

# A Review of Philippine Reorganization

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*Reorganization and administrative reforms in government, although a necessity, have been a source of frustration, disillusionment and more problems. The period of reform takes off with a heavy accent on American styles and philosophies which have been disseminated through agencies and institutions in charge of planning and implementation of government reorganization and administrative reforms. Four suggestions are raised for consideration in future reorganization and administrative reform. They are: (1) the objectives, principles and framework of reorganization must be made clear and simple; (2) continuing incremental/step by step approach must be employed; (3) participation by representatives from the government departments and agencies, the general public, private and academic sectors must be insured; and (4) political support, will and timing must be wholehearted and precise.*

## Introduction

One of the urgent tasks that the Aquino Government had to do when it first came to power was to reorganize the bureaucracy. Although there have been previous experiences prior to this overhauling, this task which was assigned to the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization (PCGR) was significant for its mandate, the means, and the results expected of it.

This study aims to: (1) survey previous reorganization attempts taking into consideration their political and administrative environments; (2) provide a framework for analyzing administrative reform; and (3) pinpoint general and specific problems to provide lessons for the future.

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The first part of the paper traces the historical experience of the Philippines at restructuring the government from the prewar period to the present. An analysis and review of the evolution of the discipline of Public Administration and its application in reorganizing the bureaucracy serves as the focal point of discussion in the second part of the paper.

### Attempts at Reorganization

Attempts at restructuring the Philippine bureaucracy can be divided into four periods: Pre-Government Survey Reorganizational Commission (Pre-GSRC), GSRC, Presidential Commission on Reorganization (PCR), and Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization (PCGR).

#### *Pre-GSRC: Initial Stabs at Restructuring (1898-1953)*

From 1898 to 1915, the legislative, executive, administrative powers were exercised by only one body: the Philippine Commission. A colonial government was set up by the Americans to administer the Philippine islands. Government reorganization during this time was undertaken solely by the Philippine Commission and clearly reflected the desires of the American commissioners, who were at the same time occupying positions as heads of executive departments.<sup>1</sup> The formulating agencies charged with the task of drawing up recommendations for government administrative reforms, were composed of American representatives from the Philippine Commission or more generally from the executive branch of the colonial government. However, this setup gradually changed over time. After 1915, the American-dominated Upper House of the colonial government was divided to include an all-Filipino Lower House that worked hand in hand with the colonial government. This arrangement was continued through the Commonwealth Republic that followed later, until "full Philippine Independence" was granted on July 4, 1946.

The Revised Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands of 1917 provided the earliest guidelines for reorganization.<sup>2</sup> This was the first legislative measure under the colonial government embodying the concepts of: (1) continuous organization, and (2) institutional organization and methods work.<sup>3</sup>

In the Commonwealth Republic, President Manuel Quezon was given blanket authority under the Commonwealth Act of 1935 to approve recommendations for governmental reorganization through the issuance of executive orders.<sup>4</sup> One of the last few acts of the Commonwealth Assembly at the outbreak of the Second World War in 1941 was to authorize President

Quezon to exercise emergency powers. Under this authority, the President was empowered to reorganize government and to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies, or instrumentalities and to abolish any of those already existing.<sup>5</sup>

After the Second World War, President Roxas was granted the same authority in his term by the newly founded Philippine Congress, to effect sweeping reorganization covering bureaus, division, agencies and commissions.<sup>6</sup> All the recommendations then of the Reorganization Committee of 1947 were embodied in just one executive order which President Roxas accepted and approved *in toto*.<sup>7</sup>

The Government Survey Board of 1936 recommending government reorganizational and administrative reforms during President Quezon's term had only one avenue by which its recommendations could be approved, which was the exercise of presidential authority by the issuance of executive orders.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, the Reorganizational Committee of 1947 had two avenues by which its recommendations could secure approval: (a) through a separate executive order to be signed by the President and (b) by proposing bills to be acted upon by the legislative assembly. Despite the availability of the latter avenue, the Reorganizational Committee availed of the former.

President Quirino's Reorganization Commission of 1950 prepared a comprehensive study which was submitted to him for approval. This study concentrated on government-controlled corporations. He exercised his powers much more extensively than his predecessors did, and issued more than 30 executive orders exclusive of the general reorganizational plan. What was previously considered as largely a government administrative reform was expanded under President Quirino's term to cover government controlled corporations.<sup>9</sup> In sum, pre-GSRC attempts at reorganization reached the level of administrative offices and government corporations. However, the task was an onerous one considering the physical and governmental restructuring the country had to undergo after the Second World War. The agencies charged with formulating the reorganizational plan had these common objectives:<sup>10</sup>

- 1) The assertion and *maintenance of US sovereignty* with symbolic Filipinization of the bureaucracy;
- 2) The necessity of establishing a wise, just, stable, *effective and economical* administration of public affairs so as to realize the first;
- 3) The collection and application of taxes and revenues shall be put upon a sound, honest and *economical basis*. Public funds, raised justly and collected honestly shall be applied only in defraying the regular and proper expenses incurred by and for the establishment of the Philippine government, and for such general improvements as public interests may demand;

4) A pure, speedy and *effective* administration of justice shall be established, whereby the evils of delay, corruption and exploitation will be eradicated;

5) Reforms in *all departments* of the government, in all branches of the public service and in *all corporations* closely touching the common life of the people must be undertaken without delay and effected, comfortably to right and justice, in a way that shall satisfy the well-founded demands and the highest sentiments and aspirations of the Philippine people. (*italics supplied*)

### *GSRC: First Comprehensive Governmental Reforms (1954-1956)*

The Government Survey and Reorganization Commission (GSRC) created in June 9, 1954 by the Philippine Congress under Republic Act No. 997, ushered in the first comprehensive attempt at reorganizing the bureaucracy. The law was enacted to attain the following objectives:

1) To promote the better execution of the *laws* and the more effective management of the government and expeditious administration of public business;

2) To promote *economy* to the fullest extent consistent with the efficient operations of the government; and

3) To increase the efficiency of the operations of the government to the fullest extent possible.<sup>11</sup> (*italics supplied*)

In order to be able to effect change, Congress granted GSRC the following powers: to create and abolish instrumentalities, functions, and positions; to group, coordinate or consolidate agencies and functions; to eliminate overlapping and duplication of services, activities and functions of the government; to transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, property, records, personnel from one agency to another; to classify, combine or split positions; and to standardize salaries, materials and equipments.<sup>12</sup> These powers and objectives were further fleshed out by the 21 guiding principles it adopted at the start of its deliberations and the additional 10 which it found necessary as they progressed. Under Section 9 of RA 997, the GSRC was authorized to reorganize all departments, offices, bureaus, agencies, and instrumentalities under the executive branch of the government. In the formulation of plans, the members interpreted this to exclude government corporations engaged in financing and all local governments under the general supervision of the president.<sup>13</sup>

Aside from the four members from the Upper House and a corresponding number from the Lower House, the enabling law that created the GSRC also provided for four members, who may or may not come from the government, to be named by the president.<sup>14</sup>

*Initiation and Implementation.* At the time the GSRC had to prepare its reorganization plans, the country did not as yet have the necessary

technical knowhow. It decided to avail itself of the assistance of L. J. Kroeger and Associates, a management firm from California, which was then helping the Budget Commissioner develop position classification and compensation plan.<sup>15</sup>

Counterpart reorganization committees were put up in the various government agencies and GSRC members grouped themselves into survey panels which later on evolved into 29 task forces assigned to recommend reorganization plans to the whole Commission. Each task force worked closely with a technical team composed of Filipino analysts headed by an American consultant.<sup>16</sup> The draft report and reorganization plans of each task force were taken up in a general session of the entire GSRC.<sup>17</sup>

The various task force proposed 55 reorganization plans embodied in 30 separate reports to the Commission, which was submitted to the President in 25 reports totalling 51 plans. Of this, only 48 plans which were embodied in 22 reports were sent by the President to Congress before the March 15, 1955 deadline.<sup>18</sup>

Section 6 (a) of Republic Act No. 997 that created the GSRC provided for a period of 30 session days in Congress within which either House could, by a simple resolution, disapprove any reorganization plan submitted by the President. No such resolution was forthcoming until House Bill No. 3113 was passed by Congress which sought to extend the life of the Commission for another year.<sup>19</sup> In addition, the bill extended the right of Congress to reject any of the reorganization plans already in its possession to the last day of the regular session in 1955,<sup>20</sup> and the bill vested on the Commission alone the authority to implement any approved reorganization plan.<sup>21</sup> Because of this last provision, President Magsaysay vetoed House Bill No. 3113. A compromise was later worked out through the enactment of Republic Act No. 1241 which was signed on June 9, 1955. Among its salient features were:

- 1) extension of the life of the GSRC to the end of 1956 with an additional appropriation of P300,000;
- 2) extension of the right of Congress to disapprove any reorganization plan already submitted to the end of the 1955 regular session and to a period of 70 days for plans to be submitted in the 1956 regular session;
- 3) implementation of approved plans by the executive branch with the GSRC preparing the initial implementing details of such plans;

4) allowing the President to modify any plans submitted by the GSRC before endorsement to Congress; and

5) further clarifying the powers of the GSRC by limiting reorganization to the National Government and vesting on the Commission the power to create agencies and/or functions.

In 1956, President Magsaysay endorsed to Congress 53 out of 61 plans. The House of Representatives rejected 20; and only four of these were rejected by the Senate.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, the process of reorganization involves a balancing between both political and administrative considerations. A report by Louis J. Kroeger cited several reasons for the non-implementation of a number of plans. These are (1) opposition to the plans by the operating agencies; (2) lack of understanding of the meaning of some of the provisions of the plans; and (3) presidential inaction.<sup>23</sup> He also claimed that even on those plans for which implementing executive orders had been issued, there appeared to be compliance on the formal level only.<sup>24</sup>

*PCR: The Marcos Years (1969-1986)*

This second comprehensive government reorganization espoused a development-oriented structure.<sup>25</sup> To give flesh to the basic reorganization objectives of promoting *simplicity, economy, and efficiency* in the government<sup>26</sup> and to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for *accelerated social and economic development*, the Commission adapted a set of guiding principles, to wit:

1) The Commission shall establish an administrative system that is *development-oriented*.

2) The Commission shall make use of past and present studies conducted by different institutions or entities in the *government, the universities, and the private sector* for the improvement of Philippine public administration.

3) The Commission shall concentrate on *factual analyses* of conditions and problems with a view to developing workable and feasible recommendations for administrative development.

4) The Commission shall reorganize the *administrative machinery* to increase its capacity to implement more effectively the programs approved by the President and Congress.

5) Reorganization shall be geared towards achieving the *greatest output* from the manpower, financial, and other resources available.

6) The bureaus, offices, and other organizational units shall be grouped on the basis of *major functions* to minimize conflicts, overlapping, and duplication

of activities and thus achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency in government operations.

7) The Commission shall foster *administrative decentralization* or delegation of authority that will result in greater participation and more effective working relationship at various levels of management.

8) The Commission shall consider measures to clarify lines of authority, improve channels of communication, and strengthen the spirit of *responsibility and accountability* in the public service.

9) The Commission shall adopt *measures or safeguards*, within the administrative system which will curtail or prevent practices and change attitudes which are inimical to sound, honest, and effective public administration.

10) Reorganization efforts shall take into account *cultural and environmental* factors in determining realistic solutions to the problems of achieving efficient, economical, and responsive management of public affairs." (italics supplied)

PCR was given the power to limit expenditures; eliminate duplication and overlapping of services, activities and functions of a similar nature; abolish services, activities and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of government; and define and limit executive functions, services and activities.<sup>28</sup>

*Composition and Scope of Authority.* A joint executive-legislative body composed of nine members - three from the Senate, three from the House of Representatives, and three Presidential appointees — was created to prepare and formulate the necessary reorganization recommendations.<sup>29</sup>

The legal mandate of the Presidential Commission on Reorganization provides for the reorganization of the executive branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs).<sup>30</sup> Despite this provision in the enabling act, the Commission interpreted this to mean that the corporations owned or controlled by the government could only be reorganized "within the limits of their respective charters."<sup>31</sup> The reorganizing agency had to propose changes limited to across-the-board policies and procedures without touching on specific corporations.<sup>32</sup> In addition to this, the legislative and the judicial branches, General Auditing Office, Commission on Elections, and local governments were exempted.<sup>33</sup>

*Initiation and Implementation.* The reorganization implemented by the Commission is significant for a number of reasons. This attempt had an all-Filipino composition who were drawn from the government, the academe and the private sector. It was characterized by an increased participation from the private sector. As a result of the participation of members from the academe, government and the private sector, the commission produced a more comprehensive plan.

After identifying the guidelines, the Commission created technical panels to conduct studies on a major functional area of the government.<sup>34</sup> The proposals formulated were later submitted to the Commission through the panel chairmen. The study was conducted in close coordination with the departments and agencies.

The plan later on passed through the Presidential Commission to Review and Revise the Reorganization Plan put up under Executive Order No. 281 on December 29, 1970, to help the President assess the reactions of his cabinet and members of the Congress to the proposals.

Consultations with the Cabinet and other congressional leaders were held to get their initial reactions to the Plan. After these meetings, Republic Act (RA) 6172 was enacted in March 1971 to extend the deadline from March 5 to May 5, 1971.

A call for a re-extension of the deadline resulted to the passing of RA 6175 further amending the date of the President's submission of the Plan to Congress within 40 calendar days following the opening of the regular session in 1972. The Review Commission was also given legislative sanctions.

After incorporating the additional refinements proposed by the technical staff, the President submitted the plan to Congress on March 4, 1972. However, the work of Congress was aborted with the declaration of Martial Law on September 21, 1972. The Integrated Reorganization Plan (IRP) was later decreed into law on September 1972 under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1 as the first major administrative reform measure under martial law.

President Marcos took advantage of his plenary powers to modify the IRP through presidential decrees. He also issued PD No. 6, "Amending Certain Rules on Discipline of Government Officials and Employees," which he used to purge the government of much vaunted scalawags, but only turned out to be a laughing episode as most names drawn were either dead or had retired long ago.

Except for the Department of Foreign Affairs, the reorganization under the IRP was reported to have been completed as of December 31, 1976 per Letter of Instruction No. 449 dated August 18, 1976. On June 9, 1978, President Marcos issued PD 1416, "Granting Authority to the President of the Philippines to Reorganize the National Government." This provided him with the mandate to prepare the way for a parliamentary form of government and further enhance his reorganizational powers.



New departments were created in recognition of the need to further give flesh to the country's developmental efforts, i.e. Department of Tourism, Department of Agriculture, etc., and if there were overlaps, inter-agency committees were established to better coordinate and integrate efforts at decisionmaking.

National planning and policy formulation was centralized under the National Economic and Development Authority which replaced the former Presidential Economic Staff and the National Economic Council. Decentralization slowly progressed with the establishment of regional offices of various line offices, and other minor agencies partially restructured.

Lateral entry in the civil service was institutionalized and a Career Executive Service was created to develop a crop of government administrators.

*PCGR: Aquino's Alternative (1986-1987)*

"Whoever comes after Marcos will have one heck of a time" were Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.'s prophetic words that set the tone for the work of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization, not knowing his wife would be the "whoever" he was predicting.<sup>35</sup> To describe the givens before the PCGR started its work was 20 years of history spent gallivanting, tolerating, and outwardly "waltzing with the dictator" as Raymond Bonner puts it from an American perspective. But to Filipinos, it is the story of repression and "penury."<sup>36</sup>

The main problems were: (1) the \$28 billion external debt,<sup>37</sup> (2) 80% of the population live below the poverty line,<sup>38</sup> (3) a bloated, "blob" bureaucracy, and (4) GOCC's numbering 250, most of which are in financial straits.<sup>39</sup> All of these seemed to dwarf the five "gallant" principles that the PCGR was supposed to use to deMarcosify, limit bureaucratic gigantism and decentralize authority as soon as possible.

The fundamental philosophy of governance that has been taken as state policy is to rely on the private sector and the market mechanism to regulate social activity, it will intervene in those areas and on those occasions where market considerations alone are not sufficient to ensure social equity and justice. This has been articulated in the speeches of President Corazon C. Aquino, and the "Freedom Constitution" that was adopted in the interregnum between the February 1986 EDSA revolution and the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. In essence, the fundamental philosophy contains two overriding principles: Economic Rationality and Social Justice.<sup>40</sup>

The five fundamental philosophies of governance are enumerated as follows:

- 1) Promoting private initiative;
- 2) Decentralization;
- 3) Cost-effectiveness;
- 4) Efficiency of front-line services; and
- 5) Accountability.

Under Executive Order No. 5, the Presidential Commission on Reorganization was reconstituted and renamed the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization. The Honorable Luis R. Villafuerte, who carried cabinet rank, was appointed chairman by President Corazon C. Aquino. Other members included the Honorable Joker P. Arroyo, the Honorable Teodoro Locsin, Jr., and the Honorable Jaime Ferrer.

The workhorses of the PCGR included high caliber consultants from both the private and the public sector who were divided into survey teams headed by a coordinator. A number of people from the academe claim that the work of the PCGR is a handiwork of the private sector. The personnel tabulation reflected in Table 1 satisfies this claim. Of the 95 total number of consultants hired by the PCGR, 74 or 78% were from the private sector.

This dominance of the private sector consultants in the work of the PCGR was interpreted by some as a natural course since it is the private sector that is eventually the recipient of goods and services and the main financial supporter of government in terms of taxes. Thus, the private sector should have a say on how they want their government is run.<sup>42</sup>

**Table 1. Composition of PCGR  
Survey Team Members (Consultants)<sup>41</sup>**

	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Private sector consultants	74	78
Government sector consultants	21	22
<b>T O T A L</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>

The scope of PCGR's authority is truly encompassing. It involves the overall reform of the administrative branch, GOCCs and local governments. Never in the history of government restructuring has a single body been given this Herculean task of reorganization.<sup>43</sup>

The PCGR proper was divided into a policy group and a special studies group. These groups were in charge of standardizing, collating, and compiling all the survey team's findings. The approval of the reorganization plans were left solely in the hands of the Chief Executive. This was due to the absence of a legislature. Nevertheless, another reason for this could be the need for immediate and sweeping reforms as stressed by the philosophical framework of the Commission to deMarcosify and avert bureaucratic gigantism.<sup>44</sup>

On the other hand, public consultations were carried out through: (1) survey team meetings, (2) cluster meetings, (3) plenary sessions, (4) integrating sessions, (5) public fora, and (6) meetings with client departments. Executive Order No. 5, Section 4 also enjoined all departments, agencies, bureaus, administrative offices, local governments, and GOCCs to submit their reorganization proposals for integration into the PCGR survey team report. The general public was likewise invited to write or air their proposals, suggestions and recommendations through a comprehensive media blitz.

The steps described below illustrates the consultation involved before an executive order is signed:

1) After the integration at the level of the PCGR Team Coordinators, a draft EO is submitted together with the original report, executive summary, and the data base to the PCGR Minister for his review.

2) The revised EO is then sent to the Minister concerned for comment. If it is already acceptable, it is then returned to the PCGR and standardized for transmittal to Malacañang for the President's signature.

3) The lawyers in the Office of the Executive Secretary review the document and add the finishing touches.

4) It does not go to the President unless it is reviewed by the different department representatives at the Cabinet Assistance System (CAS). After the CAS, it is sent back to the Office of the Executive Secretary for integration.

5) Upon signing by the President, the EO is given a corresponding number unless there are additional reactions from other sectors, in which case, implementation is suspended.

Table 2. Comparison of the Different Government Reorganizations

<i>Abueva's Tools for Reorganizational Analysis</i>	<i>Pre-GSRC* (1989-1953)</i>	<i>GSRC (1954-1956)</i>	<i>PCR** (1969-1986)</i>	<i>PCGR (1986-1987)</i>
1. What are the Goals/Principles of the Reorganization?	Less Spoils, Filipinization	Economy & Efficiency	Economy & Efficiency, Economic Social Development	DeMarcosification Decentralization
No. of Principles:	11	25	10	5
2. Who initiates/initiated the Reorganization?	Philippine Commission Congress	Congress (RA 997, RA 1241)	Congress (RA 5435)	Freedom Constitution (EO 5)
3. Who were the doers?	President, Representatives	President, Representatives and Legislators from both houses	President, Representatives and Legislators from both houses	President, Representatives, and Consultants
4. What is the scope of authority?	Overall Administration and GOCCs	Overall Administration and Reorganization	Overall Administration and Reorganization	Overall Administration, GOCCs, and Local Government
No. of Administrative Offices:	11	10	19	22
No. of GOCCs:	24	29	91	250
5. Who approved/sanctioned the reorganization plan?	By Laws, piecemeal	By law, piecemeal implementing EOs	By law, modified PDs in toto	By Law, EOs

\*Consists of the following: (1) Government Survey Board (1936); (2) Reorganization Committee (1947); and (3) Reorganization Commission (1950);

\*\*As extended in 1972, consequently attached to the Office of the President until its abolition in February 1986.

In the implementation process, the prevailing motto appeared to be "to each his own," for if the findings of the PCGR were really consultative and participative, then there would have been no difficulty in the latter stages of the reorganization program.<sup>45</sup> This was the case of the Department of Foreign Affairs reorganization (1986-87), redone by the UP College of Public Administration, which was not spared revision. As a matter of fact, even some members of the UP College of Public Administration team who finalized the EO were not able to recognize the EO signed by the President.<sup>46</sup> Critics, especially people from the academe, will say that this is because of the quality of people involved, most of whom came from the private sector, they "therefore do not know much about the problems of the government." The reorganization case in the Department of Agriculture has been under criticism from different sectors despite the fact that the reorganizational plans were done by consultants from the public sector, who came mainly from the UP Los Baños and within the Department.

Table 2 presents a comparative summary of the four different Government reorganizational period using seven guide questions in reorganizational analysis.

### **Varieties of Public Administration and Philippine Reorganization**

Each of the four varieties of Public Administration offers a distinct emphasis and relates to the people and the society in a different way. They may be identified as "traditional public administration," "development administration," "new public administration" and "development public administration." The labels of the first three varieties are rather well-known and their characteristics are easier to identify. There is however, no set term for the last variety which has also been called, by various authors, as "social conscience administration," "social development management," "development administration for equity," and the like.<sup>47</sup>

Ledivina V. Cariño

Philippine reorganizations were to some extent manifestations of the changing patterns in Public Administration.

#### *Pre-GSRC Reorganization and Traditional Public Administration*

Traditional Public Administration emphasizes maintenance of the status quo. This has apparently affected the pre-GSRC thrusts since according to Vilorio one of its underlying objectives included "the assertion and maintenance of U.S. sovereignty."<sup>48</sup> This was manifested by the

establishment of a civil service that was subservient to American whims. Most of the positions in the civil service then were held by Americans, and even if there were Filipinos, "they were not given important things to do."<sup>49</sup> Whenever there were Filipinos who had the courage to request for change, they were not taken seriously by other Filipinos who were deceived into believing that their role was to help their "brother" Americans implement their goals. Despite the presence of a colonial government, the American bureaucrats in Washington still prevailed; and in the Philippines, the Wilsonian task for Public Administration, i.e., running a Constitution, was eagerly embraced by the Americans who wanted a neutral civil service and the politics-administration dichotomy it upheld was carried over into the early years of the postwar period.<sup>50</sup>

Traditional Public Administration focused on the internal organization. To some extent the society was then experiencing a reorientation of culture from Spanish to what is now American. The love "America" craze blinded the leaders and public administrationists during those times to concentrate on the "one best way" - the American way.<sup>51</sup> This was reflected in the administrative organizational structure established which concentrated on the efficiency and economy of operations.<sup>52</sup>

Whatever was being taught and practiced in PA schools in the US, in short time reached the Philippines. Consistent with their classroom prescriptions on organization and management, fiscal administration, and personnel administration were the following concrete courses of action in administrative reforms in the Philippines:

1) In the Reorganization Act of 1916, the Philippine legislature created six departments and one of them was the Department of Finance,<sup>53</sup>

2) During President Quezon's time, the Government Survey Board recommended an "O & M entity" to assist the President. This did not require further study and thus gave birth to the Budget Commission and Budget Office, which were charged with budget formulation,<sup>54</sup> and

3) The Civil Service Act of 1900 (Act No. 5) created Weber's model of a "perfect organization," the Civil Service Board (later on the Bureau of Civil Service), which became the catalyst of traditional PA reforms.<sup>55</sup>

All these stressed the same theme: the concentration of pre-GSRC reorganizations "on the inputs to the system" and the primacy of organizational goals.<sup>56</sup>

*GSRC Reorganization and Development Administration*

The GSRC primarily called for a more effective management of government, the promotion of economy to the fullest, and the efficiency of operations of the administrative system. These were parallel to Development Administration's avowed goals of efficiency, economy and management of economic growth to achieve the road to progress, still very much Western. Thus the main concern of the Philippines during this period was the "development of an economy following the example of the West."<sup>57</sup> The bureaucracy was looked at as a given factor. According to Cariño.<sup>58</sup>

"the universal principles of traditional PA gave way to attempts at formulating middle-range theories and the generation of case studies which showed the bureaucracy not as *idealized but as existing*." (*italics supplied*)

Therefore if the GSRC was to attempt at improving the country's administrative system with Development Administration principles right after the war, it had to redirect itself from these internal problems of the organization to the problems of a Third World nation used as a battleground during the war. Endriga vividly described this:<sup>59</sup>

although the government inherited a reasonably well-organized administration and a well-trained civil service, the war and the disorders that it caused had made it difficult to restore administrative efficiency.

Together with the Daniel Bell Mission's recommendations of creating the GSRC were: (1) the establishment of the first school of public administration, the Institute of Public Administration in the University of the Philippines, which imported from the State University of Michigan tools and experiences from Western models and faculty members; (2) the creation of Wage and Position Classification Office which standardized pay and established a position classification system.

The intensification of these Development Administration stimulated activities were welcome infusions but the concentration still remained in the internal organization such as personnel. Furthermore, GSRC reorganizers were said to have been limited by their interpretation of the enacting law and the non-implementation of a number of plans it came up with.

*PCR Reforms and New Public Administration*

New Public Administration was born in the seventies in the US. It gained predominance over Traditional Public Administration's prescriptions of bureaucracy and the internal organization, and Development

Administration's value-neutrality, by setting such alternatives as "ad-hocracy," task forces, and project management.<sup>60</sup> This ran concentric with the period of martial law in the country which was spawned by the turmoil and uneasiness that wracked Philippine society.

Before the imposition of martial law, the PCR presented to Congress an integrated reorganization plan for packaged approval. According to them, this plan was blessed with the principles of economy, efficiency, simplicity "to achieve the national goals of accelerated social and economic development."<sup>61</sup> But principles and practice during martial law were two different stories. Deeper analysis would reveal that the Marcos-reconstituted PCR propelled programs and policies of repression and centralization. These ran counter to the PCR's declared aims of equity, social justice, simplicity, economic development supposed to be implemented in programs such as that of the Ministry of Human Settlement, Regional Development Councils livelihood projects (e.g., KKK, Pag-ibig, Flexihomes, and BLISS housing), and export-import oriented industries. As Cariño pointed out it was really "fadistic". It only forced Philippine Public Administration to choke in the context of a society which had an exploitative social structure to develop programs to meet human needs. This was to emphasize the "legitimacy" the regime was trying to project to the West.<sup>62</sup>

Sad to note, was the abuse and misuse of the PCR's principles which were conceived "to make responsiveness and effectiveness of programs as the main foci of concern."<sup>63</sup> Even the concept of reorganization as a continuing process by making the PCR an attached agency of the Office of the President was not faithfully adhered to. On the other hand, the PCR kowtowed to the wishes of the President although initially it prescribed substantive and impactful goals. These only compounded the already worsening negative bureaucratic occurrences.

#### *PCGR Reforms and Development Public Administration*

Development Public Administration's practice in the Philippines was re-emphasized in the 80s, by Chairman Armand Fabella of the PCR in the book titled: *Organizing Government for Effective Development Administration*.<sup>64</sup>

Development Public Administration is a combination of several previous Public Administration axioms; concern for maintenance and equity without rejecting project management; search for smaller, possibly ad-hoc organizations; modification through bureaucratic reorientation; and decentralization, a value re-emphasized by Development Public Administration as it seeks harmony between central direction and responsiveness to particular needs.



Endowed with an unblemished Chief Executive and infallible principles molded by the past's experiences of repression and people power, the PCGR could have carried out the best reorganization plan. Like its immediate predecessors, it was manned with the best consultants who came out with the principles of decentralization, efficiency of frontline services, privatization, cost-effectiveness, and accountability. These were the answer to the country's craving for social justice, equity and the desire for the centrality of the human person. All akin to the problems of other Third World Nations such as the Philippines.<sup>65</sup>

Popular consultation was espoused as presented in the extensive process carried out to involve the public in its work. The PCGR introduced efficiency of frontline services to elicit the responsiveness of government. Decentralization, one of the main themes was needed to diffuse power and authority and to bring decision making closest to the people concerned. Power was so centralized during the Marcos administration that the phrase "power emanates from the sovereign will of the people" became a myth. Privatization became one of the most sought after principle with the creation of the Committee on Privatization and Asset Privatization Trust. These were considered aside from the private sector self-regulation concept introduced in each PCGR plan.

Accountability thus aimed to insure civil service allegiance to the people, the national interest above all. This term has also been interpreted as "the ability to control those in power and hold them responsible for their actions", and to include competence, "the ability of government to do its business."

Even though the PCGR was armed with these advances in Public Administration in terms of principles equated with Development Public Administration, it was not able to maximize the use of these tools.

### Conclusion

Reorganization although a necessity, has only been a source of frustration, disillusionment and more problems. Chief Executives from Aguinaldo to Aquino have used reform and reorganization as part of their mandate from the Filipino electorate. Yet, only a few have been able to take advantage of this to come up with a well-oiled administrative structure.

The common belief based on past experiences was that if society wanted to solve a problem, creating a governmental structure was the way to do it. That structure would train and organize its workers in a way necessary to achieve uniform service and goals.

In the Philippine case, the more pervasive the bureaucratic characteristics were, rigidity and receptiveness of negative bureaucratic behavior likewise tended to pervade in the bureaucracy. Max Weber anticipated this situation in emphasizing the structure while subsuming the behavioral aspects of organizations, believing that behavior will follow later. In Philippine society, behavioral factors that were set aside by Weber created the dysfunctions which he did not foresee in his formulations, e.g., cultural values and sub-cultures. From the above discussions, it would be helpful to consider the following areas in future reorganizational administrative reforms.

*Clear and simple reorganization objectives and principles.* This is to promote better understanding, among ordinary people for whom these reforms were prepared in the first place. Even if the "best" axioms were used but not utilized and interpreted properly, they will remain technocratic gibberings, good only in semantics and on paper.

*Continuing-incremental/step by step approach.* Continuing-incremental strategies produce a massaging effect to the administrative machinery. Being a gradual one, this technique has the advantages of experimentation while building confidence among the reform agents. Thus barring crisis situations where swift one-shot changes are needed to rectify large chunks of bureaucratic fat, the continuing step-by-step approach is suggested.

*Representation and participation of the general public, private, and academic sectors.* A thorough participative and consultative method should be applied even if it takes time. To be most participative or democratic all quarters must be consulted. This might prove to be tedious but hopefully will result in a more positive result-oriented plan.

Concerned individuals can be divided into two—those who are members of the internal organization and those who are recipients or part of the external organization. An open system has to be devised. Priorities have to be set. Academic consultants with a well-rounded and broad skills are needed to help develop ideas, give technical advice, and provide independent objectives:

*Wholehearted political support/will and precise timing.* Reorganizations are political processes and it is difficult to please everybody. Strong information dissemination drives should be carried out to fan the issue, to inform, increase public awareness and to win support of action groups and the general public. Professional lobby or interest groups, cause-oriented organizations and political parties must be encouraged to expose the dimensions and implications of the plans.

The dynamics of politics/administration fusion should be safeguarded by popular will so as not to be taken advantage of by enterprising wretches. Political situations where the people have surrendered their mandate to the Chief Executive, like the February EDSA revolution that deposed the despotic Marcos regime, should be taken as the precise time to implement sweeping and massive reforms, and yet not receive public flak and backlash. These are opportunities to purge scalawags and punish culprits who have been able to cling on to the coattails of advocates of negative political behavior.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Alejandro A. Vilorio, "Reorganization in the Philippine National Government Prior to 1954," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration (PJPA)*, Vol. V, No. 1 (January 1961), p. 33.

<sup>2</sup>"Act of the U.S. Philippine Commission" approved on March 10, 1917 effective October 1, 1917 pursuant to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act of 1916.

<sup>3</sup>Viloria, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>4</sup>Commonwealth Act. No. 5, December 31, 1935.

<sup>5</sup>Government Survey Board Report, a compilation found at the Library of the UP College of Public Administration (UPCPA), p.11.

<sup>6</sup>Viloria, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 43.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 49.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 33 & 49.

<sup>11</sup>Republic Act No. 997, Section 2(a).

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, Section 4.

<sup>13</sup>Jose V. Abueva, "Issues of Reorganization Strategy: The Government Survey and Reorganization Commission (1954-1956) and the Commission on Reorganization (1969-)," Jose V. Abueva (ed.), *Perspectives in Government Reorganization* (Manila: UPCPA, 1969), *op. cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>14</sup>Republic Act No. 997, Section 3.

<sup>15</sup>Abueva, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>17</sup>For a more detailed discussion on the subject, please see Leandro V. Vilorio's article "The Government Survey and Reorganization Commission: Some Notes on Method," in

*Perspectives in Government Reorganization*, Jose V. Abueva (ed.), (Manila: UPCPA, 1969), p. 39-76.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 58.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup>Abueva, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>23</sup>Cited in Vilorio, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup>Rafael M. Salas, "Orientation for Government Reorganization," in *Perspectives in Government Reorganization*, Jose Abueva (ed.), (Manila: UPCPA, 1969), pp. 3-4.

<sup>26</sup>Republic Act No. 5435, Section 1.

<sup>27</sup>Presidential Commission on Reorganization (PCR), "Organizing for Development," *PJPA*, Vol. XXI, Nos. 3 & 4 (July-October 1978), pp. 387-388.

<sup>28</sup>Republic Act 5435, *op. cit.*

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, Section 2.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, Section 3.

<sup>31</sup>PCR, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>34</sup>For the complete list, see Abueva, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>35</sup>Republic of the Philippines, *Book I: Principles and Policy Proposals*. (Metro Manila: Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization, June 1986), pp. 1-2.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*; For a more thorough explanation about the martial law period, please see: Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing With a Dictator* (USA: Times Books, 1987) and Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., *Dictatorship and Martial Law: Philippine Authoritarianism in 1972* (Manila: Great Books Publishers and the UPCPA, 1987).

<sup>37</sup>Figure disclosed by President Corazon C. Aquino in her "State of the Nation Address" during the opening session of the new Congress of the Philippines, 1987.

<sup>38</sup>Figure disclosed by NEDA's Solita Monsod at the PHEONIX '87 Conference, Asset Privatization Trust, Philippine International Convention Center, Manila, December 1986.

<sup>39</sup>PCGR Book I, *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 17-22; An excerpt on the five guiding principles adopted by the PCGR was

reprinted in the *PJPA*, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (July 1986), pp. 317-326.

<sup>14</sup>Based on the PCGR Directory prepared by Mr. Joaquin L. Gonzalez III for the PCGR Secretariat, Makati, Metro Manila on April 9, 1986.

<sup>15</sup>PCGR Survey Team members, names withheld as requested, November 1986.

<sup>16</sup>PCGR Book I, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-15.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.* p. 17; also extensively discussed in PA 208, 228 and 298 classes at the UPCPA, First Semester, Academic Year 1987-1988.

<sup>18</sup>William G. Ouchi, *Theory Z* (USA: Avon Books, 1981), p. 37; also in Gabriel U. Iglesias (ed.), *Implementation: The Problem of Achieving Results* (Manila: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1976).

<sup>19</sup>Interview with Mr. Bienvenido C. Gonzalez, PCGR Survey Team Coordinator for the Department of Tourism and Department of Transportation and Communication; Interviews with members of the Personnel Board at the Department of Tourism; Interview with Prof. Danilo R. Reyes and Dr. Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., UPCPA; Further supported by the findings of Mr. Joaquin L. Gonzalez III in "The Personnel Dimensions of the Reorganization of the DOT," submitted as part of the course requirements in PA 228 (Special Problems in Public Personnel Administration), UPCPA, 1987.

<sup>20</sup>Used with special permission from the author, Dr. Ledivina V. Cariño, in "Administrative Accountability: A Review of the Evolution, Meaning, and Operationalization of a Key Concept in Public Administration," *PJPA*, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (April 1983), p. 126. Due to the conflicts of typologies adapted by public administrationists, the authors felt that they should make Cariño's concept as the core operational definition for Traditional Public Administration, Development Administration, New Public Administration, and Development Public Administration.

<sup>21</sup>See Pre-GSRC trend no. 1.

<sup>22</sup>Jose N. Endriga, "Stability and Change: The Civil Service in the Philippines," *PJPA*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2 (April 1985), pp. 141-142; Cited also in Vitoria "Reorganization in the Philippine National Government Prior to 1954," *PJPA* Vol. V, No. 1, (January 1961), p. 36.

<sup>23</sup>Cariño, *op. cit.*, p. 126-127.

<sup>24</sup>Endriga, *op. cit.*, p. 139-144.

<sup>25</sup>See Pre-GSRC trends no. 3 & 4.

<sup>26</sup>Vitoria, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>27</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 39.

<sup>28</sup>Endriga, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

<sup>29</sup>Cariño, *op. cit.*, p. 127; Also in Nestor N. Pilar's article, "The Relevance of New PA in Philippine Public Administration," *PJPA* Vol. XXVI, Nos. 3 & 4, (July-October 1982), pp. 228-234.

<sup>30</sup>Cariño, *ibid.*

<sup>66</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup>Endriga, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

<sup>68</sup>Cariño, *op. cit.*, p. 128; Pilar, *op. cit.*,

<sup>69</sup>Cariño, *ibid.*; Vitoria in "Issues of Reorganizational Strategy: The Government Survey Reorganization Commission (1954- 1956) and the Commission on Reorganization (1969- )," *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

<sup>70</sup>Cariño, *ibid.*

<sup>71</sup>Vitoria, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>72</sup>Republic of the Philippines, Organizing Government for Effective Development Administration (Manila: Presidential Commission on Reorganization, 1984).

<sup>73</sup>Cariño, *op. cit.*, p. 128.