Danopoulos and Simpson 2008). The military also provides a unique environment where communal barriers based on ethnicity, religion or language are eliminated.[5] Sustained contacts between groups and within mixed groups inside the armed forces engender tolerance for differences, which is also theorized to spill over into the larger society with military families and in post-military careers of veterans. Advocates for military merger, particularly among communally-divided societies, argue that absorbing ex-combatants from the minority population into an otherwise majority-dominated armed forces would lessen enmity and dull identity-based assertions elsewhere. The minority's symbolic presence inside the army is said to engender overall confidence that the institution is truly inclusive.

By contrast, Krebs (2004) contests the empirical validity of the argument that the military has an important impact on identity. He problematizes the notion of "national identity" supposed to be fomented inside the armed forces by arguing that identity/ies is/are not just subjective boundaries (defining the "us" versus "them") but is/are relational. Identity is embedded in the context of power relations (and therefore not single or homogenous) which a person constantly negotiates and chooses. An identity tends to be stable at a certain age and cannot be remade even within the most rigid confines of military living. According to him, there is little evidence that military involvement will change the values of new entrants as they have direct contact with individuals coming from different groups.

In other cases, military integration is carried out in conjunction with broader defense reforms, which seeks among other things, to improve the effective capacity of the armed forces to respond to a new threat environment. In the case of South Africa in the 1990s, integration was carried out alongside efforts to shift from a larger, primarily conscript-based to a leaner, all-volunteer professional corps (Williams 2005). If this were the context of military integration, the process is informed by moves to retool the orientation and strategies of the armed forces and so involves drastic adjustments not just for the new entrants but for those who are already inside. For South Africa, integration involved former South African Defense Force (SADF), four homeland armies and three national liberation armies and paramilitary grouping to constitute the South African New Defense Force (SANDF). For this undertaking, the integration was accompanied by a pension scheme for all veterans (including those from nonstatutory forces) and a Service Corps under the defense department which provided assistance for reintegration (Williams 2005).

Another key concern over military integration is the responsibility over such a project. In a democracy, it is presumed that the military is held accountable to elected civilian authorities. Under the principle of "civilian control," elected leaders wield political power over the armed forces by determining where, under what circumstances, and for what purposes the latter may be utilized (Aguero 1997). Clearly, this authority extends over decisions that alter the military's composition (e.g., integration). In recent years, "civilian control" of the armed forces as a criterion has been replaced by democratic governance, that is, the legitimate, transparent, accountable and participative ways in which civilian authorities manage not just the military but the entire security sector (Cottey et al. 2002: 38). This concept highlights the qualitative

difference in which the armed forces are utilized and managed under a democracy from parallel instances of civilian supervision under authoritarian regimes. Democratic governance also goes beyond the establishment of legal rules and civilian control mechanisms (such as having a civilian defense department or the legislature overseeing the military's budget and promotions) to emphasize the oversight bodies' capacity (Cottey et al. 2002: 40; Sammonds 2001: 224). The concept also points to the necessity of opening up the formulation and implementation of defense and security policies to feedback from civil society groups such as media, think-tanks, and NGOs (Edmunds 2004: 50-53).

In military insertion/integration schemes, multiple actors are involved whose positionalities and power determine the design and process by which the scheme is carried out. International actors play an important part given that they financially underwrite the programs or that they supply external support by way of training and expertise. National players (the government, domestic political parties, and the armed movement) interface with other actors. Apart from the national and international angles, there is also the dimension of civilian versus military in terms of responsibility. As was pointed out by Rito Rufer (2005) in the case of DDR programs, disarmament as a component is almost always *exclusively* handled by the military while the civilians take charge of the reintegration concerns. Integration programs closely parallel this observation; they are carried out mostly by the military eliciting little or no interest from civil society groups. There is almost a built-in exclusivity to the process owing perhaps to the fact that it is, after all, into the military organization that the ex-rebels are going to be absorbed.

Two Contrasting Cases

The Philippine Experience

Previous studies on the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) integration by Ferrer (2000), Jacildo (2003), Depayso (2004 as cited in Santos 2009), Lidasan (2006) and Santos (2009) view the process largely in terms of its contribution to the prospects of long-term peace in Mindanao. Ferrer (2000) and Santos (2009) conclude that the actual integration into the army and the police did not significantly demobilize nor disarm the MNLF. The integration included a small fraction of the estimated MNLF strength (estimates vary across literatures from 17,000 to 50,000) at the time the Final Peace Agreement was signed. Moreover, because the integration process allowed substitution by kins of ex-combatants, the number of demobilized MNLF personnel was lower than the 7,500 total provided for in the agreement. There were no other avenues for integration as the provision in RA 9054 for a separate Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) to include ex-MNLF fighters was not carried out. Neither did the integration program make any substantial dent in the number of firearms under MNLF's possession. The program required the integrees to surrender their guns as a prerequisite to recruitment and selection; the integrees merely procured elsewhere the guns they eventually turned over (or the guns were their own, rather than the movement's). With under valuation of guns within the government's guns-for-cash (BALIK-BARIL) program, many integrees logically found it more lucrative to sell their high-powered guns in the black market and procure weapons of lesser caliber and less cost to surrender to the government (Santos 2009). Others even argued that the program led to further arms proliferation in Mindanao. In joining the army, many integrees were said to have taken loans (to which they have access) and used the loan proceeds to buy more weapons. Personal/family security defined in terms of gun ownership is said to be characteristic of the Tausug male culture.

Some authors (Lidasan 2006; Santos 2009) also lament that the integration program was not connected with efforts at providing socio-economic livelihood to ex-MNLF combatants who were left out in army and police integration.

While much international assistance (from multidonor UN funds and USAID) poured into Mindanao, the programs did not specifically single out combatants but rather the MNLF's mass base. The absence of a solid safety net for those not integrated posed a more grave security concern as they could easily be recruited into the MILF, the Abu Sayyaf, and kidnap-for-ransom groups.

It has been argued that the integration process revealed significant gaps in the GRP and the MNLF's understanding about the integrees' absorption into the force, their disposition/ deployment, and the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) (Soliman 2009). The MNLF contested the absence of separate MNLF units within the AFP, the integrees' deployment outside of the ARMM, and their utilization for combat duties. On the other hand, the GRP and AFP maintained that the agreement clearly provided only for separate MNLF units as a transition arrangement (during the on-the-job training phase) but that the integrees were individually absorbed into the force and not as a distinct unit. Once absorbed, they were no different from regular soldiers and that their disposition and deployment (whether within/outside ARMM or for combat or noncombat tasks) were left at the discretion of the battalion where they belonged. Santos (2009) argues that the confusion arose because the MNLF reads the RA 9054 provision on the SRSF as applying to the integrees in the army, which was provided more clearly under the terms of the Final Peace Agreement. Lidasan (2006) argues that it could have been a more politically-acceptable arrangement to have the integrees limited to noncombat duties (e.g., civil-military operations or socio-economic development work) to avoid the moral conundrum where ex-MNLF members would fight against other armed groups within Mindanao.

The AFP's performance as an institution in carrying out this program was also examined. Ferrer (2000) attributes the relative success of the program to the AFP's flexibility in accommodating the ex-rebels. Because of the demographic nature of the MNLF (many ex-combatants were well into their 40s and 50s) and the literacy challenges typical of revolutionaries who have spent most of their adult life without access to formal education, the AFP conceded to waive the usual entry requirements (age, height and education). In addition, the AFP also offered remedial literacy classes for enlisted personnel and opportunities for immediate tertiary schooling to integree officers to bring them closer to the standards of organics/ regulars. However, Lidasan (2006) finds the process problematic. By formally waiving requirements and qualifications upon entry, and then imposing the same academic standards as those with regular AFP members once the integrees were in, the process created an "underclass" among the integrees. Lidasan (2006) also criticizes the AFP's lack of consideration of foreign military training and seasoned experience of revolutionary veterans in the assessment of officer-integrees. He argues that it would have been better if the officer-integrees were segregated during their training (in special classes) rather than mixed with regular officers.

The previous studies also probe in great detail the many complaints and adjustments experienced by integrees and regulars/organics within the same unit. These were clustered into (1) procedural difficulties arising from the very structure of the AFP (e.g., poor understanding of the AFP's complex rules and regulations; delays in pay and benefits; slow promotion; mental demands of training; long periods of separation from family) and (2) relational challenges arising from cultural differences (discrimination, no respect for religious belief). Jacildo (2003) reveals that the integrees' (from the 18th IB in Basilan) complaints shifted more towards procedural matters after completing the training and that concerns on discrimination or maltreatment gradually disappeared as the integrees spent more years inside the army.

Depayso (2004, as cited in Santos 2009) states that in the case of the 57th IB, unit leaders assessed the integrees as performing well across functions, whether combat, civil-military operations or intelligence gathering. MNLF integrees, meanwhile, articulated that they felt accepted, not discriminated against and that their personal and material conditions improved. Overall, he sees that greater respect was accorded to space and expressions of religious differences between the Christians and Muslims in the same military unit. Lidasan (2006: 47) echoes a parallel observation by a commander he interviewed in his study.

The East Timor Experience

Unlike the Philippine case where MNLF integration came out of a peace agreement, the inclusion of former Falintil combatants into the newly-created East Timor Defense Force (ETDF) arose out of a policy undertaken by the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), whose mandate included the demobilization of Falintil and the creation of political institutions for the East Timor state. In Reese's (2005) account, the UNTAET was under strong pressure from the Falintil High Command, including Gusmao, who was also chosen as interlocutor between the East Timorese Resistance Movement and the UN forces. The recruitment and selection process from among the 1,900 Falintil fighters cantoned at Aileu was argued to have been largely an internal matter where many loyal Gusmao and Ruak commanders were chosen. The marginalization of those opposed to Gusmao and Ruak and the exclusion of the so-called "Forgotten" (those who served Falintil for a few years during the early part of the resistance but left; families of those killed in action in the long years of armed resistance) in the Falintil Master List is at the root of current-day problems ailing the EDTF. It is widely viewed that the process was unfair (McCarthy 2002). Other political forces, including the Fretelin party and rank-and-file members of the CNRT also had little bearing on the final design of the F-FDTL. From the perspective of democratic governance, the reliance on personal connections (between Gusmao and Falintil elements inside the F-FDTL) rather than institutional mechanisms to oversee the army also indicates the inherent challenges to this unusual situation.

Unlike the Philippines however, there was a targeted economic reintegration program dedicated to Falintil veterans not absorbed into the F-FTDL. The Falintil Re-insertion Assistance Program (FRAP) was a one-year program carried out by International Organization for Migration and funded by World Bank/USAID and Japan. The program provided services to registered Falintil beneficiaries including transport to host communities, a monthly subsidy of $500 for over five months, a reintegration package or income-generating activity, training, and job, and medical referral. In his final evaluation report, McCarthy (2002) adjudges the program as largely successful, while at the same time acknowledging the program's limitations such as (1) the program's inability to address the special needs of older veterans who had greater difficulty in transitioning to civilian life; and (2) the non-inclusion of veterans into the Falintil Master List provided by the High Command from which the FRAP drew up its list of beneficiaries. The second point has a much more serious implication to the long-term stability of East Timor as it fuels a sustained political mobilization by security groups seeking to recruit from among disgruntled veterans.

Identity and Military Integration

At the core of the Moro question is the politics of differentiation – the assertion that Moros as Muslims constitute a group distinct from the Christian-dominated Philippine nation. From this perspective, the Muslim way of life defines who they are as a group, transcending tribal/ethnic loyalties and historically sustained through continued resistance against Western colonization and Christianization.

Tan (1993) traces the evolution of the political assertion of Muslim identity among elites in Mindanao. After World War II, segments of the Moro elite, notably professionals and students, continued to agitate for secession despite efforts by the national government to co-opt traditional leaders. In part, this was fueled by what was widely perceived as systemic efforts to marginalize Muslims, notably in the policies encouraging Christian migration and the opening up of Mindanao to foreign investments. From traditional leaders like Datu Udtug Matalam, the articulation of Moro identity shifted to Nur Misuari who brought the demand for independence to a level of armed struggle. The conclusion of the Tripoli agreement in 1976 shifted the cause towards autonomy, but the movement also splintered along this axes between the Nur Misuari faction, Hashim Salamat's Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MILF (whose goal to create a governance structure founded on Islamic principles contrasts with Misuari's more secular and inclusive version), and the MNLF Reformists. To date, there are multiple, often polarized, political articulations of Muslim identity corresponding to these factions.

McKenna (1998) explores the articulation of this Muslim identity among the rank-and-file MNLF and the movement's supporters in the Muslim community. McKenna's (1998) subset of current/former MNLF combatants from Cotabato displays a divergent understanding of the rebellion from those espoused officially by their leaders. They were likely to cite enmity towards Martial Law and personal insecurity (having no choice) as reasons that compelled them to join the armed movement and defend their Muslim faith. From revolutionary songs made popular among the Muslim masses, McKenna also notes more references to localized space (*inged*) as homeland rather than the nation (*bangsa*), and alternative motives in joining the movement (such as to advance social standing). He also notes their rather tolerant attitude towards turncoats or defectors. He argues that the ordinary MNLF rank-and-file and supporters defined their Muslim identity in an unself-conscious manner, neither fully buying into the claims of loyalty to their traditional leaders nor to strict religious interpretation by their *ulama*. This suggests the different relational contexts or power relations within which Muslim identity is deftly articulated, negotiated and asserted.

In East Timor, references to the politicized identities within the security forces overlay the institutional rivalry between the Falintil-dominated military and the police that finally erupted in 2005. Prior to that, a segment of the F-FDTL, predominantly from Lorosae (Eastern districts) was dismissed and found common ground in allegations of corruption and favoritism within the officer corps, which was distinctively dominated by those from the Loromonu (in the Western districts of Baucau, Los Palos and Viqueque). Among the complaints articulated by the group (called *petisyonaryos*) was the recruitment process for the F-FDTL which was heavily vetted by the Falintil High Command who favored commanders (and their men) from their respective regions (Simonsen 2005).[6] This divide between *firaku* (easterners) and *kaladi* (westerners) was a recurring theme among those contesting the legitimacy of East Timor's new armed forces.

Meanwhile, Siapno (2008) examines the problems and challenges confronted by women members of East Timor's army and the police. In the F-FDTL, women comprised less than 10 percent of total strength (61 out of 645). Majority of these women F-FDTL members were enlisted personnel (the highest ranking females, seven of them, were Second Sergeants) and were posted in administrative positions. Unlike the police which had a 20 percent quota for women, the F-FDTL had no special recruitment process for women. Siapno (2008: 26) cites that one woman ex-Falintil combatant was mentioned in her interviews as having joined the F-FDTL First Battalion but had since left. Quite a number of women ex-combatants also belonged to the

Falintil *petisyonaryos*. The women in uniform spoke of marginalization across many dimensions – the condescending and sexist treatment they received from male colleagues and officers, the poor working conditions in rural postings, the serious paucity of women-specific health care services (including post-trauma counseling, in the light of the 2006 incidents from which some of them were injured), and unequal access to training and advancement. Among those who joined Operasyon Conjunta (joint operations to go after armed elements behind the failed Presidential assassination) in Ermera, Siapno (2008) notes the F-FDTL women's strategies in dealing with the masculine, commando-style mindset of those who ran the military – e.g., assimilating masculine traits, insisting their femininity despite outright hostility.

The Philippine Case: The Integration Policy Examined

The inclusion of military and police integration into the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between the GRP and MNLF did not come as a surprise. In fact, a similar demand was previously articulated by MNLF in earlier peace negotiations during the 1980s (Rodil 2000: 18). It was also part of the framework for discussion under Support Committee Number 1 (National Defense and Regional Security Force) which had Undersecretary Feliciano Gacis (a retired General) and Dr. Tham Majoorsa as key panel members. There are at least two speculations why integration was included in the table: (1) for Misuari, military integration buttressed his new regional government from rival traditional politicians and their private armies as well as from nonstatutory armed groups (Azurin 1996); and (2) that it gave Misuari a way to pre-empt MNLF elements from joining the other MILF or criminally-inclined groups by providing them alternate employment (Ramos 1996 as cited in Santos 2009). It is clear from the onset that integration was not meant to disarm and demobilize the MNLF; something which President Ramos and the GRP understood to be an unacceptable proposition for Misuari. Both parties knew only too well the symbolic repercussions of such a move to the MNLF's mass base. While appearing straightforward, the exact number of how many will be integrated was the last item to be resolved by the parties, indicating the tenacious haggling between the MNLF that wanted the absorption of many of its alleged 40,000 combatants and the AFP that defended the representational element within the institution (Rodil 2000: 113).

In its final form, the insertion of MNLF elements into the AFP is provided under section 20 of the Final Peace Agreement. The provision called for the absorption of 5,750 (including 250 in auxiliary services) MNLF members. A separate number was set aside for the PNP integration. The AFP also stipulated the eventual integration of the remaining MNLF forces into the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF), but the exact target composition and timetable for creation was not spelled out.[7] Those not selected for integration were also promised socio-economic and educational assistance under a program, which was largely underwritten by international donors.

The integration process was on an individual rather than unit basis. The peace agreement described in detail that the MNLF elements would be initially organized as distinct units during the transition phase but would be gradually integrated (as individuals) into regular AFP units deployed within the autonomous area. To supervise the functioning of MNLF as separate unit during the transition phase, the highest ranking MNLF officer was designated deputy commander of the AFP Southern Command. There was also a Joint Integration Board composed of AFP and MNLF members to oversee and troubleshoot matters pertaining to recruitment, training, development and disposition of the integrees.

The mechanisms and modalities of integration in turn were covered under the Administrative Order 295, which assigned the

Department of National Defense (DND) as implementor of the program. It was to be carried out for three years beginning November 1996 in three distinct phases: processing, individual training, and on-the-job training. In the processing phase, those who would qualify for training as candidate soldiers and officers were from among the list of names submitted by the MNLF.[8] Several things were agreed upon at this stage: (1) that MNLF alone would supply the list, thus making the process of determining who will get into that list an internal decision by the MNLF command; (2) that the AFP will waive the usual entry requirements (age, height and educational attainment); and (3) that a person in the MNLF list must bring a weapon with him when they report at the training site (no weapon, no integration).[9]

None of the existing literature provides details of how the MNLF integration master list was created. It is also not clear whether there was only one list for all batches or that the list was subsequently modified for the different batches. However, based on interviews with former MNLF leaders and commanders, the high command divided the slots into quotas for each of the revolutionary committees (RC), MNLF national units, satellite commands and Task Forces.[10] Each RC and military committee (MC) then decided on how they were going to fill up the quota. There is a great degree of variation in how the quota was filled – some were given to individuals, who then could choose to use it for himself/herself or to recommend a proxy (usually a kin). In the absence of a clear directive to limit the integrees to combatants, the process yielded a liberal interpretation of who were entitled, whether those who contributed to the cause (combatant, diplomatic front, civilian support group) were living or dead. Among those interviewed, there was a general acceptance of these two categories of integrees (ex-combatants or kins of ex-MNLF combatants and noncombatants alike) but NOT of those who came by the position through purchase (there were some allegations that slots were sold and bought for a hefty price). The list was compiled by a Committee on Integration, which was then submitted to Misuari for final approval.

There were different stories about how the selection of candidates for integration was carried out. Commander Khanappi Ayao said that his troop underwent a retraining program under the 4th ID, from whose attendees the candidates were chosen for integration. One can appreciate the shifting process that occurred considering that only a few slots were given for every unit. In Commander Ayao's case:

> *Ako noon ang commander ng Northern Mindanao. Forty (40) ang aking quota, kasama 3 officers. Ang sabi, basta't qualified daw maski hindi nakapag-aral pwede pumasok. Isinama ako sa quota para sa officer, pero tinanggihan ko kasi ayaw ko ng humawak ng baril. One thousand plus (1,000+) ang tao ko, kaya ang ginawa ko, tinanong ko muna kung sino ang may gusto. Mas marami sa 40 ang interesado, kaya ang ginawa ko, bunutan para walang samaan ng loob. Pero dun sa napili, nagpalit-palit pa rin kasi hindi nakapasa sa physical exam . . . may spot. Bunutan ulit sa may papalit.* [I was then commander for Northern Mindanao. My quota was 40, including three officers. They told us that all were qualified even if they had no formal education. I was given an officer slot but I refused because I did not want to hold a gun anymore. I had 1,000 men but only 40 slots, so I asked first who were interested. Over 40 expressed interest, so what I did was to have a drawing of lots, so the men won't feel bad. But among those selected by lot, there had to be replacements because some failed the physical exam . . . they had a spot in their lungs. There was another round of drawing of lots for the replacements].

The AFP's requirement to submit firearms at the processing site, was a tricky matter. Commander Abdullawi Hadji Ebrahim dealt with the issue as follows:

Zone 3 commander ako, 100 ang aking tauhan. Binigyan kami ng 7 slots sa AFP (puro candidate soldiers) at 8 slots sa PNP. May problema . . . may requirement na baril na dala yung magpapaintegrate. Ang sabi, papalitan daw ng gobyerno yung baril . . . basta hindi homemade. Problema kasi hindi pwedeng ipadala lahat sa magpapaintegrate yung baril . . . pipilian lang ang bibigyan. Kaya tinanong ko muna, sino ang may kakayahang magdala ng sariling baril? Payag ka ba na ilabas ang baril mo? Kaunti lang ang pumayag . . . karamihan hindi muna. [I was zone 3 commander. I have 100 men but only seven slots for the AFP and eight for the PNP. There's a problem . . . a gun was required for integration. They said the government will eventually replace the gun . . . as long as it was not homemade. The problem was, it was not possible to send all the unit's guns to those going to be integrated. So I asked first who was willing to bring his gun along, willing to bring the gun out. Very few agreed . . . many decided to wait.]

The gun issue was a complicated matter considering that MNLF did not plan to disarm even with the peace agreement signed. As Commander Johnny Akbar further explained, *"yung firearm isyu sa kanya pero hindi niya pagmamay-ari. Hindi nila pwedeng dalhin. Sila dapat maghanap ng paraan – bumili, umutang."* [The firearm issued to them was not their personal property. They could not bring it with them for the integration. They must find a way – buy, borrow money.] Commanders Sonny Ayao and Ebrahim agreed with the interpretation that the guns should be owned by the units and could not be used for integration. Uttuh Salim, Council of 15 member, was very candid in admitting that majority of the guns entered into the Balik-BARIL program were personal property. He further claimed that it was an open knowledge that MNLF kept its arms even with the integration. In the end, the selection process at the micro-level privileged those with means/access to a gun against those who could not within the short period in which the list was finalized.

Another informal screening in the selection of integration candidates pertains to gender. It is worth noting that no woman was included in the three batches of MNLF integration trainees, despite the absence of such restriction in the MNLF policy. While MNLF leaders and commanders included in this research did not deny that there were women combatants, they were conspicuously absent in the final list. Mayor Muslimen Sema explained, *"may gusto pero hindi sila pinayagan ng parents or kapatid"* [the women wanted to but their parents or siblings prevented them from doing so]. Commanders Sonny Ayao and Johnny Akbar also admitted that they did not recommend the women in their unit to be integrated into the army. Commander Sonny Ayao put this matter succinctly as, *"May isang babae sa aming grupo . . . pinagsabihan ko siya na huwag sumama sa army integration dahil mahirap pag private . . . sumama na lang siya sa police."* [There was one woman from our group . . . I advised her not to join the army integration because it was hard to be a private . . . she is better off joining the police.] In a policy shift, when recruitment was opened to replace the 474 attrited cases in 2008, a special recruitment was made targeting Muslim women.[11] Of the hundreds of young Muslim women who applied from all over Mindanao, only twenty-eight were recruited to undergo a six-month candidate soldier training. The said candidates were also recommended by MNLF officers, but the requirements for height, age and education were never waived in their case.

Candidate soldiers went through a six-month training course while officer candidates did 48 weeks. The training centers for candidate soldiers were in various camps in Mindanao (but a bulk in Central Luzon), while officer candidates did theirs in Tanay, Rizal (for the first batch) then later in Capas, Tarlac (for second and third batches). According to Lidasan (2006: 44), there was not much difference between the integrees' training and the standard training for recruits, except that the integrees were allowed to use some of their training time for religious activities. The integrees

interviewed affirmed that during the training, they were given dispensation to attend Friday prayers and were provided religion-specific diet (*halal*, nonpork). In 2004, the AFP and MNLF Central Committee agreed to reopen applications to fill up 474 plantilla items (seven officers and 467 enlisted personnel) under the MNLF integration program.[12] Although there were no women in the three batches of MNLF integration trainees, a quota for Muslim women was set aside in the replacement batch for attrited cases.[13]

Following this, the candidates went through an on-the-job training where they were assigned into 47 rifle or 10 engineering companies in brigades and battalions located within the four provinces of ARMM, including Basilan. The purpose of this OJT, which lasted 24 weeks, was to give them the necessary field experience within the military's organizational setting, while maintaining their identity as a separate group (Lidasan 2006: 46). The integration process was completed once the separate units were dissolved and individual integrees were reassigned in regular AFP units within the Southern Command. In the end, the entire process was extended for one year to 1999, owing to a delay in the MNLF's submission of the master list. A total of 5,990 went to training, but only 5,191 (213 officers and 4,978 enlisted personnel) were fully integrated (OPAPP Report 2007).

The integration program was no less groundbreaking for the AFP as an institution as it had to accommodate a fairly large number of Muslim integrees. While there are already Muslim recruits into the army, the integrees comprised the single largest absorption of recruits from a minority group (4% of the entire AFP strength) – almost akin to an affirmative action program. With foresight, the AFP designed a training module that was sensitive to these identity-based concerns by allowing the trainees to observe religious practices, assigning a sacred space and for them later building mosques within the training camp, and observing religious requirements in food preparation. After integration, the AFP also tried to extend assistance to integrees in overcoming their educational/literacy barriers. Its Paaral Program allowed integree officers to go to college/university almost immediately after integration. It also offered remedial literacy programs to enlisted personnel to assist them in obtaining formal equivalency. Within each brigade/battalion, a system was designed allowing MNLF integrees the option to take extended Ramadan holidays (up to two weeks) to visit their families; a sacred space/mosque for Friday prayers was designated within the camp; and for those stationed in the headquarters, to take on "lighter" duties during the fasting season.[14] However, there were still practices within the AFP that did not accommodate religious peculiarities (food preparation, for instance). But the Muslim integree subjects admitted that they grouped among themselves to source and prepare their own food (an informal arrangement). Combat food packs/rations, however, did not consider this dietary restriction. Some research subjects said they usually just threw or gave away canned goods with pork (e.g., pork and beans).

Between the MNLF and the government/AFP, there remained a huge gap in the understanding of how the integration program proceeded. Mayor Muslimen Sema and Uttuh Salim claimed that they accepted the terms of integration because they were assured that the MNLF units will form separate units within the AFP and that they would be stationed within the area of autonomy. Mayor Sema alleged that substantial changes (e.g., scattering integrees in various units; deployment outside ARMM) that violated the terms of the peace agreement were subsequently made. Regarding the Special Regional Security Force, they also blamed the government for not committing sufficient funds for its implementation. In Uttuh Salim's words, *"Noong huling Joint Military Committee meeting, nagbigay kami ng oposisyon sa pagkawatak-watak ng mga MNLF integrees . . . dapat ay unified command at ang commander ang rekomendado ng MNLF leadership"* [In the last

Joint Military Committee meeting, we expressed opposition to the fragmentation of the MNLF integrees . . . there should be a unified command and the commander should be recommended by the MNLF leadership]. In a report, Parouk Hussin, former ARMM governor also argued for the reassignment of the MNLF integrees in the new ARMM territory or at least in the SOPFAD areas (Hussin 2005). The accusation that the government breached the agreement was a recurring theme in the MNLF leaders' official pronouncements. Dr. Mashur Bin-Ghalib Jundam, professor at the UP Diliman Islamic Studies, also regarded the integration process to be "half-baked, not fully implemented due to the absence of a separate MNLF unit and used as a way to neutralize those who support Misuari." Professor Julkipli Wadi argued that the MNLF leaders initially contemplated (and perhaps continued to think in such manner) of the Special Regional Security Force where integrees could serve, as a homogenous unit within the army (NOT police, as the national government later took it under ARMM supervision) under a district command.

Major Ricardo Lucero, who headed the Force Integration Branch under OJ3 at Camp Aguinaldo, rebutted the claims made by MNLF leaders. In his opinion, the idea of a separate MNLF unit within the army was an absurd proposition from the standpoint of national security. The government simply would not consent to such an arrangement because of the danger that it could be used by MNLF leaders to regroup. Second, the ARMM command, which covers units assigned in the ARMM area under the Southern Command, was established precisely to cater to them. It was not a "unified command" as the MNLF wanted it for the idea of a "unified command within a unified command" ran counter to the AFP's organizational logic. The AFP also could not always make exemptions for integrees to remain in the ARMM area while their mother unit got redeployed elsewhere; although individual commanders presented with such a request (i.e., from Mayor Sema) often allowed it. In other words, the military, in practice, was already accommodating MNLF demands in line with the principle of within ARMM deployment for the integrees; although on a case-to-case basis.

The confusion over the terms of the integration program was not confined to the MNLF leaders, but also to some of the integrees themselves (despite having been in the service for more than 10 years). During the FGD, some expressed continued puzzlement about why the integrees did not constitute a separate unit. The comments included:

> *" . . . pinagwatak-watak kami. Ang pagka-alam namin habang hindi pa ma-implement ang full autonomy na pinag-uusapan, kami ay buo pa dito sa Mindanao. Ang ibang kasama namin doon na sa Luzon. Pinagtatakahan naming yan. Bakit kami hiwalay-hiwalay . . ."* [We were scattered. I thought that until such time full autonomy was implemented, we would all be together in Mindanao. But some of our companions were in Luzon. That puzzled us. Why were we scattered . . .] – Captain Kabirul Sali

> *"Ang alam ko sa Integration Program mayroon Final Separate Unit; kaya hanggang hindi maabot ito, tayo ay OJT."* [What I know is, the Integration Program has provision for a separate unit; as such, until we reached that stage, we are still on OJT.] – Captain Abdul Tayan Sandigan

> *"Ganon din nasabi sa amin, na separate Unit na lahat, isang Unit ay MNLF"* [That was what we were told, that there's a separate MNLF unit.]

> *Parang ganon din . . . Akala namin Separate Unit.* [It's similar to that . . . we thought a separate unit.] – Corporal Pagayao

MNLF members (the non-integree subjects of this research) also thought along the same manner. They were convinced that the MNLF was given the bad end of the peace deal because

the national government went ahead to unilaterally interpret the terms of the agreement. Their understanding again was for the integrees to comprise a separate unit with their own command, and that they would be exclusively deployed in the area of autonomy.

It is not this research project's aim to establish who is right between the two camps. What needs to be pointed out, however, is that such divergent interpretation persists between the national government and the military, on the one hand, and the MNLF, on the other. The idea that the national government failed to deliver on these commitments is shared across the MNLF constituency – leaders, rank-and-file members and even the integrees themselves. This, along with other perceived shortcomings in fulfilling the terms for Mindanao autonomy, fuels lingering distrust of the national government.

Unpacking Identity inside the Armed Forces

To paint a broader picture of life as an integree and as a Muslim man or woman inside the armed forces, three separate focused group discussions among selected members of the 6th Infantry Division were conducted at Camp BGen Siongco, Awang, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao.[15] The subjects were divided into three groups: (1) integree officers; (2) integree enlisted personnel, and (3) Muslim officers and men who were not integrees. In addition, two Muslim women from the 73rd IB in Maasim, Sarangani province who joined the army as part of the replacement batch were also interviewed. Three former integrees who had gone on AWOL or were discharged from the army (one from Cotabato City and two from Maasim, Sarangani province) were also interviewed.

One of the central difficulties in conducting this research project was the subjects' resistance to the concepts devised by the proponent to categorize them. The subjects actively contested the use of the terms "rebels" and "insurgents" to refer to their preintegration status as members of a nonstatutory armed group. This struggle over correct nomenclature is suggestive not only of the ill-match between the concepts we use as researchers and the subjects' understanding of who they are, but more pointedly to the core issue of their identity inside the armed forces. Their identities (plural, not singular) were often articulated in oppositional terms – that is, how they were different from the "other" group. Religion and ethnicity are some of the objective criteria of differentiation.

The MNLF integrees articulated their identities in terms of these oppositional categories: (1) integree vs. regular/organics; (2) Muslim vs. Christian; (3) man vs. woman. Being an MNLF is a stronger identity source among former combatants than noncombatants. The link with MNLF is made usually in reference to their credentials as past combatants or the program which enabled them to join the army.

> "*Hindi ko mai-alis sa sarili ko na* [I cannot deny that . . .] I *am MNLF and I belong to the Bangsamoro. I got my Commission through the MNLF Integration Program.*" – Captain Matalam

> *"More than 15 years active in the MNLF before the integration."* – Captain Sinagandal

> " . . . *[t]he recruitment of the former MNLF fighters to become AFP soldiers three categories yon . . . Una, the former combatants of the MNLF; Pangalawa, relatives of certain commanders of the MNLF; Pangatlo, kaibigan ng commanders* [Third, the commanders' friends]. *Mayroon pa rin nakasali in terms of money* [There were also those who joined through money]. *I was recommended by my first cousin who is an MNLF commander.*" – Captain Igasan

It is clear from the last quote that the integrees themselves, those who came into the service by "buying" integration slots lacked legitimacy for they had no connection to the

MNLF. During the FGD, my research assistant pointed out that some of the younger integrees were in fact children of known MNLF martyrs. The idea of "blood contribution" to the cause does not only involve a previous experience as a combatant, but also those of family members who have served in a parallel capacity.

Tribal or ethnic origin (e.g., Tausug, Maranawon, Maguindanawon) was not strongly articulated, although the integrees were keen on these objective "markers," which they claimed were easy to establish by reference to their colleagues' surnames (in their uniform patch) and by their facial features. There were also linguistic clues to these tribal origins, which they easily comprehended. When a Muslim regular officer was narrating the story of his experience commanding a platoon of mixed organics and integrees during an operation, the rest of the FGD members (all Muslim regulars) understood exactly the ethnic group of the integree he was referring to just by the mimicked accent.

> *"Sa amin Tausug malalaman namin. Walang "R", "L" ang gamit. Sa pangalan pa lang ma-identify na kaagad."* [We know who are fellow Tausug. They do not use "R" or "L." You can identify them based on their names.]
>
> *"Sa pagsasalita, malaman mo rin kung Maranao o Tausug."* [When speaking, you can tell if they are Maranao or Tausug.]

Their being different from regulars/organics did not engender consistent emotive responses from the integrees. Two members of the FGD (all integrees) contested the use of the term—both said they were no longer integrees but soldiers just like everyone in the AFP receiving the same pay and benefit entitlements—that they ceased to be "integrees" when they completed the program. In their view, the persistent use of the word provided basis for segregation and was suggestive of an inferior status within the organization. In their experience, integrees were associated with soldiers who did not receive/ completed formal education. In the same group, several participants meanwhile argued that they were proud to identify themselves as "integrees" as the term suggests a different source of commission rather than a lower status. An example of these sentiments are provided below.

> *"Actually, yong term Integree, yon ay hindi pa kami naging regular forces, yan ang term. Pero nong na-enlist na kami, hindi na pwede integree. Sa naka-sanayan lang siguro."* [. . . the term Integree was used when we have not become regular forces yet, that was the term. But after enlistment, we were no longer integrees. Perhaps it's just a force of habit.]
>
> *"Minsan masakit pakinggan kasi sabi nila mga integrees yan, mga Lost Command. Hindi lang namin pinapatulan."* [It hurts sometimes being referred to as integrees, Lost Command. But I don't pay attention to them.]
>
> *"Walang problema sa amin kahit tawagin Integree. Dapat ipagmalaki pa na naka-enlist dahil Integration Program, at pinagkasunduan."* [I don't have a problem being called an integree. We should be proud that we got enlisted through the Integration Program and the agreement.]
>
> *"We must be proud of being MNLF Integrees. Proseso lang ang pinagkaibhan namin sa regulars* [We only differ from them in terms of process]. *Sa amin, may mga requirements na na-waived, like educational attainment.* [In our case, there were requirements waived such as educational attainment]" – Captain Igasan

However, the view that the integrees were less educated was also widely articulated among Muslim regular officers and enlisted personnel, although some were quick to qualify that perhaps the truism better described the first rather than the succeeding batches of integrees. The Muslim regular officers shared that integrees in their units did poorly when it came to preparing papers

and reports, and were also less interested in further schooling (compared to other enlisted personnel). General Cayton (2009) admitted that the rank-and-file integrees did exhibit a much slower career advancement pattern than their regular/organic counterparts. This he attributed as a structural barrier that was carried over when the educational requirement was waived at the time of recruitment.

Both integrees and regulars were cognizant of the imagined boundaries between themselves as indicated by their serial number (which is included in their uniform patch). That and the surname (Muslim surnames are easily distinguished from Spanish surnames that Christians normally carry) served as visual clues setting boundaries off-the-bat.

> *"Sa pangalan lang ay malaman mo na talaga na Muslim"* [You can tell one is a Muslim by his name.]
>
> *"Opo alam na nila [Mga Christians kasama] na Muslim sila. Sa Serial Number na Eight Zero hanggang Eight Three ang umpisa"* [Yes, the Christian soldiers would know who are Muslims. They can tell from the serial number which begins from 80 to 83.]
>
> *"At sa Serial Number na nagumpisa sa Eight Zero Seven. Yong iba Eight three three. Mayroon din Eight two four nag-umpisa."* [And their serial number starts from 80-87. Others, 83 and 84].

How the integrees described their relationship with fellow soldiers who were Christians was also illustrative of the nuances in identity construction.[16] Almost all the integrees in the FGD affirmed that they were provided with services and facilities that allowed them to practice their religion during their training.

> *"Binibigyan kami ng pagkakataon magsambahayang five times a day* [They give us a chance to have group prayer 5 times a day] . . . *Like before mag-physical fitness in the morning, magsambahayang muna kami* [we have a group prayer first]."
>
> *"During Ramadan, may first break, second break, at third break. Hindi sinasali sa mga patrolling, operation, exempted sa mga duties* [Those observing Ramadan are not included in patrolling and operation duties]. *Hinahati during Ramadan* [the forces are split during Ramadan]."
>
> *"Sa Eid el Fitr binibigyan din ng pagkakataon; may exemption din. Alam din ng commander."* [During Eid el Fitr, we are also given a chance; exemption. The commander knows it.]
>
> *"Nailagay ang Religious Activities naming na five times prayers . . . Binigyan ng oras para doon. Sa Muslim Holidays naenjoy din namin. Nagkaroon pa kami ng Islamic Symposium, inimbita pa namin ang mga neighboring barangays na mga Christians."* [Five times prayers were included in our religious activities . . . we were given time for that. We also enjoy Muslim holidays. We even had an Islam symposium during which we invited Christians from neighboring barangays]. – Captain Matalam

The women from the replacement batch were also given religious dispensation, but not as generous as those from the earlier batches.

> *"Bilang Muslims separate yong ulam namin. Sa five times daily prayer, hindi namin magagawa. Sa Friday prayers lang."* [As Muslims, our food was separate. We could not do 5 times daily prayers. Only Friday prayers]. – PFC Ampatuan
>
> *"May prayer room at supplies— pandong at mat— bigay sa amin* [They gave us a prayer room and supplies— body cover and mat] . . . Friday prayer time. *Pagkain namin halal, may tagaluto* [Our food was halal, there was a cook]. – PFC Cua and PFC Lunda

As mentioned earlier, this was largely due to deliberate efforts on the AFP's part to design a Muslim-sensitive training module and environment. But the experience of Muslims who were recruited in the regular program contrasted

sharply. As Muslims, there were few to a handful of them within their training batch. They also encountered many difficulties in trying to practice their religion. Some strong-willed individuals approached their respective course directors for some accommodation (e.g., permit to use training time for prayers); some were granted but others were denied. Some did not bother pressing for these considerations.

In the post-integration period and in a mixed-group environment, the assertion of Muslim-ness became more muted as the integrees came to terms with the army's work and discipline ethos. The importance of prayer and the physical limitations of fasting were recognized only when they were not in combat operations. Commanders by-and-large accommodated the special needs of their Muslim personnel if they were at camp/headquarters.

> *"Mag-pray for five times a day, medyo hindi na maasikaso." Sa holiday at Ramadan, may privilege din kami 15 days. [Pero] Nasa individual na yon, pwede man magpaalam sa CO nila.* [I could no longer find time for prayer five times a day. We have a 15-day privilege during Ramadan. But that depends on the individual, each can seek permission from the commander]. – Sgt. Alug

> *Dito kami sa loob ng Kampo, pwede natin ma-apply ang pagka-Islam dito. Sa mga lugar walang masjid, hindi tayo makasambahayang* [We can apply being a Muslim when we are inside the camp. However, in places with no mosque, we can not do group prayer]. – PFC Pagayao

However, while "spaces" were increasingly provided for integrees to practice their faith, there remained some lapses:

> *"Minsan nagkaroon ng pagmimisa sa Brigade. Yong mga ibang Tausug hindi sumama. Ako doon pa ako sa simula, pero umalis din ako ng magsimula na ang misa. Pinaliwanag din kaagad sa mga enlisted personnel na hindi na gagawin isyu yon."* [Once, there was a Christian mass at the Brigade. Some Tausug soldiers did not attend. I was there at the beginning, but left when the mass started. I explained to the enlisted personnel not to make such as issue] – Captain Matalam

The FGD participants reported less discrimination but more of misunderstanding – that the ill-behavior on the part of Christian colleagues towards them was more out of ignorance rather than deep-seated prejudice. Some of these misunderstanding included food preparation (e.g., cooking wares and implements must be separated to include nonpork contamination at the preparation stage; halal food and the special requirements for animal slaughtering); the taboo against shaking hands as a form of greeting; prohibition against drinking. They suggested an informal cultural briefing to Christian colleagues to overcome negative stereotyping of Muslims.

> *"Di maiwasan pag-assign sila [Christians] dito sa Mindanao, mag-negative reaction sila sa mga Muslims. Gaya ng sabihin nila pagkita sa mga dumadaang Muslims, « O yong mga kamag-anak mo. » Hindi ko na lang pinapatulan . . . Sinasabi ng senior namin [sa mga Christian soldiers], magpa-brief kayo kay Lt. Ulangkaya. Ako talaga ang tinatap para maiwasan hindi ma-offend ang mga civilian Muslims sa atin."* [It cannot be avoided that when Christian soldiers get posted in Mindanao, they have a negative reaction towards Muslim locals. For instance, when they see Muslims passing by they'd remark 'your relatives.' I do not pay attention to them. My commander told them to have a briefing with me. I am tapped to help them avoid offending the Muslim civilian population]. – Lt. Ulangkaya

Nevertheless, there were also MNLF integrees who bailed out of the service precisely because they felt that their Muslim identities could not be accommodated within the institution, particularly as they transitioned from being trainees (where there were given special

treatment when they were with fellow Muslims as a separate unit) to ordinary soldiers. The two AWOL members included in this research had such as an experience.

> *"Noong hinawakan kami ng IB as a separate unit, hiwalay ang pagkain namin . . . pinayagan kaming magsamba. Pero noong fully integrated na kami, sinabihan kami na hindi priority ang pagsimba kung ikaw ay sundalo. Tapos, yung pagkain namin, isang caldero na lang."* [When we were under the IB as a separate unit, our food was separate . . . we were allowed to hold group prayers. But once we became fully integrated, we were told that prayer was no longer a priority for soldiers. And then our food was no longer separate]. – Nasser Osama

> *"Hindi kami matanggap ng ibang kasama namin. Akala nila, mag-traidor kami."* [Our fellow soldiers won't accept us. They thought we would become traitors]. – Macmod Maguid

But the third respondent (who was honorably discharged by the army) did not have such difficulty. He contended that he was treated well by his unit, given hours for prayer and provided separate halal food.

The training that the Muslim women (from the replacement batch) underwent emphasized the military's uncompromising "masculinity." Except for gender segregated barracks and toilet/shower facilities, no concessions were made for the women's special needs and constitution throughout the training period.[17] The Muslim women integrees had their heads shaved, bathed in communal showers and did the same exercises and drills (e.g., cross-country running with rucksack and gun in complete uniform) as the men. But like the first three batches, they were given space within their training period for religious practice. They were given a prayer room, supplies such as *pandong* (body cover) and a mat, rest time for Friday prayers, and separate halal food. In their current posting, the Muslim women integrees we interviewed did not wear a jilbab. Their hair was short and their uniform was of the same cut as the men in their unit. They were all assigned administrative/office-related tasks. When asked whether being Muslim women was of any consequence inside the army, the respondents said it was not a big deal.[18] They did not experience discrimination or harassment, and they were treated with respect by their male colleagues and superiors.

It has been argued elsewhere that being in position of minority does not automatically result in a politicized identity. Inside the Philippine armed forces, ethno-linguistic identities even among its predominantly Christian members were historically politicized by Marcos' selective promotion of Ilocano officers into key posts. But among those who were later involved in coups, the key connection was not shared ethnicity or religion, but the leaders' school-connections (PMA mistah). In the same manner, the critical mass of Muslim soldiers made possible by the integration program is not likely to stoke politics of differentiation within. What appears from the narratives of MNLF integrees a decade or so after they have become part of the AFP is that they consider themselves soldiers first. When probed about how they felt about being deployed in the frontline against the MILF and Abu Sayyaf:

> *"Pag sundalo ka na, kahit sino kalaban dyan lalabanan na namin, kahit mga kapatid o pinsan pa namin. Yong sa amin trabaho."* [If you are a soldier, we fight any enemy, even our own brothers and cousins. It is our job.]

> *"Hindi issue kahit ang makakalaban ay MILF, kamag-anak."* [Fighting the MILF, relatives is not an issue]. – PFC Abusama

Unlike the non-integrees (MNLF political cadres) and the former integrees we interviewed who expressed moral outrage over the integrees' deployment for combat operations, there was none of that among the integrees themselves.[19]

In addition, the integrees also expressed pride over their status as soldiers and what they accomplished materially (for their family) as a

result of that. Almost all of them acknowledged the primacy of economic/livelihood concerns for choosing to be integrated.

> *". . . kinausap ng dating Commander namin na sumali ako. Sabi niya sumali ka para makatapos ang mga anak mo mag-aral. Anak ko dalawa na nasa college."* [My commander talked to me. He urged me to join so that my children can finish school. My two chidlren are now in college.] – Corporal Abusama

> *"32 years old na nang pumasok sa Army. Wala din mapasukan trabaho, kaya sumali na sa integration."* [I was 32 years old when I joined the army. I couldn't find a job so I joined the integration.] – Corporal Pagayao

> *"Maraming pasasalamat sa gobierno. Una nabago ang pamumuhay namin. Nasecure namin ang pamilya namin."* [Many thanks to the government. First, our life has changed. Our family is now secure.] – Captain Gumampang

This is not particularly unique to the integrees. The other Muslim non-integree soldiers also admitted that economic reasons pushed them to this career choice.

> *"Economic ang reason kaya pumasok para makatulong sa magulang. Makasukli man sa paghihirap nila o pagpalaki nila sa amin."* [I entered the army for economic reason, to help my parents. I wanted to give them something in return for their labors and for bringing me up.] – PFC Agca

> "Stable job." – Colonel Saguinsil

> *"Ang pinakamaganda sa sundalo, sa sahod never nade-delay. Sabi nila di pwede gutumin ang mga sundalo kasi mag coup d'etat yan."* [What is great about being a soldier is that our pay never gets delayed. Soldiers can not go hungry; otherwise they will stage a coup.] – Sgt. Ulangkaya

Being a soldier, it appears, is also a source of family prestige. Among the Muslim non-integrees, quite a number of them have relatives in the AFP and the police.

> *"May first cousin yong lola ko na sundalo na naka-motivate sa akin. Sabi niya parang wala 'ata siyang successor kung wala na siya sa serbisyo. Kailangan sa Mindanao, na dapat may isang miembro ng family na sundalo. Parang status symbol ba."* [My grandmother's first cousin motivated me to become a soldier. In Mindanao, one needs to have a family member who's a soldier. It's like a status symbol.] – Captain Nur

Life as Insurgent/Rebel versus Government Soldier

When queried about the difference between being an MNLF combatant and a soldier, the respondents readily pointed out salary/monetary benefits and better food. Apart from these material incentives, the ex-combatants also shared keen insights on how markedly different life was inside the MNLF and in the army. Many have expressed "culture" shock in entering army, specifically the regimented lifestyle it entailed and the rule-based behavior all members were expected to channel. In terms of army operations for instance, the idea of having a written order, a list of participants and a plan was novel; apparently, inside the MNLF, no such written requirement nor prior planning was needed for an operation to take place. The idea of soldiery as a 24-hour job was also alien; as the MNLF camps were remotely located, the former combatants were much more used to long period of rest and relaxation. Troop safety in operations, which is paramount inside the army, was also something they had to learn; inside the MNLF, they were trained to just attack and not care for cover. There were also interesting aspects of leadership (commander-follower relationship) inside the armed insurgency that differed from those in the army. In the MNLF, commanders wield power because of the number of guns they possess; in the army, authority flows from one's rank.

> *"Kung may lakad may hinahawakan kang ebidensiya, nasa roster ka nang*

troop." [When going on operations, you have a proof, your name is on the troop roster.]

"Sa Army, may order kung may gulo. Sa MNLF, kung sino yong may gusto" [In the army, there's an order when being deployed to settle a problem. In the MNLF, whoever wants to go, goes.]

"[Sa army] Bago mag-operation, may mga plano. At yon ay sinusundan." [In the army, prior to an operation, there's a plan. And it is followed.]

"Ang diperensiya ay 24 hours ka kapag sa military. Sa lahat ng oras ay naka-detail. Walang bakanteng oras. Sa MNLF depende sa situasyon. Kung medyo sa liblib na lugar minsan wala nang gwardiya gwardiya." [The difference is, you spend 24 hours in the military. You are in detail all hours. There is no vacant period. In the MNLF, it depends on the situation. If you are in a remote place, no need for guard duties.]

"Malaki din diprensiya. Anytime mag-attack kami sa military noon kahit walang cover. Hindi mag-cover." [There is a big difference. As MNLF, anytime we attacked the military, there was no need for cover.] – Captain Abdulhari

But it was also the army's seeming inflexibility that drove some integrees away. For instance, one AWOL respondent said he was discharged from the army because he failed to report for duty following his mother's prolonged ailment. Unlike during their MNLF days when combatants could seek permission to go home for a family emergency and expect leniency/understanding of such family obligations, the army has strict rules regarding leave of absence. The centrality of family as a concern was also depicted in one comment by an integree that the army disallowed soldiers to have their families with them inside the camp.

Narratives from ex-Falintils in East Timor[20]

The Falintil's disarmament and demobilization in 1999 and its selective absorption into the new army has been analyzed extensively in other reports. The World Bank (2008) argues that the critical postponement of the decision on what to do with the Falintil owes to: (1) the prevention of the UN from assisting armed soldiers while they were at cantonment in Aileu and the poor material conditions at the cantonment strained relationships between the Falintil and the UN personnel, prompting some members from the former group to go out; (2) the UN's treatment of the Falintil as a party to a civil war rather than as a victorious liberation army enjoying popular community support; and (3) the poor communication and lack of coherent power-sharing between the UN and the East Timorese leadership. The speed at which disarmament and demobilization were carried out (roughly one year) did not provide the Falintil leadership sufficient time to discuss the effects of such a transition at the institutional and individual levels, nor was the public adequately informed or consulted about the process which gave birth to the new army.

This analysis is echoed by persons we interviewed. Cornelio Gama (Commander Eli-7) and Renan Selak shared very negative views of how the recruitment and selection process during cantonment proceeded. They said the international actors did not treat them differently from the Indonesian-supported militias; that in the crucial period when they were inside Aileu, they were not given financial support of any kind – leaving their wives to financially support the family here and there.[21] Felipe da Acosta, a USAID Timorese personnel present during the process, recalled how the *malae* (foreigners) confused the Falintil with the militias.[22] He said there was a great deal of confusion and anger at Aileu because the rank-and-file was not properly informed about how exactly the screening for inclusion into the new army will proceed. He recalled one Falintil rebel declaring that he would never pass any test given in Portugese as he had not written in the 24 years he was in the movement.

The interviews further revealed how the cantonment process took place. Gaspar Lopes (Halerik) recounted that his troop received orders from Taur Matan Ruak (then head of Falintil following imprisonment of Xanana Gusmao) to report to Waymori and to bring their weapons. The troops from 13 districts were said to have converged at this "interim" camp—where they continued their military drills—before moving yet again to Aileu. It is not clear how the arms were eventually disposed, but some respondents said each unit had an armory where the guns were kept (rather than as individual possession) while at cantonment. The guns were not surrendered to a central authority but were kept by their respective units under the watch of their commanders. Jose da Costa (Ventura) and Amaro da Costa (Susar) mentioned having passed tests (writing and physical fitness) for admission to the new army. The internal conflicts within the Falintil leadership affected the recruitment process. Following Cornelio Gama's (Eli-7) walkout from the cantonment, many of those under his command (he was commander for Region 3) either left with him or lost faith in the process.[23] Amaro da Costa (Susar) said he decided not to join the FDTL in solidarity with his commander, even though he passed the tests. Gastao Salsinha, who also passed the test, recalled not having been told where he would be posted.[24] But those who made it were divided into two – *prasa* (enlisted personnel) and *graduado* (officer). Those who obtained good marks were given rank from Sergeant to Captain. The test engendered conflicting reactions as many were immediately left out (those who did not know how to write; and those who were physically weak). Salsinha pointed to this outcome as "unfair" and charged the Falintil leadership with "nepotism" in the recruitment process. He argued that fewer men were recruited from Regions 3 and 4, even though many were as smart, strong and skilled, compared to those from Regions 1 and 2. Domingos Augusto (Commander Deker), an ex-combatant from Region 4, disputed this observation. Although he recognized the presence of competition within the Falintil leadership, he nevertheless thought that the selection was representative of the various regional commands.

From Rebel to Soldier to Rebel yet Again: Conceptions of "Space"

For many Falintil ex-combatants, their life as rebels forged lasting habits and traumas, which were not easy to shed after the political transition in 1999. Their intimacy with violence/gun was one such dimension. Jaime Ribeiro (Komandante Samba) said that after being demobilized and disarmed, he felt like he had lost his arm; his gun had become an extension of his bodily self after having slept with it for 25 years. Renan Selak, by contrast, was only too happy to give up his gun and to rebuild his family. His trauma of giving up his four children while inside the movement was far more pronounced.

For many ex-rebels we interviewed (including women ex-Falintil whom Dr. Siapno interviewed in a previous research), family and personal relationships were reconfigured profoundly throughout the resistance. Renan Selak shared the heart-wrenching story of how he and his wife had to give up their children as infants and toddlers, with just a note to indicate their name, their parents and relatives to whom they should be delivered. One time, they had to strap their boy of two to a tree so he would not run back for his mother. Maria Rosa da Camara (Mana Bisoy) shared a similar story of how she, upon her commander's orders, left her three-year old daughter in the care of convent nuns. She pointed to many ex-Falintil women combatants like her who also had to get rid of their children, with many not able to locate them or reunite with them due to difficult material conditions after the war. Jaime Ribeiro also shared how he found himself emotionally ill-equipped to take care of his new family and his ailing mother when he returned to civilian life.

Salsinha and his cohorts at the Becora prison in Dili contrasted life as rebel and as a soldier both in material and social terms.[25] Salsinha said that despite serious challenges in the frontline (dearth of food, pressure from intelligence groups and the militia, not being able to sleep well, not being able to see his family), he endured because of his commitment to the cause. He acknowledged that his "mentality" changed once inside the F-FDTL: he was leading a "better" life because of relative material security, the regularity of seeing his family and the new skills he acquired (he had learned typewriting and computer skills when he joined the army). Life in the army gave him more inner peace because he did not have to physically move from place to place and he had decent shelter and food.

Curiously, when queried about the difference between life inside the Falintil and as a *petisyonaryo* in hiding, Gastao Salsinha and Amaro da Costa (Susar) said there was little difference. Although they could not go down to Dili, they had more freedom to move in Ermera because it was their home turf and that the locals (Loromonu) knew and supported their cause. They received plenty of food, telephone cards and clothing from their family and supporters from the 10 districts. Despite being underground, they had frequent contacts with their family. Although they did not openly communicate with public authorities, they allegedly had direct lines with the Prime Minister and the President. Inside prison, Salsinha found his material conditions better than when they were Falintil combatants. He also relished the "space" to think and read, something which he was not able to do in his many years as rebel and soldier.

For the women ex-combatants, the post-independence arrangements marginalized their interests. Their role as wives, earning a living to support their absentee spouses, arranging for the safety and survival of their children as well as Falintil leaders (Xanana Gusmao for instance was secretly moved from one safe location to the next largely by these network of covert women operatives), went largely unrecognized. In Dr. Siapno's 2007 interviews with them, they were inadvertently excluded from the classification of ex-combatants because many joined the movement as minors (below 18 years old). Beyond being deprived of pension and other material benefits, the women's substantial contribution to the movement was also largely unrecognized in the official narrative of the resistance as found in the Museum. Their articulations of security (along food-water-energy nexus) as well as criticisms on the F-FDTL were largely ignored by its predominantly male leadership.

Comparing the MNLF and Falintil: Issues and Challenges

Throughout this research project, there has been skepticism about the comparability of the MNLF and Falintil insertion programs. That skepticism arose out of perceived differences between a revolutionary army that was successful (Falintil) and one which was not (MNLF). One such encounter was with students of the National University of East Timor for whom a serious study problematizing the Falintil and comparing it to an "insurgent" group like MNLF was unacceptable. As major proponent, I have also presented the partial results of this project before colleagues in a Philippine Political Science Association assembly, during which one foreign delegate also questioned the comparison of the two cases. Dr. Abhoud Syed Lingga, a well-known Mindanao academic, expressed as well some doubts about the choice of the two cases, considering that one was inserted (MNLF) while the other one became the core of a new army. In the first, there was a pre-existing army with its own organization and culture into which the ex-rebels were absorbed; in the second, they comprised the new army and therefore stood to strongly shape the subsequent military organization and culture.

While registering these skepticisms, as research proponent, I stand by my choice of the

comparative approach in dealing with the subject matter. Both tell stories of a process – from a policy perspective and on the level of individuals (ex-combatants) who experienced it. This research project is an attempt to bridge policy, practice and individual experiences. It is a modest attempt to show a more nuanced picture of how the lives of ex-insurgents were transformed as a result of a policy in which they were involved either as subjects or as observers. The inclusion of oral histories was a deliberate methodological choice for myself and my research partner, Dr. Jacqueline Siapno. It is hoped that through this comparative enterprise, some lessons could be drawn about the common concerns of rebels moving from nonstate to state spaces (and in the case of Salsinha et al. in East Timor, to nonstate spaces yet again).

Table 1 presents the differences and (few) similarities between the two cases. One area in which they diverge pertains to the political context in which the insertions took place. Owing to the legal frameworks in which military integration took place for the Philippines and East Timor, the question of accountability becomes blurred. In the Philippines, the Final Peace Agreement of which military integration was a component vests in the parties to the agreement—the MNLF and the national government (through the civilian Department of Defense)—with responsibility over the matter. In East Timor, the intake of Falintil combatants as a decision was largely the UN's own doing, occurring as it did during the period of UN transitional authority. As in parallel cases of integration elsewhere, the military (for the Philippines, the AFP; in East Timor international military actors) played a key role in implementing the programs. The power balance (or imbalance) along these two dimensions—national/international, civilian/military—determined how the programs were ultimately designed and carried out. That there were many parties responsible for the programs also diffuses accountability.

The MNLF integration program was, in retrospect, part of a largely unaccomplished autonomy project. In East Timor's case, the Falintil insertion was embedded within a bigger scheme to create state security forces for the newly-independent country. From the perspective of democratic civilian control, both had consequences. The MNLF, under the leadership of Nur Misuari did not have time to consolidate its political power over ARMM, the regional civilian instrument, leading to MNLF's marginalization vis-a-vis the national government over the modalities of the integration process. Thus, civilian control through the regional apparatus was not feasible. At the national government level, the program was implemented by the Philippine military, with little oversight from civilian authorities. By contrast, the Falintil leaders, notably Xanana Gusmao and his loyal men captured key leadership positions in the post-transition East Timor government, allowing Falintil interests to be ascendant. However, because precisely of these Falintil ties, the institutionalization of civilian control mechanisms in East Timor remained problematic.

In both cases, the fragmentation of the movement affected the dynamics of military integration. In the Philippines, Misuari's ouster and his replacement by the Council of 15 created opportunities to use the integration process as a means of strengthening one's power base. In East Timor, the marginalization of those not associated with Gusmao (e.g., Eli-7) and other veterans resulted in violent confrontations involving the security forces. The civilian apparatus of the Philippine national government appeared to have all but washed their hands off the process, leaving the matter entirely to the armed forces. The UN appeared the same for East Timor – having done all what it could under the circumstances (including financing and making possible the Falintil re-insertion program; the organizing and training of the new armed forces).

The policy nature and processes likewise revealed stark differences. The "international

Table 1. Comparison of the Programs Inserting MNLF and Falintil Elements into the Philippine and East Timorese Military

Areas of Comparison	Philippines, MNLF	East Timor, Falintil
context of the military insertion program	part of a peace agreement between national government and a nonstatutory armed group	part of nation-building project under UN auspices
	MNLF a "defeated" army	Falintil a "victorious" army enjoying widespread legitimacy
	embedded within an autonomy project, but largely unaccomplished	embedded within larger project to create state security forces, but immature civilian control mechanisms
	MNLF did not capture political leadership of ARMM, regional civilian apparatus	Falintil leaders occupied key positions inside new government
policy nature	funded entirely by national government and implemented by national army; re-insertion (to society) program received international assistance but did not specifically target ex-combatants; no veterans list nor pension scheme	underwritten by international donors and involved international military actors; re-insertion (to society) program targeted ex-Falintil; veterans list and pension scheme
policy process	selection of internal matter in the MNLF High Command; liberal criteria; distributed slots to various commands; perceived as marginalizing pro-Misuari elements	selection of internal matter within the Falintil High Command; selection occurred during cantonment at Aileu; seen as favoring Gusmao loyalists and ex-combatants from Loromono
scope of the insertion program	intake of 10 percent of known MNLF strength at the time of the agreement	30 percent intake of ex-Falintil
	combatants and proxies	combatants only
	no disarmament or demobilization included	disarmament and demobilization folded into selection process
	no cantonment; those selected asked to report individually to training sites	recruitment, selection and training done while at cantonment for 18 months
	integrees mixed in with regular army units	ex-Falintil compose a separate battalion stationed at Baucau
identity issues of	being ex-MNLF, not a strong identity source within army owing to mixed composition integrees	being ex-Falintil, a strong identity source within army
	tendency among ex-combatants to view MNLF credential as basis for army entry but younger proxies view MNLF integree label as minoritization	Falintil identity contested by some veterans and petisyonaryos as non-inclusive
	Muslim cultural identity affirmed by military institutional practices that accommodate religion-based dietary requirement, space and time-off; cross-cuts with commission type (regulars versus integrees)	Loromonu versus Lorosae identity politicized; basis for political mobilization and instability

hand" was more pronounced for the East Timor case than in the Philippines; however, international donors provided much needed support for the reintegration projects for those (more numerous) excluded from the military insertion program. We find that in East Timor's case, the military insertion and societal re-insertion programs were better complements in that they targeted ex-combatants and were premised upon the drawing up of a Falintil veterans list. The same list (although there remained charges of non-inclusiveness) later became the basis for identifying beneficiaries of veterans' assistance programs. By contrast, there was no Master List of MNLF veterans and the choice of who gets inserted into the military was internally decided. The MNLF also had little influence over the recipients of societal re-insertion programs, many of which were channeled through the national government and so followed quite a different set of criteria for beneficiaries.

In terms of proportion, there was a larger intake of Falintil veterans into the F-FDTL than of the MNLF in the Philippine army. Moreover, while only combatants (and furthermore, only those interred at Aileu) were considered for the Falintil insertion, in the Philippines, the integrees included both combatants and proxies (who were noncombatants). There was no overt purpose to disarm or demobilize the MNLF in the process, but in the case of Falintil such was insisted upon by the international authorities. Because the Falintil troops were cantoned at Aileu, this process was made easier (but no less controversial) for the international authorities. In East Timor, the Falintil combatants were recruited, selected and trained while at cantonment; in the Philippines, these processes were more complex. The recruitment and selection took some time and was exclusively internal to the MNLF; the training was handled by the military. Those selected were told to report individually to the training sites. In both cases, the final organizational configuration for inserts (separate unit or mixed in with regular units) reflected the relative power position of the Falintil and the MNLF at the time of implementation. In Falintil's case, the leadership (enjoying as they were tremendous public prestige and Xanana Gusmao, their leader, acting as representative for the entire East Timor resistance) succeeded in insisting on a battalion composed entirely of Falintil ex-combatants. For the MNLF, their demand for a separate unit was only carried out up to the point of on-the-job training (OJT), but the integrees were subsequently dispersed across the various units. Their demand for a separate Special Regional Security Force and ARMM-only deployment for integrees remained unfulfilled.

The inserts also had varying levels of attachment to Falintil and MNLF. In the Philippines, this attachment to the MNLF was rather weak owing to the mixed composition of the integrees (ex-combatants and proxies). Even among ex-combatants, the attachment was more functional than emotive. Being an integree was a source of commission (as opposed to regular/organics) but did not suggest marginality. By contrast, being an ex-Falintil was a strong identity source among inserts, particularly as they were organizationally separated from the other battalions whose members were openly recruited. Yet this Falintil identity was also contested by those who were excluded and marginalized by the process of selection into the F-FDTL and veterans' benefits. In the MNLF, Muslim cultural identity among the integrees was affirmed institutionally by the military, which provided spaces and opportunities. Because this religious distinctiveness cross cuts with commission type, Muslim-ness was de-politicized. In East Timor, the perceived marginality of Lorosae within the F-FDTL was used as a rallying point for political mobilization.

Notes

1 Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting. Toronto, Canada. 3-6 September 2009.

2 Dr. Jacqueline Siapno of the National University of East Timor was a co-researcher for this project. The section on the Falintils was drawn largely from the case study she had written for the project.

3 A detailed description of the methodology utilized for the research is embedded in the sections. Data gathering was done in East Timor (Dili and Ermera) in October 2008 and in the Philippines (Manila, Cotabato City, Datu Odin Sinsuat [Maguindanao province], General Santos City and Maasim [Sarangani Province]) in March and April 2009. For the Philippine accounts, all translations of quotes in Tagalog were made by Dr. Hall.

4 There is a wealth of literature based on experiences of post-conflict DDR programs. However, many of these accounts only mention military integration in passing. Rufer (2005, 40) cites the cases of Angola where UNITA fighters were integrated to the victorious FAA, without concomitant changes in the FAA's structure, and those of Liberia, Afghanistan and Burundi where a new army was created with the intention of having such composed of various ethnicities. He highlights that while there are key differences in the way DDR programs are carried out, the responsibility for the process is divided along national/international as well as civil/military dimensions resulting in serious gaps in outcome. A central concern is precisely determining who is combatant. Peter (2007) and Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) examined at great length the inherent challenges of re-integrating ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, whose DDR program started in 1996 and went into full swing following the UN Mission in 2000. According to Peters (2007: 40), only a few thousand of the 76,000 former combatants from the old army, the opposition Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and militia-Civil Defense Force (CDF) opted to re-enlist in the new military. Majority instead chose to engage in skills training, return to school or accept agricultural or micro-enterprise package. Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) reports that in this particular case, successful reintegration is associated with rank, education, place of settlement and whether the combatants came from abusive or non-abusive units. Those in lower rank, less educated, who settled in poorer areas and who came from non-abusive units had little difficulty reintegrating. Of the factions, the militia-CDF is also argued to be better reintegrated compared to the RUF combatants. The authors likewise dismiss a link between successful reintegration and exposure to internationally-funded DDR programs. Knight and Ozerdem (2004) also points to the multiplicity of international organizations each carrying out their own DDR programs with little coordination. In terms of reintegration, they argue for the need to devise special modalities for vulnerable groups of ex-combatants (child soldiers; women) and for assistance provision apart from outright cash subsidy, which is often subject to corruption.

5 But by the same token, the military could also become exclusively defined with a single ethnic group, equating particular ethnic interests to that of the state. In this manner, the military is exclusivist and less tolerant of other groups. As in the cases of Pakistan, Uganda and Fiji, the military in these countries are intimately linked with particular ethnic groups (Punjabs, indigenous Fijians and northern tribes, respectively) and have been instrumental in the perpetuation of ethnic-based politics (Zirker, Danopoulos and Simpson 2008).

6 Siapno's (2008) review of the human resource list of F-FDTL reveals this trend. An overwhelming number of F-FDTL members are from the three the districts mentioned.

7 The SRSF is already present in the Regional Police Force, which is articulated under sections 2-11 of Republic Act 9054 (Expanded ARMM). The RPF, which is the PNP Regional Command for the autonomous region is made up of existing police units, MNLF elements and those recruited later. Clearly, under RA 9054, the SRSF is not meant to be a third security force but rather comprise the police; MNLF elements are already integrated within.

8 It was also agreed that the AFP will take in 5350 CS and 160 officer candidates for training. The numbers were deliberately padded as not all are expected to complete the course.

9 By contrast, there was no firearm requirement for the police integration.

10 Given the sheer number of MNLF units, the quotas were rather small. Some of our respondents alleged there were complaints.

11 The women completed their training in 15 January 2009. The training for men (replacement batch) were still on-going at the time of the interview.

12 This number is below the 559 (seven officers and 552 enlisted personnel) recorded attrited cases. The AFP removed items for those who were killed-in-action and non-battle casualties (e.g. deserters).

13 The women from the replacement batch underwent a separate training from the men.

14 These include exemption from patrol duties. However, if the unit has already been deployed for combat operations, this exemption no longer holds true.

15 Those who participated in the FGD were selected by General Alfredo Cayton, Division Commanding Officer based on the criteria I have set. There were 10 integree officers, five integree enlisted men, and seven regular Muslim officers and enlisted men/women. The participants were drawn widely from the various battalions that comprise the division (7th, 64th, 57th, 37th, 75th and 401), headquarters and support units. The full list of participants can be found in the appendix.

16 Not all integrees were Muslims. Some of the batchmates of the FGD participants also included a handful of Christians.

17 What is unique about the case of these Muslim women integrees is that their training followed a regular class as those of enlisted men. Theirs was a regular, NOT special class tracked for the Women's Auxiliary Corps (WAC).

18 The Muslim women integrees were by no means from traditional, non-military backgrounds. In fact, they were previously CMT and ROTC officers, and therefore are mentally and physically familiar with the rigor and demands of military living.

19 Perhaps those who considered this a moral quandary have been selected out. Of the three AWOL cases we covered, all have cited precisely these concerns—fighting fellow Muslims, non-accommodation of religious needs—for opting to leave. There was one, however, who mentioned having lost faith in the integration process with the dismissal/capture of Nur Misuari and the elevation of the Council of 15.

20 The following discussion is drawn from the Final Report entitled "From Guerrilas to Soldiers, MPs, Civilians, to Rebels: A Comparative Analysis of the Philippines' and East Timorese Policies Integrating ex-Falintil and ex-MNLF combatants into the Armed Forces, State Bureaucracy, and Civil Society" written by Dr. Jacqueline Siapno for the SEASREP project. Some parts were also based on the interview notes that the author gathered while at East Timor in October 2008.

21 This was a statement given by Xanana Gusmao in a conversation with Dr. Siapno.

22 Interview. USAID Office, Dili. October 2008.

23 In an interview Eli-7 explained what happened in Alieu. In his account, he had sought permission from the Falintil leadership to take a leave-of-absence to visit his family, but was refused. He got out of Aileu nevertheless, but when he returned he found his camp ransacked. He said he has not received an explanation why this happened. Unhappy with the situation, he decided to leave. Some of his men left with him. Interview at his house in Dili. October 2008

24 During the interview with the petisyonaryos, we could not get a consistent account on what the written test contained. Salsinha says it was a True or False and multiple questions type, with some math.

25 Salsinha joined the approximately 596 soldiers who left their barracks in 2006 to protest discrimination by Lorosae commanders, who numerically dominate F-FDTL's First Battalion. After the crisis erupted, a segment including Salsinha went underground in Ermera. He and his men were the targets of Operation Conjunta by the F-FDTL and the police. Salsinha himself is accused of "attempted assassination" of President Horta. In 2008, they surrendered and undergoing trial.

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- Akbar, Johnny. Interview with the author. 6 April 2009. General Santos City.
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- Chua, Norayda (PFC). Interview with the author. 6 April 2009. Maasim, Sarangani Province.
- Hadji Ebrahim, Abdullawi. Interview with the author. 3 March 2009. Cotabato City.
- Jundam, Mashur Bin-Ghalib. Interview with the author. 21 February 2009. University of the Philippines Diliman. Quezon City.
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- Sanayatin, Monawara Esmael. Interview with the author. 3 March 2009. Cotabato City.
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- da Costa, Jose (Ventura). Interview with the author. Becora Prison, Dili, East Timor. 27 October 2008.
- da Costa, Amaro (Susar). Interview with the author. Becora Prison, Dili, East Timor. 27 and 30 October 2008.
- Gama, Cornelio (Komandante Eli-7). Interview with the author. Dili, East Timor. 29 October 2008.
- Lopes, Gaspar (Halerik). Interview with the author. Becora Prison, Dili, East Timor. 27 October 2008.
- Ribeiro, Jaime (Komandante Samba-9). Interview with the author. Liquica, East Timor. 29 October 2008.
- Salsinha, Gastao. Interview with the author. Becora Prison, Dili, East Timor. 27 and 30 October 2008.

Appendix 1. List of Participants to the Focus Group Discussion at Camp BGen Siongco, Awang, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao on 4-5 March 2009

- MNLF integree officers
- 1Lt. Harris Malang
- 1Lt. Abdul Nasser Adio
- Capt. Rabirul Sali
- Capt. Abdinussur Igasan
- Capt. Jimmy Matalam
- Cpl. Norman Pandian
- Cpl. Datukan Abasama
- PFC Asraf Lielani Ampatuan
- Capt. Saudi Nur
- Sgt. Udtog Alon
- PFC Joel Agka
- PFC Mohammad Usop
- Cpl Alan Sumensil
- Muslim regular officers and enlisted personnel
- Capt. Lahid Abdulhari
- Capt. Abdul Tayan Sandigan
- 1Lt. Arnold Aliudin
- Capt. Salib Gumampangan
- Capt. Leonardo Malimping
- MNLF integree enlisted men
- Cpl. Alonto Kiblat
- PFC Abdulmanan Ayob
- 1Lt. Aslim Ulangkaya

Appendix 2. List of Persons Interviewed and their Affiliation

Philippines

- Johnny Akbar, former MNLF Commander, NGO leader
- Khanappi "Sonny" Ayao, former MNLF Commander, NGO leader
- Abdullawi Hadji Ebrahim, Abdullawi, former MNLF commander, Vice President, Association of Brgy. Captains, Datu Balangan, Maguindanao
- Datumama Kabagani, former MNLF combatant, retired teacher
- Leopoldo Lalang, former MNLF combatant, NGO worker
- Arsad Landasan, former MNLF combatant, NGO worker
- Nasser Osama, former MNLF integree
- Macmod Maguid, formerly MNLF integree
- Mohalidin Guiomla, former MNLF integree
- PFC Norayda Chua, MNLF integree, enlisted woman
- PFC Noraisa Lunda, MNLF integree, enlisted woman
- Monawara Esmael Sanayatin, MNLF Ladies Auxiliary, DepEd employee
- Bai Albaya Wampa, MNLF Ladies Auxiliary, NGO leader
- H. Kanida Kassim, MNLF Women's Military Auxiliary
- Mahendra, Madjilon, former member of MNLF diplomatic corps
- Muslimen Sema, MNLF leader, Cotabato City mayor
- Uttuh Salim, MNLF leader
- General Alfredo Cayton, Commanding Officer, 6th Infantry Division
- Major Ricardo Lucero, Head of Force Integration Branch, OJ3
- Susan Marcaida, Program Director, Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
- Lingga, Abhoud Syed, Executive Director, Institute of Moro Studies, Cotabato City
- Wadi, Julkipli, Professor at Institute of Islamic Studies, UP Diliman
- Jundam, Mashur Bin-Ghalib, Professor at Institute of Islamic Studies, UP Diliman

East Timor

- Komandante Samba-9 (Jaime Ribeiro), ex-Falintil commander – now a civilian.
- Renan Selak, ex-Falintil Commander – now an MP, UNDERTIM Party.
- Komandante Eli-7 (Cornelio Gama), ex-Falintil commander, – now an MP, UNDERTIM Party.

- Komandante Deker (Domingos Augusto), ex-Falintil – then joined F-FDTL – then joined the "rebels."
- Felipe da Costa, Timorese staff, USAID.
- Maria Rosa da Camara, Mana Bisoy, ex-Falintil, now an MP, CNRT Party.
- Tenente Gastao Salsinha, ex-Falintil – then joined F-FDTL – became "Petisionarios," accused of "attempted assassination," became the target of a long military-police "Operasaun Konjunta," and now in Becora Prison, with colleagues:
  - Gaspar Lopes (Halerik)- ex-FFDTL, petisionario rebel, now political prisoner.
  - Jose da Costa (Ventura) – ex-FFDTL, petisionario rebel, now political prisoner.
  - Amaro da Costa (Susar)- ex-Falintil, ex-FFDTL, rebel, now political prisoner.

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Entrepreneurship and Economic Development

Eric Vincent C. Batalla

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY

The Philippines' long-term lagging economic performance resurrects certain questions about the quantity and quality of the country's entrepreneurs. Is there a scarcity of entrepreneurs in the Philippines? What kind of entrepreneur is lacking? What factors affect the quantity and quality of Philippine entrepreneurship? This article explores the answers to these questions with the end in view of shaping relevant public policies.

The article also attempts to explain lagging economic performance based on an examination of initial conditions affecting entrepreneurship particularly during the decades immediately following national independence. As noted in the earlier literature on Philippine development, this period is critical to the country's postwar economic history. As shall be shown, the institutions and culture that have evolved during that era have shaped the nature of Philippine entrepreneurship. The allocation of innovative and productive entrepreneurial activities in the economy was decided during that time. The rest is history.

Economic Performance and Entrepreneurship

Since the publication of the World Bank's *East Asian Miracle* (EAM) in 1993, many public intellectuals and policymakers have realized that the Philippines, despite its early promise, is nowhere near achieving goals of general prosperity, reduced inequality, and full-employment. The Philippines was not among the high-performing Asian economies (HPAEs) that the World Bank report identified in the EAM.

Balisacan and Hill (2003) follow up on the problem of the country's lagging economic performance vis-à-vis the region's performance. They describe the Philippines as "one of the world's major development puzzles" and presented four sets of conventional explanation. These explanations are based on, to wit: 1) policy errors, 2) conventional economic growth explanations, 3) institutional and political barriers, and 4) even bad luck. According to these authors, not one set of explanation could stand on its own and that the Philippines failed

to grow as quickly as several of its neighbors in the 1960s and 1970s for all of these reasons (Balisacan and Hill 2003: 40).

Nelson (2007) attempts to offer a cultural explanation to the mystery. Using comparative and historical references, he traces poor economic performance to the country's Spanish-Catholic heritage. He argues that religion and cultural attitudes derived from this heritage obstruct freer markets and democracy in the Philippines.

Yet Nelson (2007) is not able to demonstrate how the Spanish legacy is reflected in the business behavior or decisions of Filipino entrepreneurs. This is understandable because of his ostensible interest in the performance effects of open markets and democracies in countries like the Philippines. Without the benefit of local data, this and similar studies offer little evidence on the effects of religion and cultural practices on Philippine economic performance, and particularly on Philippine business.

Nevertheless, Nelson (2007) represents an inclination among economists to broaden their perspective about the mystery of Philippine economic performance. More recently, Yap and Balboa (2008) identify factors "not purely economic" that constrain economic development. Among the constraints, which they fail to elaborate on, was "spotty entrepreneurship." This reference to entrepreneurship dovetails with the earlier observation made by the business tycoon, John Gokongwei. According to Gokongwei, Filipino entrepreneurs lack "daring" as compared to their Malaysian or Thai counterparts.[1] Such observations usher back questions raised in the 1950s and 1960s about the quality of entrepreneurship in the country.

There is also the issue of quantity that stems from an interpretation of the earlier literature on development economics. It is argued that less-developed countries (LDCs) sorely lack entrepreneurs. This interpretation has spawned programs aimed at increasing the supply of entrepreneurs in the LDCs.

In the Philippines, many antipoverty programs initiated by government, big business, non government organizations, and international financial institutions bear this orientation. Indeed, many local communities lack talents and resources needed to raise productivity levels. In these communities, entrepreneurship training and development programs may be necessary.

However, the importance of these programs may be exaggerated to the point that scarce development resources are allocated to saturated or nonstrategic industries. As well, policy attention tends to be diverted away from areas more strategic to the development of enterprises and industries. These reflect deficient economic planning and management.

As this article will point out, further refinements are required in crafting policy for inducing the kinds of entrepreneurship necessary to spur Philippine economic development. The debate on this policy should at least tackle what exactly is lacking in Philippine entrepreneurship that makes it respond poorly to the demand of national development. Another area, often tackled but not entirely clear, concerns the factors that affect domestic entrepreneurship.

The next section attempts to qualify the notion of scarce entrepreneurship by resurrecting from the literature certain typologies of the entrepreneur. It also lays down the framework used here to provide an understanding of the Philippine experience.

Development and the Scarcity of Entrepreneurs

The relationship between economic development and enterprise is not always clear. Up to now, there are those who think that development depends solely on government. Along this line of thinking, the question becomes a matter of good and bad government (or governance). In other words, economic performance is associated with a particular

presidential administration. Such thinking virtually ignores the crucial role of the enterprise in economic development. The development equation should comprise both governance and enterprise performances.

Granted for instance, that there is good government in a society that allows private enterprise to operate, how can the economy move up? Clearly, the long-term expansion and distribution of incomes would depend on the entrepreneurs of that economy. However, this statement leads to the issue earlier raised: it is not entirely clear whether performance is a function of quantity ("how many?") or quality ("what kind?") of entrepreneurs in the economy. It is necessary in this regard to visit the theoretical literature for clarification.

Leibenstein (1968: 73) distinguishes two types of entrepreneurs, namely, the routine and new type of entrepreneurs (N-entrepreneurs or Schumpeterian entrepreneurs). Routine entrepreneurs operate in established and clearly defined markets. In contrast, N-entrepreneurs operate in markets that are not well defined and in which many aspects of the production function are not well known. Thus, the risks borne by one type of entrepreneur considerably differ from the other. Both types of entrepreneurs are important. However, N-entrepreneurs actively create and expand industries. As well, they adopt new technologies and processes. This kind of entrepreneurship, according to Leibenstein (1968: 75), is scarce.

Nevertheless, based on the above typology, an economy could be imagined as having both routine and N-entrepreneurs. The more the N-entrepreneurs, the greater the tendency for the economic frontier to expand. According to Leibenstein (1968: 75-76), the supply of N-entrepreneurs depends on 1) certain personal capacities, 2) the sociocultural and political constraints to demonstrate these capacities, as well as 3) the response of potential entrepreneurs to *motivational states*. Motivational states are basically systems of approval, rewards and punishment for effort and behavior within and outside of the firm. Sociocultural and political constraints are considered part of the entrepreneur's *external* motivational states.

Baumol (1990) advances a different typology. He departs from the conventional notion that developing economies constantly lack entrepreneurs by arguing that the supply of entrepreneurs tends to be uneven in time and place. This variability in the supply of entrepreneurs may well depend on "the spirit of enterprise," which may rise or decline at some point. Thus, instead of focusing on supply, Baumol suggests laying stress on the rules governing entrepreneurial activities.

Baumol divides entrepreneurial activities into productive and unproductive (including destructive) undertakings. Innovation is an example of a productive entrepreneurial activity while rent seeking and crime are examples of unproductive activities. Accordingly, the allocation of these activities in an economy depends on the existing rules in society. If the rules are such that a greater allocation goes to unproductive (and destructive) activities, then economic performance would tend to be dismal or average. Poor economies could be seen in this light. Thus, the rules have to be changed so that the payoffs for productive activities are clearly greater than those for unproductive activities. Otherwise society has to wait for slow cultural change.

Leibenstein (1968) and Baumol (1990) help clarify at least three aspects relevant to a less developed country's (or LDC's) entrepreneurship policy. First, superior entrepreneurs are scarce. Second, policymakers should pay attention to "motivational states" in order to encourage entrepreneurs to innovate and aim for higher productivity. Third, the environment within which entrepreneurs operate should be such that firms compete for efficiency rather than for rents or for criminal activity. In other words, LDC policy should focus on institutions that enable productive entrepreneurship.

Other authors emphasize the effects of culture on the spirit of enterprise. This school of thought could be traced to Weber (1958) who claims that the Protestant ethic influenced capitalist development. This work has become the basis of current perspective that culture determines economic performance. For instance, the study of Franke, Hofstede, and Bond (1991: 165-66) declares that "differences in cultural values, rather than in material and structural conditions, are ultimate determinants of human organization and behavior, and thus of economic growth."

Culture and the structure of incentives constitute the "rules of the game" for the cast of players in the economy. They are difficult (though not impossible) to change. Hence, the nature and character of entrepreneurship often depend on the rules of the game formed at an earlier time. Entrepreneurship in the Philippines could be examined according to this perspective. The next two sections attempt to accomplish this.

Entrepreneurship and Philippine Development

The 2003 Annual Survey of Philippine Business and Industry (ASPBI) provides the latest data covering Philippine business establishments of sizes below and over 20 workers. Succeeding surveys have covered only enterprises with employment sizes of 20 or more people. Thus, no updates are available in regard to the total number and characteristics of Philippine business establishments.

Be that as it may, the preliminary results of the 2003 ASPBI show that the total number of enterprises in the country at that time was 717,947. Enterprises with employment sizes lower than 20 people account for 97 percent of the total number of enterprises. Based on Aldaba (2008), the 2003 data could be disaggregated according to employment size and employment contribution as presented in Table 1.

Table 1 shows micro enterprises comprising 92 percent of Philippine business establishments and 34 percent of total employment. Large enterprises (LEs), which account for less than one percent of establishments, share the same level of employment. Likewise, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which have human resource complements ranging from 10 to 199, contribute 32 percent of total employment.

More than 60 percent of the establishments belong to the tertiary (or service) sector, mostly in retail and trade (Aldaba 2008). The service sector has traditionally accounted for a large share of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). In 1965, when the Philippines was still considered an agricultural economy, the service sector already shared 46 percent of GDP. However, it only shared a third of total employment. As Table 2 shows, the service sector's share of employment steadily rose such that by 2002, it accounted for almost half of the employed labor force.

Table 1. Number and Employment Share of Establishments By Size, 2003

Size of Enterprise	Share of Total Number of Establishments	Share of Employment
Micro	92.0	34
Small and Medium	7.6	32
Large	0.4	34

Source: Adapted from Rafaelita M. Aldaba (2008). SMEs in the Philippines: Meeting the Globalization and Development Challenges, powerpoint presentation at the Philippine Economic Society 46th Annual Assembly, 14 November 2008.

Table 2. Production and Employment Structure of the Philippine Economy, By Sector, 1965-2003

	Primary Sector				Secondary Sector				Manufacturing (part of secondary sector)				Tertiary Sector			
Sectoral Distribution (in percent)	1965	1980	1995	2002/2003	1965	1980	1995	2002/2003	1965	1980	1995	2002/2003	1965	1980	1995	2002/2003
Share of Gross Domestic Product	26	25	22	14	28	39	32	32	20	26	23	23	46	36	46	53
Share of Employment	57	46	44	38	16	17	15	15	-	11	10	9	27	37	40	47

Notes: 1) The primary sector includes agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. The secondary sector refers to the industrial sector which includes manufacturing, construction, utilities, etc. The tertiary sector refers to the services sector. 2) Labor data up to 2002 only.

Sources: World Bank Development Report, various issues; ILO Laborsta.

From 1965 to 1980, the share of manufacturing climbed from a fifth to a quarter of the GDP. The government tried to attract foreign direct investments (FDI) but the FDI flows in manufacturing were not sufficient to arrest the sector's pattern of stagnation and decline. The GDP share of manufacturing stagnated to 23 percent while its share of total employment declined.

The rise of the Philippines as a service-oriented economy could therefore be seen in light of the manufacturing sector's inability to develop despite the growing production possibilities based on rapid technological developments abroad. The development of Thailand's economy reflects the realization of some of these production possibilities. From 1965 to 1995, Thai manufacturing's share of the GDP rose from 14 percent to 49 percent. In 1995, manufacturing shared 15 percent of total employment. Likewise, Malaysia's manufacturing rose from 10 percent in 1965 to 33 percent in 1995. The share of Malaysia's manufacturing sector in 1995 was 22 percent of total employment.

How and why did domestic industrial entrepreneurship fail to develop in the Philippines? Based on the earlier theoretical discussion, the question could be approached either by examining personal entrepreneurial capacities or "motivational states." In the case of the former, it would be misleading to say that superior entrepreneurial capacities were non-existent. In fact, top-rate entrepreneurs emerged at various points in the nation's history, e.g., Andres Soriano, Enrique Zobel, Henry Sy, and John Gokongwei. Thus, we are led to examine the external and internal factors motivating entrepreneurship.

The early decades following national independence represented an exciting period for Filipino entrepreneurship. In fact, the 1950s were referred to as the decade of the Filipino entrepreneur. The following section reexamines the motivational states during that period.

Motivational States

Several factors affecting entrepreneurial motivation in domestic manufacturing could be identified. Yet it seems that, of these factors, the institutions that evolved and the underlying cultural and belief system are the most critical.

The government and economic institutions that evolved in the postcolonial era have produced an incentive structure that provided greater rewards to entrepreneurial activities other than in manufacturing. Further, a "deficient" kind of nationalism has discouraged the expansion and deepening of domestic manufacturing. This deficiency is evident in both demand and supply sides.

The material incentives away from manufacturing and the deficient nationalism of previous generations combined to produce a dynamic that eventually led to the rise of a service-oriented economy. This unfavorable combination is particularly reflected in the management of the country's import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policy. That regime, started in 1950 and extended by many political administrations for at least two decades more, spawned serious problems that affected the future course of Philippine development.

Trade Policy and Public Governance

An ISI policy is essentially a strategy to support infant industries through a variety of protective instruments. Instruments of protection include tax, tariff, inflation, and foreign exchange policies. ISI worked to build the industrial capabilities of a number of East Asian countries like Japan and the Republic of Korea. However, in the Philippines, ISI was mismanaged; the country's initial industrial capabilities deteriorated.

While the country's ISI policy promoted infant industries and a small entrepreneurial class, its management also encouraged biases against traditional agricultural producers, export of manufactured goods, backward linkages, and the development of small and medium enterprise (Power 1971; Baldwin 1975; Pauuw and Fei 1973; ILO 1974). These biases favored exporters of primary commodities (e.g., sugar), importers, and assemblers of finished goods. The Philippines' ISI regime also encouraged smuggling, which was highly profitable in view of the great demand for foreign consumer goods.

Thus, in the name of economic nationalism, the system of foreign exchange and trade controls came to serve narrow economic interests (Golay 1968; Pauuw and Fei 1973). Further, under this regime of controls, the economy offered to entrepreneurs greater rewards for short-term, quick profits than for long-term, growth-oriented investments (Sicat 1972). This incentive structure affected the beliefs and attitudes toward investments for the long-term, like research and development (R and D).

By the mid-1970s, the remarkable structural defects arising from the country's inward-looking orientation became obvious. Wong (1979: 69) lists eight such defects, namely, 1) inward-looking manufacturing industries, 2) an excessive dependence on imported inputs, 3) excessive economic reliance on a few primary exports due to the failure of the industrial sector as a source of foreign exchange, 4) neglect of wage-goods industries, 5) greater inequality of income distribution, 6) over-concentrated regional development, 7) slow growth of industrial employment, and 8) technical and economic inefficiency.

The extended ISI regime also had political and socio-cultural consequences. Its economic and political beneficiaries shaped business-government relations for decades. In the process, political competition was closely tied to economic competition, as the system of foreign exchange and trade controls became a source of political spoils, patronage, and corruption (Yoshihara 1994; Sicat 1972; Hutchcroft 1990; Fabella 1999). These characterized traditional political culture, which Timberman (1991) argues, was the fundamental reason behind the "changelessness" of Philippine society and economy.

The damage wrought by import controls on government and business institutions is captured by Fabella (1999: 2-3) who wrote:

"While World War II shattered many of the previously-held social verities, it was import controls and subsequent policies to supplant imports which captured the imagination of the business elite. Here was a new avenue to wealth. The regime relied on the monopoly and rationing of foreign exchange on the basis of a commodity classification of imports. This was a tremendous source of economic power and, what's more, perfectly legitimate. Those who got easy access to the precious dollars got very rich very quickly . . . Those who did not have this access can still become rich through smuggling made profitable by exorbitant domestic prices . . . True the Hukbalahap insurgency captured the headlines. But it was the economic insurgency in the form of smuggling that was permanently changing the social landscape. Soon, mayors and governors were in on the action, followed by local and then national legislators. Import substitution's costliest legacy was not a bevy of inefficient industries; it was the erosion of governance coming in the heels of the collapse of respect for the law."

Culture

Several researches have linked the protectionist regime to the low levels of manufacturing productivity in the country (e.g., ILO 1974; Pauuw and Fei 1973; Tecson 2000). The reverse effect has been shown by Tecson (2000), in which economic liberalization episodes bore a positive impact on total factor productivity (TFP) in manufacturing industries and overall economic performance.

In an earlier work about trade policy effects on the manufacturing industry, Tecson (1996) argues that protection is an instrument that breeds managerial slack because of the absence of competitive pressure. Accordingly, "managers operating in protected environments are not forced to adopt best practice techniques and/or are engaged in rent-seeking activities that keep them from concentrating on more productive endeavors" (Tecson 1996: 4). She further adds that the lack of import competition tends to dampen the entrepreneurial drive to innovate and conduct R and D.

Yet the link between trade policy and productivity levels remains unclear. As Oshima (1987: 219-220) points out, "We are also led to look beyond protection [of domestic manufacturing industries] into the quality of entrepreneurship by the fact that in the service and non-manufacturing industries where protectionist policies did not apply, the growth of labor productivity was even more disappointing than in protected manufacturing, with the lowest growth rates among all the East Asian and ASEAN countries." The low productivity levels even in non-manufacturing industries lend support to claims about the predominant business and work culture. Particularly, low levels of productivity reflect certain attitudes and beliefs toward technical change.

Golay (1961) argues that Philippine business is conservative, referring to the risk aversion of wealthy families even in the 1950s. The conservatism of Philippine big business, dominated by families, has been manifested not only in terms of their business ventures but also in the way they manage their organizations. They are slow in adopting organizational and technical innovations being introduced in more developed economies. For example, during the formative years of the personal computer industry, expressions like "It's no use, they have better technologies," "We don't have the technology" and "Why reinvent the wheel?" could be heard from the local business community. In rice agriculture, the adoption of modern machineries to cut post-harvest losses and increase production efficiency has taken several decades. Business preferences for money lending and trading have been stronger than for manufacturing.

Other authors suggest that negative economic attitudes reflect deficient nationalism. Fallows (1987) coins the term "damaged

culture," to describe Filipinos, who despite being patriotic, were caught in a Hobbesian world where man is at war against his fellow man. He says:

> "Individual Filipinos are at least as brave, kind and noble-spirited as individual Japanese, but their culture draws the boundaries of decent treatment much more narrowly. Because these boundaries are limited to the family or tribe, they exclude at any given moment 99 percent of the other people in the country. Because of this fragmentation, this lack of useful nationalism, people treat each other worse in the Philippines than in any other Asian country I have seen."

Likewise, Constantino (1966) argues that Filipinos suffer from colonial mentality. This mentality, conditioned by centuries of colonial rule and post-colonial administrations, has resulted in a latent inferiority complex and a general preference for foreign things among Filipinos including business leaders. Constantino (1966) points out that the educational system established by American rule has fostered certain economic attitudes that discourage progress and industrialization.

First, popular pictures of farm settings in the Philippines subtly but strongly leave the impression that the economy must remain agricultural. To quote Constantino (1966: 47), "It strengthens the belief that the Philippines is essentially meant to be an agricultural country and we cannot and should not change that."

Second, through the educational system, he says that a "new type of American" is being produced, with Filipinos imbibing American values. They have developed consumption habits based on the influx of imported American goods.

Finally, the educational system has reinforced in Filipino minds the superiority of other nations. "Our books extolled the Western Nations as peopled by superior beings because they were capable of manufacturing things that we never thought we were capable of producing" (Constantino 1966: 48).

The educational system therefore has blurred the Filipinos' sense of nationalism. Consequently, there has emerged what Constantino calls "Un-Filipino Filipinos." These are Filipinos who care less about the plight of millions of their countrymen than for foreign sensibilities. They "even oppose nationalistic legislation because they have become willing servants of foreign interests or because in their distorted view, we Filipinos can not progress without the help of foreign capital and foreign entrepreneurs" (Constantino 1966: 53).

There may be other elements in the country's system of beliefs that affect policy and economic performance. However, here, the findings point to excessive business conservatism and an inward-looking and deficient nationalism as the core. Combined with bad governance, they lay down the foundations of a rent-seeking society.

Conclusion

Governance problems have been often blamed for the economy's lagging long-term performance. Indeed, the failure of industrial entrepreneurship and the rise of the service economy in the Philippines could be attributed to the early postcolonial management of the country's institutions and culture. The culture and the politics of the early postcolonial era have caused serious economic and social distortions and have created a dynamic that shapes the future course of economic development.

Filipino entrepreneurs have operated within structures that allow certain cultural elements from the country's colonial past to prevail. An inward-looking, deficient nationalism, excessive business conservatism, and a pervasive *rentier* mentality discourage potential industrial entrepreneurs. Such mindsets, of course are not isolated from the larger political and economic environment, which provides greater rewards to entrepreneurs in non-manufacturing activities.

Consequently, the allocation of entrepreneurial activities in the economy has been skewed toward routine as well as unproductive endeavors.

Despite the existence of highly successful entrepreneurs, this skewed allocation sustains issues about the quality of Filipino entrepreneurship. As suggested here, the quality of entrepreneurship is not simply a matter of personal capacities. It would do well for development policy to probe deeper into the motivational states that would change the "rules of the game" and enable greater entrepreneurial contributions to Philippine economic development.

Note

1 "John Gokongwei Jr: A taipan turns 80," Sunday Lifestyle, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 6 August 2006, Section C2.

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INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES

PSSC's Travel Grants and International Linkages Program

Virginia A. Miralao

The earliest PSSC travel grantees on record are the late Dr. Alfredo V. Lagmay and book editor Alfonso de Guzman who were provided some assistance by PSSC to attend and participate in special seminars relating to their own fields in 1974. The program was then called Travel and Seminar Awards Program, the main intent of which was ". . . to grant travel assistance funds mainly in the form of per diem allowances to social scientists on official business trips abroad." Under the program, travel grants were fused with seminar awards, and so it (the program) also provided ". . . financial assistance to associations and institutions, in particular PSSC members, in their conduct of local conferences, seminars, workshops, lecture series, etc."

In 1978, the program was renamed Travel and Study Awards Program after PSSC assistance extended for the conduct of local conferences and seminars was constituted into a separate Conference/Seminar Awards Program. The Travel and Study Awards Program thus continued to provide supplementary travel funds to social scientists who were invited to attend and present papers at conferences and similar scholarly/ academic gatherings abroad.

Between 1974 to 1981, a reading of earlier SSI issues shows some 49 travel assistance awards extended by PSSC to national scholars. As shown in the accompanying list of PSSC Travel Grantees during the period, the foreign meetings/conferences attended by travel grantees included international disciplinal conferences, various inter- and intra- regional meetings in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific, and international social science conventions and congresses. In 1981, PSSC travel grantees also included PSSC delegates or representatives to the 2nd International Conference on Philippine Studies (ICOPHIL) held in Honolulu that year. PSSC has since become an active partner of ICOPHIL, hosting its conferences when these are held in the Philippines, or extending travel grants to those attending conferences held in other countries.

The Travel and Study Awards was discontinued in 1982 due to insufficient funds. A mid-decade assessment of PSSC programs in 1986 also noted that there had been no equitable distribution of PSSC travel grantees – geographically speaking or institutionally. Of the grantees in 1980 and 1981 for example, most

were affiliated with the University of the Philippines, followed by Ateneo de Manila University, and De La Salle University. Only two grantees came from other institutions and only one other grantee came from outside Metro Manila.

PSSC resumed extending travel grants only in 1996, although it should be mentioned that in the interim (1982 to 1995), the Council continued to send a delegation or representatives to conferences convened by regional and international bodies of which PSSC was a member or partner, such as AASSREC, ISSC/IFSSO and other UN/UNESCO agencies. As the Council still had insufficient funds for travel awards, it maintained a limited annual budget of P85,000 used primarily to sustain PSSC's Regional/International Linkages with the above bodies. This budget grew incrementally over the years until 2003 when this reached P250,000 per year. It was also in 2003 that a Governing Council resolution was passed constituting a Grants Committee to screen the applications for PSSC travel awards. Over the years, the Grants Committee has also evolved implementing rules and guidelines governing the awarding of travel grants. Travel grants thus are now institutionalized as part of PSSC's Regional/International Linkages Program with an annual budget of P350,000.

Of the 84 travel grants awarded from 1996 to 2009, 70 went to members of PSSC's 14 regular member-associations. Members of the Philippine Political Science Association were the most active in availing of these grants, followed by members of the Psychological Association of the Philippines, the Philippine Society for Public Administration, and the Philippine National Historical Society. Eight of PSSC's associate member organizations have also availed of these travel grants including the UP Population Institute, UP College of Mass Communication, UST Social Research Center, the Ateneo de Naga University's Social Science Research Center, and the Institute for Popular Democracy (See Table 1A).

In Table 1B, one notes that travel grantees from the University of the Philippines far outnumber those coming from other institutions. (UP-Diliman alone accounts for 33 grantees, and UP-San Fernando, UP-Los Baños, and UP-Visayas account for another 7 grantees.) The universities with the next higher number of grantees are De La Salle University and Ateneo de Manila University (both with 8 grantees), although they emerge a far second to the University of the Philippines.

Table 1B also shows that geographically, the regional distribution of PSSC travel grantees has not changed since the 1980s. An overwhelming 87 percent (or 72 out of 83 grantees) are from the National Capital Region, with only 11 others coming from outside Metropolitan Manila. The regional universities that have availed of travel grants are the Ateneo de Naga University, the Divine Word College of Legazpi, and the University of San Carlos in Cebu City. Social science faculty members from Mindanao universities have yet to avail of PSSC's travel grants program.

Finally, Table 1C shows that PSSC's travel grantees from 1996 to 2009 attended conferences in as many as 25 different countries. The US remains the single most visited country while in terms of world regions, Asia was the most visited by PSSC's travel grantees, followed by Europe, North America, Australia and Africa.

Table 1A. PSSC Travel Grantees (1996-2009) by Associational Affiliation

Associational Affiliation	Number of grantees who have availed of TAP
PSSC Regular Members	
Linguistic Society of the Philippines	4
Philippine Association of Social Workers Inc.	1
Philippines Communication Society	2
Philippine Economic Society	4
Philippine Geographical Society	6
Philippine Historical Association	3
Philippine National Historical Society	5
Philippine Political Science Association	14
Philippine Population Association	4
Philippine Sociological Society	10
Philippine Statistical Association	3
Psychological Association of the Philippines	10
Ugnayang Pang-Aghamtao	4
Sub-total	**70**
PSSC Associate Members	
Division of Social Sciences - UP Visayas	1
Institute for Popular Democracy	2
Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran	1
Social Research Center, UST	2
Social Science Research Center, Ateneo de Naga University	2
Social Weather Stations	1
UP College of Mass Communication	2
UP Population Institute	2
Sub-total	**13**
Other Association	
UP Asian Center	1
Sub-total	**1**
TOTAL	**84**

Table 1B. PSSC Travel Grantees (1996-2009) by Institutional Affiliation and Regional Distribution

Institutional Affiliation	NUMBER
LUZON	
NCR	
Academe	
University of the Philippines-Diliman	33
Ateneo de Manila University	8
De La Salle University	8
University of Santo Tomas	4
Miriam College	3
Philippine Normal University	1
Assumption College	2
Government Agency	
National Historical Institute	1
Department of Social Welfare and Development	1
National Economic Development Authority	1
National Statistics Coordination Board	1
Statistical Research and Training Center	2
Others	
KAISA Para sa Kaunlaran	1
Philippine Social Science Council	2
Social Weather Stations	1
Institute for Popular Democracy	2
Demographic Research and Development Foundation, Inc.	2
Sub-total	**73**
REGION III - CENTRAL LUZON	
Academe	
University of the Philippines-San Fernando	2
Sub-total	**2**
REGION IV-A - CALABARZON	
Academe	
University of the Philippines at Los Baños	2
Sub-total	**2**
REGION V - BICOL	
Academe	
Ateneo de Naga University	2
Divine Word College of Legazpi	1
Sub-total	**3**
VISAYAS	
REGION VI- WESTERN VISAYAS	
Academe	
University of the Philippines in the Visayas	3
Sub-total	**3**
REGION VII- CENTRAL VISAYAS	
Academe	
University of San Carlos	1
Sub-total	**1**
TOTAL	**84**

Table 1C. PSSC Travel Grantees (1996-2009) by Countries: Venues of Conferences

CONTINENT/COUNTRY	NUMBER
NORTH AMERICA	
Canada	5
US	14
Sub-total	**19**
ASIA	
China	5
Cyprus	1
Hong Kong	2
India	1
Japan	5
Malaysia	5
Singapore	1
South Korea	3
Thailand	2
Turkey	1
Vietnam	4
Sub-total	**30**
EUROPE	
France	1
Germany	3
Italy	5
Norway	2
Portugal	1
Spain	5
Sweden	1
The Netherlands	7
Sub-total	**25**
AUSTRALIA	
Australia	6
Sub-total	**6**
AFRICA	
Kenya	1
South Africa	2
Tunisia	1
Sub-total	**4**
TOTAL	**84**

Directory of TAP Grantees
1974-2009

NAME/*AFFILIATION*	CONFERENCE/*VENUE*/INCLUSIVE DATES
1974	
Lagmay, Alfredo *Department of Psychology* *University of the Philippines*	American Studies Seminar *Choongnam, Korea* 3-20 September
de Guzman, Alfonso II *Institute of Philippine Culture* *Ateneo de Manila University*	Training in Scholarly Book Editing and Design *Japan* 13 September – 30 November
1975	
Ventura, Eva Duka *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines*	International Seminar on Inter-Regional Cooperation in South and Southeast Asia *Hyderabad, India* 2-31 January
Baumgarter, Joseph SVD	Seminar on Scholarly Publishing in Southeast Asia *Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia* 30 January – 1 February
de Guzman, Raul *College of Public Administration* *University of the Philippines*	Philippine Studies Council Annual Meeting *California, USA* 24-26 March
Parel, Cristina *Statistical Center* *University of the Philippines*	Conference on International Migration *Honolulu, Hawaii, USA* 30 May – 15 June
Cariño, Ledivina *College of Public Administration* *University of the Philippines*	Second Conference on International Migration *Honolulu, Hawaii, USA* 1-30 June

Bulatao, Rodolfo *Department of Sociology* *University of the Philippines*	Conference on Measurement of Preferences for Number and Sex of Children *Honolulu, Hawaii, USA* 1-30 June
Bauzon, Leslie *Department of History* *University of the Philippines*	XIVth International Congress of Historical Sciences *California, USA* 22-29 August
Feliciano, Gloria *College of Mass Communication* *University of the Philippines*	Meeting of Five Heads of Institute of Social Research and/or Communication *Nairobi, Kenya* 11-30 August
Luna, Telesforo *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	13th Pacific Science Congress *Vancouver, Canada* 18-30 August
Solidum, Estrella *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines*	Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association *California, USA* 1-6 September
Salamanca, Bonifacio *Department of History* *University of the Philippines*	Asian-Pacific Conference of American Studies Specialists *Fujinomiya, Japan* 4-7 September
Makasiar Sicat, Loretta *Philippine Social Science Council*	Conference of National Social Science Councils and Analogous Bodies *Paris, France* 6-9 October

1976

Salamanca, Bonifacio *Department of History* *University of the Philippines*	International Seminar on Contribution to the American Bicentennial *Honolulu, Hawaii, USA* 28 June – 1 July
Daquiz, Renato	XXIst International Congress of Psychology *Paris, France* 18-25 July
Alfonso, Amelia	XXIst International Congress of Psychology *Paris, France* 18-25 July

Salita, Domingo *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	25th Anniversary of the Department of Geography and Geology *Hong Kong* 21-25 June
de Guzman, Alfonso II *Institute of Philippine Culture* *Ateneo de Manila University*	20th Congress of the International Publishers Association and President's Conference of the International Association of Scholarly Publishers *Tokyo and Kyoto, Japan*

1978

Enriquez, Virgilio *Department of Psychology* *University of the Philippines*	29th International Congress of Applied Psychology *Munich, Germany* 30 July – 4 August
Ingles, Raul *College of Mass Communication* *University of the Philippines*	ASEAN Multimedia Project *Bangkok, Thailand* 30 October – 2 November
Fondevilla, Rosi *College of Social Work and Community Development* *University of the Philippines*	2nd Session of the ESCAP Committee on Social Development *Bangkok, Thailand* 6-12 December
Illo, Jeanne Frances *Institute of Philippine Culture* *Ateneo de Manila University*	International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences *New Delhi, India* 10-12 December

1979

Samonte, Elena *Department of Psychology* *University of the Philippines*	First International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology Asian Regional Conference *Hong Kong* 19-23 March
Parel, Cristina *Statistical Center* *University of the Philippines*	First Franco Asean Conference *Singapore* 28 May – 2 June
Cariño, Ledivina *College of Public Administration* *University of the Philippines*	World Congress of the International Political Science Association *Moscow, USSR* 12-18 August
Gonzales, Andrew *De La Salle University*	XIVth Pacific Congress *Khabarovsk, USSR* 5-20 September

de Guzman, Raul *College of Public Administration* *University of the Philippines*	International Conferences on Improving Public Management and Performance on Administrative Sciences *Washington, USA* 30 September – 4 October
Rosete, Nievelena	UNIDO Seminar on Public Enterprises *Lgublana, Yugoslavia* 1-15 October
Estanislao, Jesus	Conference on China and Asian Economies *Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia*

1980

Makil, Perla *Dept. of Sociology-Anthropology* *Ateneo de Manila University*	Philippine Studies Conference *Michigan, USA* 29-30 May
Foronda, Marcelino Jr. *Department of History* *De La Salle University*	Philippine Studies Conference *Michigan, USA* 29-30 May
Miralao, Virginia *Dept. of Sociology-Anthropology* *Ateneo de Manila University*	Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University *New York, USA* June
Rosell, Dominador *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	150th Anniversary of the Royal Geographical Society of London 9-10 June
Villacorta, Wilfrido *Department of Political Science* *De La Salle University*	Association of Southeast Asia Institutions of Higher Learning (ASAIHL) *Jakarta, Indonesia* 26-29 June
de Leon, Corazon Alma *College of Social Work and Community Development* *University of the Philippines*	6th Symposium of the International Federation of Social Workers *Hong Kong* 14-16 July
Eviota, Elizabeth *Institute of Philippine Culture* *Ateneo de Manila University*	Conference on The Sex Division of Labor, Development and Women's Status *Austria* 2-10 August
Salita, Domingo *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	25th International Geographic Congress *Tokyo, Japan* 31 August – 6 September

1981

Bautista, Lourdes *Department of Linguistics* *De La Salle University*	Interdisciplinary Project of the Cultural Learning Institute of the East West Center *Honolulu, Hawaii, USA* 1 May – 30 June
Miralao, Virginia *Institute of Philippine Culture* *Ateneo de Manila University*	Second International Philippine Studies Conference *Honolulu, Hawaii, USA* 27-30 June
Samson, Laura *Department of Sociology* *University of the Philippines*	Second International Philippine Studies Conference *Honolulu, Hawaii, USA* 27-30 June
Valencia, Luzviminda *Department of Sociology* *University of the Philippines*	Second International Philippine Studies Conference *Honolulu, Hawaii, USA* 27-30 June
Makil, Perla *Institute of Philippine Culture* *Ateneo de Manila University*	2nd International Philippine Studies Conference *Honolulu, Hawaii, USA* 27-30 June
de Guzman, Raul *College of Public Administration* *University of the Philippines*	Roundtable Conference of the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration *Canberra, Australia* 12-18 July
Salita, Domingo *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	Second Tsukuba Conference and World Regional Development and Planning *Japan* 10-14 August
Lupdag, Anselmo *Central Luzon State University*	International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology and the International Council of Psychologists Asian Regional Conference *Taipei, Taiwan* 10-15 August
Ventura, Elizabeth *Department of Psychology* *University of the Philippines*	International Association of Cross-Cultural Psychology and International Council of Psychologists Asian Regional Conference *Taipei, Taiwan* 10-15 August
Bautista, Paulina *College of Mass Communication* *University of the Philippines*	IFSSO Seminar on Comparative Analysis of Basic Conceptions of Social Values

Villacorta, Wilfrido *Department of Political Science* *De La Salle University*	IFSSO Seminar on Comparative Analysis of Basic Conceptions of Social Values

1996

Abaya, Eufracio *Department of Anthropology* *University of the Philippines*	5th International Philippine Studies Conference *Hawaii, USA* 14-16 April

1997

Lamug, Corazon *Department of Social Science* *UP Los Baños*	2nd Asia-Pacific Regional Conference of Sociology *Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia* 18-20 September
Castillo, Emma *Philippine Normal University*	36th Annual Convention of the Japan Association of College English Teachers *Tokyo, Japan* 5-7 September

1999

Samonte, Elena *Department of Psychology* *University of the Philippines*	International Workshop on Asian Values and Vietnam's Development *Hanoi, Vietnam* 24-26 March
Planta, Ma. Mercedes *Department of History* *University of the Philippines*	9th International Conference for the History of Science in East Asia *Singapore* 23-27 August
Mula, Emma *National Historical Institute*	10th World Congress of Friends of Museums *Sydney, Australia* 13-17 September
Ignacio, Violeta *Department of History* *University of the Philippines* *San Fernando*	V Congreso Internacional de la Associacion Expanola de Estudios del Pacifico *Madrid, Spain* 15-19 November

2000

Makasiar Sicat, Loretta *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines*	18th World Congress of the International Political Science Association *Quebec, Canada* 1-5 August

Malay, Armando Jr. *Asian Center* *University of the Philippines*	International Conference on Vietnam in the 20th Century *Hanoi, Vietnam* 19-21 September

2001

Labrador, Ana Maria Theresa *Jorge Vargas Museum* *University of the Philippines*	19th General Conference and 20th General Assembly of the International Council of Museums *Barcelona, Spain* 1-6 July
Tigno, Jorge *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines*	Association of Pacific Rim Universities Fellows Program UCLA in the USA *Beijing, China* 11- 25 August
Gealogo, Francis *Department of History* *Ateneo de Manila University*	4th European Philippine Studies Conference *Alcala, Spain* 9-12 September
Apilado, Digna *Department of History* *University of the Philippines*	4th European Philippine Studies Conference *Alcala, Spain* 9-12 September

2002

Planta, Ma. Mercedes *Department of History* *University of the Philippines*	Asia-Europe Institute of the University of Malaya *Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia* 1-31 May
Laroza, Leonardo *Social Weather Stations*	Thirty-third Summer Seminar on Population, Workshop on Communication Population and Health Research to Policymakers *Hawaii, USA* 29 May – 30 June
Sylverio, Mely *De La Salle University*	Hawaii International Conference for Social Science *Hawaii, USA* 11-15 June
Dy, Mary Ebitha *Communications Arts and Adversiting Department* *Miriam College*	11th Asian Media Information and Communication Annual Conference *Perth, Australia* 26-28 June

Del Pilar, Gregorio *Department of Psychology* *University of the Philippines*	17th International Congress of Rorschach Projective Methods *Rome, Italy* 9-14 September
Gonzales, Ernesto *Social Research Center* *University of Santo Tomas*	10th Annual Conference of the American Society of Catholic Social Scientists *Michigan, USA* 18-19 October
Martin, Isabel *Department of English* *Ateneo de Manila University*	Seventh English in Southeast Asia Conference *Hongkong* 6-8 December

2003

Umali, Conchita *Graduate School* *Assumption College*	International Council of Psychologists (ICP) 61st Convention *Toronto, Canada* 11-14 August
Albert, Jose Ramon *Statistical Research and* *Training Center*	54th Session of the International Statistical Institute *Berlin, Germany* 13-20 August
Agbisit, Joanne *Philippine Social Science Council*	Cooperation Among Countries in the Mekong Sub-region: Challenges and Opportunities in Context of New Changes in Asia-Pacific *Ha Long, Vietnam* 27-29 August
Puyat, Joseph *Department of Psychology* *University of the Philippines*	15th AASSREC Biennial General Conference *Canberra, Australia* 9-14 November

2004

Laguna, Elma *Department of Sociology* *University of the Philippines*	Population of America Annual Meeting *Massachusetts, USA* 1-3 April
Caoili, Olivia *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines*	Democracy in Asia, Europe and the World: Toward a Universal Definition *Seoul, Korea* 3-4 June

Cruz, Grace *Population Institute* *University of the Philippines*	7th International Conference on Philippine Studies *Leiden, The Netherlands* 16-19 June
Juanico, Meliton *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	7th International Conference on Philippine Studies Leiden, The Netherlands 16-19 June
Lusterio-Berja, Clarinda *Population Institute* *University of the Philippines*	7th International Conference on Philippine Studies *Leiden, The Netherlands* 16-19 June
Mangahas, Maria *Department of Anthropology* *University of the Philippines*	7th International Conference on Philippine Studies *Leiden, The Netherlands* 16-19 June
Porio, Emma *Dept. of Sociology-Anthropology* *Ateneo de Manila University*	7th International Conference on Philippine Studies *Leiden, The Netherlands* 16-19 June
Santos, Antonio *University of the Philippines* *Los Baños*	7th International Conference on Philippine Studies *Leiden, The Netherlands* 16-19 June
Ignacio, Violeta *University of the Philippines* *San Fernando*	International Oral History Association Conference *Rome, Italy* 23-26 June
Miranda, Evelyn *Department of History* *University of the Philippines*	International Oral History Association Conference *Rome, Italy* 23-26 June
Mabazza, Daniel *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	10th World Conference on Transport Research *Istanbul, Turkey* 4-8 July
Go, Stella *Dept. of Behavioral Sciences* *De La Salle University*	36th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology: Social Change in the Age of Globalization *Beijing, China* 11 July
Lim, Cristina *Social Science Research Center* *Ateneo de Naga University*	IIFET 2004 Japan: What are Responsible Fisheries? *Tokyo, Japan* 24-30 July

Montiel, Cristina *Department of Psychology* *Ateneo de Manila University*	28th International Congress of Psychology *Beijing, China* 8-13 August

2005

Virola, Romulo *National Statistics Coordination Board*	55th Session of the International Statistical Institute *Sydney, Australia* 5-12 April
Villaseñor, Jon Michael *Social Science Research Center* *Ateneo de Naga University*	Women's World Congress 2005: 9th International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women *Seoul, South Korea* 19-24 June
Erasga, Dennis *Dept. of Behavioral Sciences* *De La Salle University*	37th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology *Stockholm, Sweden* 5-9 July
Josue, Gerardo R. *Communication Arts and Advertising Dept.* *Miriam College*	14th Asia Media Information & Communication Annual Conference *Beijing, China* 18-21 July
Ogena, Nimfa *Population Institute* *University of the Philippines*	25th IUSSP International Population Conference *Tours, France* 18-23 July
Rico, Ruth L. *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines*	Association of Pacific Rim Universities Doctoral Students Conference *Oregon, USA* 7-12 August
Ortega, Arnisson Andre *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	4th International Convention of Asia Scholars *Shanghai, China* 20-24 August
Atienza, Christine *School of Economics* *University of the Philippines*	16th AASSREC Biennial General Conference *New Delhi, India* 27-29 August

2006

Baunto, Assad *School of Economics* *University of the Philippines*	11th Annual Meeting of the Society of Labor Economists *Massachusetts, USA* 5-6 May

Berja, Juanito Jr. *Institute for Popular Democracy*	2006 Summer Seminar on Population Workshop on Liveable Cities in Pacific Asia: Research Methods for Policy Analysis *Hawaii, USA* May 30 – June 29
Quijano, Jodylyn M. *Department of Economics* *University of Santo Tomas*	International Conference on Policy Making *Hong Kong* 28-30 June
Cabilao, Finardo *Dept. of Social Welfare & Development*	International Society for the Study of Human Behavioral Development Conference *Melbourne, Australia* 2-6 July
Atienza, Maria Ela *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines*	20th World Congress of the International Political Science Association *Fukuoka, Japan* 9-13 July
Hall, Rosalie *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines in the Visayas*	2006 America Political Science Association Conference: Power Reconsidered *Pennsylvania, USA* 31 August – 3 September
San Pascual, Maria Rosel *College of Mass Communication* *University of the Philippines*	IR 7.0 Internet Convergences (International Conference of Internet Research) *Brisbane, Australia* 27-30 September
Martin, Isabel *Department of English* *Ateneo de Manila University*	Theory and Application: World Englishes in World Contexts *Japan* 7-9 October
Ang-See, Teresita *KAISA Para sa Kaunlaran*	Diversity in Diaspora: The Chinese Overseas Regional Conference *South Africa* 1-6 December

2007

Batalla, Eric Vincent *Department of Political Science* *De La Salle University*	American Asian Studies Annual Meeting 2007 *Massachusetts, USA* 21-25 March

Gultiano, Socorro *College of Arts and Sciences* *University of San Carlos*	Population Association of America 2007 Annual Meeting Program *New York, USA* 29-31 March
Sanchez, Esmeralda *Institute of Religion* *University of Santo Tomas*	Syncretism in South and Southeast Asia: Adaption and Adaptation *Bangkok, Thailand* 24-27 May
Portus, Lourdes *College of Mass Communication* *University of the Philippines*	7th International Conference on Diversity *Amsterdam, The Netherlands* 3-6 July
Cuarteros, Gladstone *Institute for Popular Democracy*	5th International Convention of Asia Scholars *Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia* 2-5 August
Deocariza, Mariño *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	5th International Convention of Asia Scholars *Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia* 2-5 August
Elloso, Lilia *Statistical Research and Training Center*	56th Session of the International Statistical Institute *Lisboa, Portugal* 22-29 August
Umali, Conchita *Graduate School* *Assumption College*	Peace, Hope and Well-being across Cultures *California, USA* 11-14 September
Tadem, Teresa *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines*	2007 Euroseas Conference *Naples, Italy* 12-15 September
Arugay, Aries *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines*	2007 Euroseas Conference *Naples, Italy* 12-15 September

2008

Mabazza, Daniel *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	2008 Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting *Massachusetts, USA* 15-19 April
Holmes, Ronald *Department of Political Science* *De La Salle University*	International Political Science Association Conference *Montreal, Canada* 30 April – 2 May

Francisco, Carlota *Department of Filipino* *Ateneo de Manila University*	International Child and Youth Research in the 21st Century *Nicosia, Cyprus* 28-29 May
Jurisprudencia, Jerry *Department of Psychology* *Miriam College*	2nd Convention Of Asian Psychological Association *Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia* 26-28 June
Sta. Maria, Madelene *Department of Psychology* *De La Salle University*	20th Biennial International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development *Germany* 13-17 July
Lopez-Advincula, Leslie *Dept. of Sociology-Anthropology* *Ateneo de Manila University*	International Sociological Association Research Committee 01 Interim Meeting *Seoul, South Korea* 14-17 July
Tarroja, Maria Caridad *Department of Psychology* *De La Salle University*	XXIX International Congress of Psychology *Berlin, Germany* 20-25 July
Saguin, Kristian Karlo *Department of Geography* *University of the Philippines*	31st International Geographical Congress *Tunis, Tunisia* 12-15 August
Nelson, Gloria Luz *Department of Social Sciences* *University of the Philippines* *Los Baños*	International Sociological Association First Forum in Sociology *Barcelona, Spain* 4-8 September

2009

Agbisit, Joanne *Philippine Social Science Council*	World Social Science Forum *Bergen, Norway* 10-12 May
Rufino, Rozanno *National Economic Development Authority*	World Social Science Forum *Bergen, Norway* 10-12 May
Erasga, Dennis *Dept. of Behavioral Sciences* *De La Salle University*	Canadian Sociological Association's 2009 Annual Conference *Ottawa, Canada* 25-29 May

Lavares, Melissa *Demographic Research and Development Foundation, Inc.*	East-West Center Communicating with Policymaker about Population and Health *Hawaii, USA* 2 June- 2 July
Sollano, Francis *Department of English* *Ateneo de Manila University*	18th AASSREC Biennial General Conference *Bangkok, Thailand* 27-29 August
Penetrante, Marylendra *Divine Word College Of Legazpi*	10th Annual Counseling Conference *Nairobi, Kenya* 1-3 September
Hall, Rosalie *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines in the Visayas*	American Political Science Association 2009 Annual Meeting and Exhibition *Ontario, Canada* 3-6 September
Subade, Rodelio *Division of Social Sciences* *University of the Philippines in the Visayas*	2nd Diversitas Open Science Conference *Capetown, South Africa* 13-16 October
Tigno, Jorge *Department of Political Science* *University of the Philippines*	Second International Conference of Japanese Studies in Southeast Asia: The Past, Present, and Future *Hanoi, Vietnam* 22-23 October
Ang, Alvin *Social Research Center* *University of Santo Tomas*	8th International Conference of the Japan Economic Policy *Japan* 28-29 November

PSSC at the First World Social Science Forum

Luisa L. Fernan

A seven-member Philippine delegation led by PSSC Executive Director Virginia A. Miralao participated in the First World Social Science Forum (WSSF) on 10–12 May 2009 in Bergen, Norway. The other members of the delegation were Joanne Agbisit and Ma. Luisa Fernan of PSSC, Ruth Rico of the University of the Philippines, Clarence Batan of the University of Santo Tomas, Rozanno Rufino of the National Economic and Development Authority, and Winifredo Dagli of Earthquake and Megacities Inc.

Convened by the International Social Science Council (ISSC), the WSSF was hosted and co-organized by the University of Bergen and the Stein Rokkan Center. The conference theme "One Planet-Worlds Apart?" aimed to highlight the relevance of social sciences in current global realities. Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize Laureate in Economics in 1998, delivered the keynote address entitled "Challenges for the Social Sciences in the New Century." Rajendra Kumar Pachauri, Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change who shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with Al Gore, was plenary speaker on the topic "Can Science Save Us? Challenges for the Social Sciences from Climate Change." Other leading social scientists also spoke during plenaries covering the topics "One Social Science–or Many," "Towards Novel Assemblages of Territory, Authority and Rights," and "Knowing Better and Doing Worse? What Social Science Can Provide for Policy Makers."

In addition to the Plenary Sessions, 38 parallel sessions were organized by ISSC's member-organizations and partner institutions and 54 posters were set up covering a broad range of topics and cross-disciplinal perspectives. In its bid to encourage promising and early career scholars in the social sciences, ISSC awarded 40 scholarships and support grants to young researchers to present their respective works via poster presentations or in parallel sessions. Among the recipients of full or partial grants were five of the Philippine delegates who participated in the poster sessions: Ruth Rico (Governance, Development and Indigenous Peoples: The Implementation of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of the Philippines); Clarence Batan (Value Formation Among Inactive Filipino Youth); Joanne Agbisit (Invisible in the Net: E-publishing and Online Knowledge-Sharing Initiatives of Filipino Social Science Organizations); Rozanno Rufino (Reforming the Public Sector Framework on Development Policy Research in the Philippines); and Winifredo Dagli (The Commodification of the Sacred: Political Ecology of Ecotourism in Mt. Banahaw National Park, Philippines). PSSC also displayed the poster presentation of Dr. Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr. (Overseas Labor Migration and Transnational Marriages in a Rural Philippine Village) who was unable to attend the Forum.



At the end of the conference, the closing session reflected on the proceedings and identified the challenges that confront the social sciences today. Identified as a major concern is the capacity of the social sciences to be relevant, pertinent and potent in addressing pressing and intertwined global issues such as climate change within the context of reducing existing inequalities between/among nations and classes; promoting sustainable development amidst the need for continuing economic growth; managing growing populations while raising life expectancy; and encouraging universal values even as we allow cultural diversity to flourish.

PSSC Participates in the 18th Biennial General Conference of the Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils

Joanne B. Agbisit

The Philippine Social Science Council (PSSC), an active member of the Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils (AASSREC), participated in AASSREC's 18th Biennial General Conference in Bangkok, Thailand on 27-29 August 2009. The conference was hosted by the National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT) and attended by representatives of AASSREC's 13 member-organizations as well as guests and observers from Pakistan and Taiwan. Leading the Philippine delation were PSSC Chair Allan B.I. Bernardo and Executive Director Virginia A. Miralao.

The conference, which was formally opened by Prof. Ahnond Bunyaratvej, President of NRCT, and Dr. Darryl Macer, UNESCO Bangkok's Regional Advisor on Social and Human Sciences in Asia and the Pacific, had the theme "Multiculturalism in a Globalizing World: Views from the Asia-Pacific." The Philippine country paper was delivered by Mr. Francis Sollano, a young faculty member of Ateneo de Manila University's Department of English. Entitled "Reconfiguring Multiculturalism in the Philippines: The Entry of Local Products in the Global Market," Sollano's paper looked at globalization as a driver of multiculturalism, compelling provinces and regional groups to be conscious of and highlight their distinct cultural and economic characteristics (e.g. Paete sculptures, Cebu mangoes) and to market these for global consumption. Other country paper presenters focused on the roots, notions and experiences of multiculturalism in their own countries and the impact of globalizing forces and institutions on multicultural societies and initiatives.



The conference was capped by a Business Meeting where AASSREC's member-organizations discussed the accomplishments and forthcoming activities of the Council and chose the next set of officers. For the next biennium (2009-2011), the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), which previously held the post of First Vice President, will assume the AASSREC Presidency and will serve as host of the 19th Biennial General Conference in 2011. PSSC, meanwhile, was elected First Vice President, making PSSC next in line as ASSRREC President and host of the 2013 Biennial General Conference. NRCT now holds the post of Second Vice President, while the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia remains the Secretariat of AASSREC.

FELLOWSHIP NEWS

Twenty-nine Individuals Selected as 2009 Fellows of the Ford Foundation International Fellowships Program

Joanne B. Agbisit

Twenty-nine promising individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds were selected as new fellows of the Ford Foundation International Fellowships Program (IFP) in the 2009 round of competition administered by the Philippine Social Science Council (PSSC). Of the 29 successful applicants, 18 were women and 11 were men, with more than half coming from Mindanao.

The new fellows will receive full financial assistance, including tuition support and living and travel allowances, for a maximum of two years of Master's studies. They can study in any IFP partner institution in Europe, Asia, Australia or the United States.



To prepare the new fellows for graduate school, PSSC organized a week-long orientation which included a briefing on fellowship entitlements and responsibilities by PSSC's IFP staff; presentations on the educational systems of the US and UK, which were done by the Philippine-American Educational Fund and the British Council, respectively; and academic advising by specialists in the fellows' chosen fields of study.

PSSC likewise arranged a two-month training seminar to improve the new fellows' English language proficiency, hone their computer skills, and develop their ability to conceptualize and undertake independent research. PSSC tapped the Ateneo Language Learning Center for the English refresher course and the Statistical Research and Training Center for the computer training seminar. The training on research conceptualization and design, meanwhile, was handled by PSSC's pool of experts led by Dr. Manuel Diaz and Dr. Virginia Miralao.

The 2009 fellows constitute the last batch of IFP fellows from the Philippines. PSSC began implementing the program in 2002 in partnership with the US-based International Fellowships Fund. During the eight-year period, 223 Filipinos have been awarded the fellowship, half of whom have completed their graduate studies.

Ten Social Science Students Receive Grants under the Research Award Program

Joanne B. Agbisit

PSSC awarded 10 graduate students with research grants under the 2009 Research Award Program (RAP). The four PhD grantees will receive financial support of up to P50,000, while the six MA grantees will receive P25,000 each. The grants are intended to cover costs related to the students' preparation of their thesis or dissertation.

The recipients include Samuel Anonas (PhD Philippine Studies, Mindanao State University); Marianne Jennifer Gaerlan (PhD Applied Linguistics, De La Salle University); Vicente Villan (PhD History, University of the Philippines-Diliman); Analyn Salvador-Amores (PhD Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford); Maria Eda Carreon (MA English Language Education, DLSU); Jo Anne Dumalaon (MA Psychology, Ateneo de Manila University); Zyralie Lotivio (MA Demography, UP Diliman); Ruzzel Brian Mallari (MA Demography, UP Diliman); Joy Raquel Tadeo (MA Anthropology, UP Diliman); and Ma. Aleah Taboclaon (MA Psychology, UP Diliman).

Established in 1968, RAP embodies PSSC's commitment to support the academic preparation of young scholars in the social sciences. A total of 438 graduate students have been awarded RAP grants in the four decades of program implementation.

A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP

Dr. Virginia A. Miralao Feted at Retirement Party

Joanne B. Agbisit

Dr. Virginia Miralao retired from office in December 2009 after serving as PSSC Executive Director for fourteen years and a year's stint as PSSC Chair. She is succeeded by Dr. Grace Gorospe-Jamon, a professor of political science at the University of the Philippines and former Dean of the Development Academy of the Philippines' Graduate School of Public and Development Management.



Family, friends, colleagues, and staff feted Dr. Miralao, Jean to all of us, with a surprise retirement and thank-you party on 17 December 2009. PSSC Chair Allan Bernardo, who gave the opening toast, thanked Dr. Miralao for making his stint at PSSC fulfilling and effortless. "Jean knows what's to be done and knows how to make it happen. I saw how PSSC changed during her tenure as Executive Director and was impressed at the level of professionalism, efficiency and productivity that the Council has achieved. I'm glad to have had the chance to work with her and to be part of PSSC's glory," Dr. Bernardo said.

One of the highlights of the party was the stirring tribute made by former colleagues in the Council. Dr. Meliton Juanico, who sat in the Board for many years as representative of geography, recalled how Dr. Miralao was able to bring peace and unity to Council meetings and activities. "When Jean came into the picture, the atmosphere was acrimonious, but with her charm, humor, and savoir faire, Jean was able to restore good will and camaraderie among the members and she has done so for 15 years," remarked Dr. Juanico. Longtime family friend and former PSSC Chair Jose Endriga mentioned that the most obvious legacy of Dr. Miralao was the PSSCenter. "She has turned the PSSCenter and its grounds into a beautiful and welcoming place," he marveled. Former PSSC Chairs Cayetano Paderanga and Felipe Miranda, meanwhile, thanked Dr. Miralao for her role in strengthening the Council and the social science community as a whole. Dr. Paderanga commends that the way Dr. Miralao competently managed PSSC— its finances, assets and human resources— while continuing to contribute to scholarship is a major feat, something few people can combine. Prof. Miranda agreed and added, "Jean was able to beautify the building, generate good finances, and maintain good scholarship, which raised the level of productivity of and added prestige to PSSC."

Former PSSC staff, Ms. Lorna Makil and Ms. Monette Jimenez, also shared their fondest memories of Dr. Miralao who was not only a boss to them, but a good friend as well. In the message read by Ms. Chit Drilon, Ms. Makil said "I want to thank you, Jean, for the important and sometimes unintended enlightenments that you gave me. When we traveled together, you showed me how to enjoy a new place, especially its cuisine. Your search for spirituality, especially when you started those meditation lessons, helped me deepen my own spiritual enlightenment and awakened my search for personal liberation."

The main surprise of the evening was Dr. Cynthia Bautista's announcement of Dr. Belinda Aquino's grant of US$5,000 for the establishment of a Virginia A. Miralao Research Fund which shall be used to give a yearly cash prize for the best journal article written by a promising young scholar. Dr. Aquino, professor of Philippine Studies at the University of Hawaii-Manoa and close friend of Dr. Miralao, said that the fund "aims to honor the invaluable and distinguished contributions of Dr. Miralao to the development of social science in the Philippines primarily in her role as Executive Director of PSSC for many years, and as a talented scholar herself in the field, someone who has written extensively on social science issues which have enriched the state of academic scholarship and aided public policy concerns."

The festive gathering also included parlor games, a surprise dance number, and a video tribute by the staff which featured the lighter side of Dr. Miralao. Before the evening drew to a close, Dr. Miralao gave her heartfelt thanks to all those who supported and trusted her for the past 15 years. She said her turn at PSSC has been among her happiest as it has given her the freedom to pursue and combine her passions: research, organizing, decorating, gardening, and entertaining guests. "But it's time to go and it's time to bring new blood and new ideas into the organization. I thank Dr. Jamon for accepting the challenge of becoming PSSC's next Executive Director," she said.








DR. MIRALAO'S RETIREMENT PARTY IN PICTURES






Dr. Grace Gorospe-Jamon assumes PSSC Executive Directorship

Segundo E. Romero
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY

Dr. Jamon is Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines in Diliman where she has been teaching full-time since 1976.

Dr. Grace Gorospe-Jamon started the year 2010 as the new Executive Director of PSSC. She brings into the position a reputation for principled and competent leadership in an academic and policy institution as Dean of the Graduate School of Public and Development Management of the Development Academy of the Philippines (GSPDM-DAP) from July 2005 to June 2006 and from November 2008 to June 2009, and as President of the archipelago-wide Association of Schools of Public Administration of the Philippines (ASPAP).

Dr. Jamon is Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines in Diliman where she has been teaching full-time since 1976. She holds PhD, MA, and AB degrees in Political Science from the University of the Philippines. She was a scholar of the Asia Foundation to the 1991 Young Professional Program held in San Francisco, USA. She also completed an Executive Course in Brand Management in Kyoto, Japan in 2005 and a Summer Course in National Security at Kiel University, Germany in 1989. Dr. Jamon specializes in and often serves as resource person in the areas of religion, politics and church-state relations, local and participatory governance, policy formulation and advocacy, and competency-based education and training.

In addition to teaching, Dr. Jamon is involved in advocacy and development work. She is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Transparency International–Philippines (TI-Phil) and the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) which she co-founded with fellow UP Professors in 1989. She is also a Senior Fellow of the Institute for Studies in Asian Church and Culture (ISACC). In 1999, President Joseph Estrada appointed her as one of five members of the Presidential Conscience Committee to advise the President on the use of Executive Clemency. Dr. Jamon has also served as consultant to various government offices, civil society groups, faith-based organizations, and private institutions.

Dr. Jamon is a cancer survivor, now on her 20th year of remission. She considers this extended grace of life as one of the engines of her persistent drive for excellence in service to the larger community, disciplined with integrity, and colored with compassion.

TRIBUTES

IN HONOR OF CORAZON B. LAMUG, My Mentor

Mark Oliver Llangco
IFP FELLOW 2008
PH.D. STUDENT (SOCIOLOGY),
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

Dr. Corazon Lamug was the immediate past president of the Philippine Sociological Society (PSS), former dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and Professor of Sociology at the Department of Social Sciences in UP Los Baños. She was my professor in SOC 135 (Attitudes and Persuasion). But more than being my former professor and the former dean, I will remember her as the one who gave me the biggest breakthroughs in my life. And today let me share with you how I plan not only to remember her but also to honor her.

I am at the crossroads of my professional career and I am grateful for the unprecedented role Dr. Lamug played in it. Dr. Lamug was instrumental in my being Fellow-Elect of the PSSC-administered Ford Foundation International Fellowships Program for the year 2008. One afternoon in October 2007, I was asked by the department secretary to give her a call. Over the phone, her first question was, "How soon are you finishing your master's?" I said, "this year Ma'am." "The reason why I am asking is because I want

you to submit an application to a scholarship. This is a generous scholarship. Even more generous than Fulbright. And you can study anywhere in the world." I was dazzled by the idea and was speechless for a while. Our conversation continued and I can remember another important statement she said. "You know, professional development is institutional development. Teaching is public service." At that time, I was agreeing to all the nice words and encouragements she was telling me. I didn't know exactly what it should mean to me. My thinking was that implicitly, she was telling me that she was giving me an opportunity to advance my career and at the same time looking at that as a means to strengthen the department. That opportunity, she said, was not given to everybody, only to those who are committed or most likely to be committed.

And so, the day of the interview with the national selection panel came on May 2008 at PSSC in Quezon City. After the five-minute interview with four panelists I went out of the room and saw Dr. Lamug, who said that she was the fifth member of the panel. She said she decided to inhibit herself and leave the room during my turn because she was the one who recommended me. When I went home to Calamba, Laguna I got another text message from our department secretary saying that Dr. Lamug was again looking for me. When I called her, Dr. Lamug said that even though she was not supposed to say it, she was happy to tell me that the members of the panel recommended me. I was euphoric. That meant I will just have to wait for the formal announcement of my election as fellow.

It is only now that I am beginning to realize how life-changing that phone conversation was. I was telling Leslee that in the future when I remember that point in my life, it would have been ordinary. But because of this event, I now have an idea how I would interpret it in the future. Dr. Lamug unexpectedly opened the door to a life-changing opportunity through the Ford IFP Fellowship. What better way to honor her than to be an outstanding sociologist like herself and fulfill the promise to return and share in the task of strengthening the department.

One of my friends asked me an hour after learning that Ma'am Lamug has left us: "Oliver, how does it feel that you are her last project?" I felt honored and burdened at the same time. I felt honored because I know that opportunity was not given to everybody. And burdened because I have to keep the promise.

To my mind, she has symbolically passed on the baton by distributing it to many. Honoring her memory is fulfilling my deal with her to successfully complete my graduate studies in order to build the institution. It is about becoming an outstanding sociologist and making the practice of sociology in UPLB as energetic as it is in Manila. It is to actualize that potential that a Dean Corazon Lamug saw in a former student named Mark Oliver Llangco. It is to nurture the seed that she has planted in UPLB to grow into a sturdy and fruitful tree.

Dean Lamug, I am pleased to be one of your last projects. With much gratitude and love, I embrace your challenge and legacy.

May God's eternal light shine upon you. In the heart of my heart, I thank you.

Dr. Corazon Lamug was President of the Philippine Sociological Society (PSS) and a member of the PSSC Board of Trustees when she passed away in September 2008. Previously she served as PSS representative in the PSSC Governing Council in 1992 and 1993. She was a most enthusiastic and energetic partner of PSSC, organizing panels composed of Los Baños scholars for various PSSC conferences and actively promoting PSSC grant programs (as the Ford Foundation International Fellowships Program, the ASIA Fellows Awards, and PSSC's Research Award and Travel Grant Programs) among her students and young colleagues.

REMEMBERING FINARD

Amihan Abueva
REGIONAL COORDINATOR,
ASIA AGAINST CHILD TRAFFICKING (ACTS)

Finardo Cabilao was a quintessential social worker of our times.

In contemporary Filipino Society racked by the wide disparities between the elite and vast majority of our people who are struggling to make a living, where countless children and youth live and work on the streets, millions of people leave the country in search for jobs, so many families on the verge of breaking-up, there is more than ample work for social workers.

As a government social worker for almost 30 years, Finard started his profession with the National Training School for Boys (NTSB), then in Occidental Mindoro and was promoted to various offices of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), particularly as director of the External Assistance Service; Policy Development and Planning Bureau; and Social Technology Bureau.

Finard defended the rights of street children, trafficked persons, children in conflict with the law, Filipino refugees and deportees in Malaysia and the elderly. He assisted the Philippine Alliance for Youth Offenders (PAYO) and the Coalition of Services for the Elderly (COSE), cooperating closely with NGOs in the Philippines and abroad.

From 2002 to 2004, he was the national president of the Philippine Association of Social Workers Inc. (PASWI), the organization of social work practitioners in the country.

He was assigned as social welfare attaché to Malaysia in July 2008. Dedicated to his profession and his countrymen, Finard unselfishly assisted the rescue of almost two hundred Filipino women and youth who had been trafficked to different parts of Malaysia. He ensured that they were provided with shelter and other appropriate services while waiting to be repatriated to the Philippines. Finard was also committed in strengthening the network of

individual community volunteers, NGOs, and religious organizations that could provide support to trafficked persons and those in detention centers. He advocated for better policies and more comprehensive services for trafficked persons.

Finard also networked and developed links with NGOs in the Philippines, Malaysia and other countries, sharing with them his experiences and suggesting new programs for protecting victims of trafficking. In cooperation with the police, several cases were filed against traffickers in spite of the challenges with the impunity surrounding the traffickers. He worked closely with media to raise awareness about the issue of trafficking with the intention of contributing to the preventive measures. He advocated for the provision of more services for the victims who have been repatriated in order to break the cycle of re-victimization. And he also supported the development of the National Recovery and Reintegration Database to have an efficient system of monitoring the cases of trafficking as well as the type and quality of services provided to trafficking victims.

Finard was threatened in the course of his work to defend the trafficked persons. Although he was a diplomat, Finard waived his diplomatic immunity in order to support the trafficked persons in pursuit of justice. He built a wide network to ensure that trafficked victims are provided with quality services.

Finard was well aware of the risks his kind of work entails but he was always determined to give the best quality of service to those who needed his help. On 5 August 2009, Finard was brutally tortured and killed in his apartment in Kuala Lumpur. His untimely death has helped NGOs and government personnel to unite and put pressure on the full implementation of the anti-trafficking law and for the protection of service providers. He has become a powerful symbol of integrity, service and commitment for all of us working to defend the rights of trafficked persons.

PSSC was most fortunate to have Finard Cabilao join its Board in 2002, at the time that he became President of PASWI (Philppine Association of Social Workers, Inc.). Because of his many valuable services, PSSC requested PASWI for an extension of Finard's term as discipline (social work) representative to the Council. He served in the PSSC Board from 2002 to 2007. As Treasurer and Chair of the Finance and Personnel Committee, he helped shepherd the reorganization of the PSSC Secretariat in response to changes in the Council's environment and activities. He was also responsible for putting teeth in PSSC's membership policies, recommending that sanctions be imposed on member-associations who fail to comply with the rules on membership. He did many other things, including actively promoting and helping raise funds for the 2003 National Social Science Congress which focused on The Filipino Youth, and the International Association of Historians in Asia (IAHA) Conference which PSSC hosted and organized in 2006. He was also very accessible – PSSC Accounting could ask him to sign checks anytime and he made himself available to chair a lecture or moderate a session when needed. Finard had a good grasp of organizational imperatives and institutional requirements. Many of us will remember him as a great friend, a team player and an avid supporter of PSSC.

GREAT INSTITUTIONAL LOSS AT UP-NCPAG

Belinda A. Aquino
PROFESSOR EMERITUS,
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ASIAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII AT MANOA

The unfortunate passing in recent years of four UP academics who were key faculty, scholars, researchers and administrative leaders at the National College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG) is a major institutional loss that has created a great void that will be difficult to fill. At a time when it is getting harder in higher education to train, recruit, and retain talented and productive faculty to strengthen academic institutions all over the world, the loss becomes doubly unsettling, if not painful.

The four NCPAG stalwarts who have departed in the last four or five years were Professor and Dean Raul P. de Guzman, University Professor Ledivina (Leddy) V. Cariño, Professor Ma. Concepcion (Maricon) P. Alfiler and Professor Victoria (Vicky) A. Bautista.

First, a word about the UP institution they left behind.

The NCPAG traces its nearly 50-year roots to the establishment of the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) at the original UP campus on Padre Faura, Manila, in 1952. It was one of the first institutes set up during the presidency of Vidal Tan under a contractual agreement with the University of Michigan. The first of its kind in Asia, IPA eventually became a regional center to advance public administration as an academic and professional discipline, particularly with regard to raising levels of efficiency and effectiveness of government and public service in general.

Over time, IPA metamorphosed into the Graduate School of Public Administration, the College of Public Administration, and finally into the NCPAG. The current NCPAG was eventually relocated to the flagship Diliman campus. It was a landmark development in the institution's history as it achieved the status of a "national" professional school following an Act of the Philippine Congress. This status not only gave national but also international recognition to UP as a center of excellence for the promotion of public administration as a field of academic and professional inquiry.

Raul de Guzman (PhD, Florida State University) was a prime mover and pioneer in NCPAG's continuous growth, starting as a junior faculty and rising up the ladder until he became not only Professor but Dean of the College. He would eventually become UP Vice President for Planning and Finance, as well as Chancellor of UP Los Baños. He was also instrumental in developing the Local Government Center, a unique outfit which did a lot of outreach and research on local governments and issues. He also headed the university's Management Review Team during the Angara administration, which designed much-needed reforms for university governance. He traveled extensively observing trends in other countries, and was largely responsible in setting up the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA), which is still active today. Raul wrote extensively on public administration topics and came out with an early textbook entitled *Patterns of Decision-Making in the Philippines* and various other useful references.

It is not possible within this limited space to chronicle all of Raul's notable achievements as one of the most committed and productive scholars in vital areas of public administration, especially on public policy, local governments, development, organization and management, and regional issues. His graduate courses on politics and administration, his administrative leadership, his stewardship of college and university committees and programs, his social and management skills, and various other invaluable contributions not only to NCPAG but to the university community and larger society will be sorely missed.

Leddy Cariño was an intellectual giant throughout the College's history with a prodigious research and instructional output, as well as outstanding service to various university and college projects. A true-blue product of public administration from undergraduate to graduate school, she achieved the status of University Professor, the highest academic rank given by the university for exemplary academic achievements. Leddy had a broad interdisciplinary background augmented by a PhD in Sociology (Indiana University), which showed in her formidable writings on such topics as corruption, public policy, bureaucratic reform, civil society, land development, and so. She authored a landmark publication entitled *Between the State and the Market: The Nonprofit Sector and Civil Society of the Philippines* on the relationship of civil society with government and the private sector. She was extremely prolific and was also a constant contributor as well as overseer of the quarterly *Journal of Public Administration*. Her editing skills were remarkable. She was a devoted professor mentoring masteral and doctoral students on their theses or dissertations on complex topics.

She also became an academician of the National Academy of Science and Technology (NAST), one of the few social scientists invited to join this prestigious national organization of scientists. She achieved so many academic distinctions during her lifetime including becoming dean of the College of two years.

Vicky Bautista (PhD Sociology, Michigan State University) was another interdisciplinary faculty who provided academic diversity to the College. A sociologist, she was mainly interested in social and cultural issues in places or communities where ordinary working men and women live. She got her undergraduate training in sociology at UP Diliman and went on to Michigan State University (MSU) to pursue her doctorate in the same field. When she returned to the Philippines, she was hired as faculty by the College, where she taught courses with sociological content based on the Filipino experience. She introduced innovations in the graduate curriculum as teaching in Filipino to make her subject matter more understandable to students. It is not easy to teach in Filipino especially in fields like sociology where concepts are not easily translatable to the vernacular, and Vicky should be commended for this approach she used in her classes.

She was particularly interested in health issues and conducted various community projects on these issues. Her interest in this area was recognized by the NAST, which gave her an award, along with Leddy Carñno and Maricon Alfiler (all of NCPAG) for their contributions to health and social science. NAST, under the presidency of Dr. Perla Santos Ocampo, expanded the academy's purview to include social science concerns, such as population, demography, public policy, health, family, community and so on. Vicky had done a lot of field work on some of these topics in various local communities.

Maricon Alfiler (PhD, University of the Philippines), was likewise a home-grown product of NCPAG from its earliest days on Padre Faura in the early 1960s. I first met her when I was an IPA graduate fellow and she was a student assistant at the Institute assisting faculty with curricular and other needs. She was like a Girl Friday to the faculty and administration who knew how to run and get things done. She did all kinds of administrative chores and assisted in the completion of various projects in the College. In time she would go to graduate school and receive a Master's in Public Administration (MPA) and remained with the College.

She pursued and finished a PhD in Philippine Studies, which broadened her more specialized training in public administration. She eventually joined the College as a faculty member, rose through the ranks until she became professor and dean. Because of her administrative skills and knowledge of public issues, she was tapped by UP President Emerlinda Roman to join Central administration as Vice President for Planning and Finance, a position that she occupied until her untimely passing in 2009.

I will end on a personal note, which conveys the depth of my grief and sadness over the demise of all four, whom I knew and liked so well as friends and colleagues and fellow travelers. Raul gave me my first graduate school fellowship which changed the course of my life and led to a career in social science. He was a kind and gentle soul who always made you feel important with his concerns and attention. Leddy, though she was of a younger generation, was a real friend of some 48 years. After UP days, we met again as East-West Center student grantees in Hawaii in the early 60s. Maricon and Vicky came much later but I got to know them just as well. We spent so many happy hours whenever I returned home for a vacation or conference. Those days are irreplaceable and will always mean a lot to me.

The demise of Drs. Raul de Guzman, Ledivina Cariño, Ma. Concepcion Alfiler and Victoria Bautista was also a big loss for the Philippine social sciences. All four were members of the Philippine Society for Public Administration (PSPA) and represented the discipline in the PSSC Board at various times.

Dr. de Guzman sat in the PSSC Executive Board in the early years of PSSC (1972, 1974-1976) and again in the Governing Council from 1978 to 1983. Dr. Cariño represented PSPA at the Executive Board for two years, 1979 and 1980. In 1979, she was elected as its Secretary-Treasurer and Chair of the Finance Committee, and in 1980, she was designated Chair of the Research Committee. Dr. Bautista served in the Executive Board from 1983 to 1984 and was member of the Research Committee. Dr. Cariño returned to PSSC in 1991 as representative of the Philippine Sociological Society at the PSSC Governing Council. Dr. Alfiler, meanwhile, was member of the Executive Board from 1992 to 1994 and was elected Chair in 1994. She was only the second public administration representative to be elected Chair of the PSSC Executive Board.

Even after their terms at PSSC ended, they remained interested and active in Council activities. They lent their time and expertise in National Social Science Congresses, either as paper presenters, discussants or panel chairs. They also participated in PSSC's lecture series, public fora, and roundtable discussions.

Central Subscription Service and Book Center

The PSSC Book Center helps promote Philippine social science materials, particularly the publications of PSSC and its member-associations. The Book Center also carries books and journals released by the country's leading university presses and social science institutions. It sells individual copies of publications, accepts orders for specific titles, and services subscriptions for regular journal publications. The list of available titles at the PSSC Book Center can be viewed at the PSSC website (www.pssc.org.ph) and facebook account.

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