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

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

POPULATION, PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT*

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In the Philippines especially, only the most hardy traveller in development studies would venture along the path of population studies with anything but the greatest circumspection. Population studies in the country[1] are prolific, and in 1972 Philippine population-influencing programmes took the first place (away from population-responsive agriculture) in external pre-investment and technical assistance funding.[2] At the same time, however, there is also a notable concern in the country with the planning of regional development and it is not apparent yet that the two have been brought into very close association either with each other or with the renewed emphasis – another sign of the present times – on national planning for what are called the social aspects of development. It is, therefore, to this triad of issues in public policy studies that this November, 1974, tentative and speculative discussion, drawing upon a range of Asian materials, is addressed.[3]

One of the themes to be explored must be the view (so prevalent in state-supported family planning programmes that apparently it has become an integral part of them) that only small families are planned families. The premise is that big families are supposed to be unplanned, matters of accident or of ignorance. From a sociological viewpoint, it is likely that nothing could be further from being the case in actual practice so far as the majority of the Philippines' population, for instance, or the low-income population of any similar country, is concerned.

Another connected theme to be explored is that of "kinship" in general or of an "extended family system" in particular as an obstacle to "planned economic development," as measured, for instance, in terms of increasing *per capita* income. This is highly disputable too. In what follows, indeed, the contrary position will be advanced, namely, that large family systems

*This paper was originally prepared for the Asian Trade Union Women's Seminar on Population and National Development, the Department of Labour, Republic of the Philippines, October 1973, at which Shrimati Parvathi Krishnan made some most pertinent observations. In revising it for publication, I have taken a number of further sources into account which were either unavailable or unknown to me then – for instance, the Philippine studies of Dean Jose Encarnacion – to which my attention was drawn by colleagues in the Cooperative Regional Development Project of the University of the Philippines' National Development Research Center directed by Dr. Ben Cariño, Director of Research and Publications of the University's Institute of Planning, to whom I am grateful for other assistance as well.

[1]For the most comprehensive bibliography see *Philippine population studies: a preliminary bibliography with selected annotations* by R. Bulatao, E. de la Cruz and others, the Social Research Laboratory, the Department of Sociology, the University of the Philippines, October 1974.

[2]Information supplied by the Office of the Resident Representative, UNDP, Manila. For the population-influencing versus population-responsive formulation see the National Academy of Sciences, *Rapid population growth: consequences and policy implications*, John Hopkins Press 1971, Chapter IV: Population Policy.

[3]The best collection of Asian studies on population and social development is ECAFE, *Population aspects of social development, report of a regional-seminar and selected papers*, Asian Population Studies Series, No. 11, 1973.

are themselves forms of economic and social planning and development as this is understood and acted upon by their members either when they multiply their numbers or when they differentiate and situate their occupations accordingly or in both these regards. Population, if you will allow the expression, is not to be equated with copulation (but in any event natality is only one component in family size: mortality of the young and old is another).

Demographic and other kinds of social analysis for planning purposes must relate to many levels and sectors of social organization, not that of the family alone. In part, indeed, the very idea of family limitation connotes a broader importance of socio-political economic structures other than that of the family, such as the nation or the state or a region of either. If, for instance, planning for regional development is to become a more and more all-embracing concern in a country, policies about population will have to reflect this no less than those in other sectors and perhaps more.

The aim of the following discussion is general, insofar as some fundamentals of public policy planning and social development are involved, and particular inasmuch as they are applied to thinking about population policies specifically.

Public Policy

Whether or to what extent family fertility limitation in itself does or will lead to more social justice (i.e., better income distribution in the country, lower wealth differentials, and more equitable access to economic and political opportunities) is a problem for public policy studies. To increase GNP in a country, as is well known, is not necessarily the same thing as improving income distribution. Maximizing the one does not necessarily maximize the other at the same time. In any event there is a very specific limitation of the GNP calculation for population and public policy studies, and this is that, other things being equal, it tends to increase with population size. It would perhaps follow from this consideration alone that population size is always to be maximized in the interest of maximizing GNP.

By public policy I mean planning whether emanating from the private or the state or the religious or any other sector (or level) which has implications for public welfare whether positive or negative. Policy or planning decisions are addressed, not just to any problem, but to those considered instinctually or ideologically to be in urgent need of solution. This could scarcely be otherwise because there are usually so many different people considering so many different pressing problems at any one time that it would be impossible for all of them to be solved at once. So problems are ranked in priorities which are changed as necessary.

The objectives of planning also change from time to time. In a sense, at the national level, the subject in the name of each ministry in a government is a priority problem area. By comparing cabinet-level task forces one can get some idea of national variations in this regard. At the regional and other levels one can get an idea of priorities in a similar way but as one passes from the macro to the micro, so, as a rule, does it become more difficult to discover informal as well as formal patterns of activity. Thus the research task grows more complex as well.

We would need to know, for example, to what extent cabinet-level responsibility in ministerial structures for population is a specifically designated function and, if not, then why not. Then, at regional levels and below, we need to know which, if any, special agencies are concerned with population questions as such and their formal and informal interrelationships with other agencies, and what they do, and so on. It wil then be possible to evaluate these facts. Kingsley Davis, for instance, has urged the importance of agencies of economics and education over agencies of health, for population policy.[4]

Which social group or category deems *what* to be most critical or crucial in resource allocation varies considerably from one level or situation to another. It may, for instance, be either manpower, land, capital, foreign exchange, management, or any combination of

[4]Kingsley Davis, "Population Policy: Will Current Programs Succeed?" *Science,* Vol. 158 (Nov. 1967).

these. It is the nature of single-factor general theories of planning to seize on one or more of these factors-of-production which are, if to varying extents, factors-of-production, too, as somehow particularly causally related to development. Sometimes it has been land, sometimes capital (and savings), that theorists have selected as being the most vital single such causative factor. As yet (and one doubts that there ever will be) there has been no uncontroversial and definitive demonstration of the monopolistic merits of any one of these for explanatory purposes. The slippage between the findings of individual case studies in population studies and the prevailing general theories about population and development[5] is no less than it is in other branches of planning studies. Perhaps, indeed, there is more. Certainly, except at UN world population conferences (such as this year's in Bucharest), divided though the current literature is between different schools of thought about, for instance, the implementation of policies and the extent of their likely effects, seldom does it reflect the world's major ideological confrontations.[6]

Ideological conflicts in development studies rapidly and very pointedly bring hitherto unanticipated limitations of general theories into focus. At the same time, however, the field of population planning shows that even in ideological diversity there may be situational similarity. Governments almost everywhere in Asia — so again the case of the Philippines is not particularly exceptional — now deliberately seek to influence the rate of net national population increase. This is true in communist, socialist and nationalist countries in the region alike and across religions as well. For instance, between Island and Mainland China, as we all know, there are many differences. However, there appear also to be many similarities in public policy as practiced as well. Common Chinese features for example now include governmental advocacy of late marriage as a means of family limitation. Moreover, on both sides of the Taiwan Straits the ruling ideological constraints were opposed to, rather than supportive of, family limitation as a population policy[7] only a few years ago as they were in the Philippines also.[8]

Since what is a scarce resource will, by the same token, also be a materially valuable one, a pattern of customary or statutory law will already have come into existence to regulate its use and ownership. This being so, any new planned intervention aiming at so to say a new public good will almost inescapably require some new tools, and some of these will be new laws. Inasmuch as the old laws were introduced in earlier periods following previous directions of planning for the regulation of valuables in society, planning studies have to embrace what in effect are conflicts of laws, conflicts of planning. It is almost never just a matter of the presence or absence of planning. Thus successful planning has to be approached for the most part as the making of a new order where there was an old order before. *Both* these orders in their respective contexts, will tend to be seen by the groups advocating them as realistic but especially the persisting old order. At any rate, resistance to change in the first instance is apt to be reasoning rather than unreasoning. Constraints on the making of new plans by old administrations are, of course, especially limiting.

Families and Kinship

There is one line of thinking in "economic" planning about "social" obstacles to economic growth that reaches its purest form in the notion that "kinship" and, especially, "extended families" foster the population increase, which national planners see as so subversive of their purposes. Is it enough to describe "extended families" simply as "kinship groupings"

[5] cf S. Kuznets, "Population trends and modern economic growth — notes toward a historical perspective, "United Nations Cairo Symposium on Population and Development E/Conf 60 Sym 1/4 28 April 1974; K. H. Khalil 'Impact of development on population growth' E/Conf 60/Sum 1/23 21 May 1973.

[6] For a brief comment on earlier World Population Conference see P. M. Hauser, Discussion (pp. 35-6) in *First Conference on Population,* 1965, University of the Philippines' Population Institute, 1966.

[7] For a study of the Straits of Taiwan see S. C. Hsu, *From Taboo to National Policy: The Taiwan Family Planning Programme Up to 1970.* Chinese Centre for International Training on Family Planning, Taichung, Taiwan.

[8] Population Institute, University of the Philippines, *First Conference on Population, 1965,* Population Institute, University of the Philippines, 1966.

and do they undermine "economic development"?

The first thing to discuss must be the notion of "extended families". Fortunately, this concept in itself does not present much difficulty. In rural and urban Asia (also Africa and elsewhere for that matter) it is common for the members of low-income (and other) families to cling together at various stages in their cycles of expansion and contraction. They choose to live more or less under one roof and to coordinate certain of their other activities as well so as to gain the economic and other advantages that can come from such joint actions. It is such groupings that have been deliberately formed for these very pressing and sensible reasons that are commonly referred as "extended families". Accepting this as an adequate definition of this term for first purposes, we can now drop the inverted commas.

Seen from the outside, whether all or nearly all the members of an extended family are kin or affines or not, it is easy to assume that an extended family is such simply because "it shares common kinship values" of family solidarity. From the external point of view, which will be that of those of us who happen not to be members of extended families ourselves, an extended family may indeed appear to be an organized "kinship solidarity" which palpably does confront professional national and regional planners as a form of passive but also probably active resistance as well to their designs.

Seen from the inside, on the other hand, the relationship between say, married brothers will only too clearly be seen for what they are, namely, at times a mix of virtually all kinds of sentiments ranging probably from extremes of cooperation and extremes of conflict, some of which would not normally be called manifestations of kinship at all in any sense.

These latter kinds of sentiments and relationships are those which romantic and external conceptions of 'kinship' and 'the family' often fail to consider completely in theory. Yet everyone knows in practice that a whole range of relationships is found within family life as well as in other sectors or at other levels of society, polity and the economy. Brothers might think it necessary at times to keep up an appearance of mutuality for the sake of their own, as well as other peoples' ideals, tactics or strategies. But it will be perfectly well known to all those personally concerned that the reality, at other times, is different. Partly, then, this is a matter of actual behaviour differing from the ideal. But partly also it is because relationships *in* families or kindreds, kith or kin groupings, are not always the product *of* those structures. Planning in families (or in other levels of sectors) is not always planning *for* families, and this is a fact of life that analytical categories in public policy studies have to recognize. When extended families are described simply as kinship institutions, this essential duality of situational and, of you like, cultural (as in the situation and the culture of poverty arguments) tends to be concealed, neglected or contradicted.

Another observation made is that extended families tend to be large families. But are they only contingently large, contingent on the lack of availability of contraceptive technology? In low-income urban populations throughout Asia on the whole, this simply does not appear to be the case. In urban inner Manila, for instance, where parents count children more as assets than liabilities, there is a social prestige in having a large family. As well as this being an expression of many other values,[9] verbally communicated or not,[10] having many children may also be a measure of male *machismo* (assuming that family fertility is the father's decision, which may or may not be so). But to have many children is not only a matter of habit, prestige, pleasure, self-determination or vitality. It also seems to be a good economic proposition in prevailing circumstances as an alternative to what would be other kinds of good economic propositions in other circumstances.

[9]See for example R. Bulatao, "Values, Attitudes and the Desire for Children," Experts' Meeting on Philippine Population Research, The Population Center, Makati, 1974.

[10]See B. V. Lozare, "Family Structure and Decision-Making: Implication for Family Planning," Experts' Meeting on Philippine Population research, The Population Center, Makati, 1974.

Low-income young and older people, as in Tondo[11] and elsewhere in Manila today, create their own employment in service jobs. Judged by the standards that a bountiful and structurally changed or changing socio-economy would enable, these jobs may be considered manual and marginal. But judged by present-day and imminent realities by the low-income groups actually concerned. these are the occupations that are actually graspable, attainable by one's own efforts by means of which one survives.

If those already controlling a government or a state were really in a position to pursue policies which had even the faintest hope of bringing about structural change of the social and political economy in the imminent future, *and if* this were known to and acted upon by low-income groups, *only then* might having many children seem less an asset than liability.

What has been described so far with a Manila example derives originally from this author's experience of Chinese family organization in rural and urban northern Taiwan.[12] In the Philippines it has also been observed that extended families in near Manila at any rate are not dissimilar. As one could also gather, extended family life in northernmost India, for example, also seems comparable. Perhaps, then, we are in the presence of a regional phenomenon. Extended (and for that matter nuclear) families that persist over time do so because they are planned, by their own rights and for their own purposes, to do so. Desired compositions, moreover, may be produced not by birth planning alone but also by the adopting[13] in or the giving out, the exchanging or fostering, of other children, youth or adults who may or may not be selected on a descent basis only. This is nothing less than manpower planning (as the terminology goes in national planning) in a literal and internal sense.

[11]As investigated in the DAP socio-economic research on the Tondo Foreshore, 1973-4, to which the writer, together with Mrs. Mary Hollnsteiner and Ruperto Alonzo, serves as consultant.

[12]See Chapter 2 in S. H. Wang and R. Apthorpe, *Rice Farming in Taiwan: Three Village Studies,* Academia Sinica, Taipei, 1974.

[13]Adoption is a social institution that appears to be pervasive in Asia but the population literature appears to be almost totally devoid of studies on this subject, something which clearly needs to be remedied.

At the same time, where a deliberate policy is followed of diversifying the occupations in which extended family members engage in the interests of complementary and balanced growth and the getting of a good range of social (and perhaps also political) connections, there is manpower planning in an external sense.

The aim of all this planning and organization at the extended family level may be more for survival than for more ambitious or developmental goals. Low-income families as a rule have few resources except their own manpower to rely on merely to survive in a hostile environment. Development studies must include survival studies. Where development functions that normatively should be performed by the state and its agencies are ineffective or inoperative, a family may have no alternative than simply to try to rely on the social and economic connections at the local level that it can make for itself.

One aspect of socio-economic change is social mobility. Where there are but few possibilities for an individual and his or her own immediate family to improve socio-economic status very much by upward mobility, either in the same occupation or by changing occupation, because all accessible wages or salaries on average are low and relatively undifferentiated, or because in the case of farmers agricultural output is largely at the mercy of a unifomly inhospitable physical environment unmitigated by crop or animal insurance, what would be wisest for the impoverished to do? Surely it would be to come to some sort of understanding with those with whom there are actual or potential grounds and sanctions for at any rate a limited pooling or sharing. For the really impoverished, if the choice is between a limited cooperative or an unlimited competitive process, it appears to be the former that holds out the best hope of surviving.

Where, then, to conclude and summarize the scenario thus far, there is a tendency for extended families not to break up but on the contrary to persist over time, this is because kinship is not only kinship. Extended families are not families (characterized by kinship solidarity and continuity) only but also miniature manpower and other resource allocation policies, organized developments of land, labor

and capital on the micro scale. In fact, this is not so micro when a single extended family (as in northern Taiwan, for example) may number around 50 persons. Kinship, and particularly its extended forms, is not only "a social institution", not only "a social aspect", not only "a social value". As a unified and comprehensive form of corporate (or non-corporate) planning, it calls for a unified and comprehensive analysis and understanding in public policy studies particularly.

Family and Fertility

Extended families engender high fertility, but in low-income groups fertility may be even higher in nuclear families. This is especially significant inasmuch as the nuclear families predominate numerically over extended families in rural and urban Asia alike.[14]

High fertility in nuclear families has been reported for a number of countries in Asia or regions of them, including simple as contrasted with joint families in India[15] where the number of joint families has decreased and marital fertility has increased. In Karachi[16] research has shown that fertility is higher in the nuclear than in extended families. The results of a comparative study of nuclear and extended households in the Philippines[17] perhaps are similar.

Parents may tell researchers that they need many children for the security this will bring them in their old age. Obviously, this fosters the classical image of extended families in situations where the welfare effects of the state are minimal. But if the researcher were to take this spoken norm too literally, the measure of economic support that flows from children to parents long before old age would be underestimated. In the perspective being taken here, it would be only when having many children is seen as being "expensive" (costs outweigh benefits) that some of the economic motivations which may be responsible for fertility decline during what demographers call the demographic transition[18] may be expected to limit fertility.

From Taiwan there is evidence that the perceived economic utility and cost of children has an appreciable net effect on family size preferences and the use of contraceptives independent of education and income. This is particularly interesting since the labels "traditional" and "modern" as applied to population and other studies conventionally are held to mean differences in education and income especially. This again goes to show that extended families are not kinship institutions only but are in some ways not unlike firms with the business they are in being, so to put it, population. That all they may really aim to do is to break even rather than to make a profit maybe because this is a realistic adaptation to the total environment in which they have their being. Mortality rates may be among the limiting factors taken into account in natality planning (before the demographic transition especially).

When, according to our scenario, could or would an extended or a nuclear family with a lower fertility be able not only to survive but even to improve its socio-economic status? It would be: when differential wage rates and the like, which probably would involve occupational and geographic mobility among other things, would permit or even require this, if actual or potential gains are to be realized.

It is consistent with this speculation that, in countries in Asia where fertility is declining rapidly, there are rapidly rising *per capita* incomes. It is, nonetheless, difficult from the available evidence to isolate the effect of social mobility alone on fertility. The most comprehensive regional Asian study on population and

[14] Mercedes Concepcion and Felipe Landa-Jocano, "Demographic Factors Influencing the Family Cycle" (Table 1) *UN Symposium on Population and the Family* (Honolulu 1973) E/Conf 60 Sym 11/7.

[15] ECAFE 1973 *op. cit.* (see fn 3) p. 123.

[16] *Idem.*

[17] Alice O. Cabil, "Comparative Study of Nuclear and Extended Households in the Philippines," paper presented at ODA Conference, Manila, 1972.

[18] A. J. Coale, "The demographic transition", UN Economic Council World Population Conference 1974: Symposium on Population and development, Cairo June 1973 (E/Conf 60/ Symp 1/9; Dudley Kirk, A new demographic transition' in National Academy of Sciences, *Rapid Population growth: consequences and policy implications.* John Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 123-147.

social development available states[19] categorically that "....the development and use of mobility indices in multivariate analyses of fertility behavior is a largely unexplored area of demographic research". The kind of social research needed here is longitudinal social research in which survey methods would be combined with those of participant observation. But this kind of social research is as rare in Asia as it is in the rest of the world.[20] In its absence one can only gain what impressions one may from survey data.

For the Philippines regressions based on 1968 census data for nuclear, single family households calculated by Jose Encarnacion[21] are not inconsistent with the scenario put forward in the present discussion inasmuch as they show "that the usually assumed effects of higher income and education on fertility are realized only when these variables reach certain maximum levels...the threshold level of income appears to be in the neighborhood of the median income level". Precisely as Encarnacion remarks, this is disturbing from a conventional population planning viewpoint "because it indicates that birth rates are likely to be higher before they get lower during the earlier stages of development below a certain threshold". In another paper[22] the same author suggests that this may be because "a major effect of rising incomes is to enable women to acquire better health and to have greater access to medical facilities and prenatal care resulting in their greater capacity to bear more children."

This Philippine research is an instance of the unusual in population-resources-environment studies[23] in that it considers demographic variables not as independent, affecting but not being affected by, economic and other variables, but the reverse.

In Taiwan (where the demographic transition has begun) a study of husbands' motives for family limitation already cited[24] found the advantages of a large family broadly speaking to be "seen as being predominantly non-economic, while the disadvantages cited are very largely economic. Similarly, the more frequent arguments against small families are non-economic." The latter are said to relate to the quality of family life, that life in a large family is pleasant, happy, interesting, and that children in small families may be spoiled. But, of course, happiness, etc., is by no means exclusive of economic factors especially, as economists would put it, at the margin. It is because economic motivations are so important at all levels of society that we speak so much about them. In the Philippines the most common (national average) preference may be now for four or five children with at least two sons to carry on the family name. As in the case in Taiwan, for those who desire families smaller than this national average, an important consideration appears to be the economic difficulty of providing properly for many children when it is felt that this should include schooling.

A comparative study of Philippine nuclear and extended households showed the former to have a younger population, especially children aged 14 years or less.[25] That extended households are economically better off than their counterparts on the whole is a fact which has been related to differences in dependency ratios. There were 103 dependents per 100 productive members of nuclear households as agianst 74 dependents per 100 in the productive ages of nuclear household. Each nuclear household supports more than one dependent, but for extended households the burden of one

[19]ECAFE 1973, *op. cit.* (see fn 3 above) pp. 5-6, 87-90.

[20]Currently Robert and Beverly Hackenberg, of the University of Colorado's Institute of Behavioural Sciences are engaged on such studies in Davao City and its hinterland, Mindanao, Philippines, Their results are eagerly awaited.

[21]Jose Encarnacion, "Effects of family income and education on fertility: cross section results, Philippines, 1968," University of the Philippines' School of Economics Institute of Economic Development and Research, Discussion Paper No. 72-9, May 1972.

[22]Jose Encarnacion, "Fertility and labour force participation: Philippines 1968," *Ibid.* Discussion Paper No. 73-13, August 1973. For further studies see Agustin Kintanar, Romeo Bautista and others, *Studies in Philippine Economic Demographic Relationships,* Economic Research Associates and Institute of Economic Development and Research of the School of Economics, University of the Philippines, 1974.

[23]See United Nations Report on the symposium on population, resources and environment (Stockholm 1973), United Nations E/Conf 60/CBP/3 25 March 1974, p. 31.

[24]Eva Mueller, "Economic motives for family limitation: a study conducted in Taiwan," *Population Studies,* Vol. 26 No. 3, November 1972, pp. 383-403.

[25]See fn 17.

dependent is shared by nearly two adults in the productive ages.[26]

A Philippine study of population with particular reference to Mindanao[27] in considering the reasons why low-income families are large, and planned to be large, puts the emphasis squarely on the benefits of extra hands rather than the costs of extra mouths in remarking that "couples who live at or near subsistence levels actually obtain for each additional child they bear with little additional investment an extra pair of hands for work". It draws attention at the same time, however, to non-economic considerations in recording that low-income couples also state that "each additional child provides greater security for the respect (and respect is a particular important element for the poor) and support of these couples in old age". Another Philippine study,[28] of which the results will be available shortly, is specifically concerned to assess the benefits of large size that accrue and seen to accrue to rural families in Luzon engaged primarily in agriculture. Its findings thus far are precisely in accord with the speculations in the present discussion.

That no inter-relationships have yet been observed anywhere in Asia[29] between, for instance, statutory pension schemes and the reduction of fertility may be due in part to a combination of the factors that are emerging in these Philippine studies. It is not only in old age that economic (and other) flows from children to parents are important. A family small in number is not necessarily weak in "family solidarity" or "social familism". But certain categories of families may be – and apparently often are – planned to be large specifically so that the chances of such solidarity may be augmented (and so to say an insurance is taken out against death rates by increasing natality accordingly). We have, however, seen that it is not always extended families which are correlated with the highest fertility rates –nuclear families in Asia appear, in fact, to top the bill. The reproductive performance of a population, like all its other attributes, are a complex of many factors which are[30]

> "intricatley related with social organization, social norms, religious beliefs, economic goals, technological level, and much more. A number of social and cultural factors, like early marriage, a contempt for spinsterhood, a strong desire either for a male or a female child, and so on, tend to promote fertility. But there are a number of other such factors that serve to lower it: these include the emphasis placed on abstinence and celibacy; rules relating to the remarriage of widows; prolonged lactation; prolonged absence of spouses for cultural or economic reasons; frequency of divorce; and practice of such birth control measures as coitus interruptus, induced abortion, and infanticide. The level of fertility in a population, therefore, is the net result of mutually offsetting tendencies. Thus, the net effect of the social changes on fertility that take place as a result of changing economic circumstances, new communication systems, colonialism,independence, schooling, and the like, might be neutral, negative or positive."

In addition to the multivariate analysis, the further research that is needed lies in at least two directions. The first concerns the spatial and social circumferences of the units of reference we call families and households. "Extended" and "nuclear" as structural terms do not connote exactly who might be involved in individual cases, and where. For the Philippines, distinctions have been made between at least nuclear-lateral, nuclear-joint, nuclear-linear, less-than-nuclear households.[31]

The second concerns duration. Family and household composition changes over time. Family developmental cycles, as these are called in social anthropology, vary very much from country to country as well as within countries, but no country could be without them. Concerning limitation methods, families differ presumably not so much in *whether* these are used at all as *when* they are used. It is one of the

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] F. C. Madigan, *Birth and Death in Cagayan de Oro,* Quezon City: Ateneo University Press, 1972.

[28] Being carried out by Jesuita Sodusca, Department of Anthropology, University of the Philippines.

[29] ECAFE, 1973, *op. cit.* (see fn 3 above) pp. 9-10.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] Mercedes Concepcion and Felipe Landa-Jocano, "Demographic Factors Cycle," UN Economic and Social Council World Population Conference 1974: Symposium on population and the family, Honolulu, August 1973 E/Conf 60/Sym 11/7.

critical concerns of all kinds of social and economic planning to consider precisely when it would be best introduced to have the best hope of success. Higher levels of *per capita* income may not be negatively associated with high fertility – household structures kept constant, for instance, at ages 15-19 and above 35 years. If so, it would be inept for policymakers at the national level not to direct their efforts at implementation according to such age groups, which may vary by province.

Structural Change

The recent history of population planning in Asia is not one of the introduction of family fertility planning, which was absent before, so much as the appearance of an additional location, at the level of the state, of responsibility for it. This new source for public policy planning has probably, in all the countries in which external aid has been pivotal in this respect, looked primarily for technological solution – here a contraceptive technological solution for unwanted births only – solution is not peculiar to population planning. It is a rather general pattern in externally induced innovation, and to assess it one has to ask all the usual questions about, for instance, the extent to which technology was lacking or merely different earlier, how great are the costs and risks of the new methods, who are the beneficiaries of those costs seen conversely as revenues, how far older methods still continue, and so on.

A series of history of science questions is to be asked as well so that false comparisons may be avoided. During the critical period of the Japanese demographic transition for instance, from 1947-1957, the consensus is that abortion was the major birth control method used.[32]

As is accepted by some authorities to have happened in Taiwan, Hongkong and Korea, for instance, the diffusion by the state of well-organized family planning including new contraceptive technology practices can accelerate somewhat the process of fertility decline probably "by providing better information to circulate in the widening social networks, by rationalizing services and supplies and by providing important social legitimation for the new ideas.[33] But this is so only where certain other conditions are favorable, such as

> "where significant social development has already occurred; where mortality has been relatively low for some time; where there is evidence that many people, wanting moderate-sized families, are beginning to try to limit family size; where there are effective social networks transcending local communities through which family-planning ideas and services and other modernizing influences can be disseminated."

Another cautionary bell has been rung about contraceptive programmes as well. There can be a high demand for these *and* a high fertility at the same time.[34] For these and other reasons Kingsley Davis rejects that family limitation programmes can achieve population control. This is not, though, to impugn their value for other purposes. Davis himself describes his own argument[35] in short as "directed not against family planning programmes as such but against the assumption that they are an effective means of controlling population growth."

He thinks it wrong that millions of dollars should be spent on a policy that is not designed as to be likely to achieve the goals it purports to seek. He points out that if it is but a preliminary to some next and more effective step, it is a next step that is never mentioned. In his view the main benefit of domestic and aid-financed family planning programmes as practiced is that they free women from having to have more children than they want. This benefit accrues to them, thier children and society at large.

Some present tendencies in Asia are much as they are elsewhere in respect of income distribution. Disparities between rural and urban sectors, and within the urban sector, are widening rather than closing. Thus the stated aims of development planning at the national

[32] Abdel R. Omran, "Abortion in the Demographic Transitions" in National Academy of Sciences *Rapid population growth: Consequences and policies*, John Hopkins Press, 1971, pp. 479-532.

[33] Ronald Freedman, The Sociology of Human Fertility, *Current Sociology*, Vol. X-XI (2), 1961-62.

[34] Kingsley Davis, *op. cit.*

[35] *Ibid.*

level increasingly put social development, social justice, on the forefront. In the Philippines, after the calling out of the troops in 1972 and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus had failed in their objectives and martial law was imposed, the state set the aim of the New Society as to change an economic order where ninety percent of all the riches were owned by only five percent of the people and the remaining ninety five percent of the people live in subsistence and below subsistence. The social and political obstacles to this rest as much, if not more *above* rather than *below,* in oligarchical structures, as they are freely called in the Philippines by government and by system oppositionists alike. It being precisely these distributional aspects of power that input-output models in neo-classical economics and academic sociology neglect, it is evident that higher yielding varieties of these two disciplines are required by public policy studies.[36]

To what extent (let alone when) could even a zero average rate of increase of population lessen even regional *per capita* income disparities? Presumably only to a very indeterminate degree if ever, and in the very, very long run indeed. Even if "average family size" in any particular country were reduced say from five to six, to two or three, it is not immediately evident that this would in itself necessarily bring about any form of structural socio-economic change. Physical renovation of the environment in urban slums does not by itself necessarily lessen poverty. As, indeed, all urban sociologists in the Philippines know, the opposite is more likely to be the case. So with poverty in urban, for that matter rural, families. It was the purpose of the first parts of this paper to argue that any drastic reduction of numbers in the majority of the families in the country today would, in effect in present circumstances, seemingly be a step more towards extinction than amelioration.[37]

Why does this tend to be obscure or unconsidered altogether in population public policy studies? Is it because population studies, while concentrating on growth or on distributional implications (large numbers minimize economic gains), give too little attention to the productional aspects (many hands make light work)?[38] If it were only the minority of high-income families in the country today who were to limit their numbers drastically, various implications for the structural change would be easily discernible. As a scion of the social and economic elite in the Visayas commented to me recently, if he and his equals were to adopt family limitation, something he felt that they were rich enough not to have to do for the promotion of their own upward mobility (they were at the top anyhow so their problem was how to stay there), they would be swamped. For his social and economic class, he said, it was necessary to continue to have the large families they could afford simply because in the number of their children lay their strength. Family limitation in this uppermost stratum, that of the wealthy family corporation, might then have considerable implications for structural change. But this is not envisaged in present official policies for obvious reasons.

What we see here, as in so many other fields of development studies, is another case of one and the same argument having different consequences in different socio-economic contexts. The Philippine population problem may indeed, as Mercedes Concepcion has put it, be one "not of number or density but of growth" and faced with "the paradox (that) solutions to demographic difficulties have usually come as by-products of social and economic development (but) a declining rate of population growth is essential to that sustained social and economic development whose expected outcomes include decreasing family size and a lower rate of population growth".[39] But the reasons for this growth, its significance and its consequences, are not the same for all socio-economic groupings. There lies the rub and the

[36]See appendix C of R. Apthorpe, *Development Indicators,* Working Paper No. 4, Cooperative Regional Development Project, National Development Research Center, University of the Philippines.

[37]Depending on undernutritional and poverty levels.

[38]The contributions to population studies of Colin Clark are notable exceptions to this trend and controversial partly for this reason.

[39]Mercedes B. Concepcion, "Philippine population growth: paradox of development" in *The Philippine Economy in the 1970s,* Institute of Economic Development and Research, University of the Philippines, and Private Development Corporations of the Philippines, 1972, pp. 1-12.

complexity for public policy. The difficulties are not all equally problematic. There is, then, no one path for but a single policy to take.

It is at this stage in population studies that one turns away from family planning towards other levels and sectors and the subject of industrial location and regional development, for instance, and the lessening of regional disparities in social equity. When the results of the 1973 ILO Employment Mission to the Philippines will have been assessed tri-sectorally, the direction of future industrialization and employment policy in the country will become known with more certainty. If, however, the interrelationships between industrialization and structural change in the Philippines up to the present at least have been not unlike Latin American patterns, another warning siren must be sounded.

On the direct effects of industrialization on structural change in Latin America an authority, Celso Furtado, who is a sociologist as well as an economist, has remarked on the extent to which these are constantly decreasing, rather than the opposite, with the figures indicating that

> between 1938 and 1948 the increase of one per cent in industrial production resulted in an increase of only 0.62 per cent in industrial employment; the same relationships during the 1950's decreased to 1:0.26 per cent. Within the context of the latter ratio a 3 per cent annual increase in industrial jobs would require that the industrial sector increases at the rate of 12 per cent. Since 3 per cent is the rate of population increase, we can infer that even a cumulative growth of 22 per cent per year in the industrial sector would not affect the structure of employment significantly. Thus it is that, despite the relatively high industrial growth rates achieved in the region, the proportion of industrial workers among the total population has declined.[40]

Are the figures for the Philippines and Asia very different?

It is also to be wondered whether, if industrialization in the West had happened under the conditions now obtaining in the East, "the surplus labor caused by the disorganization of pre-capitalistic production methods would have been absorbed? Would there have been the improvement of the standard of living of the common worker which helped to create the large markets and which gave rise to the economies of scale?"

If patterns of urbanization in Latin America and the Philippines are similar, and *if* migration to the town, which is comparatively small in the Philippines where the census-defined urban and rural sectors growth rates are about equal,[41] is in search of employment in industry,[42] then neither this kind of industrialization nor migration amounts to being much of a structural change. If urbanization in Asia is more intimately bound up with services than industries, it is probably for this reason that poverty in the Philippines measured by any of several indices is less an urban than a rural problem ('urban' and 'rural' here again as defined in the BCS spatial-physical categories).[43]

To what extent – again in the prevailing circumstances – could it be envisioned that a Philippine population policy of *rural* industrialization would bring about a socio-economic structural change? In China – again on both sides of the Straits of Taiwan – rural industrialization is said to have contributed effectively to a degree of rural-urban *per capita* income equalization. For India a similar policy is said on the whole not to have succeeded in having this effect. Which of the two experiences is

[40] Celso Furtado, *Obstacles to Development in Latin America* (translated by C. Ekker) New York: Anchor Books Doubleday and Co., New York, 1970, p. 119.

[41] cf. P. D. Simkins, "Migration as a Response to Population Pressure: the Case of the Philippines" in W. Zelinsky, L. A. Kosinski and R. M. Prothero (editors) *Geography in a Crowding World: A Symposium on Population Pressures Upon Physical and Social Resources* O. U. P., 1970.

[42] There is no clear answer to this question in Philippine migration studies at the present time but see Imelda Zosa, "A Multi-variate Analysis of Immigration Flows in the Philippines," paper presented at ODA Conference Manila, December 1972 and forthcoming new work by B. V. Cariño and Imelda A. Zosa in Bicol.

[43] Whether or not this physical/numerical categorization of 'urban' is adequate for distributional studies of a socio-economic phenomenon such as 'poverty' is a matter of considerable doubt as yet unresolved in Asian studies.

more relevant to the Philippines, and why, could conceivably be related to the effects of urban and regional planning thresholds of some nature. These, in turn, if they could be calculated – they have not thus far – might pertain to the phenomenon in the Philippines, as Juan Gatbonton[44] put it, of "so-called growth poles freezing into frontiers of the dual economy" rather than having more developmental effects.

It has been the main purpose of this somewhat speculative contribution to population and public policy studies to argue, as Ivan Illich remarked about development planning in another connection, that, with regard to population planning today, we may "have to learn to laugh at accepted solutions in order to change the demands that make them necessary."[45] Asking new questions is, of course, not the same thing as solving them, but before they are asked, how can they be considered? The best avenues towards new approaches are those which do not classify problem-areas (population, employment) simply aspectually (as, say, a social rather than an economic aspect) or as the province of this or that single discipline (to continue with the example sociology or economics). It is where population planning has been classified with "social aspects" and "sociology" that the "economic aspects" and "economics" of the matter have been taken into account only tangentially, and *vice versa,* and essential points which are social *and* economic have been overlooked.



[44]Juan T. Gatbonton, "Poor country economics," *Times Journal,* 14 October 1974. For an incipient academic analysis see Eli Remolona, Term Paper, Institute of Planning library, 1974.

[45]"Outwitting the 'Developed' Nations," in R. H. Elling, *National Health Care: Issues and Problems in Socialized Medicine,* Aldine and Atherton, 1971, p. 276.

STYLES OF DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

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The following notes outline certain traits of development processes and policies in Latin America since the 1950's. The attempt to do so for a region made up of twenty countries ranging in population from more than one hundred million to less than two million, some of them highly urbanized, with per capita incomes comparable to those of Italy or Spain, some of them overwhelmingly rural, with income levels among the lowest in the world, supposes a good deal of over-simplification and arbitrariness in selection of traits. However, common historical, cultural and political factors — including those arising from proximity to a single powerful neighbor and common problems of economies dependent on exports of a narrow range of raw materials have generated a predisposition to interpret developmental experiences within a common conceptual framework. However divergent the dominant national ideologies and policies, these have emerged as alternative answers to problems as dependent, intermittent and unbalanced economic growth, political instability, and poverty that have been continually debated at the regional level. A brief general survey is thus somewhat easier than it might be for other major regions of the Third World. The modest purpose is to offer Philippine students of development a starting point for the consideration of experiences in many ways similar to their own country's, as diagnosed in studies such as the so-called Ranis Report, *Sharing in Development,* and to point to a body of theoretical writings and empirical studies that might throw new light on the issues now being debated in the Philippines.[1] Among the central issues are:

1) The viability of socially-oriented development policies, or more broadly, of the formal "planning" of development, in societies with dependent market economies and very unevenly distributed wealth and power.

2) The legitimate role and real capacity of the State in development: a servant of majority opinion expressed through constitutional processes, the agent of a dominant class, a broker between contending interest groups, or an autonomous actor entitled to impose its own conception of development in the name of the whole society and to repress incompatible pressures and demands?

[1] Unfortunately many of these writings have been published in Spanish or Portuguese only. *Social Change and Social Development Policy in Latin America* (United Nations 1970) discusses the controversies and gives bibliographical references. See also the *annual Economic Surveys of Latin America* and the *Economic Bulletin for Latin America* published by the Economic Commission for Latin America. Among the economists, political scientists and sociologists who have made important published contributions to the debate (from widely differing points of view) are Alonso Aguilar, Eric Calcagno, Fernando Cardoso, Julio Cotler, Carlos Delgado, Orlando Fals Borda, Celso Furtado, Andre Gunder Frank, Theotonio dos Santos, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Jorge Graciarena, Gino Germani, Helio Jaguaribe, Marcos Kaplan, Carlos Matus, Sergio Molina, Pedro Paz, Raul Prebisch, Anibal Pinto, Anibal Quijano, German Rama, Jose Silva Michelena, Aldo Solari, Oswaldo Sunkel, Oscar Varsavski and Claudio Veliz. Many of these are past or present staff members of ECLA.

Many of the themes in the current debate over development can be traced back to the 19th century, long before the term "development" became current. The Mexican revolution, beginning in 1910, and the Batllista movement in Uruguay about the same time, were particularly fertile sources of initiatives on State promotion of development and control of key sectors of the economies, expansion of social services, agrarian reform, and "popular participation." For present purposes, however, it is convenient to begin with the 1950's, when Raul Prebisch and his associates in the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) formulated a series of propositions that called for development strategies quite different from those followed by most of the countries up to that time. These propositions have been summed up in a series of catch-phrases that have been current ever since. First, that the relations between *center* and *periphery,* in international terms, tend to concentrate the fruits of technological progress in the world centers, partly through longterm deterioration in the terms of trade for primary products. This proposition was later extended to the exploitative relationships between national center (or primate city) and national periphery, under the lable of *internal colonialism.* Second, that national policies should shift their emphasis from development *hacia afuera* (outward-oriented) to development *hacia-adentro* (inward-oriented). That is, they should rely less on the expansion of their traditional exports as sources of economic dynamism and more on industrialization and agricultural modernization for an expanding domestic market. This proposition was also given a territorial application; that is, that national policy should attempt to diffuse development to the empty or impoverished national hinterland. Third, that development requires *structural changes,* a proposition that some participants in the debate have interpreted narrowly to mean changes in the structure of production, mainly from agriculture to industry, and others have interpreted very broadly to include changes in the structures of political power, social relationships and distribution of incomes and wealth. Fourth, that national policies should be guided by formal development planning, presented as a body of neutral techniques capable of maximizing efficiency in the use of scarce resources to achieve any objectives decided on by the political leadership.[2]

These ideas were quite controversial when they first appeared, and ECLA continues to be attacked from time to time, usually on the basis of over-simplified versions of its ideas of the 1950's, for misleading governments into neglecting export promotion, fostering inefficient import-substitution industries, and entertaining technocratic delusions on their capacity to plan and control economic growth. It is unnecessary to enter here into this mainly economic controversy. For present purposes, it is sufficient to emphasize the change in predominant opinion in governmental circles in the United States as well as Latin America around 1960, that converted the previously heterodox ECLA views into a new orthodoxy.

At that point, the Cuban revolution offered a much more radical alternative to existing development processes and policies. Its leadership advanced the propositions that authentic development required the overthrow of existing power structure, breaking of the ties of dependency on the United States, and public ownership and socialist planning of the entire structure of production and distribution. The appeal of these propositions in the rest of Latin America was strong enough to generate a major counter-movement to head off the challenge, to achieve accelerated economic development and social reform to forestall social revolution.

The result was the Alliance for Progress, governed by the Charter of Punta del Este, approved by all the Latin American governments except Cuba and by the United States in 1961. The Charter incorporated a large part of the ECLA ideas of the 1950's, with a more pronounced social orientation. It set an overall target of six per cent for annual increases in the gross domestic product, which would mean for most of the countries increases of about three per cent in per capita terms, and committed the countries to vigorous industrialization and agrarian reform programmes. It contained promises, mainly in general terms, for rapid educational

[2]Albert O. Hirschman, Ed., *Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments* (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1961) contains an excellent critical survey of the different currents in Latin American debates on development up to the Cuban Revolution and the Alliance for Progress.

expansion, expansion of other social services and housing supply, and for income redistribution. It was backed by U.S. guarantees of aid to countries meeting its terms, and committed the countries to prepare ten-year economic and social development plans as a condition for such aid.

An impressively complicated set of regional mechanisms was created for the channeling of aid and the evaluation of progress. First, an Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress examining annual reports prepared by the Organization of American States on the "internal efforts and needs for external assistance" of each country and discussing them with representatives (usually Finance and Economic Ministers and heads of planning agencies) of the countries. Second, a committee of experts, known as the "Nueve Sabios" – the Nine Wise Men – to evaluate the development plans of the countries. Third, the creation of an Inter-American Development Bank, with its own procedures for evaluation, and managing a Social Progress Trust Fund earmarked for educational, health, housing and other social projects, producing its own detailed annual reports on "Social Progress in Latin America." As by-products, an Inter-American Committee on Agricultural Development was set up, which has organized an important and controversial series of national studies of land tenure and agrarian reform experiences. An Economic and Social Planning Institute was created as a counterpart to ECLA to give courses in planning, organize country missions, and conduct research, and a Latin American Demographic Institute was organized, also to combine training and research.

As with most human endeavors, the Alliance for Progress did not succeed in shaping the future to the rational and benevolent model set forth in its Charter. A good deal of the machinery proved inoperative, and the ten-year development plans were prepared perfunctorily as formal requisites for obtaining aid. The Nine Wise Men found they could accomplish nothing and collectively resigned. Industrial growth was fairly vigorous, particularly in the larger countries, but remained highly dependent on imported inputs, came increasingly under the control of foreign corporations, and generally did not expand employment fast enough even to keep up with the rate of growth of the labor force. As time went on both parties to the Alliance tended to blame each other for the failure of reality to conform to the Charter and a series of high-level meetings were held to try to straighten things out. On the one side, aid was not forthcoming in the amounts and with the freedom from strings expected, rising amortization payments, remittances of profits, etc., gradually offset most of the external funds entering the region. On the other side, most of the governments did not have the political capacity of implementing the reforms they had committed themselves to –particularly in such areas as agrarian reform and fiscal reform – even if they really wanted to.

Perhaps the most incontrovertible influence of the Alliance was in the marked improvement in the basic information and diagnoses needed for development policy, in the institutionalization of planning, and in the regionalization of discussions of development policy. All of the countries now have planners, administrators and social scientists accustomed to discuss development policy at the regional level, many of them former participants in regional courses, with a common frame of reference however much they may disagree with each other in their conclusions.

One striking feature of the developmental debate since the early 1960's needs to be kept in mind: the continual confrontation of two positions (each with many variants) that imply diametrically opposed evaluations of what is happening, even though the proponents of both positions agree on the inacceptability of existing trends and the imminence of crisis. For one group, the general ideas associated with the Alliance for Progress have continued to represent the only acceptable means of avoiding catastrophic social upheavals. Their arguments are intended to convince both forces dominant domestically and the United States that they must undertake structural reforms, sacrifice some of their power and privileges, provide more generous aid, etc., in their own interest. For the other group, the same symptoms of crisis mean that the forces now dominant domestically and the world centres are inherently incapable of bringing about authentic development. The phrase, "the development of underdevelopment" became current among Latin American Marxists to emphasize that underdevelopment is not simply a lagging be-

hind the world centers that can be overcome through their aid and through domestic reforms, but a structural relationship of dominance and exploitation that can be overcome only through the very revolutionary upheaval that the first group interprets as unmitigated catastrophe. The two positions have confronted each other with particular clarity in the biennial sessions of ECLA, almost the only regional forum in which Cuba has been continually represented.

The actual course of events has not corresponded convincingly to the hopes or fears of either group. The Cuban example has continued to demonstrate the viability of a strategy of development totally different from those pursued elsewhere in the region, uncompromisingly egalitarian, relying on mass mobilizations and moral incentives in preference to material incentives, but its survival has been at a high cost and the likelihood of other countries in the region following a similar path is not great. At the other extreme, Brazil has demonstrated that a development strategy characterized by extreme income concentration, repression of dissent, and postponement of "structural reforms" to the indefinite future can also be quite successful on its own terms. In general, in spite of a good deal of superficial instability and unrest, the different variations on the prevailing style of dependent and uneven development have shown a capacity to survive and advance amid contradictions. The supposed revolutionary discontent of the masses has proved weak and sporadic. Where the political systems have reached an apparent impasse through inability to satisfy the conflicting demands made on them, the result has usually been the emergence of a regime under military tutelage, in some cases simply to preserve the pre-existing order, in others to seek an orginal socially-oriented path to development. At the end of the 1960's, Gunnar Myrdal concluded a rather pessimistic evaluation of Latin American prospects by saying that "perhaps the most likely possibility would be the continuation of present trends" with "neither reform nor revolution," and this has yet to be disproved.[3]

[3]"The Latin American Power Keg", appendix to Gunnar Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty: A World Anti-Poverty Programme in Outline* (Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, 1970 .)

National experiences after more than a decade of attempts by governments to accelerate and plan development naturally differ widely. In general, the most urbanized countries with relatively high previous income levels and relatively wide political participation have had relatively slow growth rates and persistent inability to obtain a minimum of national consensus on development policy and distribution of the fruits of development. The larger countries, starting from lower levels of incomes, urbanization and political participation have had more success in growing and diversifying economically, and in keeping the struggle for wider participation under control. The smaller countries have, for the most part, remained much poorer, more rural, and more dependent on exports of primary products.

Overall rates of increase in the gross domestic product have in some countries — notably Brazil, which has a very heavy weight in the regional averages — been higher than the six per cent target of the Alliance for Progress, but in the majority have been lower. Rates for the late 1960's and early 1970's have generally been higher than those of the early and middle 1960's, mainly because of more favorable terms of trade for export. Urbanization has continued to be rapid, particularly in the large countries. The coverage of education, and to a lesser extent of other social services, has broadened considerably, but with the rural population at as much of a disadvantage as before. Most countries by now have agrarian reform laws and agencies, but the scope of the reforms themselves has, except in three or four countries, been very limited. Agricultural modernization has advanced mainly along capitalist and mechanized lines, and mainly in zones previously sparsely populated; the main reservoirs of extreme poverty remain in rural zones. Regional development planning initiatives have been fairly numerous, but the attempts to link regional planning with national planning and use the former to relieve the disadvantages of the poorer regions have had little impact; the more successful regional development schemes have been relatively narrowly conceived projects, mainly for river basin development. Consumption patterns have been modernized and diversified, and very high proportions of most national populations have been brought under the influence of the mass media, but the

available data suggest that there has been no improvement in the food consumption of the masses of the population, and a marked deterioration for some groups. Urban housing levels must have deteriorated, but other aspects of the urban environment – water supplies, electrification, sewerage – have improved.[4]

Altogether, this sounds much like the course of economic growth and social change in other parts of the Third World, including the Philippines. The rich have been getting richer, wider strata have gained some benefits from the processes of modernization, and some at least of the poor have been getting poorer. In Latin America, however, with the exceptions of some of the smaller countries and of some large internal regions such as the Northeast of Brazil, per capita incomes are higher, and urbanization and modernization more diffused than in most of Africa and Asia. The larger countries have reached a kind of dependent semi-development. If it is possible for them to continue to advance along similar lines, they have considerable advantages over the rest of the Third World. If not, they have a great deal to unlearn and particularly formidable interests and expectations in the way of radical change in their styles of development.

Under these conditions, it should be particularly important to know whether the widening income inequalities imply absolute impoverishment as well as relative impoverishment for the majority of the population, whether the widening inequalities represent a stage superable by continued high growth rates or a long term trend inseparable from dependent development, whether important sectors of the population perceive the inequalities as intolerable, or whether the combined consumption demands of the different classes or income strata can be reconciled with the productive capacity of the society. Present data unfortunately can be manipulated to support many different answers to these questions. In general, the sectors of opinion that are convinced that the style of development is intolerably unjust find grounds for argument that it is essentially unameliorable and eventually nonviable because of intensifying impoverishment of the masses. The sectors of opinion that consider the style desirable or irreplaceable find grounds for arguing that it already benefits the majority and will eventually incorporate the whole population.

The Social Development Division of ECLA has recently been trying to explore these questions by examining distributional trends in education, occupational stratification, and incomes revealed by censuses and sample surveys made around 1960 and 1970. Indicators in these three areas give quite different impressions of the degree of broadening of the population strata that benefit from the prevailing style of development. The most striking changes are seen in education. Enrollment at all levels has grown faster than the size of the relevant age groups, but secondary and higher education have been expanding at extraordinarily high rates while primary education is still far from universal, and much of it, particularly in rural areas, remains too brief and poor in quality to impart permanent literacy. In most countries the percentage of the relevant age group enrolled in higher institutions doubled or tripled between 1960 and 1970, and rates of growth since 1970 have been still higher, in some countries reaching twenty per cent or more annually. Even with these rates of growth higher enrolment ratios have not yet reached the level of the Philippines; it is striking that while in the Philippines most of the expansion has been in fee-charging private institutions, in latin America most higher education is provided free or practically free in public institutions, and in some countries, the State now spends more on higher education than on primary education. Quality has naturally suffered from the rapidity of expansion, attempts to plan education in accordance with manpower needs have been ineffective, and the university environments have been highly conflictive. One might conclude that this differential expansion of education has proved the cheapest way for governments to satisfy the demands of urban families to participate in gains from development, through hopes of better jobs and higher status for their children, but that the expectations created will be increasingly hard to satisfy within the limits of the style of development.

[4]These questions are discussed in more detail in Part III of ECLA's *Economic Survey of Latin America 1973.*

Changes in occupational stratification, toward urban occupations that can be classified as "middle" or "upper," have also been pronounced, although more limited than the differential educational expansion. Between 1960 and 1970 in most countries for which data are available, the increase in relative size of these occupational strata more or less compensated for the sharp decline in employment in the primary sector, while the relative importance of urban manual workers and the occupational categories that probably represent underemployment and marginality remained constant or increased more slowly than the middle and upper occupational categories. The figures need to be interpreted with a good deal of caution but they have important implications for the developmental debate. Predictions that the style of development will eventually break down because of the growing relative size and power of the proletariat and of the underemployed and impoverished sub-proletariat in the cities are not borne out. Modern urban industrial employment has expanded only slowly, but the urban economy has somehow – probably largely through public employment – been able to absorb a large part of the growing labor force into jobs implying some improvement in status. As in the case of education, the possibility of long-term maintenance of this safety-valve, implying continual increases in public expenditures and doubtful contributions to production by much of the employed population, is questionable. It must also be kept in mind that the changes in occupational stratification occur in a context of three per cent annual increases in the national labor force, and increases in the urban labor force around five per cent. Any increase in the relative size of the population in a given occupational category thus means a quite large quantitative increase, and a constant relative size also means substantial growth in absolute numbers.

Income distribution data have even greater deficiencies, particularly in measurement of the shares received by groups at the top and the bottom and in comparability between countries and over time. For what they are worth, they suggest some broadening of the groups that have benefited, but a much higher continuing concentration than do the educational and occupational data. Altogether, income distribution remains even more concentrated in Latin America than in most other parts of the Third World, after more than a decade of policies calling for redistribution.[5] Statistics for four of the larger countries –Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela – indicate that in 1970 the top five per cent of income receivers got 34.0 per cent of personal income and the next fifteen per cent 31.0 per cent. The real concentration at the top is undoubtedly higher, in view of the difficulty of calculating income from profits and the ease with which the group at the top can conceal part of income. Both of these groups gained slightly in relative terms and enormously in absolute terms between 1960 and 1970. For the remaining eighty per cent of income receivers, gains were more or less proportional to their previous positions on the income ladder. The sixty per cent in the middle had 33.4 per cent of income in 1960 and 32.3 per cent in 1970, with modest gains in absolute terms. The twenty per cent at the bottom had 3.2 per cent in 1960 and 2.7 per cent in 1970; in absolute terms and at constant prices their incomes remained practically constant. On their face, the data demonstrate increasing inequalities but not necessarily an increasingly explosive situation. Those who have gained something outnumbered those who have not, and the gains probably coincide by and large, with relative capacity to intervene in an organized way in the political process. If the groups in the middle compare their present situation with their own past rather than with the situations of the more prosperous, they might be reasonably satisfied. The dimensions of extreme poverty, in the sense of inability to satisfy minimum physiological needs for food and shelter, are important, but affect minorities with very weak capacity to endanger the style of development.

This line of argument, however, does not take into account that the style of development, with its dynamism dependent on a continually diversifying and modernizing market for consumer goods, and the charac-

[5] A recent classification of countries by income level and inequality of distribution prepared by the Development Research Center, World Bank, places 9 out of 15 Latin American and Caribbean countries in the "high inequality" class, none in the "low inequality" class; in the rest of the world "low inequality" countries considerably outnumber "high inequality" countries. (Hollin Chenery and others, *Redistribution through Growth*, Oxford University Press, 1974.)

teristics of urbanization, with the need for new kinds of expenditure simply to cope with its disbenefits, practically insures that no stratum of the population will be contented with its income and that the urban groups in the middle, striving to rise, will probably be more aggressively discontented than the strata below them. Several different kinds of poverty coexist and struggle for a larger share, and one can find in the Latin American press and in political campaigns abundant evidence of the extent to which they disregard each other. To part of the population, poverty means inability to afford an automobile; and this part exerts pressure on the authorities to increase the supply, control prices of cars and gasoline, and subsidize purchases on credit. To another part, poverty means not being able to get enough to eat, and this group in the urban setting exerts intermittently effective pressure to keep food prices low. Since 1973, the impact of various world crises has brought the struggle over shares of the national income to a new stage. Up to that point, only four countries – Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay – suffered from chronic high rates of inflation, to which the economies and the organized interest-groups had adjusted in differing ways, and which have been commonly interpreted as devices for evading or postponing unmanageable conflict over distribution. Now practically every country has rates that are high and rising, and since they have not learned to "live with inflation" the potential for social conflict is high. In the larger Latin American countries as in the central countries, the sudden rise in oil prices has multiple repercussions on the viability of the way of life of the urban upper-middle strata, increasingly characterized by low-density suburban residence dependent on the automobile.

No government has admitted to being satisfied with the prevailing style of development, even when the balance of public policies has favored dependent and concentrated growth. Since the gradual eclipse of the Alliance for Progress they have shown a remarkable readiness to endorse bold international policy declarations calling for integrated, autonomous, "human-oriented" development, defined in terms completely different from the real trends in the countries, coupled with assertions of the legitimacy and right to non-interference of different national styles of development. Thus far, the national attempts to find original paths to development corresponding to these declarations are few and some have already proved abortive.

In the case of Colombia, one sees a governmental attempt to discover an original path through international expert advice and rational demonstration. The ILO Seers Mission, the first predecessor of the Ranis mission, recommended a somewhat similar combination of labor-intensive industrial and agricultural development combined with redistributive measures. While the conclusions were officially endorsed, the rational demonstration did not convince the dominant political and economic forces of the country sufficiently to bring about implementation.

In Chile, one sees a series of attempts to create an original style of development, featuring organized popular participation, income redistribution, employment creation, national economic autonomy and State control of key sectors of the economy, and drastic agrarian reforms, first under a "communitarian" and then under a "socialist" label. These attempts, promising in their conception, failed for many reasons, including intense political partisanship and cross-purposes over objectives and tactics, inability to control the pace of popular participation and redistribution called forth, intense hostility amounting to sabotage from the domestic groups adversely affected, and an external economic blockade and have been followed by a return to a version of the market economy under military tutelage.

In Peru since 1968, one sees an attempted revolution from above, stemming from military dissatisfaction with the inability of the previous political order to achieve a dynamic and nationally autonomous style of development, featuring State control of key economic enterprises, a gradual transition to co-operative or workers' management in industry and agriculture, and a national system of local participation and links between local groups and the centre intended to leave the traditional party and parliamentary system functionless.

In Brazil and Mexico, the two most populous countries of the region and also the most successful in achieving high rates of economic growth and industrialization at the

price of exceptionally uneven distribution, one sees a conviction in governmental circles and in public opinion, stimulated by the shock of the world crises, that it is high time for a shift toward socially oriented development, without thus far any clear strategies emerging as to how to elicit participation, expand employment and combat poverty while keeping economic growth dynamic and avoiding the emergence of unmanageable demands on the one side and unmanageable resistance on the other.

The old debate between the ideologists who argue that the prevailing style of development is the only one achieveable, that it is preferable to no development at all, and that talk of a different order is dangerous nonsense, and the ideologists who argue that this style does not deserve to be called "development", that it is inherently incapable of generating anything better, and that its contradictions will bring about its demise before long, is receiving new impetus from the present crises, and catastrophist warnings are again coming to the fore; the national societies are urged to adopt one set of prescriptions or another under penalty of collapse. Catastrophe or revolutionary transformation are quite conceivable but probably not inevitably and probably not dependent on the adoption or rejection of any given prescription for public policy. The past two decades have demonstrated, if nothing else, the limitations on the capacity of States to control the development of societies according to technocratic or normative-utopian criteria, and the resilience of power structures in changing sufficiently to preserve their essential characteristics. Probably the appropriate conclusion would be not that a new and infallible "unified approach" to policy must be found or a new theoretical explanation of "development" but that governments and the different forces of the societies must go on struggling with the same unavoidable problems – of accumulation, production, distribution, popular participations in decision-making, enhancement of national autonomy.

The preceding notes suggest a number of parallels with Philippine experience over the same period. For the most part these have been left implicit, in the hope that the Philippine reader will be stimulated to pursue them, without the presumptuousness of an outsider's doing so. ■



ADMINISTERING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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> Planning and implementation are not so much a chain of sequences as a cycle. They reenforce and give substance to each other. If the government is not properly organized to implement a plan, it follows that it is not properly organized even to *plan,* if by the latter we mean a program that is substantive enough to be translated into action.[1]

INTRODUCTION

Planning, though a relatively new concept, has been tried over and over again in the Philippines. Economic planning was undertaken at the national level (and, to some extent, in the regions), while physical planning was pursued at all levels of government.

The National Economic Council (NEC), established in the '50's, was entrusted with the task of formulating "definitive and consistent national economic policies and comprehensive economic and social development programs"[2] and acted as the President's economic adviser. In the early '60's the Program Implementation Agency (PIA), later renamed Presidential Economic Staff (PES) was created as "a technical agency doing heavy analytical research work in project priorities, operational planning, and day-to-day proposals"[3] to supplement the NEC's broad policies and economic strategy. The PES increasingly subsumed the NEC's role as economic adviser to the President, although the NEC continued to make broad economic plans.

The functions of the two economic planning bodies were supplemented by the Board of Investments which drew up annual investment priorities, the Budget Commission which programmed the magnitude of government expenditures and the Central Bank which administered the monetary system. Physical planning on the national level was performed by the National Planning Commission (NPC) which was created from three defunct agencies – the National Urban Planning Commission, the Real Property Board, and the Capital City Planning Commission.

Various government entities, like the Department of Public Works and Communications and the Peoples' Homesite and Housing Corporation undertook limited physical planning functions. Sectoral plans on the national level were performed by different government departments.

At the regional level, the task of economic planning was assigned to the Regional Development Authorities in eleven areas of which only

[1]Sixto K. Roxas, "Organizing the Government for Economic Development Administration," a report submitted to President Diosdado Macapagal, 1964.

[2]Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, "Reorganization Plan No. 10," 1955.

[3]As discussed by Caridad S. Alfonso in "Organization for Economic Planning: National Economic Council, the Presidential Economic Staff, the Budget Commission, and the Central Bank," in Jose V. Abueva (Ed.) *Perspectives in Government Reorganization* (Manila: UPCPA, 1970), pp. 141-181.

five got off the ground. A semblance of planning was undertaken by Provincial, City and Municipal Development Councils at the local level. The local development Councils were composed of department and office heads and were chaired by the local chief executives.

While planning agencies existed in all levels of government, they were generally ineffective because of administrative defects of organization, staffing, and financing. To start with, the intended central planning agency (the NEC) was beset by organizational defects.[4] It had a big and unwieldy policy-determining Council, composed of representatives from Congress (three from the Senate and three from the House), three from the executive branch, and three from the private sector. Only the Chairman was a full-time member. Lack of coordination and harmony characterized the relationships of the various units of the NEC's technical staff. Moreover, the NEC's planning functions were dispersed to other agencies (the PES particularly) with which it did not have close coordination. The NEC likewise lacked an implementing arm. These weaknesses of the NEC caused the President to rely increasingly on other economic planning bodies, till in the end the PES supplanted its role as Presidential economic adviser. The PES' increasing importance was traced by an analyst to its being "better equipped than the NEC to give the President up-to-date information" and its propinquity to the President's office.[5]

Duplicity and overlapping of responsibilities characterized not only the two central economic planning agencies but the whole economic planning mechanism. An observer pointed out that in the Philippines

> ...The Budget Commission prepared fiscal programs with priorities that differed from those included in the plans. The Central Bank ignored the plans in controlling credit and in allocating foreign exchange...The other departments and agencies proceeded as if the plans did not exist.[6]

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Clair Wilcox, as quoted by Albert Waterston in *Development Planning: Lessons of Experience* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1965), p. 316.

At the regional level, the few Regional Development Authorities which were organized virtually became inutile because of the "high level of aspirations manifested in their avowed goals and financing which have been practically nullified by the paucity of actual support and implementation."[7]

The local Development Councils failed miserably in their functions because they hardly met, or if they did, they "did not go beyond discussing, setting priorities and approving these projects."[8] The local Planning Boards, for their part, did not go beyond zoning, and physical planning was largely left to the local Engineer's Office.[9] And yet, these local planning agencies were vested with powers to plan without waiting for approval from the National Planning Commission, and this devolution of the planning function to these local agencies effected the inutility of the NPC.

The Move for Reforms. The chaos and disorganization that characterized the planning agencies was replicated in the whole machinery of government. In the attempt to find solutions to the problems of inefficiency brought about by the dysfunctional administrative set-up, Congress created the Commission on Reorganization in 1969 to reorganize the executive branch of the Philippine government in order to bring about greater efficiency and economy in government operations. To perform its task, the Commission created Reorganization Panels, each intended to look into the organization of government agencies with related functions, and to recommend new schemes of organization to meet the need for more efficient services.

The Commission's Panel on Economic Planning and Program Implementation identified the basic deficiencies of the government's machinery for planning as follows: 1) Dispersal of planning functions among several bodies; 2)

[7] Abelardo Samonte, "Regional Development Authorities: Role, Structure and Feasibility," *PJPA* (April, 1968), pp. 110-123.

[8] Salvador Parco, "Some Factors of Success and Failure of Community Development Councils," (BDPB n.d.), mimeo.

[9] Asteya Santiago, "Planning Organization in the Philippines," *Australian Planning Institute Journal* (April 1969), pp. 33-37.

Lack of effective coordination among economic bodies; 3) Weak link between development planning and government budgeting; 4) Weak link between plan formulation and program execution; and 5) Lack of administrative capacity for sectoral and regional planning.[10] The Panel underscored the necessity of "institutionalizing the active involvement of the country's top political leadership" and the need to closely link planning and execution. It recommended strengthening of regional planning to provide for balanced development throughout the country.

Another group – the Panel on Regional and Community Development, reiterated the importance of undertaking regional planning and development "within the context of aggregative planning that takes place at the national level and the specific planning and programming that occur at the local level."[11] The Panel on Field Organization and Local Government Relations echoed this concern for systematic regionalization and recommended the division of the country into eleven regions for administrative decentralization.[12]

The proposals of the three groups were consolidated with those of other panels in the Integrated Reorganization Plan which proposed, among others, the creation of a single economic planning agency, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), with a field office in each regional capital. With the creation of the NEDA regional offices went the establishment of the Regional Development Council (RDC) in each region. The RDC for each of the eleven regions is composed of the Provincial Governors and City Mayors and the Regional Directors of national offices in the region, with the NEDA as technical arm. The RDC in each region is in charge of the preparation of regional development plans.

[10]Commission on Reorganization, "Report of Reorganization Panel No. 4 on Economic Planning and Program Implementation" (1970), mimeo.

[11]Commission of Reorganization, "Report of the Panel on Regional and Community Development" (1970), mimeo.

[12]Commission on Reorganization, "Report of the Panel on Field Organization and Local Government Relations" (1970), mimeo.

The President's first Decree after the declaration of Martial Law in 1972 implemented the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Although the plan's recommendations for many government departments were drastically changed, the regionalization policy has been implemented uniformly and the NEDA was one of the first agencies to be fully reorganized. The NEDA has been vigorously pursuing the government's policy by organizing RDC's and actively lending technical support to them.

Although not a recommendation of the Commission on Reorganization, the initiative of the President's Office in systematizing the monitoring and implementaiton of plans through the PROD-COPE system complements the Commission's proposals. A Presidential Regional Officer for Development (PROD) in each region is directly responsible to the Executive Secretary and has the task of implementing government programs within the region. Major projects are coordinated on a national basis by Coordinating Officers for Program Execution (COPEs) of which one exists in every department concerned with developmental projects.

Planning and the Bicol Region

The concept of a Regional Development Council (RDC) may be new to all the regions in the country, but not to the Bicol region, whose experience in involving the political officials in regional planning became the inspiration for the Commission on Reorganization's proposal for the involvement of local chief executives in the RDC.

The Bicol Development Planning Board (BDPB) was organized in 1964 through the initiative of the local chief executives (the Governors of the six provinces and the Mayors of the two – later three – cities) in the region. The BDPB's experiment was entirely new in that: 1) It involved the political officials in regional planning as they sat in the Board themselves; 2) It financed the effort in regional planning from contributions of the provinces and cities involved; 3) It tapped external funding (the Asia Foundation and the Agricultural Development Council) for support for special projects; 4) It made use of technical

assistance from academic institutions (notably, the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines and the International Rice Research Institute); and 5) It developed a system of communicating BDPB activities to the clientele through seminars and publications.

The BDPB antedated the Bicol Development Company (BIDECO) a regional development authority created by Congress in 1966, which was similar in organization, functions and financing to the RDC's created in other regions. The BIDECO, however, had the added power of acting as a holding company in investment–generating projects. In general, however, both bodies were unsuccessful in enhancing the development of the Bicol region.

The BDPB significantly succeeded in its initial efforts. During its first three years the Board met regularly, utilized external funds to undertake project feasibility studies and local seminars, and its secretariat was ably funded from local government contributions. Its next three years saw less frenzied activity and marked the beginning of financial problems. By the early 70's its decline was rapid, and with the creation of the RDC, its abolition in 1973 was actually a graceful exit for the BDPB.

The BDPB and the BIDECO shared common problems. Financially, the BDPB suffered because of waning interest on the part of the contributing local executives who composed the Board (because members of the Board changed composition after the local elections of 1967 and 1971); on the other hand, the BIDECO's financial problems were due to the difficulty in getting its Congressional appropriations released. The two also had the same problem of lack of technical personnel. The BDPB relied, unwisely, on U.S. Peace Corps volunteers (whose services it got for free) whose tenures were impermanent and who were not really planners; the BIDECO had too many non-technical personnel in its payroll as against the much needed technical staff members, because of displaced priority in personnel placement, lack of funds to attract competent personnel, and lack of qualified personnel in the area to attract. Both were run by politicians – the BDPB, by a Board composed of local chief executives, and the BIDECO, by a board of political lameducks – who were largely responsible for the waning interest of the local units (in the case of the BDPB) and projects motivated by vested interest (in the case of BIDECO). Both were unable to formulate a workable regional plan (the BIDECO came up with a general plan in 1968 which was not implemented and the BDPB produced a "non-plan" in 1973 in a frantic attempt to keep afloat amidst the tide of reorganization), because of lack of technical and financial support. Finally, each felt superior to the other, refused to coordinate, and went about its own way despite an agreement for cooperation forged between the two bodies in 1969.[13]

The RDC was established in Bicol in 1973 when the BDPB was at its nadir and the BIDECO was in a state of confusion after the President suspended its Board meetings. The RDC's composition includes not only the local chief executives which formerly comprised the BDPB, but the General Manager of the BIDECO as well. The other members are the directors of regional offices of the national government established in Bicol and the Executive Director of the Bicol River Basin Project, a newly-created body in charge of developing the Bicol River Basin area in Camarines Sur and part of two other Bicol provinces (Camarines Norte and Albay). The region's PROD, who happens to be concurrently Regional Director of the Department of Public Highways, is also a member of the Council.

The creation of the RDC in Bicol, like those of the RDC's in other regions, is intended to systematize the planning and implementation of development in the region, using the NEDA's overall plan as guide. For the Bicol RDC, it will mean the translation of national economic goals into more specific objectives for Bicol, taking into consideration its existing natural, fiscal and manpower resources and potentials.

Would the RDC be the answer to Bicol's development? It will take years and the full implementation of the RDC's concrete pro-

[13]For a more detailed account of the BDPB and the BIDECO, see the author's report, "The Administration of Development Planning in the Bicol Region" (UPNDRC, 1974), mimeo. Or refer to Arturo Pacho, "Planning, Poverty, and the Bicol Region," *Local Government Bulletin* (January-February 1972), pp. 8-11.

posals to find this out. However, based on its immediate past experience and certain indicators of a government agency's administrative capacity, we may be able to assess the Bicol RDC now and the directions it is taking.

Administrative Capacity

The failure of planning in the Philippines can be traced, not to the planning mechanism alone, but to the entire Philippine administrative system which has been critized as inefficient and extravagant, if not downright corrupt. Often, as the findings of the Commission on Reorganization show, the defects lie in unsystematic organizational set-up which cause overlapping and duplication of activities among agencies and lack of coordination among related units. Sometimes they are due to the lack of competent personnel to do the work, or to the lack of funds. At other times, however, the culprits are inept and corrupt leaders.

Our earlier study on the planning bodies in Bicol showed that the failure of planning in the region stemmed from defects in the organizational inputs which rendered the agencies' goals far too high to be met. The problems were common throughout — the perennial lack of funds and lack of technically competent personnel, the lack of dedicated leadership, the misplaced priorities. The outputs were nil, because of the constraints in the inputs.

How would the new Regional Development Council fare? Will it be beset by the same problems and become, like all the others before it, inutile? Or having been created after mistakes in the past, is it now given adequate inputs to make for better results?

The Concept of Administrative Capacity

A government agency's administrative capacity to perform its services is measured in terms of what public administration theorists identify as concepts of productivity, efficiency, and effectiveness.[14]

Productivity refers to "the ratio of output to input" and "increases when the ratio of output to input increases."[15] Inputs include finances, manpower, equipment and other elements fed into the administrative agency. Outputs are results, measured in terms of goods and services produced by the agency. Efficiency is related to productivity, because it is also "measured by the amount of resources used to produce a unit of output."[16] Efficiency, to our mind, denotes time, the more output produced in less time, the more efficient an agency is.

However, "to look at performance purely from the viewpoint of productivity and efficiency is not adequate, and it is essential to examine effectiveness in achieving not only the goals and objectives of an administrative unit, but also overall national goals and objectives."[17] To be effective, an organization must have the maximum impact, meaning "action must not be too little (or too much), too late (or too early) and should be at the right place and time and in acceptable quality."[18] Thus, an effective agency must produce relevant timely outputs.

To assess effectiveness, the outputs must be examined in terms of outcomes.[19] Outputs, of course, are the results of inputs, but the outcomes (of these outputs) may be discernible from effects resulting from those services or activities which are the outputs. For instance, a certain province in Bicol has impressive infrastructures — a beautiful, modern Capitol with an auditorium decked with the finest drapery, good roads, and an Olympic-sized swimming pool, which are clearly outputs of the national and provincial governments' efforts in the province. It is, no doubt, a mark of efficiency. But the test should go further than the outputs. Are these outputs effective? They are, in the

[14]See the *Philippine Journal of Public Administration,* "Special Issue on Administrative Productivity," (July 1973).

[15]C. Y. Wu, "Refining Concepts of Performance in Development Effectiveness, Profitability, and Productivity," in *Ibid.,* p. 288.

[16]Amitai Etzioni, *Modern Organizations* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 8.

[17]Wu, *Op. cit.,* p. 294.

[18]*Ibid.,* p. 298.

[19]Norman Uphoff, "An Analytical Model of Process and Performance for Developing Indicators of Administrative Capacity," in PJPA, *Op. cit.,* p. 373.

sense of giving the residents of the province, a sense of pride for those public works projects which other provinces do not have. (And pride cannot be counted in terms of monetary value.) But are those what the residents of the province need? The areas beyond the heavily endowed capital remain unreachable, the lives of the people remain unchanged. The government machinery in that province may be said to be *efficient, but not* effective, because the projects it undertakes are not what the people in the province need. It could probably be more effective if a system communications and feedback to and from the people is developed to ascertain their needs and wishes; this takes into account another concept, *efficacy.*[20]

In assessing a government agency, we must look at the inputs (manpower, financial resources, capital outlays, organizational set-up, etc.) and how they are utilized to produce the outputs (number and quality of activities or services to meet its objectives) to achieve desirable outcomes (from the government's point of view and from the clientele's). We are going to examine all these components in our analysis of the Regional Development Council of Bicol (Region V).

The Bicol RDC: Goals and Inputs

> . . . . The RDC is the NEDA in the region; it performs parallel functions as those of NEDA at the national level.[21]

The Regional Development Council in every Region in the country is the planning body for the region. As such, it is composed of the Region's decision-makers (the provincial Governors and City Mayors in the area) and the Regional Directors of national offices in the region. It is also provided technical expertise for its planning and research activities by the NEDA's regional office.

The Reorganization Commission gives the RDC the following functions:[22]

1. To conduct a comprehensive and detailed survey of the resources and potentialities of the region, and on the basis thereof, prepare long-range and annual plans for the region with the guidelines set by the NEDA;

2. To translate the national economic goals into more specific regional objectives which shall be reflected in the plans and programs of action prepared for the region;

3. To develop a research program involving continuing studies on the social, economic, and cultural development of the region;

4. To consider and adopt an annual regional economic report for transmittal to the NEDA;

5. To extend planning and other related forms of technical assistance to the local governments, local planning boards and sectoral departments of the national government existing in the region and private entities;

6. To coordinate all planning activities of sectoral departments of the national government existing in the region in relation to those of the local governments and local planning boards;

7. To make the necessary changes, amendments and revisions in the regional plans to improve and update them.

In the Bicol region, the RDC subsumes the functions of the defunct Bicol Development Planning Board, which was the RDC's inspiration. The RDC, of course, has more functions than the BDPB, and has been provided with the technical staff which the BDPB sorely lacked.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Gerardo Sicat, "NEDA and Regional Development Planning," *NEDA Development Digest,* February 15, 1974.

[22] *Integrated Reorganization Plan,* Plan VII-1,

Organization. The Bicol RDC is organized like other RDC's throughout the country. It consists of a Council proper, an Executive Committee, and a Technical Staff.

The Council proper is deliberative, policy-making body which is mandated to meet in regular session once a year "to consider and adopt annual regional economic reports on the status and progress of development in the region for transmittal to the NEDA." In Bicol, it is a huge body of twenty-five composed of the following:

I. Elective Representatives

1. Mayor, Legazpi City
2. Mayor, Naga City
3. Mayor, Iriga City
4. Governor, Albay
5. Governor, Camarines Norte
6. Governor, Camarines Sur
7. Governor, Catanduanes
8. Governor, Masbate
9. Governor, Sorsogon

II. NEDA Representative

10. Regional Executive Director (RED)

III. Representatives of Regional Authorities

11. General Manager, Bicol Development Company (BIDECO)
12. Executive Director, Bicol River Basin Council (BRBC)

IV. Regional Directors of National Government Agencies

13. Department of Public Highways (concurrently the PROD)
14. Department of Public Works
15. Department of Local Government and Community Development
16. Department of Education and Culture
17. Department of Health
18. Department of Labor
19. Department of Social Welfare
20. Department of Agricultural Extension
21. Bureau of Plant Industry

V. Non-Member Guests* from other Regional Offices

22. Department of Agrarian Reform
23. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
24. National Irrigation Administration
25. Population Commission

The Bicol RDC is chaired by Governor Vicente Alberto of Catanduanes who was elected by the members. His Vice-Chairman, as exemplified by the *Integrated Reorganization Plan,* is NEDA Regional Executive Director (RED) Alberto Olaguer.

The Executive Committee which has the crucial task of reviewing and recommending to the Council the adoption of regional plans, programs, policies, and guidelines, is headed by the NEDA RED or Mr. Olaguer. The members are two representatives of the local chief executives and Regional Directors of key government agencies in Bicol – the Department of Public Highways (in Bicol, he is also the PROD), Department of Public Works, Bureau of Agricultural Extension, Bureau of Plant Industry, Department of Local Government and Community Development, BIDECO General Manager, and the Executive Director of the BRDC. The Committee meets at least once a month.

The NEDA RED also heads the technical staff composed of NEDA personnel who serve as the research and implementing arm of the Council. The NEDA technical staff is divided into the Plan Formulation Division which maps out the plans and programs, and the Program Coordination Division which extends technical assistance to local governments, local planning boards, and sectoral departments of the national government in the region and private entities.[23]

* Their membership is not stipulated in the *Integrated Reorganization Plan,* but by virture of their positions, their directors are coopted in the RDC. This was decided upon at a meeting on July 15, 1974, when the body unanimously felt the necessity of expanding its membership to include "all the other regional directors as it deemed proper." (From July 15 minutes.)

[23] *Ibid.*

Staffing. While the Bicol RDC has met as early as August, 1973, its technical arm was not completely organized until early 1974, after the NEDA approved (on January 9, 1974) the staffing pattern for all the regions. The Divisions of Plan Formulation and Program Coordination are headed by Senior Professional Economists. The technical staff of the Plan Formulation Division is composed of economists, while the Program Coordination Division is staffed by specialists in Agriculture, Industry, Infrastructure and Social Development.

The Bicol RED is a career government employee, having started as mere clerk in 1956, rising to Assistant Bank Supervisor of the Development Bank of the Philippines before his appointment to the NEDA in 1973. A native Bicolano, Olaguer holds a Bachelor of Science in Commerce degree from Aquinas University in Legazpi City and a Master of Business Administration degree from the University of the Philippines in Manila.

Except for one economist, the NEDA technical staff positions are all filled. The NEDA people are young, the average age being only 33 (the oldest is 39 and youngest is 28). The oldest is head of the Plan Formulation Division and is virtually the RED's right-hand man. A mathematician by training, he has had research and a semblance of planning experience in the Bicol Development Planning Board.

Only five of the eight technical personnel of the NEDA submitted the one-page questionnaire given them. Of the five, only one answered as not having a civil service eligibility, the rest have first grade (professional) eligibilities, two of whom are eligible "Economist." All have bachelor's degrees in the social sciences (one in economics, one in agricultural economics), and all have attended training programs, although only two have had intensive training in planning (one attended a year's course in Development Economics in UP while another attended the UNCRD seminar in comprehensive planning in Nagoya, Japan). The Infrastructure Specialist is a Civil Engineer by training and experience, while one economist has worked with the UNDP Laguna Lake Project and the PES. No doubt, the five of those who submitted their questionnaires are young but educationally qualified, in the absence of qualifications requirements for NEDA personnel to follow. The RED says he recruits young people because he does not look at experience in terms of years. "A bachelor's degree in the field is the minimum requirement, though we prefer master's degree holders or those with graduate units." What he considers important to the job is "the ability to get along with people,"[24] which he gauges through the interview. He is very proud of his staff.

Financing and Supervision. The RDC's financing comes from the NEDA head office in Manila, which earmarks quarterly sub-allotments to the regions for RDC personnel, maintenance, equipment and other operating expenses.[25] For FY 1974-75, Region V has an allotment of ₱102,319.00. In addition to NEDA allotments, the RDC in Bicol has been receiving, for the past year, a contribution of ₱5,000 from each province and city in the region, which supports expenses incurred in meetings of the Council and the Executive committee.

Appointments are issued by the NEDA Director General in Manila, with the RED having only recommendatory powers. Direct supervision comes from the Regional Development Staff (RDS) in the main office, which has the prime responsibility of providing "guidelines for regional development based on and consistent with the long-term development plans and annual development programs prepared by the NEDA."[26] The RDS has the complementary functions of coordinating the planning and implementation of approved regional development plans and programs, and extending assistance to regional development authorities.

RDC Activities

Council Meetings. Since its organizational meeting in August, 1973, the RDC has held one

[24]Interview with Mr. Olaguer, September 9, 1974.

[25]NEDA, NRO Guideline No. 1, June 6, 1974.

[26]Letter of Implementation No. 10.

regular and five special meetings in four different provincial capitals. It has been meeting monthly since June 1974 when it held a special meeting in Legazpi to listen to the presentation of the UNCRD Plan for Bicol by the participants to the United Nations Comprehensive Regional Development course held in Nagoya, Japan and the Bicol region. The next month, it met again to discuss the UNCRD plan. In its meeting in August, it organized task forces and action teams which would prepare the reports and plans for their respective sectors, which would all go into the final plant to be collated by the NEDA. In September it met in Naga City to hear the sectoral reports on the current situation in Bicol. Its latest special meeting was held in Sorsogon, Sorsogon in October to discuss the RDC budget. It held its regular meeting for 1974 in November in Virac, Catanduanes, where it reviewed its activities and heard the sectoral reports of the task forces.

Its Executive Committee, of course, has been meeting more often to discuss problems to bring up the RDC. Its meeting on September 12, 1974, is typical of such meetings. There it discussed the problems facing the task forces and the necessity of holding a two-day seminar on Regional Planning to orient task force members on the rudiments of planning.

Workshop and Task Force Activities. Before the NEDA Technical Staff was even fully organized, the NEDA office for Region V conducted, in collaboration with the U.P. Institute of Planning and the Cooperative Regional Development Project, a three-week Seminar-Workshop on Regional Planning. The Workshop which was held in November and December, 1973, was attended by 73 participants coming from regional and local offices in Bicol, who heard lectures on rudiments of planning and research and did exercises on sectoral planning. The final presentation was attended by some members of the RDC who heard the sectoral recommendations on Settlement Patterns and Population Distribution, Agricultural Development and Supporting Infrastructures, Manufacturing and Other Industries, Regional Transport Network, and Social Services and Manpower.

At present the RDC is busy with Task Force activities aimed at producing sectoral plans for collation by the technical staff in early 1975. The RDC's eight Task Forces are chairmanned by a local chief executive each.[27] The Task Forces are on 1) Agriculture, Agro-Industry, and Agri-business, 2) Industries and Tourism, 3) Reforestation, Flood Control and Resettlement, 4) Urban and Rural Development, 5) Population and Family Planning, 6) Health and Nutrition, 7) Physical Infrastructures/Utilities, and 8) Social Services. Because of the magnitude of the work, each task force is provided an action team and as many sub-committees as are needed, making for a total of 22 sub-committees. Each Task Force is coordinated by one or two staff members of the NEDA who do the propping up. As one NEDA staff member puts it, "We are actually pushing. They always take what we say 110%. But they provide the data."

The Task Force approach was utilized by the RDC to hasten the process of planning and to involve all the sectors represented in the council. As the RED explained, the NEDA is "not initiating plans. Line agencies and local governments do the planning; we'll just reconcile them into one rational, comprehensive plan."[28] The RED's idea is involvement for all concerned. He does not seem to find any problems in the Task Force approach; the committee members "are enthusiastic; their support is fantastic! " The RED claims.

The Plan Under Collation. The NEDA's target is a four-year rolling plan for Bicol which is flexible enough to revise every year. They have set the end of October for sectoral proposals and the end of February for the final plan. As of this writing (December 1974) NEDA people claim that the sectoral proposals are in and that they are in the process of integrating them. However, they insist that no copies are yet available for scrutiny.

The RDC's Problems of Coordination. The Task Force approach was probably resorted to because of the initial difficulties the NEDA experienced in getting the cooperation of the heads of offices in the gathering of data. A very

[27] A ninth task force which will integrate all reports is headed by Chairman Alberto.

[28] Interview, *op. cit.*

young NEDA staff member complained in July (before the Task Forces were organized) that "the heads of offices do not submit to us the data we ask them; nor do they even give us copies of their activities and problems." She agreed with us that her youth was a disadvantage, and the lack of specific instructions to line agencies on how to deal with the RDC was a stong handicap. The more active involvement of the heads of offices in the task forces seem to solve the NEDA's initial problems.

While planning for the whole region, the RDC has to contend with the existence of a planning agency for the Bicol River Basin which has better funding and greater government support (the USAID funds many of its projects and provides technical assistance, and its governing body is Cabinet level, whereas the RDC only has NEDA funds and little central technical assistance, and its Council Membership is on the local and regional levels only). The NEDA's initial reaction was to avoid going into activities already being performed by the BRBC. However, in June, 1974 the President issued Letter of Implementation No. 73 which put the BRBC under NEDA's supervision. The RDC was very happy, and the RED started making plans about dividing his time between Naga where the BRBC is based and Legazpi where NEDA is. In July, one could sense the bouyed up morale of NEDA personnel. By September, however, people at NEDA hardly talked of the BRBC. When interviewed, the RED attributed the change to LOI's non-implementation. He claims to prefer the distinction existing between the two bodies, for "how can 21 people (NEDA Region V) coordinate a project with staffing larger than it is, with funds much greater than what it has?" From the point of view of the BRBC, "the LOI gives the NEDA (in Manila) supervision, not the RDC. You can't expect the BRBC which is cabinet level to be under the RDC which is only regional and local." Besides, BRBC people claim to be far ahead of the RDC, because their projects are on-going, whereas RDC is only initiating its plans.

How do the two planning bodies work together? The Executive Director of the BRBC is a member of the RDC and its Executive Committee. As the Executive Director described it, "We let them know what we are doing, this is, after all, a smaller area. They must know what we are doing so that they will not duplicate our activities."[29] The NEDA RED expressed the same view, "We don't plan for that area, we adjust our plan to theirs; our area is bigger."

The PROD is the President's implementing officer in the regions. His position is only concurrent with whatever position he has; in other areas, he may be a Philippine Constabulary Commander or a Regional Director. In Bicol, he happens to be a Regional Director of the Department of Public Highways, and as such, he is a member of the RDC and the Executive Committee. He attends Council and Executive Committee meetings, and assists on the task force on Infrastructures. His role in the RDC is definite as Regional Director; as PROD, however, his relationship with the RDC is not at all defined. For the present, however, no irritants have arisen between the PROD's office (of personnel on full-time detail from other offices and which exists without a budget) and the RDC, probably because the RDC is still in the process of plan formulation and has not gone into program coordination. The PROD's office cooperates in providing data and technical assistance where they are needed.

The Inputs and Outputs in Balance

We cannot assess the RDC well until its first plan for Bicol becomes available for scrutiny; in fact, until its plan becomes operational.

However, if we use the RDC's schedule and targets as bases for determining its efficiency, we can say that the RDC meets its targets, because work is proceeding on schedule. It is *productive* because it is able to meet its deadlines for its most urgent activity. It is *efficient* because it is able to set the leadership in the task of planning, to involve the members in its task.[30] But whether it will continue being

[29]Interview, September 12, 1974. The same view was expressed by another BRBC official in Manila in an interview in October, 1974.

[30]Indicators of administrative capacity as pointed out by the UN for regional organizations are: 1) planning programs, 2) mobilizing resources, 3) organizing work forces, 4) executing their functions and projects, 5) meeting deadlines, and 6) completing good quality work within authorized funds.

such depends on its capability to meet all its goals and objectives, that will take more time for any analysis.

The RDC, initially, may be *efficient.* But its plan, when available, will let us determine whether it is effective. For its effectivity will depend largely on its ability to meet the needs of the region, and on its ability to maximize resources to meet needs realistically. Further, it will depend not on the plan alone but in its implementation — its *effectiveness* will depend on the priorities chosen in maximizing resources in meeting the plans' goals. Implementation, of course, will hinge on the line agencies, but the RDC has the task of setting the priorities and the momentum, and coordinating all efforts in the program implementation.

As for *efficacy,* the RDC's initial experience tends to show the absence of a system of communications and feedback between the RDC and its clientele —the Bicolanos in all walks of life. There are yet no indications that the *Barangays* (villages) are involved in the planning process, even in the provision of data, much more in the articulation of needs. In fact, some of the NEDA's technical staff do not seem to be as familiar with the Bicol terrain; some of them have not even heard of existence of a barrio in Legazpi City — a barrio in the outskirts of the city which people typify the rest of Bicolandia for whom the government must plan. They get their data from government offices; they do not go out to the field to check inaccuracies in secondary data, much less to determine the rural people's needs. Whatever "Plan" the RDC will put out would be a plan done in their office, with secondary data supplied by other government agencies.

The RDC may turn out to be *more efficient* than other regional agencies before them; but may still be lacking in effectiveness and in *efficacy* which are crucial in the task of government.

Organizational Pitfalls

The Commission on Reorganization's experiment in involving the elective local officials with appointive regional directors seem to be working well. In the body with so huge a composition as the RDC, the non-attendance of some local officials in meetings do not hinder the RDC's task, because they are not in the majority. Their views are important and are given consideration, their leadership is recognized in their chairmanship of the RDC and the Task Forces, but the RDC is able to move along with less attendance from them. However, their membership in the Council insures immediate moral and, to some extent, financial support from the local units for which the planning is done.

RDC-BRBC. But the RDC even now faces the problem of coordination with the BRBC. True, the BRBC covers only one portion of the Bicol region, and has its own sources of financing. But the existence of two planning bodies in the area only "letting each other know" what they are doing is already proving dysfunctional. The RDC shows a facade of unconcern for BRBC, but envy and bitterness about the other's existence is discernible within the RDC's staff and membership. Over at BRBC, an air of superiority prevails, and resentment towards it is felt in not only the RDC but in the Provincial Development Staff of local unit it is supposedly working with. The President's Letter of Implementation remains unimplemented, because both camps feel more comfortable existing as separate, distinct units. Certainly, the BRBC as a Council composed of cabinet members cannot be beholden to a Council composed of only regional and local officials; certainly, the BRBC Executive Director cannot be working under the NEDA RED. But both are planning for the region, no matter how distinctly the BRBC separates its area of activity. A regional plan for Bicol should not skip the River Basin Area but work in conjunction with it. What is needed is a system of working relationship between the two agencies.

The "Nagoya Plan" for Bicol (prepared by the UNCRD Training Group) proposed the phasing out of the Bicol River Basin Project upon completion of its activities (six years) and recommended the merger of the RDC technical staff and the BRBC "to constitute the nucleus of a Regional Development Authority," whose Board of Directors would evaluate and approve programs. This recommendation implies abolition of the RDC which is the groups' controversial recommendation.

For all the impressiveness of the Nagoya Groups' Four Volume Reports, its recommendations along the administrative lines seem to be impractical. The Nagoya Group, as an unconcerned outsider, plans for one region and disregards the overall scheme for the country. In abolishing the RDC in one area it ignores the Integrated Plan for the country, the series of regional units upon which the central government in Manila would rely for assistance and support. What is needed is a plan for Bicol's administrative planning machinery which would be consistent with that of the entire country.

RDC-PROD. The PROD, right now, is invaluable to the Bicol RDC as Council and Executive Committee member, provider of data and technical expertise in task force activities. However, when the RDC plan is finished, the PROD will certainly assume more of his implementation functions. When the implementation phase of the plan is reached, problems of coordination may occur between the PROD and the RDC, which has a division in charge of program coordination. In that event, two regional implementing agencies will occur, each duplicating the other's functions, with both neglecting to implement some programs. It is important to anticipate this problem now and make provisions for its solutions.

The Nagoya Group's initial recommendations is for the PROD to be designated co-chairman (with the NEDA RED) of the RDC's Executive Committee, the NEDA in direct charge of plan formulation and the PROD in charge of plan implementation. That proposal, however, separates plan formulation from plan implementation, two functions which must go hand in hand. A semblance of unity occurs in the joint chairmanship of the chief planner and the chief implementor of the executive committee, but does not really solve the problem.

What, again, is needed, is an administrative set-up that will take care of the RDC's problems with other regional bodies (like the BRBC in Bicol) and with the PROD, that will be institutionalized,not only in Bicol but in the entire country.

Regional Administrators

The Commission on Reorganization is toying with a new idea of creating the positions of Regional Administrators for the eleven regions in the country, to provide supervision and coordination of government programs in the regions. It is still under study, and no details have yet been provided to implement the idea.

For Bicol's problems, at least, the idea of a Regional Administrator may be the answer. The Regional Administrator (RA) would be able to weave together the functions of over-seeing plan formulation and implementation; the PROD and the NEDA doing one aspect each, as per the Nagoya Plan, with coordination and supervision entrusted to the Regional Overseer. The RA may be able to provide the necessary bridge between the RDC and BRBC. This, however, would presuppose that the RA would have great Presidential Authority.

Organization and Functions. Our idea is for a Regional Administrator, or Area Supervisor, Regional Assistance Executive Secretary, or even a PROD[31] in a larger context, who would be answerable to the President for his region. He may come from the President's Office, as Ex-Governor Jose Estevez of Albay suggests,[32] or he may be a military man, as some quarters speculate; it does not matter much; as long as he has Presidential Authority and rank that will be respected by the higher authorities in the region.

Since the NEDA has both policy formulation and program coordination functions, it would be best to do away with the present PROD's office altogether. This is not a drastic proposal, since the PROD-COPE concept was intended mainly to facilitate the implementation of projects after the declaration of Martial Law. Moreover, there won't be much problems of displacement, since the PROD's office (in all the regions) does not have its own budget or personnel; nor are there full-time

[31]The author is inclined to adopt the term PROD for the Regional Administrator. The term RA is used here, however, to prevent confusion with the existing PROD.

[32]Interview with Ex-Governor Estevez, March 1974.

PRODs. For PRODs occupying concurrently high positions, they may be promoted to the RA post. In the case of Bicol, the PROD's post may stay till the incumbent retires in 1976. The abolition of the PROD's office would thus strengthen the NEDA Regional Office as a policy formulating and program implementing body.

Since the NEDA RED is no higher in stature than the other regional offices, the RA could be able to perform the necessary functions of overseeing and integrating all the regional offices and regional development authorities in the tasks of development, since the RA is answerable to the President while the regional directors are answerable directly to their Department Secretaries. The PROD's abolition would not in any way diminish the powers of the Executive Secretary's Office because it would still monitor the process of program coordination for the President, and the RA's would be dealing with the President through the DMS.

The RA is Regional Coordinator of the President, and as such, must be endowed with the power to call the RDC for consultation. Because the municipal mayors are not represented in the RDC (they are represented only indirectly through the Governors) the RA should involve them in his consultations. The RA should therefore be mandated to call annual consultation meetings of what we may now call Regional Consultative Body, to keep him abreast of developments in the region, and to communicate to them national policies. Barangay captains should also be met by the RA from time to time.

Aside from such annual meetings, the RA must also maintain frequent consultations with the RDC Executive Committee. While he may head the Regional Consultative Body, however, it is important that he does not head the RDC or the Executive Committee, and that he does not become even a member of such bodies, so as not to disrupt the existing situation, and so as not to stunt or cramp their processes.

While equipped with Presidential authority, the RA's would have only coordinative functions in the region, so as not to endanger local autonomy and initiative. Because the RA's status is important, his responsibilities cannot be delegated, and his staff would only perform the task of keeping the RA abreast with developments and monitoring activities for him. They will work in close coordination with the NEDA's technical staff and the pertinent technical personnel of line departments and regional development authorities.

The RA's office would have three divisions — Planning, Implementation, and Special Projects. The Planning Division would coordinate with the NEDA's Plan Formulation Division while the Implementation Division would coordinate with the Division on Program Coordination. The Special Projects Division would take charge of coordinating special national government programs, like the Green Revolution and Beautification drives.

Financing the RA's Office. Because the RA is a national official in the region, his salary should be paid by the national government. However, it is necessary for the local and regional authorities to help fund the office to have identity with it, and they should be made to contribute to the operating expenses of the office and/or the salaries of its staff. This can come from fixed contributions from the local and regional authorities. In the Bicol RDC the local units this past year were able to contribute ₱5,000 each; perhaps, they (and those in other regions) can be able to contribute a fixed 2% of their income to regional development, (1% to go to the RDC and 1% to go to the RA). As of FY 1972-73, 1% local government budget credits in Bicol totalled ₱411,201.39. Considering that the local Tax Code provides greater sources of funds to local units, income from this source would be able to fund the RA's operational activities.

Harnessing the RDC for Bicol's Development

The Regional Development Council in Bicol has no doubt been very active in formulating the first plan for the Region. In that regard, therefore, it has been efficient. But its effectiveness will depend largely on the kind of plan it will produce for the region. As one eminent economic planner warned about the process of plan formulation:

> 'To increase production' is not a plan but a wish: 'to increase the production of rice' is neither a plan but a slightly more specific wish; it becomes a plan when the region most suited for increased production is defined, the nature and magnitude of investments in irrigation facilities, in fertilizer, in agricultural expenses, in transport and storage facilities are determined, the financial refinements are measured, the sources of finances are specified, the policies consistent with those objectives are laid down, and the agencies responsible for each thread of action in the whole scheme are mobilized and made to carry out their specific roles under an effective overall coordination.[32]

We have proposed the creation of the office of the Regional Administrator to further provide the overall coordination so needed in Bicol, because of the ambiguity of relationships between the PROD and the RDC, and because of the existence of other regional bodies in Bicol like the Bicol River Basin Council and the Bicol Development Company. But the effectiveness of the overall coordinating machinery depends largely on the leadership that the person to be appointed to that position will be able to provide. What is needed (in Bicol as well as in other regions) is a dynamic, development-oriented administrator, who will utilize the Presidential powers delegated to him for positive development, rather than to enhance his own powers, as the political and administrative leaders of the Old Society were generally prone.

The final test for the RDC's effectivity is the soundness of its plans and their actual implementation. To be most effective, the RDC's plans must reflect the needs and wishes of its clientele, and the program's implementation must also take into consideration the desires and capabilities of the populace. This can only be done through continuing dialogues with the people to determine their wishes and needs. Periodic consultation through *barangay* meetings must be instituted, and regular communication must be established through the mass media to keep the villagers informed of what their government is doing for them.



[33]Roxas, *Op. Cit.*

EXPLODING THE MYTHS IN THE METROPOLIS

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Review of Leo Jakobson and Ved Prakash, eds. *Urbanization and National Development* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), 320 pp.

The myths that mask the face of Asian cities are by themselves foreboding and enigmatic as the people who inhabit these cities. They persist because we know less of them and what we do know do not tell all or accurately. To uncover these myths that tend to persist in our image of the Asian city is part of the aims of this book on *Urbanization and National Development* jointly edited by Leo Jakobson and Ved Prakash, both from the University of Wisconsin. The editors and contributors to this book are not exorcists chanting hymns or prayers to ward off or purge evil spirits; they are serious scholars who present facts and models on urban population growth, land policies, and economic development, among others. Eerie incantations and incense dancing on the wind are replaced by Gibrat's law, Fourastie's schema, Yule distribution, and Gini coefficient.

This book calls for "more and more careful research" into the problems and processes of urbanization in Asia to get a better appreciation of this phenomenon and to provide policy-makers with a concrete basis for making critical judgments. The first of a series on urban studies by Sage Publications the present volume centers on urban planning and urbanization policies at the central government level. It also contains ten chapters including a bibliography on existing materials on urban development. The introductory chapter by the editors on "Urbanization and Urban Development: Proposals for an Integrated Policy Base" is a clarion call for a framework to unify and weave together theories on urban development. Herculean as it may appear, Jakobson and Prakash argue in favor of building a theoretical framework which is "acutely felt in the developing countries." But then, should not more information output be encouraged first considering the disconcerting lack of data available? With what do we build up a model when the building materials are yet scarce and inappropriate? (Compare the editors' words: "...at this point we do not have specific data and analyses to support our contention..."; Another contributor writes: "the study of the urbanization process... is greatly handicapped by lack of even the basic cross tabulations in censuses...paucity of analytical studies...limited data...").

The editors summarized the themes and issues discussed in meetings held in 1966-1967 by the United Nations, the International Union of Local Authorities, and the Pacific Conference in Honolulu. One common conclusion of these forums was the recognition of urbanization as a component of the national development process. No doubt each meeting had its own special declarations to make – as all meetings do! For example, the U.N. Seminar affirms that "the process of urbanization is irreversible"; IULA maintains that "the meaning of urbanization itself is undergoing change"; and the Pacific Conference reiterates that urbanization should be viewed as a functional approach. Economic, social, or physical components are to be viewed as a whole. The editors put it more eloquently that the "growth patterns (in urban areas) are influenced by factors other than economic and technological." They admit that the dimension of values expressed in cultural and human terms is

an important element. The urbanization framework to be evolved should therefore consist of data plus values.

The following chapter on "Economic Development and Urbanization" by Stanislaw H. Wellisz maintains that although there is a need to have a proper balance of the various components, it is difficult to define and to enforce such a balance. Even then Wellisz attempts to define an urbanization strategy which is congruent with economic and social development goals. In this effort he provides some answers to such questions as: Are Asian small cities too large? Is Asia over-urbanizing? Is the urban environment unduly neglected? and, Is a rational urbanization policy possible? The editors feel that Wellisz' article attempts to bridge the gap between the economists who neglect problems of space, and the physical planners who disregard the economic factors. Who should then bridge the gap between the economists, the planners, and the administrators who commonly abandon both the physical and economic factors? The chapter ends optimistically with the words: "There is hope for new and better solutions."

Gerald M. Desmond in his piece "The Impact of National and Regional Development Policies on Urbanization" points out the spatial dimension of urbanization and the effects of national economic policies such as on income, employment, and investment. To Desmond urbanization is an "inevitable concomitant of economic development." Yet we do know that it occurs generally in response to spontaneous market conditions rather than deliberate policies and programmes. Thus Desmond poses the question as to whether human settlements could be "deliberately altered, controlled or influenced at all." Moreover, Desmond bemoans the conception of "spaceless" plans in the region wherein decisions on economic and social development are made ignoring the physical or spatial dimensions. The idea of a spatial budget is introduced as an administrative tool which could be developed by urban planners and administrators.

"Planners dream as dreamers plan," goes the hickory ryhme of Ashish Bose. In his chapter on "Urbanization Process in South and South East Asia", Bose presents the nightmares of urban planners in Asia: the rapid population growth and migration patterns in cities. In terms of numbers the author declares that Asian countries are experiencing the urbanization process "in the face of rapid population growth ranging from 2 to 3 percent per year, with the rate of urban growth ranging from 3 to 6 percent per year." Urban planners have become immured to waking up each day to confront acute and distressing problems of providing more and better services to more people and maintaining minimum standards and the quality of urban life.

Being a professional demographer Bose complains of the inadequacy of data, the lack of basic studies and the weaknesses of current censuses in the region. According to Bose, many have fallen into a rut by using time-worn and flimsy slogans on urbanization such as "over-urbanization of Asian countries," "push and pull factors," or "balanced and integrated" urban development. Such generalization, Bose observes, tends to confuse the issues rather than clarify them. The culprit lies on the fact that data are scanty and little rigorous analysis has been done with the use of available information. Bose attempts feebly to include two sub-themes namely, the roles of big cities and small towns in urbanization. He failed to explain clearly what these roles are except by using the themes as convenient headings.

Brian J.L. Berry in his "City Size and Economic Development" describes the battle royal between the "modernizers" and "traditionalists" in the field of urban planning and development.[1] The contention lies on the hierarchy of cities and the relationship of such a hierarchy to national development. The modernizers favour concentration in large urban centers, particularly in the primate city, to avail of economies of scale and benefit from existing and expanding social, physical or economic infrastructures for further growth and breaking down social inequalities. On the other

[1]The "modernizers" are represented by [Gordon Edwards] Institute of Planning, University of the Philippines, Occasional Paper No. 2, *The City in the Third World* (Quezon City, 1972), while the tension between the "modernizers" and the "traditionalists" has been noted by Belinda Aquino in "Local Government and Community Development; the Indian and Philippine Experience," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* (special issue on Local Governments), X, 2-3 (April-July, 1966).

hand the traditionalists are against concentration of growth in one or a few cities which is the reason for social disparities and inadequacies in a country. The latter argues that primacy reflects "over-urbanization" and drains the life and resources of the country, particularly the rural and backward areas.

Ironically, Berry views that the modernizers are in one sense conservatives while the traditionalists are radicals. The first group believes in the filtering down mechanism of growth in which at a certain stage of concentration development will tend to equalize and influence the underdeveloped parts of a country. The second group has a radical stance by asserting the need for changes and direct intervention in the urban system to promote equitable growth and reduce the role of primate cities which have colonial backgrounds. This group debunks the notion of filtering influence on growth as hopeless.

A compromise to the two seemingly opposing views is the development of growth centers and medium-sized cities.[2] Regional planners are advancing this middle ground policy to overcome the weaknesses of the arguments used by the modernizers and the traditionalists. National development can be maintained by easing the pressures on and the problems of the primate city through a "system of alternative growth centers." Berry calls this compromise strategy as "growth pole cum decentralization." There is a variation though of this policy in the Philippines since the implicit direction being taken is towards growth pole cum centralization.

T.G. McGee in his chapter poses the question: Are cities in Asia catalysts or cancers? This chapter following Berry's discussion reexamines the role and function of cities in terms of an analytical socio-economic model. McGee realizes the difficulty in generalizing about Asian cities because of their cultural diversity, varying history and variety of functions performed. Three assumptions are offered as a starting point in trying to understand the Asian city. First, one has to know the processes operating within a country and internationally. Secondly, an analytical construct should incorporate the relationship of the city with the countryside and transcend the "dichotomy between the city and the nation at large." Thirdly, one has to distinguish sharply between the pre-conceived role and actual functions of the city since there is usually a large gap between the two.

The chapter concludes that Asian cities "play an important but not necessarily a central role" in national development. In answer to the question raised earlier, McGee tersely claims that cities are "both catalysts and cancers, aiding and hindering the national process." McGee does not give a clear either/or answer since according to him there are many permutations in the roles and functions of Asian cities based on their own environmental setting and background.

"Slums and Squatters in South and Southeast Asia" by Aprodicio A. Laquian deals with the most real and dynamic life of the city. As the most concerned scholar on this particular issue, Laquian makes optimistic assertions about the slum communities and their potentials in the development process. He observes that slums are not the dead end avenues of low-income people. Slums and squatters are stable, self-satisfying to residents, and functional. Life in the slum is "not tough, troubled or dangerous" as non-residents perceive them to be. Hardly could one "conceive of the squatter or slum dweller as a radical or revolutionary." Slums should be recognized as "agents of transition" or "mediator of social change." The slum community provides the transitional urban life to the new migrant from the rural areas.

Laquian recommends that the developmental roles of slums should be recognized by policy-makers and planners. What can be done is to plan the unplanned slums and integrate them with the total urban community. The chapter goes further than the conventional description of slums by lumping in the "Chinatowns" in Asian cities as slum areas too. There is one little shaky observation by the author

[2]The forerunner of this idea in Asia is the U.N. Centre for Regional Development in Nagoya (Japan) which organized a seminar on Urban Development Strategies in the Context of Regional Development from October to November 1974. See also its "Role of Cities in Attaining a Desirable Population Distribution in the Context of Rapid Urbanization" (Nagoya, 1974).

when he states that: "...there is some doubt whether they (the Chinatowns) still play as large a developmental role." The appropriate question is not so much on roles and integration as giving political justice and rights to people who have taken the option of living in another country. The "undersirable effects" of these communities have their own positive aspects. The unwanted, neglected and decaying Chinatown is now being capitalized for example in Manila, for tourism purposes. The billboard signs in Chinese restaurants torn down by Mayor Villegas have mushroomed again together with the arches, gates and pagodas that have been built. Urban renewal through community participation became effective when the government suddenly reversed its policy on denying the presence of the Chinese community. Denied land ownership and access to land through legal means, the Chinese have adopted themselves to condominium living which to sociologists and urban planners is still a subject of extensive and expensive research in Mandaluyong, Rizal.

Ved Prakash cogently writes on "Land Policies for Urban Development" as a measure of responding to pressures on the use and demand for urban land. Policies must be made explicit, coordinated and enforceable so that land which is a scarce commodity and has competing uses could be allocated in a rational basis. Prakash points out that land measures in the region are "mostly ad-hoc and sporadic, and do not seem to form part of a well-knit overall policy." The article recounts the background in the shaping of components of an urban land policy in India. The policy on pricing for land disposal was vague and unrealistic and provided for conflicting goals (economic returns in the disposal of land with due considerations to the poorer sections of the community).

One piece of advice in the chapter appears sweeping and unrealistic by itself: land assessments should be insulated from the political function. Be that as it may, land assessment is a political decision because it pinches on the pockets of the citizens and voters.

The final chapter by Tarlok Singh on "Urban Development Policy and the Role of Governments and Public Authorities" is a plea for governments to evolve a national policy on urban development. Policy, according to Singh, is necessary to guide and influence future urban growth as well as to control and restrict the present rate of growth. Much economic planning has been made at the aggregate level without any due consideration to location and the city or community level which becomes the recipient of the benefits and disbenefits of implementing an economic plan. Singh is candid in his statement that a truly meaningful urban policy "...must grapple with the underlying conditions of economic and social life."

Two essential points are introduced in this chapter, namely the notion of increasing participation at the community level and improvement of local government as an institution for developmental purposes, particularly on the administrative mechanism, skills and experiences needed for urban planning. Fortunately, Singh admits that the deficiencies at the local or city level are not entirely the fault of the city itself but due in part to the lack of response of the central government authorities.

The book dispels the myths woven around the Asian cities and provides a clearer perspective in knowing more about these cities. Jakobson and Prakash offer a new definition of urbanization to settle the debate on minimum size or scale, presence of facilities and services, density, etc. They define urbanization as "...a phenomenon describing a process of change in the situs of populations due to changing conditions in society at large." Urbanization becomes part of a total developmental process in a dynamic environment. There is no common standard or yardstick to describe and measure the urbanization pattern in cities in Asia. For the moment the Jakobson and Prakash model is a useful analytical tool to begin serious studies in urban development.

The editors performed an excellent yeoman's job in selecting the contributors, editing the materials and placing them in proper sequence. The contributors in fact do share common threads such as: on eschewing generalizations (although some persist to use them unconsciously like Wellisz on equilibrium and Singh on push and pull factors), the non-applicability of concepts and techniques of the developed countries, and the acceptance of underlying broader social and economic conditions to explain urbanization.

One can sense, however, the strong bias of the editors in a book dealing with two sub-regions of Asia. Of the nine contributors about five have training, interests or experiences in the Indian continent. This is reflected in the data and case studies presented and the lop-sided bibliography which is exhaustive with publications on India. The listing for the countries in Southeast Asia is skimpy if not outdated.[3]

On the whole the contributors of the book are optimistic that more rigorous research on urbanization can bring us closer to the neon lights at the end of the urban tunnel. Urban analysts, policy-makers and urban planners cannot but fail to see a glimmer of the light by reading Jakobson and Prakash's book.

[3]For an extended general bibliography see Gerald Breese, *Bibliography on Urban Development in South East Asia* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1973) and on the Philippines see Rachel Agustin, *An Annotated Bibliography on Housing and Urban Development* (Manila: U.P. College of Public Administration, 1973), and Institute of Planning, University of the Philippines, *Annotated Bibliography on Environmental Planning* (Quezon City, 1968 and 1970).

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BOOK NOTES*

Elliot Aronson, **The Social Animal.** *New York: The Viking* Press, 1972. 324 pp.

This is a book in social psychology, and is concerned with topics that are associated with this field, such as: conformity, mass communication, human aggression, attraction, prejudice, self-justification, etc. What makes it different from other social psychology books is in the way it has been written.

Aronson wrote this book primarily with the student in mind. He thus tried to be "brief without being unfair," and to "present complex materials simply and clearly without oversimplifying." The result is a very interesting, concise, and easily understandable book which should prove useful not only to students but to anyone who finds social psychology interesting.

Asian Regional Institute for Social Building Research, **School Building Design Asia.** *Colombo,* 1972. 304 *pp.*

The Asian Regional Institute for Building Research selected the materials for this book based on the experience of some eighteen Asian countries being served by the UNESCO. The book offers general recommendations for the design of primary and secondary schools within the special context of the Asian region. Several factors affecting design are discussed, including climate, topography, the peculiar needs of the pupil himself, the space requirements of both the curriculum and the teaching methods, as well as the ever-present problems of financial limitations. Although the book is written primarily for educational planners, administrators, and school building designers, it also offers relevant information to principals and teachers.

James Bailey, ed. **New Towns in America: The Design and Development Process.** *New York: Wiley and Sons,* 1973. 165 *pp.*

The American Institute of Architects compiled the basic materials for this book from the Conference on New Communities held in Washington, D.C. on November 1971, in which more than three hundred and fifty professionals participated. In general, the book provides stimulating information on the past, present, and future role of American new towns. It covers a broad range of topics: it offers a comparative view of historical and current new towns plans in America; describes the whole process of new towns design and development; and explores the economic, social, physical, and political aspects of new towns development.

Robert W. Burchell and James W. Hughes, **Planned Unit Development: New Communities American Style.** *New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University,* 1972. 254 *pp.*

The importance of Planned Unit Development (PUD), a type of residential land development, has increasingly grown in the United States. It is America's equivalent of the new community which is destined to become of crucial significance in the light of the changing spatial organization of metropolitan areas. As a land development tool, PUD permits a mixture of land uses – residential, commercial, industrial – on the same land tract, creativity in design, and the provision of public and common open space.

Aimed at both the academician and the professional, this book examines the intricacies of the planned unit development process. It

*Starting with this issue, the *Philippine Planning Journal* will be publishing book notes. These are intended to acquaint the readers with new acquisitions of the Institute of Environmental Planning Library, and to assist both students and practitioners in their choice of reader matter. Benjamin Cariño, Dolores Endriga, Nelia Custodio, Liena Buenvenida, and Delia Alcalde prepared the book notes for this issue.

traces PUD's origins, demonstrates its effectiveness, determines the market it serves, and provides rough policy guidelines for communities choosing this type of development. A case study of the Twin Rivers PUD in East Windsor Township, New Jersey's first planned unit development, is included to show the impact of PUD on a local area.

G. N. Georgano, ed. **Transportation Through the Ages.** *New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,* 1972. 311 *pp.*

This book takes the reader to a journey through time as it relates the story of transportation and travel from prehistoric times to the present. With the aid of diagrams and pictures collected from various museums, the book traces and illustrates man's achievements in land, sea, and air transportation. Starting with the era of foot travel, the book follows man's progress in his effort for faster and easier geographic mobility, and concludes with an account of man's latest, and perhaps most phenomenal achievement in transportation: space flight.

Brian Goodall, **The Economics of Urban Areas.** *Great Britain: Pergamon Press,* 1972. 379 *pp.*

This book presents how general economic principles and analysis explain the internal structure and functioning of urban systems. The role of economic factors in understanding urban spatial dimension is particularly emphasized. A major portion of the book is devoted to a discussion of urban land-use patterns and urban location decisions in terms of the workings of economic forces. Such a discussion provides policy guidelines for urban and regional development planning.

The book is primarily designed for readers with little or practically no background in economics. It is preferably recommended as textbook for students of urban planning and urban studies of both undergraduate and graduate levels. Planners, economists, urban designers and practitioners of related fields will find a wide applicability of this book in their respective professions.

David Hamilton, **Technology, Man and the Environment.** *London: Faber and Faber, Ltd.,* 1973. 357 *pp.*

The book, in the author's own words, describes "the overall pattern of technology: what technology is, what its effects are on everyday life, and how it is changing our world, and the problems it brings" (p. 7). In more specific terms, Hamilton describes the benefits – and disbenefits – of technology in the various fields: medicine, transport, communications, production, etc. The author presents detailed information in support of his arguments for a reappraisal of the purposes of technological advance, and the need for its regulation and control. He then suggests a method by which such control and regulation might be carried out.

Lucien M. Hanks, **Rice and Man.** *Chicago, Illinois:* Aldine-Atherton, Inc. 1972. 173 *pp.*

In this book, Lucien M. Hanks, professor and author of numerous articles in anthropology, writes of Bang Chan, once a rice growing village north of Bangkok, to show what happens to the lives of farmers as they shift from one mode of cultivation to another. With an eye for detail, he portrays their everyday economic and social activities and situates these in the broader physical and cultural environment in which they occur. Adroitly juxtaposing the poetic and the practical, he captures the charm and candor of peasant life without breaking its relatedness to other parts of the ecosystem. Hank's approach affirms the basic unity in all forms of life, a truth every Thai knows at heart.

Michael Nelson. **The Development of Tropical Lands: Policy Issues in Latin America.** *Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press,* 1973. 306 *pp.*

A product of the joint program of research undertaken by the Instituto Latinamericano de Planifacacion Economica Y Social (ILPES) and the Resources for the Future, the study represents a comprehensive examination of the economic basis underlying investment policy for the development of new lands for forestry

and agriculture in Latin America. Through a detailed survey of twenty-four land development projects, the author attempts to sort out the principal issues involved, analyzes the main factors that have contributed to the success or failure of each, as well as identifies the discrepancies between actual results and the projected benefits of new-land development.

Peter Rossi and Walter Williams, eds. **Evaluating Social Programs: Theory, Practice, and Politics.** *New York:* Seminar Press, 1972. 326 *pp.*

This volume of selected essays written by leading social scientists is divided into four main parts. The first describes the organization of the book and defines the key concepts. The second and third parts deal with evaluative research in theory and practice. These sections raise and discuss conceptual, methodological, political, bureaucratic, and organizational problems and issues met in evaluative research. The last part looks into the roles of both government and social scientists in fostering high quality evaluative research.

Donald Eugene Smith, ed. **Religion, Politics and Social Change in the Third World: A Sourcebook.** *New York: The Free Press,* 1971. 286 *pp.*

A book of readings dealing with the intricate and dynamic relationships which link religion, politics and social change over a vast geographical area: South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America. Various aspects and characteristics of four religious systems which predominate in this vast area (Hinduism, Theravada Buddhism, Islam and Roman Catholicism) are examined, particularly as they relate to the development of the so-called Third World countries.

A useful bibliography of books and monographs at the end of the book directs the reader to the more important scholarly works on the different aspects of the subject.

Andrew Thorburn, **Planning Villages.** *London: The Estates Gazette Limited,* 1971, 154 *pp.*

As its title suggests, this book offers a methodology to those interested or involved in village planning. Andrew Thorburn likens a village to a garden, which must be "weeded and fertilized, the plants trimmed and trained, and yet allowed to grow in its own way." Just as gardens are beheld differently by their proprietors, so are villages. The varied views, sentiments, and values people attach to villages create no small difficulty in defining what a good village ought to be. Added to this is the village's own changing character, functions, and lifestyle. Thorburn thus cautions planners against the danger of generalizing from the particular while suggesting a probe into the composition of different villages using, say, age/class groups. While he admits that the multiplicity of functions villages try to serve virtually puts to naught all attempts at formulating a universally applicable solution to planning problems, he thinks this kind of study might be able to pin down some basic differences as well as similarities among villages from which planners can take off.

planning news

PLANNING NEWS

Graduate Program Up for Revision

Future enrollees at the IEP will enjoy more options for study under the proposed new curriculum hammered out during the Fourth IEP Faculty Workshop held at the Continuing Education Center, UP Los Baños, on September 14-15, 1974.

The revised system will offer two programs on a semestral, instead of the present trimestral, basis: 1) a two-year program leading to a master's degree in Urban and Regional Planning (MURP), with or without thesis; and 2) a one-year diploma course. This is designed to accommodate both the practitioners who can go on a study leave only for a year and the increasing number of young and college-fresh applicants with training in fields other than the preferred physical sciences, including the social sciences.

The new curriculum will take the problem-oriented approach in teaching; that is, it will consider all aspects of specific planning problems and activities. It was felt that the current aspectual division of studies fails to give a comprehensive view of the planning situation and that the new approach would remedy this deficiency.

It also provides for core subjects and areas for specialization and includes a system of correspondence of courses between the present and the proposed programs. Thus, the present batch of students may graduate under the old program by enrolling in the new courses.

The shift from "environmental" to regional and urban planning is the Institute's response to the growing emphasis of the Government on regional and urban development, which has increased the demand for urban and regional planners.

The proposal is under consideration by the Steering and Curriculum Committees of the University Administration.

IEP to Vancouver Conference on Human Settlements

The IEP has been nominated as a demonstration project of a training and research institute, in connection with the Philippine participation in *Habitat,* a UN conference-exposition on human settlements to be held in Vancouver, Canada, in mid-1976. As such, it is expected to present "innovative approaches to the problems of human settlements and possible solutions which might be taken up by the government facing the same difficulties."

In making the nomination, UP President Salvador P. Lopez cited IEP's role in human settlements planning in the country and in some other Asian countries, such as Korea and Thailand.

If accepted, the Institute will put up an exhibit tracing its progress since it began in 1968, according to Professor Gerardo S. Calabia, IEP Secretary.

The UN conference-exposition will serve as a forum for an international exchange of information on human settlements.

To Conduct First Special Course for Local Planners

The development staffs of thirteen pilot cities are participants in the first special course in urban planning to be conducted jointly by the Bureau of Community Development of the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD) and IEP, from October 21 to December 12, 1974.

This is intended to acquaint the local planning boards with the mechanics of preparing a framework plan. As part of their requirements, the participants will make one for their respective cities.

Prof. Tito C. Firmalino, seminar director, said the short course was an answer to the demand for planning specialists on the local level.

The participating cities are: Cabanatuan, Cavite, San Pablo, Iriga, Bacolod, Cebu, Tagbilaran, Tacloban, Zamboanga, Cagayan de Oro, Ozamis, General Santos, and Puerto Princesa.

New Planners '74

Nineteen MEP graduates joined the roster of the country's planners in 1974, bringing the total of IEP trainees to 101 since 1968. They are: Marilu M. Alferez, Benjamin A. Carandang, Eleanora M. de Guzman, Severo L. Ferreria, Lourdes F. Mencias, Nguyen Ba Quang, Nguyen Thien Nhon, Godofredo B. Olores, Felino A. Palafox, Jr., Saviniano M. Perez, Francisco C. Puzon, Jr., Eli M. Remolona, Alberto G. Reyes, Leonardo A. Tanseco, Wilhelmina V. Tecson, Camilo V. Tiqui, Jose Ramon L. Faustmann, Juan P. Nieva, and Ma. Cristina V. Turalba.

Prof. Portugal is Acting Dean

Prof. Ramon C. Portugal has been named Acting Dean of the IEP in the absence of Dean Leandro A. Viloria, who is on a stint as a WHO consultant at the Asian Center for Development Administration in Malaysia.

The Acting Dean, one of the pioneer faculty of the Institute, is concurrently the University's Vice-President for Administration.

He is an AB-English and LI.B. graduate of the UP, *cum laude,* and holds an MA in Public Administration from the University of Michigan and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Syracuse University.

Dr. Portugal, 54, has been serving in the University in different capacities since 1946. He also worked in Canada and the Sudan, Africa as personnel officer and public administration training expert, respectively, while serving with specialized agencies of the United Nations.

The Largest Batch Ever!

Indicative of a spreading planning consciousness is the upsurge in the IEP's enrollment for school year 1974-75. Sixty-one students, most of them below 30 years of age, registered at the beginning of the first trimester. Thirty-

three are studying full time. The highest figure reached before this year was 44 in 1971.

Because of the unprecedented increase in enrollment the IEP is now faced with the problems of student congestion and classroom shortage. A program of expansion of its facilities has therefore been started.

A New Name for the Institute

The Institute of Planning is now officially known as the Institute of Environmental Planning in a decision made by the UP Board of Regents on May 31.

PAPERS INVITED FOR INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON LOWER-COST HOUSING PROBLEMS

Clemson University and the International Association for Housing Science are jointly sponsoring an International Symposium on Lower-Cost Housing Problems to be held in Atlanta, Georgia, U.S.A. on May 24-28, 1976.

The symposium is a non-profit academic activity intended to generate interest in housing problems and to disseminate information on the different aspects of housing.

Nearly one hundred speakers from more than twenty countries are expected to deliver papers in the symposium. Topics of interest in lower-cost housing include: Systems Approach; Building Science; Housing Projects Around the World; Conventional and Industrialized Production; Energy Conservation and Expenditures; New Materials; Codes and Specifications; Innovative Construction Schemes; Financing; Land Development; Environmental and Public Health Considerations; Construction Safety; Maintenance and Management; Sociological and Psychological Factors; Legal Aspects; and Climatic Factors.

In this connection the organizers of the symposium would like to invite contributions from all interested parties. Persons who may be interested in presenting papers should submit, in triplicate, and by September 1, 1975 abstracts not exceeding five hundred words to:

Dr. Parviz Rad, Chairman
Papers Committee
IAHS International Symposium
Department of Civil Engineering
Clemson University
Clemson, South Carolina 29631
U.S.A.

All papers to be delivered will be reviewed by a committee of housing specialists.

For further information, address inquiries to:

Dr. Herbert Busching, Chairman
Organizing Committee
IAHS International Symposium — 1976
Department of Civil Engineering
Clemson University
Clemson, South Carolina 29631
U.S.A.

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