

# **Abstracts of Articles**

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## **A CRITIQUE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH: FOCUS ON ASPIRATIONAL LEVELS**

by Victoria M. Arcega

The assertion of some social scientists that psychological variables (attitudes) are sufficient indicators or predictors of modernization has doubtful application in the Philippine setting. Empirical studies on the relationship between the level of aspiration (an attitudinal variable) of a group of Filipino farmers and the over-all state of economic development in the Philippines reveal that a modernistic outlook or attitude expressed in terms of high aspirational levels (i.e., perceived educational, occupational and material expectations) do not necessarily result in, connote or ascertain modernization or development.

Evidence points to a resultant discrepancy between goal-setting and goal attainment — found to be largely attributable to existing structural impediments. Resultantly, this situation creates in the individual the need for a more realistic reformulation of goals more consonant with existing conditions.

The implication of this apparent gap between expectation and fulfillment to the policy-makers or administrator is evident. His crucial task lies in removing obstacles for the translation of an idealized state (an outlook or inclination) into actual goal realization (action). To make these individual goals coincide with over-all national developmental goals is his second appropriate concern.

## **SYMBOLISM, STERILITY AND REORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES**

by John Rehfuss

An evaluation of the actual impact of political or administrative change, specifically, on human behavior, remains a neglected area. The United States' experience in urban consolidation and administrative reorganization seems to typify a situation whereby the amorphism "the more things change, the more they stay the same" holds true. Apparently, failure to effect long-term behavior change within the organization renders reorganization a politically sterile venture and often, a mere symbolic victory. For indeed, any institutional change to be considered substantial, must positively and clearly demonstrate actual modification of human behavior.

Contemplation of future reorganization moves at the regional or agency level must be weighed in the light of ensuing costs and benefits, political and administrative advantages and disadvantages, indeterminacy of resultant changes and the inevitability of change as a natural occurrence. The administration must also determine the possibility of instituting substantive change and redirection within an organization or region without major confrontation.

## **THE MUSLIM PROBLEMS AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE**

by **Mohammed Fatthy Mahmoud**

The problem of Muslim integration into the national body politic has been tackled in various forms at different points in Philippine history. A historical look, however, from the Spanish period to the pre-martial law days reveals continuous failure at Muslim integration. The slow, irrational and unsystematic attempts of the Philippine government is seen in the light of a relative lack of congruence between the government's perception of the Muslim problem and the Muslims' own perception of their problems and of their own view on government's intentions.

In due time, it has been recognized that failure at Muslim integration would pose as a serious obstruction to national development. The advent of martial law in the Philippines paved the way for the implementation of a comprehensive program geared to give the Muslims a new deal. The introduction of the RAD program (Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao and Sulu), the codification of Muslim traditional laws, the implementation of a program to restore the ancestral lands of the Muslims, the establishment of the Philippine Amanah Bank and the recognition of the important role played by Muslims in writing the history of the Philippines, are some of the specific and governmental moves adopted to implement the program.

Apparently, the Muslim integration problem calls for a fuller understanding of its psycho-sociological and religious dimensions and for a more realistic and matured appraisal of the Muslims (their fears, problems, aspirations and tradition) as an ethnic group amidst diversity. Although it is still premature to assess the impact of the recent integration reforms, the presidential decrees so far issued are indicative of the new orientation towards the Muslim policy.

## **REORGANIZATION OF THE NIGERIAN FEDERATION: ITS BACKGROUND AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS**

by **Dr. Oyeleye Oyediran**

The reorganization scheme initiated in Nigeria in 1967 was built more on a political, rather on an administrative or doctrinal premise. A glimpse at Nigerian history reveals a maze of arbitrary splitting up and amalgamation of component area units in a pattern based on ethnic composition and geographical expediency. The resultant structural imbalance in the Nigerian Federation led not only to the physical demarcation of geographic regions into distinct entities, but also to the polarization of cultures and to the quality of interests and purposes among the Nigerian populace. Inherently, such pre-conditions obstruct future stability.

The reorganization of the Nigerian Federation was a countermove to foster stability and eventually, create an independent and balanced federation. To a great extent, however, the creation of twelve states out of a

federation of four regions brought with it wide-ranging repercussions. Administrative, political and economic problems experienced subsequently by both Eastern and Northern groups of states are cases in point.

The readjustment in state boundaries, the division of powers between the federal and state governments, and fiscal problems still remain unresolved. Despite these problems, the 1967 Nigerian reorganization was a necessary and appropriate move. By and large, it was symptomatic of a strong national awareness of the needed integration in Nigeria.

## **THE PLANNING MACHINERY IN INDONESIA**

by Nimrod Raphaeli

Planning in Indonesia throughout the fifties and the early sixties failed to establish proper and definite directions towards economic growth and development. Multi-year development plans — the 1956 five-year plan, the 1961 eight-year plan and the 1968 three-year plan — were devoid of realism and rationality, and were thus unequipped in grappling with economic stagnation problems and in providing economic and social direction.

It was the Sukarno leadership in July 1966, which sparked off a recovery and rehabilitation period for Indonesia's economy. Later, the five-year development plan of 1969 articulated in concrete terms the main thrusts of investment and development, with economic stabilization as the most immediate and urgent policy objective. Increase in agricultural production, expansion of primary exports and rehabilitation of the economic infrastructure constituted other priorities in the plan. The creation of the National Economic Stabilization Council in 1966 and the National Planning Agency (DEPERNAS) in 1967 demonstrated Indonesia's efforts for a more rational economic system and policy through a modern planning machinery.

The recent recovery period saw progress in policy implementation, budgetary processes, project evaluation and improvement in the realm of public administration. However, existing institutional weaknesses and deficiencies in these areas tend to undermine the headway so far gained. In the light of past achievements and failures, the preparation of the next five-year plan (1974-1979) would be an opportune occasion for the Indonesian government to effect institutional reforms that would strengthen administrative capability in the performance of developmental functions and tasks expected from a modern state.