The Institutionalizing of Social Conduct and the New Society in the Philippines (Part I)

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I. Philosophical Antecedents

EFFORTS at expressing demands for disciplined human conduct by some formal, institutional arrangements are as old as organized social life itself. History records persistent preoccupation by rulers or governments with keeping certain human impulses under deliberate public control, while stimulating or maintaining others that they regard as socially desirable or vital to the welfare of community life. This historical experience is attested by such diverse instances as the practice of rigid rituals and taboos in primitive societies, the customary code of conduct during medieval feudal times in the West or the apparatus of bureaucratic directives regarding proper public conduct that is one of the prominent features of our contemporary life.

In this article, we shall focus our interest on man's conduct as a member of a group or the state — on social conduct — and on the attempts by the state to regulate such conduct. Such attempts may be expressed by the idea of "the institutionalizing of social conduct." For the purpose of this article, "conduct" refers to the "manner of behaving oneself," while "social" refers to "any behavior or attitude . . . that

is oriented consciously or unconsciously toward other people." [1] The term "social conduct" refers to the mode of human behavior that involves mutual communication among members of a group or of society, which usually expresses itself through some commonly agreed set of general standards of values.

"Institutionalizing," as applied here to social conduct, refers to attempts at controlling people's beliefs or actions by deliberate acts of public authority, such as by laws or official initiative, or as the process by which such control is accomplished. More specifically, institutionalizing social conduct may be defined as a deliberate attempt by the state to integrate human behavior into the framework of national objectives or to put it differently, as an attempt to use human behavior as an instrument of state policy. It may be noted that our interest is only in those institutional arrangements that concern the state; this excludes other forms of institutional arrangements, such as belong, for example, to private or religious associations or bodies.

Conduct and Nature

The factors that have bearing on the issue of institutionalizing social conduct

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[1] Julius Gould and William L. Kolb (eds.), *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 643.

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are many and may be viewed from several perspectives. Our first perspective will be to approach our issue in terms of the traditional philosophic treatment in which the question of social conduct is related to certain assumptions about the nature of man. Such assumptions may be crucial to the interpretation of social life or conduct, as, for example, the difference between Hobbes and Locke, two seventeenth century Western thinkers, demonstrates. While following essentially the same method of reasoning and of exposition of their argument, namely, the Galilean-deductive method, these two thinkers came up with completely different conclusions, completely different models of political life (Hobbes with royal absolutism, Locke with a representative government based on popular sovereignty — simply because their starting assumptions about human nature basically differed.

Philosophic tradition advances roughly two basic assumptions about the nature of man: that human nature is essentially "good" and that it is essentially "bad." The idea that man by nature is good is frequently said to be the position of philosophic "idealism." It is associated with such ideas as the belief in the innate goodness of man, man's natural sociability and essential rationality. The idea of man's innate goodness has been expounded, for example, in the teaching of Confucius and of Rousseau. The Confucians appear to regard humanity not only as the most desirable virtue in relations among people but also as in harmony with Nature. Likewise, Rousseau, a seventeenth century French thinker, speaks about the innate sympathy of man with, or compassion for, the suffering of his fellow-men, about innate feelings of goodness in the unspoilt heart of every human being. This position appears to imply that socially disruptive human conduct is only a deviation from the "natural" conduct, an exceptional rather than a normal practice of man. It is true that both Confucius and Rousseau admit the value of institutionalizing social conduct under certain conditions, that is, when man for some reasons has failed to pursue his natural self. However, such measures can only be "corrective" in character, not affecting human nature as such. At best they can only be conducive, as the famous Confucian Mencius has put it, to "the restoration of right feelings," i.e., of man's innate goodness. On this assumption, then, the institutionalizing of social conduct is neither a strictly "normal" nor an absolutely necessary feature of social life.

The idea of human goodness appears also latent in the Aristotelian belief in the social nature of man. On this belief, man is an essentially social animal. His life-experience is essentially a shared, common human experience. This is taken to imply that social motivation is an instinctive or natural endowment of man and that, therefore, some degree of natural restraint is present in all human relationships. The implication here appears to be that what should be emphasized is the

proper development of such natural tendencies, not social controls or prohibitions.

A similar relative lack of interest in institutionalizing social conduct is manifest in the rationalist tradition of political thought, at least in the West. The idealist-rationalist Plato, for instance, believes, in his *Republic,* that the presence of laws is a sign of social decay. Similarly, the rationalist economist Adam Smith, one of the great initiators of modern liberalism, is convinced that the less laws or restrictions, the better. For him, there are certain natural laws of human conduct that dictate man to follow his self-interest and this will presumably lead to a perfectly ordered society. A "natural harmony of self-interests" will, according to him, result. In Adam's thinking, human differences and needs will complement one another in the end. He assumes that man would act essentially in a rational, enlightened way, i.e., bearing the social consequences of his action in mind, not strictly selfishly. The pursuit of self-interest is thus not harmful, rather it is the prerequisite of common welfare. Adam Smith implies that state control can only be a hindrance to natural conduct, hence, it is an evil. Another great rationalist thinker, Marx, the founder of modern communism, reveals a similar negative attitude to coercive state action, at least once the state of social perfection — of a classless society predicted by him — will have been accomplished. He speaks about the "withering away of the state;" presumably the entire

framework of traditional institutions including the state would either disappear altogether or would become subject to complete reorganization. All these mentioned rationalist views appear to have that much in common that they regard state action in matters of conduct as ideally undesirable and unnecessary, as contrary to the "natural" order of things.

The assumption that human nature is essentially "bad" is frequently identified with the position of philosophic "realism." On this position, man is usually defined as a self-motivated, egocentric being, whose spring of action is self-interest or overwhelming concern for seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. Sometimes he is also pictured as an essentially aggressive creature. In its more extreme form, this view of man is the familiar picture of Machiavelli's despotic rule, a political "realist" or schemer, concerned purely with political domination, and the Hobbesian aggressive individual in the state of nature, whose psychological make-up is explained in crude terms of materialist behaviorism or of man's consuming passion for personal power. A similar picture is frequently found in the Christian view about human nature. Thus on the Augustinian-Patristic tradition, man is viewed as a "deprived," "corrupt" animal, ever-open to sinful temptations, to "evil." Such human depravity has been ascribed to the act of the Fall of Man, by which man became alienated from God's righteousness and now, driven away from the original blessed condi-

tion, he is dependent on his own human resources for goodness or salvation. But too easily he is weak and succumbs to evil. This biblical lesson led St. Augustine to explain the origin of the state as a divine act. It was ordained by God in man's post-fall anarchic condition of life. It is essentially an instrument of compulsion by which God calls man to order. It exists as a retribution for man's sin, to compel man to be good, and at the same time as a remedial institution, to give a chance to man by following the new God-ordained order to find salvation for himself. On this assumption about human nature, coercive action and manipulation of human conduct by the state of human conduct is not only desirable but absolutely necessary if there is to be peaceful and orderly social existence.

Perhaps, most assumptions about human nature are not as extreme as those that have been mentioned. For most thinkers, human nature is somewhere between the two extremes, that is, it is a mixture of both good and bad elements. Even this position, however, affects views on the desirability of state action in matters of human conduct. On this modified position, though the capacity for human goodness is not denied, man is not trusted altogether. Man is said to be characterized by many good points but his concern for himself is also acknowledged as ever-present and as potentially undermining community life. Thus although the Christian St. Thomas, regards the state and laws as essentially

natural institutions, he contends at the same time that coercive authority is a necessary part of social life and that the dispensation of law and justice and maintenance of temporal order is the moral obligation of the ruler. For him, although essentially good in his soul, man is a vastly imperfect being, man's resistance to evil having been weakened by his Fall. Likewise, the rationalist-utilitarian Bentham is not convinced that natural reconciliation of human self-interests, predicted confidently by Adam Smith, is within the possibility of realization in social life. Although his view of the state and of laws, like Adam Smith's, is an essentially negative view, Bentham, nevertheless, regards it as a necessary thing. It is an instrument by which a rational social order may conceivably be affected by "artificial" means, such as by legislation. For him, there can only be an "artificial harmony of self-interests," not a "natural" harmony. More specifically, he considers the state with its laws as an evil, a necessary evil. It makes use of coercion or pain, which for him is, evil by definition. Nevertheless, it is better than having no such institutions. It is evident that he has no great trust in the universal rationality of man. It may be added that contemporary thought on human nature as represented by practitioners of today's politics appears also to be one of "guarded optimism" modified by political "realism." This can be summed up under the saying: encourage human goodness and cooperation whenever possible, but be prepared for human conflicts and war in case of need.

Social disintegration and Social health

Approached from another perspective, the issue of institutionalizing social conduct by state action may be regarded as a sociological issue, as an important factor in community life. It may be explained in terms of the dynamics of community disintegration and of subsequent attempts at community restoration or regeneration.

On this explanation, a community at a certain stage of its growth is said to become "sick," to manifest failure of "normal" healthy functioning or development. This condition of community life has been described by Jessie Bernard as "a state in which any one or more of the several subsystems . . . fail to function at some specified expected level of effectiveness."[2] This is, of course, only a general description of the conditions involved, which are not easily applicable to actual reality of social and political life. In practice, it may be difficult to determine what degree of disintegration in society must be present before the dose of social poisoning becomes lethal, that is, before disintegration becomes a threat to the survival of community life. Still, a point is conceivably reached beyond which social disintegration becomes near total and social anarchy becomes the dominant factor in community life.

This state of social disintegration is, of course, a situation that must be avoided by all means, for in a community, like in individuals, health is

universally recognized as the primary concern in life. The attainment of social health is the ultimate goal at which all societies aim. The condition of optimal social health or "the ideal-type of a community that is not disorganized" may be defined as involving the following major aspects:[3] (1) the physical plant is in good running order, capable of serving the needs of the people; (2) the people are in good physical and mental health, that is, able to perform at least minimal levels of efficiency; (3) there is at least a tolerable fit between community needs ("functional requisite") and functional subsystems (institutions and groups) to serve them; (4) there is consensus with respect to norms, so that everyone knows what to expect of everyone else, and hence there is no confusion; and (5) these expectations are fulfilled. On this definition, social change "would not be precluded, but it would be change for which the community is prepared, . . . that is, synchronous and compatible among all the systems." Now if a community falls short of the mentioned conditions, then it will presumably do its best to restore its health, to effect social regeneration. It is obvious from our argument that disintegration and social health represent two opposite poles on the scale of community life.

The argument of social disintegration and social regeneration is then closely related to our issue of institutionalizing social conduct. There appears to exist a correlation between so-

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[2] Jessie Bernard, "Community Disorganization," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, III (1968), p. 163.

[3] *Ibid.*

cial disintegration (or regeneration for that matter) and the institutionalizing of social conduct. Assuming that social health is the most desirable state, all deviations from such a state demand corrective measures of some kind or to some extent. It is evident that the greater the degree of disintegration, the more we deviate from the healthy norm, the more drastic actions must be taken to restore the norm. Undoubtedly, in time the authority of the state would make itself felt using methods of compulsion if other remedies should prove themselves insufficient, such as religious sanctions. This would then take the form of institutionalizing certain aspects of human conduct by laws or deliberate government action. In this way, government action in matters of conduct and the state of social health, it seems, go together, the government being the instrument (although not necessarily the sole instrument) to provide effective remedial measures, by means of compulsion or sanctions to whatever deficiencies in social health there may be.

Relativity of the Concept

Viewed from yet another perspective, the issue of institutionalization of social conduct may be treated in terms of diverse political, moral economic or cultural conditions or values. Political reality indicates that apart from utopian schemes of certain philosophers, like Plato, our notion does not follow a universal or absolute path. Rather, it must be viewed in terms of particular social conditions or values

and so belongs to the realm of political relativity.

In the first place, social conduct may be said to be related to prevailing political systems, to the ideas which such systems enshrine, or to the constitution on which the particular civil society we have in mind is founded. This was clearly recognized over 2,000 years ago by Aristotle who drew a distinction between political goodness and moral goodness. Moral goodness, he claims, is a universal quality while political goodness is a changing quality, relative to the prevailing constitutional arrangement. These two need not be exactly the same, although ideally they should be as close as possible. This implies that a person living under a democratic system would be expected to display political or social conduct that is different from a person who is a subject of a monarchic system. Montesquieu, an eighteenth century French rationalist thinker, even identifies what virtues or social conduct should be present under what constitutions. In a republican system, he says, the overriding virtue is that of "liberty": in monarchy, it is "honor": in tyranny it is "fear." As he sees it, social conduct should be manipulated by institutional means to fit it with the given constitutional requirements.

In the second place, social conduct may be said to be related to prevailing moral standards or values. Such a relationship has clearly been perceived by no less a political realist than Machiavelli. It may be recalled that he had two ideal models for political life: the

despotic model of *The Prince* and the republican model of *The Discourses.* Which of the two models should be followed depends, according to him, on the degree of public virtue that prevails. To Machiavelli, a republican system based on freedom, can only exist when the spirit of public morality is high, when men act as responsible citizens. In case of moral degeneration or anarchy a despotic ruler is needed to maintain security and order. In the latter case, Machiavelli advises the use of unscrupulous, even evil, means for attaining presumably good ends. Although Machiavelli himself does not explicitly state what institutional means the despotic ruler should employ in effecting a condition of national health, his argument appears to imply at least some recognition of the necessity of more direct manipulation of people's lives by public authority, a direct intervention of the state with people's standards or values.

In the third place, social conduct may be regarded as a factor of socioeconomic life, as having a contributory role to play in the social and economic development of the nation. Here its role, particularly in its institutional form, is to support national social and economic objectives.

Lastly, social conduct is said to be related to what may be broadly described as cultural or spiritual values. Following Montesquieu, cultural values may be regarded as a product of many forces or factors. They are a combination of such factors as customs, laws and institutions, mores of the people, religion, temperament of the people, climate, etc. Montesquieu insists that the said factors are not simply brought together in a haphazard way, that there is a certain "necessary relation" that marks their combination. He implies that behind the variety of these factors, there is a certain fundamental unity, a unity of outlook, a spiritual ideal or what he calls "the spirit of the laws." This realization should then affect our thinking about political institutions and about social conduct. In brief, these two should be in harmony with the spiritual ideal that is wanted. Montesquieu implies that malfunctioning in society is due to disharmony between these two and the basic ideal of social life. But such disharmony can be remedied. It is on the wise legislator to make the necessary adjustments, to make the actual conduct of man conform to the ideal conduct.

Political Socialization

The issue of social conduct is said to be connected with the process of political socialization. Indeed, attempts at inculcating the "right" social conduct may be regarded as one aspect of political socialization. Briefly, political socialization implies the idea of a learning process applied to politics, i.e., learning appropriate social and political values or attitudes or responses. It denotes the process by which the individual learns to adjust himself to the state by acquiring social behavior that the state approves. It is an instrument whose aim is the formation of predict-

able and "positive" response to the state by its citizens, ultimately intended to heighten the sense of national unity or solidarity and so of social stability in the nation. This process may be conceived in a narrow or in a broader sense. Conceived narrowly, it may be defined as "the deliberate inculcation of political information, values, and practices by instructional agents . . . formally charged with this responsibility." Conceived more broadly, it "would encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, . . . including . . . also nominally nonpolitical learning that affects political behavior, such as the learning of politically relevant social attitudes and the acquisition of politically relevant personality characteristics."[4] In the first sense, the process is conceived strictly as a deliberate instrument of government policy; in the second, broader sense, it refers to all the different factors that affect social and political behavior of man.

Attempts at political socialization are a familiar feature of organized social life. Among the earliest recorded attempts in the West are Plato's scheme for rigid state training of his ideal citizens and rulers or Aristotle's preoccupation with defining "the type of character appropriate to a constitution," both inspired by the concern with the consequences of man's behavior upon the well-being of social life. In recent decades, such attempts have been sub-

ject to extensive academic studies whose purpose has been to throw new light on the dynamics of learning in politics in such diverse aspects as (a) learning connected with the citizen role (which involves the aspects of political commitment and of political or ideological motivation), (b) learning connected with the subject role (involving loyalty, reactions to public authority, views on the legitimacy of political institutions), and (c) learning connected "with recruitment to and performance of specialized roles, such as bureaucrat, party functionary and legislator."[5]

Political socialization impinges on our lives, whether in an unconscious or a deliberately propagated form. In its "unconscious" form, it may be identified with the habit of mind developed by living in or by being permanently exposed to a particular set of social attitudes. In a more deliberate form, for instance, it is present in Civics teaching in school whose aim is to inculcate in students certain basic social principles or values, a sense of civic consciousness and ultimately to lead them to become responsible members of society. Political socialization takes then a less obvious form in such public expressions as observance of public holidays, worship of national heroes or remembrance of significant historical events and other

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[4] Fred I. Greenstein, "Political Socialization," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XIV (1968), p. 551.

[5] On political learning and the quotation see *ibid.*, p. 552. Some of the areas in this field recently explored are the methods of civic training or "the making of citizens," e.g., Charles E. Merriam in 1931, Bessie L. Pierce in 1933; the relationship between personality and national, social, political or ideological attitudes or characters, e.g., Inkeles and Levinson in 1954; and the development of political behavior of children and adults, e g., Hyman in 1959.

such symbolic acts of nationalism. One of the most effective means for disseminating socially desirable attitudes — of political socialization — in modern times has been the mass media, such as television, newspapers and radio broadcasting, because of their easy access to the general public and the universality of their appeal.

It is evident that political socialization is of direct relevance to, and has important consequences on, the issue of institutionalized social conduct. If successfully applied, political socialization should decrease the incidence of social conflicts and should make man act in a socially more responsible way. For a 'socialized' man would presumably be a good citizen acting "spontaneously," without threats of sanctions or punishment so that social discipline would become more of a "natural" thing. Thus successful socialization would remove, or at least reduce, the need for social constraints or regulations, for direct institutional control, i.e., state control, of human conduct.

Non-institutional Models

The institutionalizing of social conduct is by no means universally regarded as socially desirable or commendable. Many social thinkers of the past, both of the West and of the Eastern world, indeed even today, have shown hostility to excessive attempts by public authority to control or manipulate people from above. In some cases they have been against

state interference with human conduct altogether.

In the present section, we shall consider one such model of non-institutionalized social conduct, associated with Taoism, an influential Chinese philosophy originating over 2,000 years ago.

The Taoists displayed complete distaste for all forms of governmental interference with people's lives. This distaste was derived from their peculiar mystical belief in the Oneness of Nature. As they saw it, Nature exists as a living whole and knows no divisions or separations into parts. They likened it to a stream of water everflowing freely, painlessly and spontaneously. This image of Nature was applied to the life of man and society. Supreme happiness and wisdom consist in following Nature, that is, in following one's own natural self. By this, the Taoist meant living a simple, uncomplicated, spontaneous existence, resigning oneself to what Nature dictates.

The Taoists contrasted sharply Nature with human institutions: Nature is good, but human institutions are artificial and essentially bad. With their laws, regulations, ceremonies and ethical codes, institutions are only so many barriers separating man from the true, natural existence. Indeed, the Taoists regarded human institutions or governments as the real cause of human misfortune and suffering. Chuang Tzu, the most brilliant of the early Taoist

thinkers, contends, for example, that it is not the people themselves but governments that are the real authors of criminality; that it had been only with the emergence of governments with their rigid regulations that "gangsters appeared." If people are unruly, he implies, it is exactly because the rulers meddle with them.

From these general beliefs, the Taoists drew certain inferences that had to do with the issue of organized social life and social discipline. In short, governments are here not to manipulate people such as by laws; at most they should contribute to their material welfare. They should pursue a *laissez-faire* policy, that is, leave man alone. More specifically, they should revert man to his natural simple existence. To do this, they should ban all refineries of the luxurious or sophisticated kind. These involve only artificial values and moreover incite greed or profit-seeking, which in turn gives rise to criminality. As Lao Tzu has put it, "Banish wisdom, discard knowledge, . . . banish humanity, discard righteousness (he refers here to familiar Confucian virtues which he regards artificial) . . . . banish skill, discard profit, and thieves and robbers will no longer exist." [6] The best way to govern the people is to keep them simple and ignorant, again in Lao Tzu's words, "to empty the people's hearts, but fill their stomachs; to weaken their wills, but to strengthen their bones . . . to make

6 All quotations from Lao Tzu in this section are taken from Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, *The Story of Chinese Philosophy* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1961), Ch. 3.

the people without knowledge and desires." To the Taoists if governments pursued this enlightened policy, man would not worry, would lead an easy-going existence, would be innocent and simple, would work properly without grumbling and ultimately would be happy.

On Taoist teaching, the government would operate on the principle of *wu-wei,* usually translated as "non-action." This implies non-interference: that the government should do nothing, "to do nothing and everything will be done." More accurately, this implies "not overdoing" anything.

Taoists precepts for life are reflected in their precept for government. Government should be conducted with complete absence of worry or strain, complete relaxation. In practical terms, this means: "govern a large country (like China) as you would cook a small fish," Lao Tzu exhorts his ruler, that is, with little time wasted and little skill needed. The Taoist position appears to assume some form of natural goodness in man, that a simple man is not naturally disruptive of social order. At any rate, the Taoists are quite explicit that all attempts to subject human conduct to state control and compulsion should be abandoned as in principle wrong, as against Nature.

It may be added that the negative Taoist position on the state and institutionalized social conduct is not an isolated case in the history of social and political thought. History records many philosophers and philosophic

movements with similar distaste for governmental interference with man's social life. All these appear to have at least that much in common: that they are convinced that the less government, the better; the less laws, the less misery. Ideally, there should be no political institutions at all in the sense of coercive public bodies. Such views are expressed, for instance, in Plato and Confucius who both base their ideal rulership on moral guidance, not on laws; in classical liberalism which regards governments as merely "interfering" with natural social or economic laws; even in Marxism which sees no need of the state in the ideal-classless-social order; and in modern anarchism which advocates, as the original term "an-archos," meaning "no-government," itself suggests, complete liberation of man from all forms of government.

Institutional Models

The institutional models of social conduct — the opposite of non-institutional models—touch directly on our own issue of institutionalizing social conduct. These models belong to political systems that are anxious to keep their citizens under tight public control and manipulate them by deliberate government action. Their ultimate goal, they claim, is greater social or national solidarity and unity. These systems, of course, reject as unacceptable or absurb arguments against social intervention or arguments in favor of abolition of the state or government such as have been advanced in the previous section.

There are many such models found in different periods of human history and in different cultures. We may mention, for example, the classical model of Sparta, with its military-like organization of social life, or in recent times, the spectacle of twentieth century totalitarian regimes, whether of the fascist or the communist variety. In these regimes, the art of social control and manipulation may be said to have been developed to near perfection. In them, the state is in complete control of all aspects of human life — social, political, economic, cultural, etc. Opposition to the regime is disallowed or repressed; only the official ideology is tolerated; and methods of compulsion, even of terror, are made use of as a deliberate instrument of government policy to keep the populace in order and obedient to what the national leadership commands.

In the present section, we have avoided such extreme positions on social conduct. Instead, our selection has been Jean Jacques Rousseau, an eighteenth century French social moralist and thinker. With its emphasis on democratic principles and attitudes, Rousseau's model appears more relevant to our own experience, at least in liberal-oriented democratic states.

Rousseau's problem in politics is a problem that is fundamental to all democratic thought that is, how to reconcile individual freedom with the presence of public authority, how to create "a community where men could both

be free and at the same time members of a civil society." He wants a free society, one that is based on voluntary consent of man, and is not a mere agency of human oppression.[7]

Rousseau's answer is his statement of political rights defining what he means by "legitimate," i.e., rightly ordered, political institutions or principles; those that will ensure human liberty. On his principles, a legitimate government is a government by laws, not by men, and all members of the community must be treated with perfect equality. The principle of equality is fundamental in Rousseau's political teaching and, when applied to politics, makes Rousseau the true founder of modern popular sovereignty or democratic government. Rousseau contends that civil society originates in the voluntary consent of all men to join, formalized by the act of the so-called social contract. By this act, he says, a man does not lose his freedom, for every other man loses the same amount; rather, he gains an equal amount like everyone else, together with other benefits, such as security and even more important, the prospect of living as a "civilized being." Man's new freedom is not, however, the same kind of freedom as before — unrestrained or wild — now it is subject to the laws and standards which the

new community accepts. More explicitly, it is subject to the interest or the "will" of the community, which Rousseau calls the "general will." The general will — conceived as the will of the community as a whole — is to be supreme and to be the judge of what is right for social life. It may be said to represent the "spirit" of community-life.

For such "communal will" or "communal spirit" to manifest itself, certain conditions must, however, be fulfilled first. First, all members of the community must be allowed to participate in public decisions, at least in matters of more important social concern. The public will cannot be truly general, unless it comprises all individual members. The omission even of one man would nullify the generality or legitimacy of the public will. Second, there must be no discrimination against any member or members of the community. The principle of absolute equality of treatment, which is Rousseau's basic principle of political legitimacy, demands absolute non-discrimination. The last condition is the presence of common interest or society-oriented conduct.

The last condition for the presence of communal will is the most difficult to grasp. Here, Rousseau insists that there can be no true community spirit or community will unless men are motivated by common good, not by private, selfish goods. He draws a distinction between the will of majority or the will of all on the one side and the general will on the other side, con-

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[7] For a more extensive treatment of Rousseau's problem in politics, see the writer's article "Political Legitimacy, Popular Sovereignty and Rousseau," in *Jernal Sejarah*, Vol. X (1971-1972), a University of Malaya publication. For Rousseau's own best statement, see his *Social Contract and Discourses*, trans. with intro. by G.D.H. Cole (London: Dent, 1963).

tending that neither majorities nor even agreement among all men need necessarily represent the general will, for they may stand only for selfish interests of particular men. For him, the general will is not a mere will of quantity but rather of quality, of what is right. It represents the general interest, common good; it implies what all men have or believe in common, a universal consensus.

This view of general will reveals the essential ideality of this crucial Rousseau notion. For him, it is not enough for members of the community to participate in public life such as by voting in elections. What is needed as well is an act of spiritual identification with the goals of community life. Ideally, there would be among all men a high spirit of public consciousness, a universality of outlook and feelings. To put this differently, for Rousseau, true democracy implies both universal suffrage and unselfishness: there cannot be true democracy unless all men participate in public life and unless they get away from selfish individualism and adopt society-oriented attitudes or outlook.

As Rousseau sees it, the real and most important task in democratic politics today is the task of transforming man from a selfish being to a society-motivated being, by increasing the citizen's commitment to community life. Rousseau does not, incidentally, think that his demand for greater commitment by citizens to the community is unrealistic or impossible. He contends that some such commitment exists in all societies; indeed, without some consensus in basic outlook and values no society could endure for long. The present problem, then, is how to increase such a commitment or simply how to make man act in a socially more responsible way. This problem calls for the improvement of the present quality of the general will, intensification of public sentiment among the people and extension of the area of public consensus.

Rousseau's proposal to accomplish such a task takes basically two forms, political and moral, which are closely connected with one another. In our exposition we are more interested in Rousseau's proposals for moral reformation rather than in his more political proposals, for these have direct bearing on our interest in social conduct. Rousseau's social-moral reformation is said to have been inspired by the puritan Spartan or Genevan ideal of social life whose aim was the maximal socialization of man-citizen:[8] not less politics in the life of man, but more politics: not less, but more political guidance. Some writers who tend to view Rousseau in almost completely Spartan ways emphasize Rousseau's quest after creating a "perfect citizen" and speak about Rousseau's attempts

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[8] Strictly, Rousseau is said to have two models of social conduct, not merely one, Spartan. His other ideal is a simple, unspoilt rustic life, of the "return-to-nature" type, based on primitive family life and relative physical independence of man, on relative absence of close relationships or of bonds of economic dependency. See Judith N. Shklar, "Rousseau's Two Models: Sparta and the Age of Gold," *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. LXXXI, No. 1 (March 1966), Section 4, pp. 40-49.

to "denature" man or to repress the original autonomous self and to create a new "common self" in man.[9] Political socialization is the instrument by which human nature is to become "socialized."

Rousseau proposes at least two concrete institutional measures by which the desired socialization of man is to be accomplished. The first is the establishment of a civil religion. Rousseau thinks highly about the social importance of religion for its advocacy of absolute values or universal goodness. He is a harsh critic of modern scepticism and materialism as undermining moral virtue and as pernicious to orderly social existence. For this reason, he proposes that a state religion be established which would be enshrined in the constitution and to which all citizens would be compelled to ascribe. In fairness to him, he does not conceive the proposed national cult in a narrow, dogmatic way; rather, the new state religion would consist of certain most fundamental religious and moral principles, such as the belief in one Supreme Being and love of fellowmen, sanctity of promises and so on. In other respects, it would be completely tolerant of particular religious beliefs. For Rousseau, what is important about religion is not its theology but the presence of a moral message. Without solid moral values that only religion offers, societies soon become

sick and men, corrupt. Hence, his insistence on civil religion as the foundation of all social conduct.

Education is the second and more direct instrument by which the desired socialization of man is to be accomplished. It is also the most potent means for inculcating the right social attitudes, for introducing the desirable conduct in society. More specifically, Rousseau's aim is to inculcate the right type of social character in young people, to keep them away from the enticing pull of material ambition and to stir up in their hearts the fire of national idealism, of love of their fatherland. Rousseau as an educator has little patience with "liberal" education and advocates a highly selective educational process, a rigid curriculum which is inspired primarily by his idea of socializing man. His educational formula for socializing children, for example, is to set before their eyes only the right models of social conduct and conditioning them to such models as well as to try to intensify the group feeling among them. The latter method will then involve such psychological devices as exposing children to the full weight of public authority and opinion and so playing on children's sentiment.[10] In Rousseau's words, in practice, "this is to arrange things so that every citizen will feel himself to be constantly under the public eye . . . all shall be dependent on public esteem that nothing can be done . . .

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9 See for instance, Shklar, *op. cit.* Other writers, while recognizing Rousseau's anxiety to turn man into a truly socialized being, do not accept the idea that this is done at the cost of loss of human autonomy. For controversy on this issue, see the writer's article mentioned above.

10 See J. W. Chapman, *Rousseau—Totalitarian or Liberal?* (New York: AMS Press, 1968), particularly pp. 59-61.

without it." [11] Presumably, such device will cause heightening of feeling of pride and vanity among children, so that they "will more readily respond to the opinion and approval of . . . their fellows." [12]

It is evident that political socialization by way of public guidance, whether applied to religion or education, is for Rousseau an indispensable means to the formation of the proper national character and values. It is a true school of citizenship. Indeed, even Rousseau's political principles are said to manifest a similar preoccupation with moral values or character-formation.

As some writers on Rousseau like Shklar see it, Rousseau's obsession with democratic referenda rather than with elections in our sense should not be taken as expressing deep concern on his part for democratic sensibilities or natural rights. Rather, they are intended to be of ritualistic value: public rituals or festivals whose aim is to reaffirm, at periodic occasions, the essential unity of the nation. More fully, on their negative side, such referenda act as a break on tendencies of the government to become despotic and arbitrary: on the positive side, their "function is symbolic and ritualistic. They actually do very little." Or as Shklar has put it elsewhere, "The very occasion of consenting, the assembly, is a device for keeping their country before their eyes, and their public selves intact . . . to remind men of their public role." [13]

[11] Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Political Writings*, trans. and ed. by Frederick Watkins (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1953), p. 244.
[12] Chapman, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
[13] Shklar, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

Viewed from this perspective, Rousseau's political principles are primarily educative in character and are intended to contribute to Rousseau's socializing process. Rousseau's entire outlook in his social philosophy appears, then, to resolve the question of proper social conduct. This is not the place to raise the important question whether, or to what extent, Rousseau's political socialization or his methods of manipulating social conduct are compatible with his alleged loyalty to democratic values and human freedom. Our purpose in this section has been merely to explain Rousseau's social scheme as a model of an institutional form of social conduct.

Puritan and Permissive Attitudes

Our two models above may be regarded as somewhat "ideal" construction, too perfect for actual political life. In fact, they kept being modified by their authors themselves. Thus, when Taoism actually became, as it did for a period, the official philosophy of state in China, it did not pursue the idea of abolishing government laws, nor did Rousseau, the great advocate of popular sovereignty, think anything wrong by believing in strong government and even by writing in glowing terms about the need for an inspired legislator who would transform the nation. Likewise, Plato, while on the one hand rejecting methods of social compulsion as incompatible with the idea of true goodness, introduced on the other hand, one of the most authoritarian and rigid systems of educa-

tion ever devised by man, that may well serve as a model even for present totalitarian states. Even more significant is Plato's conversion, in his later years, from his original idealism to a more "realistic" assessment of political life. This is manifest in Plato's *Laws,* in which not morality, but "the golden cord of law" becomes the foundation of a well-organized state, and government control of social life is strong and wide-spread.

It is also interesting to note that Confucius' appeal to love of humanity or fellowmen proved itself insufficient to serve as a solid foundation of the Chinese philosophy of state. Gradually, the emphasis in Confucius' teaching shifted from concerns with moral virtue to more legalistic modes of thought, more discipline-conscious conduct. Thus, a few generations after his death, Confucius' humanistic message became vastly diluted by new "Confucian" elements. For example, Mencius, a famous Confucian scholar, came to regard the virtue of *yi* (justice, righteousness) rather than Confucius' own *yen* (humanity) as the principal Confucian virtue and for the semi-Legalist Hsun Tzu the virtue of *li* (formal ritual, etiquette), in effect ritual prescriptions and ethical codes, became the core of Confucian ethical teaching. It may be added that the type of Confucianism that has passed on as the Chinese philosophy of state into the modern age was far from the simple, humanitarian message of the Master himself. Rather, it marked a blending of Confucius' general moral

outlook and political paternalism with prohibitive elements of Legalism, that is, with emphasis on bureaucracy and law.

Our survey of the various positions on social conduct reveals not a universally accepted practice on this issue. Rather, there is a spectrum which ranges from extreme absence of social controls to extreme presence of social controls, with most countries being perhaps somewhere in-between these extreme positions. This suggests the useful concept of two psychological models or attitudes, corresponding to the two extreme positions on social control. The first suggests a "permissive" or "liberal" attitude to life; the second, a "non-permissive" or "puritan" attitude.

We shall briefly illustrate these two different — and opposite — social attitudes by referring to two classical examples of them. The puritan attitude is usually associated with the Spartan ideal of social life; the permissive attitude with the Athenian ideal.[14]

Briefly, the Spartan-type puritan attitude is identified with the emphasis on social unity and conformity, on controlled and disciplined social conduct and physical training, and on a static view of social life and political isolationism. Expressed in psychological terms, this is said to be an essentially self-defensive attitude, involving a "siege mentality" type of behavior,

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[14] See, for example, G. Lowes Dickinson, *The Greek View of Life* (13th ed.; New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1920), Ch. 2, Secs. 9 & 10.

men being motivated by fear of destruction. On this attitude, the society wants to be left alone, undisturbed by external influences. It is fearful even of more radical internal changes. This attitude is said to involve what Popper has called a "closed society" conception of life.

On the other hand, the Athenian-type permissive attitude is identified with the emphasis on social diversity and individuality, on human spontaneity and mental training, and on a dynamic view of social life and political cosmopolitanism. Psychologically, this attitude is said to reflect the confidence of the society to prosper despite certain internal and external strains or conflicts. Contact with other nations is welcome and development of social life is regarded on the whole as beneficial. This attitude is said to involve an "open society" conception of life.

The two attitudes to social life just mentioned are, again, extreme positions. Most actual societies appear to move somewhere between the two attitudes or contain both elements. Still, these two positions may serve as a reference against which social conduct of all societies can be measured or by which social conduct in general can be described.

Conclusion

This review has revealed the issue of institutionalizing of social conduct as an issue of great diversity and as open to a great variety of perspectives

and approaches. This diversity manifests itself in the views of human nature, in the relative meaning of the concept and in the idea of political socialization. It has also become evident that this issue does not lend itself to easy generalizations, for there are many models both of the institutional and non-institutional kind, of permissive and non-permissive societies that have exerted equal appeal under certain circumstances of social life. No final judgment can thus be made which of such model is to be adopted as a universal scheme.

Yet it is obvious that whatever choice we make in the matter of state-control of human conduct, such a choice is likely to profoundly affect the whole fabric or quality of social life. Indeed, this may make all the difference between man's subjection and liberty. For if the balance of state control is tipped too much in favor of control, as Rousseau with his collectivist will is frequently accused of doing, then human liberty may well be sacrificed and the very reason for state control — presumably both security and liberty — may well be lost. On the other hand, if the balance is tipped excessively in favor of liberty, then social anarchy may conceivably follow. In sum, each society may be said to face inevitably the problem of conduct of its citizens in a somewhat different way and each solution to such a problem should, accordingly, be different and, adapted to the given historical conditions of social life.

1974

The second part of this article will focus on a concrete attempt at institutionalizing social conduct in a response to certain contemporary social and political needs. This example is the Filipino "New Society" — a name given to the new political order in the Philippines. This should illustrate what this issue means in terms of current political practice, what the actual aim of institutionalizing social conduct is and what the methods are by which the regime tries to consolidate the conduct of its citizens. The example may broadly apply to other developing countries, where the issue of proper social conduct is likewise of crucial importance.