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Philippine Industry and Pollution Control Legislation

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Since industrialization is seen as the all important remedy to most of the economic ills of the developing countries in the Third World, it has easily gained numerous advocates from both the private and public sectors. The almost unquestionning acceptance of the "industrialization ideology" has resulted in little attention to its possible adverse effects on the environment. Most Philippine industries, except for a few selected firms, have managed to avoid pollution control legislation by 1) arguing that industry is vital to the national well-being, 2) involving the sentiment of awa (pity), 3) deflecting blames from industry to the public, 4) creating a favorable public relations image, 5) fighting legal battles, 6) gaining access to the policy processes, 7) indefinitely delaying compliance, 8) outright deception and noncompliance and 9) attempting to shift the cost of compliance from industry to the government. This article discusses each of these strategies and looks into their possible consequences on Philippine environmental control programs.

The Philippine economy exhibits many so-called "Third World" features. These include low per-capita income, a radically uneven distribution of wealth, an agricultural sector contributing a disproportionately high share of the GNP, banking and commerce substantially controlled by aliens, and a dependence upon advanced industrial countries for many finished products as well as for capital to spur local industrialization. The Manila government considers industrialization to be one of its prime duties, and progress has been made in this undertaking.

Although much money is still tied up in safe but unproductive investments such as land, the government has been encouraging, with some degree of success, the flow of capital into areas traditionally considered more risky: industry and commerce. As a result, the proportion of income derived from manufacturing has been steadily rising.

A major portion of Philippine industry is located in Greater Manila, along the Pasig and other rivers. This extreme degree of industrial concentration near the nation's primate city has caused many problems only dimly anticipated when industrialization

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began. One of these has been pollution. Manila-area manufacturing falls into these broad categories: food and related products, beverages, textiles, lumber products, paper and related products, rubber products, chemical and allied products, petroleum refining, fabricated metals, and machinery.[1] Nearly all of these manufacturing categories are pollutive.

An industrialist deciding upon a plant location wants: 1) the site that yields the lowest cost per unit of output; 2) minimum transportation costs and reasonable labor costs; 3) plentiful skilled labor; 4) a cooperative attitude on the part of local governments; and 5) "healthy" tax structures.[2] From the viewpoint of the Filipino industrialist, Greater Manila has offered all these advantages. With the resulting concentrated pollution, though, a basic conflict of interest has arisen between private industry and the general public. The response of Philippine industry to this situation and the way it has influenced the formulation and implementation of legal restraints on pollution constitutes the focus of this article. It is probably incorrect to speak of Filipino industrialists as a coherent interest group. They have been unable to act with the easy unity of purpose of the sugar bloc or the coconut interests. Industrialists never could deliver their workers' votes *en masse* as could the landowners with those of their tenants — thus they could not elect men to Congress who would reliably support the interests of industry.[3]

The Ideology of Industrialization

In an objective sense it might be said that the Filipino industrialist should possess little "power," since he has traditionally lacked the required base of power in the Philippine political system: control of votes. However, businessmen and industrialists have succeeded in obtaining many of their most desired concessions from the political system. The explanation for this success is to be found in a pervasive "ideology of industrialization." John J. Carroll expresses this ideology concisely when he states that:

> Despite the misgiving of some economists, the underdeveloped and newly independent nations of the world today look to industrialization as one of the most important keys — and sometimes the most important key — to the realization of their economic and political ambitions. The arguments and slogans behind this desire for industrialization vary from country to country: balanced economic growth; jobs for a growing population; declining terms of trade for producers of raw materials; "completing the revolution" by freeing a country from dependence on foreign markets, and thus overturning a "colonial" pattern of economic activity. Whatever the value of the arguments presented, the demand

[1] See Telesforo W. Luna, Jr., "Manufacturing in Greater Manila," *Philippine Geographical Journal*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 3-4 (July-December 1964), pp. 55-86.

[2] Maurice Fulton, "New Factors in Plant Location," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. XLIX, No. 3 (May-June 1971), p. 4.

[3] David Wurfel, "Individuals and Groups in the Policy Process," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. IX, No. 1 (January 1965), p. 38.

> for industrialization is strong and in many places one opposes it at his peril.[4]

This "ideology of industrialization" casts suspicions on anyone who raises environmental issues and allows industrialists to exercise their power in two ways different from other groups: First, industrialists have an often-undeserved reputation for power. Therefore, decision-makers often render the decisions industrialists wish, without any action on the part of the latter. Secondly, because the "ideology of industrialization" is so pervasive policy-makers try to manipulate the political-economic system to promote rapid industrial growth. In this case, the "power" of industrialists stems from their presumed ultimate economic benefit to the country as a whole. Far from having to demonstrate their power in order to enhance it, industrialists may well be better off if they appeared weak.

Private industry, through its various semi-official organs, has not discouraged the government's desire to ensure a healthy rate of profit. In relation to the issue of pollution, a 1970 Philippine Chamber of Industry statement read: "Pollution abatement is a responsibility which industry cannot shirk. provided it does not kill industry and *it does not bring our profit below what investors are expecting,* management would be happy to cooperate."[5]

Apart from the obvious, public ways in which the industrial sector attempts to influence pollution policy (which included open lobbying in the "old society" and the submission of proposed presidential decrees in the New Society) there are many tactics, covert and overt, legal and illegal, through which industry has so far resisted having to make expenditures on pollution control. These tactics include 1) arguing that industry is vital to the national well-being; 2) invoking the sentiment of *awa* (pity); 3) deflecting blame from industry to the public; 4) creating a favorable public relations image; 5) fighting legal battles when necessary; 6) gaining official admittance to the policy process; 7) indefinitely delaying compliance; 8) outright deception and noncompliance; and 9) attempting to shift the cost of compliance from industry to the government.

"Industry Cannot Afford Pollution Control"

This argument is usually preceded by the statement that "pollution is not so bad here" as compared to Japan and the United States. Such an assertion is deceptive, because although true for certain exotic categories of pollutants, it is manifestly false as far as visible, perceptible pollutants (vehicle exhausts, smelly rivers) are concerned. Pollution control, it is argued, is too expensive for the young, growing industries of

[4] John J. Carroll, *The Filipino Manufacturing Entrepreneur: Agent and Product of Change* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 1.

[5] Editorial, *Philippine Architecture, Engineering and Construction Record,* Vol. XVII (August 1970), p. 12.

the Philippines.

The validity of this argument is exceedingly difficult to assess and, because it involves sensitive political decisions, is rightly the province of the Philippine government. There is no doubt that treatment can be phenomenally expensive, and that some plants would no longer be able to operate profitably if controls were enforced.

Awa for the Little Man

This is a variant of the argument that industry is good for the nation. Here, it is frequently asserted that pollution control expenditures will force plant closings which will result in unemployment. The appeal for *awa* carries great weight in Philippine culture, and it is a rare industrialist who foregoes the argument, some actual examples of which are:

> Should our operations be abruptly stopped, pursuant to the order, thousands of individuals belonging to the families of our laborers would starve and go hungry.
>
> We don't want to lay off personnel. As you know, textile mills are very labor-intensive. It is in that context that I want to appeal to the powers to be a little more considerate of our problems.
>
> My factory employs 3,000 people there are 1,000 people living almost free inside the Artex compound. The textile industry is depressed and I am losing money every day I operate.

One of the more colorful instances of this strategy occurred in 1974 when a seaweed-processing factory was called before the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) upon the complaints of a homeowners' association that the factory was producing an "indescribable stench." NPCC hearings are usually small, private affairs. Though by law open to the public, they are usually attended only by the complainants, the president or manager of the firm, an NPCC investigating engineer, and perhaps a representative from the local government exercising jurisdiction. On this day, however, the manager of the seaweed processing plant packed the commission offices with barefoot seaweed gatherers and their families. The workers appeared not to understand their role, and remained silent throughout the hearing. But their presence was a reminder of the human dimension involved. The manager later induced the original complainants to send identical letters to the NPCC to the effect that great improvements had been made and that therefore the plant should be allowed to remain open. In a follow-up letter to the commission, the manager sought to preclude future NPCC action against him by maintaining that his factory benefitted "thousands" of poor seaweed gatherers, and that "We serve the national interest, not only by helping the poor seaweed gatherers earn a living, but also by making more food available to our people."

Deflecting Blame from Industry to the Public

This frequently-used tactic of industrial spokesmen in the United States seems to have been adopted enthusiastically by Filipinc business-

men. The prototype, in the Filipino context, came in the early 1950's when the depredations of lumber companies were becoming manifest in the form of massive soil erosion and increasingly serious annual floods. The lumber companies, which had been accused on many occasions of bribing national park administrators for the privilege of denuding government land, blamed deforestation on *kaingeros,* whose slash-and-burn agriculture had maintained a stable jungle ecosystem for centuries.

In 1972, Esso Philippines, Inc. placed an advertisement in its company magazine advising that "A pollution violator may be robbing you of your right to clean air and water Learn the pollution laws of your community and obey them. Report flagrant violations of these laws to your department of health." Not long afterward, farmers near Esso's giant refinery in Limay complained that noxious gases from Esso were killing their mango trees. Esso did pay compensation to them.

But it is the Philippine Chamber of Industries (PCI) which has most assiduously tried to deflect blame from industry onto the public. Carefully defining pollution as biochemical oxygen (BOD), the PCI argues that "studies indicate that industry is responsible for 22 to 35 per cent of the air, water and land pollution." The President of the PCI, who is also a part-time Commissioner of the NPCC, expanded on this theme:

> Pollution, though undesirable, can be tolerated up to a certain degree... it is the price we must pay for progress.
>
> Pollution in the Philippines, however, is relatively mild compared to other countries for we have not yet reached the full impact of industrialization. It is only in urban areas as in Greater Manila, where the problem needs watching.
>
> Sixty-five percent is caused by human beings, and 35 per cent by industry. I may even venture to say that it is one hundred per cent caused by human beings. After all, who are the moving forces that direct industries but human beings too?[6]

This argument deludes people into thinking that their individual decisions can help, but in fact the magnitude of the problem is such that people can make a difference only by acting collectively through the political system.

Favorable Public Relations "Image"

Because subtle advertising campaigns are more common in large, successful corporations, it is only the largest (and primarily foreign-owned firms) which have used this indirect method of warding off pollution regulation.

Petroleum companies have led the way. In 1968, Shell Oil Philippines was able to turn adversity to advantage. Fishermen had been complaining of a declining fish catch in Batangas Bay, where Shell tankers unload crude oil from the Persian Gulf for a Shell refinery. Shell invited

[6] Edgardo Villavicencio,, "The Role of Private Industry and Private Citizens in Pollution Control" (Unpublished paper, Manila, 1974).

National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission (the former name of NPCC) and the governor of Batangas for an on-site inspection. The governor went away praising Shell for its "interest in the safety and health of local residents and their economic well-being, especially the fishermen."[7] A visiting United Nations expert came to a different conclusion. After reviewing the plans which Shell had made in conjunction with Caltex (which also maintains a large refinery along the shores of Batangas Bay) for the containment of large oil spills, he praised their foresight but noted that "the commendable planning, however, had been done without any contact with government authorities."[8]

The Mobil Oil Corporation, in an advertisement which contended that "there is no solid proof that lead in car fuel causes any health problems," made this statement which is typical of industry's effort to sanitize its public image:

> Some people talk about pollution. Others talk about pollution, but do something about it at the same time. Mobil Oil people, among others, do. Here's how, according to Mobil Philippines and the Mobil Oil Corporation, as corporate citizens, [they] go about making the environment cleaner so that it can support the legitimate demands of all — of industry in its efforts to provide better ways of living, and of citizens in their pursuit of a better life.[9]

Resistance through the Legal System

It was noted by the Spaniards that their Filipino subjects had a peculiar penchant for overusing the legal system. In the most remote town, it seemed, local courts were always clogged. One explanation was that Western laws provided a new and interesting way to carry on local feuds. With the advent of American colonialism, and the grafting onto the body of the Spanish-Napoleonic code the Anglo-Saxon common law as it had evolved in England and America, the Philippines acquired a reputation as "a nation of lawyers."

The Philippine judicial system, however (both past and present), exhibits some incongruities. One serious flaw is the fact that there are not enough judges, so there is a very long waiting time before a case can be heard. Delays of many years are easily obtained by a lawyer who fears the decision may go against his client. The fact that cases can be postponed nearly indefinitely explains the reluctance of the NPCC to institute legal action against violators.

In some cases, though, victims of pollution have pressed their complaints in court, and occasionally convictions have been obtained. The minimal fine of ₱100 per day renders this strategy merely symbolic unless it is coupled with injunctive relief,

[7] *Manila Bulletin* (December 31, 1968), p. 5.

[8] United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, *Report to the Government of the Philippines on a Brief Survey of Inland Water Pollution in the Philippines* (Rome: UNFAO, 1972), p. 6.

[9] "Mobil Oil in Campaign Against Pollution," *Journal of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines*, Vol. XLVI, No. 11 (November 1970), p. 4.

but appeals by factory-owners to the judge for *awa* usually preclude the issuance of injunctions.

The Most Common Tactic: Endless Delay

There is not much that can be said of this tactic other than that it is used all the time. A perusal of NPCC records, interviews with NPCC people, and the simple logic of the situation, all lead to the same conclusion: The Commission has neither the staff, the legal powers, nor the political "clout" to fully enforce its orders. Instead, it constantly issues orders to firms to cease pollution. The companies cannot admit that they have no intention of obeying the law. The result of this stalemate is one broken promise after another, followed by one "cease pollution" order after another.

Refinements on this technique are for factory-owners to plead that they need time "to make the necessary studies," they need time "to import the necessary equipment," they cannot find the "necessary chemicals to make the treatment plants work," they are "repairing their treatment plants after the recent floods," etc. (The rainy season and consequent flooding being annual, this last excuse is similarly annual).

Representation on Government Commissions

Government regulatory agencies in most countries come to assume the outlook of those they regulate. A number of factors are thought to account for this situation. First, membership on the regulatory board may be recruited from among the regulated. Second, the regulated interests may devote considerable time and money to the promotion of their viewpoints, while their opponents' efforts may be scattered, periodic, underfunded and lacking in continuity. Third, there appears to be a socialization factor at work. The longer one works in a regulatory agency and associates with people sympathetic to the interests of the regulated, the more his own attitudes come to resemble theirs.

This seemingly anomalous but actually common situation has been found to apply in the United States to pollution-control boards. In 1970, the *New York Times* surveyed state antipollution boards. Its findings:

> Most of the state boards primarily responsible for cleaning up the nation's air and water are markedly weighted with representatives of the principal sources of pollution.
>
> The inquiry revealed that the membership of air and water pollution boards in 35 states is dotted with industrial, agricultural, municipal and county representatives whose own organizations or spheres of activity are in many cases in the fore front of pollution.
>
> (The situation was deplored by federal officials who) have no objection to spokesmen for special interests serving on boards that are purely advisory. In fact, most of them welcome it.
>
> But pollution boards have policing powers and they think that it is wrong for members to be responsible for policing their own areas of activity.[10]

[10] *New York Times* (December 7, 1970), pp. 1, 50.

The same survey found the practice depended on two grounds: First, pollution is a technical matter, and the expertise and understanding of the actual dimensions of the problem, and the technical knowledge of how to deal with it, are likely to come disproportionately from the polluters. Second, there is the philosophical argument that important groups deserve special consideration. Both of these arguments are used to justify a similar situation in the Philippines.

In addition, there are some ideological and cultural reasons why Philippine industry has been at least as successful as American industry in gaining representation on government regulating bodies. There is strong reinforcement given in Filipino culture to accommodation, compromise, and consensus, and there are also cultural sanctions against the open clash of interests. Also notable is the common acceptance of the doctrine of free enterprise, and the notion that industrialization promises national salvation. Given these background factors, one should not be surprised to find that industry in the Philippines is given a fairly strong voice in the formation and implementation of governmental antipollution policies.

The ideal of cooperation and consultation was mentioned by former Senator Jovito Salonga, who explained why the Philippine Chamber of Industries was given a voting seat on the National Pollution Control Commission: "That doesn't sound repugnant to many here as it does to you Americans. That may sound appealing to most of the Congressmen. One will just stand up and say, 'I think a man from industry should sit on the commission,' and they'll all agree."

It should be noted that the case of the National Pollution Control Commission (in which one of eight commissioners represents industry) is not unusual. Industry has made much greater inroads in other policymaking bodies which it perceives as a greater threat.

Outright Non-Compliance and Deception

Eventually, the NPCC tires of requests for "grace periods" and the company then has a choice: spend or deceive. Some have chosen the latter course. There are basically three ways to get away with non-compliance: 1) Construct a treatment plant but then build bypass canals so that the treatment plant need be operated only during those days when the NPCC sends out inspecting engineers; 2) Dump wastes at night when no one can see the pollution; 3) Refuse admission to the factory grounds to inspecting engineers.

Bypasses. Often, the initial cost incurred in constructing the physical devices necessary for pollution abatement is relatively low compared to the recurring operating expenses. This is particularly true with pollution-control systems which are either power-intensive or which require constant use of expensive chemicals.

Therefore, the factory-owner may, in order to "comply" with NPCC

wishes, install a treatment plant, but at the same time construct a system of valves, gates and canals which allow him to divert the water directly into the river, not passing through the treatment plant.

Dumping at night. This tactic requires that the firm either operate at night or hold the water until after dark and then dump it. The first option is inefficient and the second, expensive because the area required for holding ponds is large and Philippine land values are astronomical. Hence, dumping at night is feasible for only two types of firms: those which have a small (easily stored) volume of wastewater; or those which have a large volume of discharge but which have enough money to purchase holding ponds of the requisite capacity. A related, and apparently legal, tactic is for the company to pump its effluent onto barges and then dump it in the sea outside of Manila Bay. As far as is known, this last technique has only been used by one paper mill which has a large volume of highly toxic waste.

Refusing admission to inspectors. Philippine factories are often surrounded by high, fortress-like walls complete with towers and armed guards. Before martial law it was frequently impossible for the men from the NPCC to gain entrance to a factory if the owners were unwilling to admit them. While this technique may appear to be a rather blatant admission of guilt, this did not stop the factory-owners who were confident they would be able to delay indefinitely any penalty, even if the pollution control commission chose to contest the issue in court. The pre-martial law situation is exemplified by this report from the Department of Health: "No laboratory analysis was conducted due to the uncooperative attitude of the management. The sampling unit was not permitted by the Personnel Officer and other officials of the company to take samples from their waste outfalls."[11]

Following the advent of the New Society, the situation remained the same when only civilian NPCC inspectors approached certain factories. Those factories which utilized bypasses would not refuse admittance to NPCC men, but would keep them waiting at the gates until the bypass canals were closed and the effluent re-routed through the treatment plant. Only then would the inspectors be admitted. When the pollution control commission came up with the countertactic of having uniformed military men accompany them on their inspection tours, management no longer tried to exclude them. "When the military accompanies us, the security guards are scared and just salute and let us in."

The Tactic of the Future: Shifting the Cost to the Government

We come now to the political heart of the entire issue, namely, "Who pays?" There are four options:

1) Nothing can be done, in which

[11] Jorge C. Ponce, *A Report to the Chairman of the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission* (Department of Health, March 29, 1972).

case the public "pays" in the sense of having to breathe dirty air and use dirty water.

2) The government might pay for individual industrial treatment plants.

3) Common, rather than indivi dual, treatment plants could be constructed, at government expense

4) The industry can be forced to install individual treatment plants *and* pay for them; that is, it can no longer treat the environment as an "externality."

Obviously, the only one of these four options that is unacceptable to business is the last. Since the first (doing nothing) is becoming less and less acceptable to the public, we would expect to see Philippine industry lobbying for either the second or the third option.

At various times grand schemes for cleaning up water-ways have been proposed. These usually involve construction of an interceptor canal so that the wastewater from all industry located along the banks of a particular water-way (e.g., the Pasig) would flow into one large treatment plant at the mouth of the river before discharge, in treated, relatively purified form into Manila Bay. Recently, such an interceptor scheme was also proposed to prevent industrial and municipal effluent from further polluting the Laguna de Bay watershed. This scheme has one drawback, even if one accepts the proposition that the public should pay for cleaning industry's wastes. This drawback is that the sheer scale of the undertaking means not only huge expenditures but also a firm decision to move ahead, the diversion of vast resources to the project (men, machines, planners, etc.) and a long lead-time until the project can be finished. Unified watershed treatment plants might be the "best" solution; however, the likelihood of their being constructed is remote. This leaves the third option: Shifting the financial burden of individual treatment plants from the industry concerned to the government.

Tax Incentives

On the question of tax incentives for antipollution equipment, the issue of "who pays" is raised in its purest form. A United States study, financed by the American Management Association, took a predictable stand:

> It may be that tax incentives provide the most effective, automatic, universal, across-the-board solution to the societal need to build pollution control into the American free-enterprise system. This may be a reasonable solution...
>
> (The AMA survey respondents) rated tax benefits as their most preferred form of financial incentive for combatting pollution.[12]

Both the industrial sector in the Philippines and the pollution control commission considered this solution to the problem at an early date and have pushed for it continuously. The enthusiasm of the commission is explained by the fact that government agencies are concerned with carrying out their assigned tasks and not with

[12] Fred Buggie and Richard Gurman, *Toward Effective and Equitable Pollution Control Legislation* (New York: American Management Association, 1972), p. 12.

broader questions of equitable burden-sharing. Issues of a philosophical nature are the province of the legislature or the highest echelons of the executive branch. The National Pollution Control Commission merely wants to stop pollution.

It seems unfortunate that the tax-incentive proposals did not receive more informed debate, because studies in the United States and at least one study of environmental issues in developing countries have concluded that tax incentives don't work. The argument against tax incentives, based on American experience, runs along five lines:

> 1) *Unprofitability.* They fail to give an incentive to invest in nonproductive facilities regardless of the lessened cost of those facilities.
>
> 2) *Badly aimed.* As used today, they give credit for physical devices that often are only a small part of pollution control (switching fuel often can be far more significant), and give credit for facilities regardless of their effectiveness in controlling pollution.
>
> 3) *No public gain.* They pay for pollution control facilities required by other laws, bringing no gain to the public in exchange for the tax loss and lessening funds for governmental pollution control, among other things.
>
> 4) *Reverse Robin Hood.* They increase general taxes through tax burden distribution and provide substantial tax write-offs to wealthy corporations having the least need of public assistance to eliminate their pollution. Yet they fail to aid small and medium-sized industries unable to purchase required pollution control equipment.
>
> 5) *Pricing quackery.* Because pollution costs are shifted to the general public, sales prices do not reflect the propensity for environmental harm during a product's manufacture, use or disposal. The true costs to society are masked.[13]

The main point concerning all such tax incentive laws is that they reward a limited number of taxpayers for pollution control *expenditures,* not for actually eliminating pollution.

Conclusions

It must be reluctantly concluded that the one tactic industry has not adopted in dealing with the Philippine environmental crisis is to comply with the law. Apart from San Miguel and a very few other large industries, almost nothing has been done. Even after a year of martial law, a newspaper reported that "Since the creation of the commission, it has been plagued with the problem of noncooperation from the private sector. Of the big number of firms said to be polluting the Pasig River, only a handful have confirmed their desire to help in the government's antipollution drive."[14] And the officially-sanctioned *Government Report* admitted, "When compliance with the law is directed, the industry either totally disregards the order or complies half-heartedly, while continuing to despoil the environment. Even if the violator is dragged to court, it still goes on defying the law."[15]

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[13] Arnold W. Reitze and Glenn Reitze, "Tax Incentives Don't Stop Pollution," *American Bar Association Journal,* Vol. LVII (February 1971), pp. 127-131.

[14] *Times-Journal* (July 24, 1973), p. 5.

[15] Victor Nacario, "NWAPCC Releases Names of Firms Violating Rules and Regulations," *Government Report,* Vol. IV (September 4, 1972), p. 2.

Industry will continue to increase its share of the net domestic product, possibly at a very rapid rate. The country may actually be, as President Marcos claims, on the verge of an economic "takeoff." Industry in the Philippines will become more and more "Filipinized" as restrictions against the Chinese continue in effect or are multiplied, and as the Filipino entrepreneurial class expands. At the same time, foreign capital, primarily American and Japanese, will continue to enter the country. Because one of the factors in the attractive terms of investment is the absence of stringent environmental protection costs, we should not expect to see the Philippine government relinquish this advantage by forcing foreign investors to erect costly treatment facilities.

Furthermore, there is no sign that the already widespread "ideology of industrialization" will lose its attraction. Young radicals dispute the ownership of industry, not its desirability. As communications with the outside world continue to improve, and as the gap between the superabundant industrial economies of the West and the agricultural economies of Asia continues to widen, we can expect the "ideology of industrialization" to become even more emotionally held.

Martial law, it seems, has resulted in somewhat greater obedience to the law, at least on the part of the powerless. Industry is more frequently being asked to respect the environment. At the same time, industrialization is the single most important New Society goal, and President Marcos may need industrialization to maintain himself in power. Under these circumstances, we might predict one of three possible outcomes: Action in the environmental field will be symbolic rather than real; Pollution will be tolerated, but covered up through cosmetic device of industrial dispersal, or; The government will shoulder an increasing share of the expense of pollution control devices.