

Review Article

V.S. Naipaul and Development Administration

GEORGE M. GUESS*

Introduction

By disarming the intellect, literary insights can often penetrate the crusts of habit, thereby encouraging fresh perspectives on complex topics. Such renewal is vital in public administration. It is especially important for the field or subfield of comparative public administration which, after 25 years of analysis, dwells on the meaning of development and the politics-administration dichotomy. The results of research in this field have unfortunately made little difference to development decision-making. The tendency persists to employ crude normative formulae and to belabor trite distinctions of excessive importance to its academic existence which are of marginal relevance to practitioners. Guided by the outmoded systems and structural-functional concepts, much analysis assumes that reorganization of public organization in traditional societies to serve Western needs of democratic market expansion will accomplish developmental objectives. Other analysts, taking refuge in the dependency concept, assume external

obstacles to the removal of underdevelopment that reorganization will leave unaffected. They suggest elimination or radical reform of capitalist structures and movement toward a socialist model of development. Though the failure of many developing countries to progress by either premise reveals the complexity of the issue, comparative public administration (CPA) and development administration (DA) works merely restate previous efforts in the field. The field may have retreated "to a wilderness where the edge of reality itself is beginning to blur."¹

It may be that "when the world is messy, you fall back either on ideology or technique."² If this tendency to intellectually retreat is to be countered, new insights are necessary to illuminate events. In the field of CPA-DA, more useful policy-specific insights are largely the product of experience, of trial and error with real forces in the field. Literary observations may serve this purpose and stimulate alternate interpretations of experience. The ex-

*Assistant Professor of Public Administration, Division of Public Administration, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

¹V.S. Naipaul, *India: A Wounded Civilization* (New York: Vintage, 1978), p. 39.

²Bernard D. Nossiter, "The Cupboard of Ideas is Bare," *The Washington Post* (May 20, 1979).

perience of V.S. Naipaul in developing areas has produced a spate of controversial insights that could reverse the trend toward crude formulae and tautological observations in the field.³ Naipaulian insights offer a profound challenge to the utility of CPA-DA research emphases in view of recognized limitations in development progress. His works express the meaning of cultural and behavioral resistance to current efforts at development and change. An implication is that much of the development progress of the future may not be stimulated by traditional administrative means. Such insights then have importance for the existence of and practice by CPA researchers.

Contemporary CPA Research Efforts

Much like its parent disciplines of political science and public administration (PA), the CPA-DA field suffers from a paucity of decision-making relevant theories. While these conclusions have been documented, only marginal support exists for scrutiny of the tools and findings of the field. This is curious when even economists hold that socio-economic development is often impossible without corresponding changes in institutions.⁴ It is as if underdeveloped egos and institutions must conform to the dictates of the field, and not the reverse! Despite

repeated assertions to the contrary, analysis remains largely insensitive to behavioral and cultural complexities. This does not mean that such societies would "develop" if insulated from transfer of the latest PA tool technology. It is to suggest that findings and distinctions in CPA-DA are simplistic, naive, and overdrawn. Based on the thrusts of recent books, it is also suggested that the analytic tools turn on crude normative formulae and should be modified or retired from service.

What is the potential contribution of PA to developing societies? Recent books suggest that transfer of the academic emphasis of the field is important. Much energy is exuded on the "boundary problem" and the ultimate meaning of "development." It would seem that the business of CPA-DA is to analyze development problems in specific contexts and, recognizing the interplay of systems in such cultures, to proffer options and probable consequences of each. By contrast, Peters finds the old distinction between politics and administration dangerous in that administrators gain the false aura of neutral competence.⁵ Applying this "false" distinction to the relationship between staff and line, he implies that this also boils down to politics. "This method of organization points to the extent to which organization by line and staff corresponds to the old adage about the separation of politics and administration."⁶ The problem with repeating such obvious insights is not really their irrelevance to decision-making. Rather, it is in the

³Born in Trinidad of Indian (Hindu) parents, Naipaul writes from London and has been termed: ". . .an articulate critic not only of society and literature in general but of his own life and work as well." Robert D. Hamner (ed.), *Critical Perspectives on V.S. Naipaul* (Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1977), p. xxi.

⁴Michael P. Todaro, *Economic Development in the Third World* (New York: Longman, 1977), p. 24.

⁵B. Guy Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy, A Comparative Perspective* (New York: Longman, 1978), p. 138.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 117.

failure to capitalize on the development possibilities created by unstructured behavior patterns in organization. A further implication is the cynical conclusion that all is politics. Naipaul has described the irresponsible civil servant who avoids decision-making but is contemptuous of the public. The academic distinctions of CPA-DA can encourage the wasteful expenditure of creative energy on "pretty picaroon intrigue."⁷ In their present form, however, they are of value only to the pristine scholar. Naipaul employs an intentional simplification, for example, to reach a conclusion similar to that of Peters. In a chapter cynically entitled "Democracy Takes Root in Elvira," Dhaniram observes: "The people of Elvira . . . have their funny ways, but I could say one thing for them; you don't have to bribe them twice. . . ."⁸ While generations of CPA-DA writers demonstrate their sophistication in rejecting the politics-administration distinction, few have offered alternate concepts to developing countries. Porter, by contrast, finds it useful for normative development of "responsibility centers" in nonprofit organizations.⁹ The promise of this latter concept for increasing efficiency and effectiveness is high and turns on an outmoded notion still exported.

Heady's revised and expanded work, a massive synthesis of research in this

⁷V.S. Naipaul, *The Middle Passage: The Caribbean Revisited* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1962), p. 80.

⁸V.S. Naipaul, *The Suffrage of Elvira* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), p. 132.

⁹David O. Porter, "Adapting the 'Responsibility Center' Concept to Government Administration," (Berlin: International Institute of Management, 1977).

field, asks penetrating questions and suggests new directions for analysis. But many of the insights are largely useful to the initiated academic. For example, he suggests five general features of administration currently found in countries of the developing world:

PA is imitative rather than indigenous; bureaucracy is deficient in skilled manpower; bureaucracies tend to emphasize other than "production-directed" orientations; the formal record is more suspect in transitional situations, and the bureaucracy has a near monopoly on technical expertise providing it generous operational autonomy.¹⁰

Such conclusions tend toward the obvious and could probably apply to many US local governments! The same features may be inferred from Naipaul together with causal insight.

The simple society bred simple people — too simple for lasting causes, so simple that their revolutions are second-hand, with energy but without principles, the imperfectly constituted society decaying into minute egoisms. And what was the cause? Slavery. . . . This was what stalled and perverted every stated metropolitan principle, French, Spanish, English, of revolution, intellectual advance, law, social drive, justice and freedom: race, the taint of slavery: it helped to make the colonial society simple.¹¹

Naipaul may be challenged for exchanging the "metropolitan paradise" for the "fallacy of the primitive paradise."¹² Yet, if one compares the po-

¹⁰Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration, A Comparative Perspective*, Second Edition Revised and Expanded (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1979), pp. 270-275.

¹¹Hamner, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 158.

licy implications of the two insights, it is evident that technical assistance and organizational reform would touch only the surface of such a culture. Naipaul counsels caution and tentative hypothesis; Heady implies a structural simplicity and emptiness that need only be filled with PA tools.

It is not argued that CPA-DA insights are monolithically tool-oriented and miss the humane, cultural sensitivity of a writer like Naipaul. Previous efforts and the new works of Heady and Peters often recognize the importance of adapting PA concepts and techniques to the multiple challenges of new cultures. Peters notes, for instance, that "What is important is the extent to which cultural differences tend to ease or exacerbate dysfunction in the bureaucracy."¹³ But subsequent use of cultural stereotype renders his conclusion irrelevant to decision-making. That is, "Western cultures are more accepting of impersonality, hierarchy, and bureaucracy than are non-Western cultures."¹⁴ But less if nonbureaucratic criteria tend to supersede the rules (Heady's general feature number 4) one must question "the entire justification for having bureaucratic structures in the first place, namely a high level of uniform behavior and client treatment."¹⁵ What is argued then, is that CPA-DA insights are guided by concepts and experience with technique that unexpectedly work against development progress. The products are either simplistic, as noted, or crudely normative, as will be discussed.

Heady has indicated that:

¹³Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 128.

¹⁵*Ibid.* p. 129.

... administration is only one aspect of the operation of the political system. This means inevitably that CPA is linked closely to the study of comparative politics.¹⁶

While the differences between CPA and DA may be reduced to relative emphases on theory-building versus applied science, it is still true that DA has:

... very little to offer of practical utility to those who want to know how to 'reform an archaic accounting system, integrate new national planning methodology within a dynamic administrative program, organize and administer a new national family planning effort, or design management operations for a new irrigation system.'¹⁷

In that PA dwells on such issues in the US, France, Germany, and other developed areas, it is unlikely that the comparative or technical skills are lacking. Integration of skill with need in developing areas may be hindered in part by the legacy of the Marshall Plan success which borders on irrelevance where the conditions for such success are lacking in Third World environments. This legacy seems to persist in outmoded models and perspectives, in part perpetuated by grantor institutions which require analysis in such terms. The reference is to structural-functional analysis and its related perspectives.

No two approaches have been more influential in contemporary comparative politics than functionalism and systems analysis and surely no others have been more controversial.¹⁸

¹⁶Heady, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁷Garth Jones, cited in Heady, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

¹⁸James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., *Comparative Politics, The Quest for Theory* (Columbus: Merrill, 1973), p. 201.

Part of the CPA-DA difficulty in inducing development may be due to the amorphous quality of the dependent variable "development." Efforts to define, refine, and replace this term are legion. Heady notes that if defined as "movement toward one or more goals or states of being for the political system," one goal may be attained at the cost of another.¹⁹ The goals themselves may "reflect the value preferences of the political scientists who selected them."²⁰ That is, if you don't know where you are headed, any road can take you there! Perhaps because of this restriction, researchers ply the main course composed of structural-functional and systems premises and hypotheses, and the narrower path of dependency composed of various Marxian variables. Faced with the same vague dependent variable, but subject to less academic pressure, Naipaul would imply defects in both analytic paths.

Systems analysis and functionalism are largely based on the concept of political phenomena as a system of regulated patterns and orientations that cluster together in equilibrium and have needs of maintenance and survival.²¹ The functional component assumes: (1) that society is a functional unity with working parts in near harmony or internal consistency. This assumes that the current "degree of integration" can be assessed and that imbalances can be related to development (a key assumption in Heady's acceptance of the imbalance thesis). The unity assumption ignores the tendency of items (budget processes, re-

cruitment practices, land reform policies to have functional and dysfunctional consequences; (2) that every custom, material object, or idea fulfills some "vital" function. This assumes that functions are known and recognized. Merton has distinguished manifest and latent functions, the latter being largely unknown and unrecognized; and (3) that whatever is functional is also necessary. Functionalism often encourages a conservative/static bias in the interest of system maintenance and status quo preservation. The assumption of stability for analytic purposes combined with the implication that programs to this end are functional, i.e., good, can produce dysfunctional consequences for DA efforts. For instance, it is clear that much of the "development assistance" to Nicaragua of late has created stability at the price of socioeconomic development and especially change.²²

The systems approach is logically related to functionalism. Viewing the political system as a vast conversion device which persists, the developmental consequences are almost parallel. That is, change becomes a special instance of uniformity, e.g., earthquakes and epidemics. But the gener-

²²Taking a strictly functionalist approach for instance, the IMF recently loaned \$64 million to Nicaragua and the USDA regularly approves (often increases) the 65 million pound beef export quota from that country of which 75 percent of the business is controlled by Somoza and his associates. Karen DeYoung, "Hunger, Polio Threatens Amid Nicaraguan Fighting," *The Washington Post* (June 15, 1979). According to Treasury Secretary Blumenthal, in a statement supporting IMF, "The current government of Nicaragua has been and is, for better or worse, the recognized authority in the country." Hobart Rowen, "Support Loan to Nicaragua," *The Washington Post* (June 15, 1979).

¹⁹Heady, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

²⁰*Loc. cit.*

²¹Bill and Hardgrave, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

ality of the perspective cannot account for the transition from persistence to non-persistence. Or, is "stress" on the system "support" in another context? When is a system not a system (the boundary problem)? Conceptual ambiguity permits researchers to premise analysis on the persistence assumption. Development becomes the movement of nation-cultures through "pattern variables" or "stages" to "take-off" economically or from backwardness to modernity²³ This Marshall plan mentality continues to encourage middle class development²⁴ and market expansion as prerequisites to development. DA in practice then becomes the application of outmoded formulae to transform the natives into smaller showcase models of Western democracy.

While these are oft-repeated allegations, Heady selects the "structural" approach in his latest CPA work. His basis is that both structures and functions have multiple functions. Research and conceptualization problems for singling out one structure and analyzing the functions it performs would be no greater than focusing on one function and identifying the structures that perform it.²⁵ That is, which of the two most commonly used perspectives will serve current academic and applied emphases in CPA-DA? With the road narrowed so far, selection is almost automatic.

At least two problems exist with Heady's choice that could partially be avoided by reference to Naipaul. First, the structures may exist only on paper. They may have been created (like PPB

in starving, corrupt environments) in response to grantor dictates in a form of tied-aid. A similar structural approach leads Peters to examine trade union leaders and representatives of smallholders, fishermen, and farmers as heads of "informal groups."²⁶ In a strict sense, these are institutional interest groups as opposed to the common notion of "nonassociational interest groups." The latter "pursue their interests informally and possess highly fluid, relatively concealed, and highly personal interaction patterns," e.g., kinship, lineage, ethnic, regional, and status collectivities.²⁷ In contrast to this approach, Naipaul attends to realism and minute detail (almost as a cultural anthropologist with PA insights). He proffers descriptions of the basic terms of existence for various levels of society including civil servants. Second, in view of definitional uncertainty, a structure in one setting may be a function in another. Yet, most research proceeds in search of structures and functions that may be implicitly modified to transform society from traditional to modern.

The crude normative formulae of most CPA analyses are patently obvious. For example, the debate over balanced bureaucratic development has not been of great assistance to policy makers in developing areas. Heady, citing Riggs, suggests that: "A policy is balanced if it maintains a reasonably stable equilibrium between the bureaucracy and the constitutive system, unbalanced if either dominates the other."²⁸ Assuming empirical referents for "domination" and "imbalance,"

²³ Heady, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²⁶ Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

²⁷ Bill and Hardgrave, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

²⁸ Heady, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

most developing countries place importance on military activities. One may then expect bureaucracy to dominate and outweigh other elements of the polity. Heady concurs with Braibanti that, nevertheless, bureaucratic reform has a permeative effect on other institutions and that external aid for this purpose should never be withheld solely on the basis that a desirable political balance from the perspective of the donor country be achieved first.²⁹

Note that the structuralist perspective, as employed by Heady, returns one to the universal functionalist problem cited earlier. The implication would be, for example, that the International Monetary Fund should now extend a budget reform loan to Nicaragua that would function independently of its political system. This is the tool orientation *par excellence!* Braibanti largely ignores the tendency of a strengthened administration to enhance the political power of an inappropriate regime. In such a case, external assistance would generate economic growth for elite enterprise and military activities at best, while retarding socio-economic development at worst. The CPA debate over means of balancing political-administrative development also ignores the Hirschman (and others) thesis that imbalance can dialectically generate competition, where backward and forward linkages can lead to development.³⁰ Heady and the majority of CPA researchers tend to overemphasize modifying changes and unilateral development patterns. Others, such as Bill and Hard-

grave, Hirschman, and Riggs³¹ stress the beneficial development effects of conflict and imbalances between, for instance, capacity (institutionalization) and demands (participation) -- that beyond the stable-incrementalist range can become increasingly revolutionary (transforming change). Naipaul avoids the functionalist strait jacket as indicated by his support for the "good humor, tolerance, amorality, and general social chaos of Trinidad" as opposed to the "petty, tight, self-important communities" of Martinique, "the most organized society in the West Indies."³²

On the other hand, the alternate dependency perspective has also reached the crude formula stage of development. As noted by Heady, the "dependency theory of development" emphasizes the overwhelming importance of external environmental factors.³³ But if the structural-functional approach presumes positive developmental results from external assistance, the dependency thesis relates underdevelopment to the Western capitalist development process (often by definition!). That is, underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and to capital shortage (Naipaul's underdeveloped ego) in regions that have been isolated from the stream of world history. On the contrary, underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process which also produced economic development: the development of capitalism itself.³⁴ Underdevelopment is then a condition pro-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 400.

³⁰ Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven: Yale, 1958), Chapter IV.

³¹ Bill and Hardgrave, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

³² Naipaul, *op. cit.* (1962), p. 218.

³³ Heady, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

³⁴ Bill and Hardgrave, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

duced by the removal of capital (ideas, initiative, and culture) in the process of capitalist expansion (tourism, foreign investments, loans). The corollary is that development is not simply the return of capitalist resources to the periphery. Instead, resources must be purified of manipulative and dominating tendencies inherent in capitalism. While various thrusts exist, according to Chilcote,³⁵ the Marxian or non-bourgeois view would be most antithetical to structural-functional analysis. Reform by tinkering with institutional arrangements such as budget processes would, by this perspective, leave the capitalist structural causes intact. Hence, the usual follow-up of analyses is the recommendation that capitalist institutions be eliminated and state-guided socialist development be commenced. Dependency analyses also reject the traditional "obstacles" to development, e.g., middle class absence, dual societies (traditional-modern), and lack of capital diffusion.

An advantage of the dependency perspective is that its variables, e.g., class control, exploitation, income inequality, and underdevelopment, can be tested empirically. For the development administrator, it may be more useful to know if political-economic class structures control administrative functions, than the answers to the more narrow question of administrative structures in relation to administrative functions. Use of the dependency perspective may focus analysis of institutions on the relevant determinants of development decision-making. The perspective may also clarify the

"ruling element" variable that is often confused by traditional CPA writers.³⁶

Despite its advantages, the dependency thesis has either been applied rigidly and dogmatically or avoided, perhaps out of professional fear of contamination with its Marxian heritage. In any case, its applications have brought charges of tautology, over-prediction, over-determination, and single-factor fallacy.³⁷ Yet, it should not be simply discarded as a "negative point of view."³⁸ The still tenuous nature of findings in this field should encourage new methods of analysis and permit entertainment of the possibility that revolution or state capitalism could enhance development progress. Indeed, combination of the relevant features of both perspectives might move them beyond tautological insight and crude normative formulae.

Naipaulian Insight and Development Administration

Despite a recent characterization of Naipaul as an "angry fatalist, adept in despair, permanent exile, neutral alarm clock, peripheral man, and specialist in ruined civilizations,"³⁹ he can provide "development assistance" to CPA-DA in two areas: (1) the cultural causes and consequences of borrowed institutions. His detailed behavioral insights and satirization of social classes

³⁶See for example, Heady, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

³⁷Steven J. Rosen and James R. Kurth, *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 13.

³⁸Heady, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

³⁹John Leonard, review of V.S. Naipaul, *A Bend in the River* (New York: Knopf, 1979), *International Herald Tribune* (May 22, 1979).

³⁵Ronald H. Chilcote, "A Question of Dependency," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (1978), p. 60.

should be incorporated in development programming and project analyses, and (2) the implication that development may not be subject to "administration" in current PA usage. It should be stressed that despite vigorous criticism of his observations, he merely poses problems in his works without offering solutions.⁴⁰ Without condescension or paternalism, Naipaul avoids the pitfalls of the widely distrusted liberal writer while skirting the edges of "imperialist literature." Though subtlety and brutality often merge (co-mingled with intentional fallacy that is usually taken seriously by critics) even in his satire, Naipaul attempts to awaken the reader's consciousness to the complexity of development problems, implying cure only through his impressionistic style.

Consider first his notion of the "underdeveloped ego." While dependency analysts would attempt to trace random repetitive behavior or eccentric practices to foreign-national bourgeoisie domination, the structural-functional analyst would isolate areas ripe for technical assistance to induce modern behavior. Naipaul would imply the fallacy of both conclusions. For example, he would suggest that such behavior "is created by the detailed social organization of (Indian) life and fits into that life."⁴¹ Instead he notes that caste and clan define the individual completely. Every detail of behavior is regulated: "the bowels to be cleared before breakfast and never after."⁴² Religious practices lock every-

thing into place and ". . . something close to a purely instinctive life becomes possible."⁴³ As noted, other forms of slavery can implant negative perception and intellectual secondariness that could qualify as both modern and traditional, capitalist and non-capitalist! If the "elimination of oppressive structures" formula is employed, Naipaul can counter with: ". . . when the props of family, clan and caste go, chaos and blankness come."⁴⁴ Recall that such "nonassociational interest groups" were largely excluded by Peters as administrative influences. Intellectual and spiritual depletion, reinforced by the accumulated practices of religion and culture, casts doubts on the simplicities of analysis and recommendations consistently reached by use of either dependency or bureaucracy perspectives.

But the picture is complicated with remarkable consistency in his African, Caribbean, and Indian analyses. For the agricultural specialist, he sketches networks of complex debt relationships ("Debt was a fact of life in these villages; interest was a form of tribute"⁴⁵). The Patel (master and village authority by custom and "consent") ruled the countryside and could decide which villages would be irrigated. For:

Development had touched people unequally. To some it had given a glimpse of a new world; others it had bound more fast in the old. Development had increased the wealth, and the traditional authority of the Patel; it

⁴⁰Hamner, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁴¹Naipaul, *op. cit.* (1978), p. 107.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁴³*Loc. cit.*

⁴⁴*Loc. cit.*

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 87.

had widened the gap between the landless and the landed.⁴⁶

To the development analyst, armed with traditional structural-functional tools, such distortions might well be cured by reorganization and conditional grants. But, noting that in India at every level, rational conversation about the country's problems trails away into talk of magic, he concludes that: "When men cannot observe, they don't have ideas; they have obsessions."⁴⁷ Change may have an entirely different meaning to a people with a major political party (Jan Sangh or National Party) that combines an Indian nuclear armory program with one for protection of the holy cow (free fodder for cows, homes for old cows),⁴⁸ than for the Western development expert, schooled in structural-functional concepts. The point is that development distortions strike deeper than institutional maladies or class domination.⁴⁹ The cultural variable at once impedes rational analysis and

opts for borrowed solutions that often turn into dependency relationships. But, as much is based on romantic ideas of pre-industrial life, Naipaul finds high science modernizing the bullock cart (bearings, metal axles, rubber tires), creating portable agricultural spraying machines, and using edging shears to replace the scythe with modern reaping shoes to retract the blade of the shears.

So the peasant, advancing through his ripe corn, would kick with his left foot and cut, while with his right he would describe a wide arc and cut: a harvest dance.⁵⁰

To import institutions divorced from their animating principles, he finds obscene, hideous, and cruel.⁵¹

Naipaul implies further that just as the cultural obstacles are beyond the simple formulae of CPA translated into technical assistance, so the dependency environment surpasses the simple cure of revolution. Recognizing the growing problem of politics for development, Naipaul states that had he known more of the *client culture*, "The book . . . might have been less romantic about the healing power, in such a culture, of political or racial assertion."⁵² On the one hand, he notes the debilitating influence of capitalist market activities on development. The Martiniquan capitalist, for example, blocks every development project in which he has no hand and the capital is invested instead in France.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 121. Item: "\$12 Million Given Indian Hindu Statue," *Albuquerque Journal* (June 19, 1979). "In a land where the average monthly income is \$13, a statue of a consort of the Hindu goddess of wealth is raking in millions of dollars in cash, jewelry and human hair from pilgrims who shave their heads when they come to pray."

⁴⁹One tendency is escapism to borrowed solutions that technical assistance may unintentionally increase. For example: "Under a glass case in a corridor there was a model of a beautifully planned city, ideal in its simplicity and symmetry. This was the Boa Vista (Brazil) of the future. I couldn't recognize it and asked where on the model was the building in which we stood. No one could tell me." Naipaul, *op. cit.* (1962), p. 121.

⁵⁰Naipaul, *op. cit.* (1978), p. 131.

⁵¹*Loc. cit.*

⁵²Naipaul, *op. cit.* (1962), "Note to this Edition."

So Martinique produces nothing apart from sugar, rum and bananas . . . Surely coconuts can grow in Martinique! 'Impossible' says one. 'The man is mad. Pay no attention,' says another. And so the bickering goes on and coconut oil is imported and milk is flown in from France . . .⁵³

Out of a profound sensitivity to the perceived needs of *client cultures*, Naipaul considers rejection of "metropolitan" standards with autarchic behavior as suicidal. For this view and for statements on the "people" as threats to responsible government, he has been criticized as a lackey of imperialism. Naipaul, however, is concerned about cultural receptivity to the new charlatan as a borrowed institution. The Guianese face goes blank and you are told exactly what he thinks you want to hear — he is lying. But this is the tourist interpretation. Naipaul finds malaria, slavery, indenture, and latifundia as more profound explanations of such behavior and asks for political arousal and education.⁵⁴ The cultural parlor game assures that every new voter regards himself as a pressure group to beg, bully, and badger the leader on petty issues.⁵⁵ At the same time, more fanatical movements (Ras Tafarianism in Jamaica) offer circular arguments and frenzied activities in search of an enemy, but ". . .there was none."⁵⁶ He rightly fears the collective unreason behind the wrong leader ("The situation required not a leader but a society which understood itself and had a purpose and direction").⁵⁷ He fears also

the famine of stewing in one's misery — of being forgotten by the metropolis in the name of a "protest" leader ("The paternalism of colonial rule will have been replaced by the jungle politics of rewards and revenge, the textbook conditions of chaos.").⁵⁸

Second, Naipaul is implying that academic claims to advance society through institutionalization should be prepared for unexpected results. This is not cynical contempt for lesser peoples, with which he has been charged, but a challenge to "experts" to recognize the different behavior of people descended from slavery in multiple forms and faced with dubious cultural alternatives. Rohlehr, for instance, defends Naipaul against the charge of "castrated satire."⁵⁹ If satire is a means of running away, it is equally a means of fighting." In *A House for Mr. Biswas*, Naipaul probes the relationship between rebellion and independence, satirizing and cataloguing a "lifetime of painful struggle and retrogression," throughout which Biswas victoriously remains himself.⁶⁰

Hence, transfer of applied techniques such as budgeting, benefit-cost analysis, accounting structures, cooperative tree farms, irrigation, electrification schemes, and their "management control" must occur within the context of people who need their culture and rightfully resist character modernization and the latest "new man" blueprints. While Naipaul has presented these insights satirically, but often brutally, their implications must penetrate CPA-DA research and practice to prevent another round of over-

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 247.

⁵⁷ *Loc. cit.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 254.

⁵⁹ Hamner, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

simplification and crude formula application.

Implications for Development Administration

The general implication of Naipaulian observations for DA is that, at least for the short run, theoretical debates should be deemphasized in favor of field work in service of local development needs. Institutional analysis and project planning should take precedence, with results tied directly to the end and appropriations of relevant agencies in an effort to institutionalize findings. It is hoped that from the field observation of institutional behavior, more deductive theoretical models may be constructed in the long run.

Beyond these general considerations, four specific recommendations seem in order. *First*, if DA is to move beyond the "icy detachment" of its current methods and employ them to build the curiosity and political consciousness necessary to recharge entrepreneurship long suppressed by negative social institutions,⁶¹ the tactics by which societal groups gain access to bureaucracy must be documented. The implication here is that development may have to be stimulated and sustained by means other than administrative management. Statist assump-

tions, for instance, in over-militarized developing countries, may impede creativity and choice. DA might encourage the creation of "independent" development trust funds controlled by societal groups. Such an institution would build on the current pattern of proliferating autonomous agencies that, working at cross-purposes, often short-circuit development policies. The suggestion is that this may be a development opportunity instead of an obstacle. A village irrigation project could then be financed directly despite politics in the central administration. DA should also encourage mixed capital, seed-money to private entrepreneurs and societal stock-ownership arrangements in local business. Note that these suggestions require only marginal theoretical elegance! *Second*, the programming of development projects, locations, contracts, and other processes, should be documented from formulation to potential points of public access-exclusion. Naipaul noted that in the islands, whites, businessmen, higher civil servants, sportsmen, politicians, and expatriates all believed they were the true elite. "This arrangement, whereby most people don't even know when they are being excluded, leaves everyone reasonably happy."⁶² Programming and evaluation should be performed separately (pre- and post-audits as well!). Structural-functional tools in a broad sense would be most useful applied to these issues. *Third*, development assistance should be conditional on performance — not of the tied-aid variety to truck purchases, for instance, but administrative-policy performance and development results. Development assistance might be

⁶¹W. C. Tuttle, in *A House for Mr. Biswas* (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), irrationally switched from one identity to another — weightlifter, pundit, lorry-driver at rest. This charlatanism also demonstrates suppressed entrepreneurship. For example, I spoke with many creative beggars in Costa Rica that requested money for oxygen (deep-sea diver), car-fare (airport baggage handler), and donations (director of non-existent special education institute).

⁶²Naipaul, *op. cit.* (1962), p. 85.

conditioned on installation of a trouble-shooter incentive system within the bureaucracy for project evaluator teams and for village participants. This system could be prefaced by a "what-if" budget system, e.g., Zero-Based Budgeting, that would encourage compilation and distribution of results-oriented information from accounting as well as budgeting and evaluation. DA could serve development by evaluation of such systems and direction of appropriate management techniques. Such efforts might break the common vicious circle of "mediocrity at every level" in administration and "among people whom such

schemes are meant to benefit."⁶³ Finally, given the real oppression of dependent ties to dominant institutions, and the limitations of traditional CPA-DA theoretical tools, researchers and academics should explore the use of competing dependency-bureaucracy perspectives. Such reforms could avoid the consequences of employing DA to transform societies: ". . . from unspoiled indolence to industrious frenzy . . ."⁶⁴

⁶³Naipaul, *op. cit.* (1978), p. 2.

⁶⁴Hamner, *op. cit.*, p. 214.