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TOWN PLANNING UNDER THE INTER-AGENCY LOCAL PLANNING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Ministry of Human Settlements*

PROJECT BACKGROUND

Efforts of the national government in the recent past were directed towards enhancing the administrative framework for the formulation and execution of policies and programs in support of the country's development priorities. To achieve this, emphasis was placed on the improvement of institutional mechanisms and processes, human resources development, the strengthening of linkages among various government agencies at the different administrative levels and on ensuring the active participation of the private sector in supporting priority programs and projects.

Within the scope of the effort to improve institutional mechanisms and processes, a program for strengthening the planning capability of government agencies, including corporate entities, was pursued, with a central planning agency providing direction and technical assistance in its implementation. Inter-agency coordination and collaboration was encouraged and corresponding institutional arrangements were effected through the pooling of resources and expertise of government agencies. Comprised within this planning capability building program were some 1,500 or so cities and municipalities throughout the country.


From 1975 through 1980, several programs were launched that sought to assist local government units in town planning activities by both government agencies and private organizations. But these were of limited coverage involving a few selected towns and cities. The first attempt at a massive nationwide coverage was launched in 1977 by the National Coordinating Council for Town Planning, Housing and Zoning (NCC-TPHZ).

Constituted under the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 511 in 1977, the NCC-TPHZ was composed of nine member agencies, namely: 1) the National Economic and Development Authority; 2) the Human Settlements Commission; 3) the National Housing Authority; 4) the Metro Manila Commission; and 5) the departments of Local Government and Community Development, National Defense, Natural Resources, Public Highways and Public Works, Transportation and Communications. Essentially, it sought the nationwide preparation of town plans and zoning ordinances. As carried out, the cities, regional and provincial capitals, and other major urban centers were targeted first, leaving the towns of lower order in the hierarchy of settlements as future targets.

During the same period, the concept of "techno-aides" was adopted. It involved the training and fielding of personnel (who served as planning assistants and community mobilizers) to the different regions for purposes of undertaking town planning and zoning activities. The concerted efforts of the member agencies of the NCC-TPHZ brought about the completion of 177 town plans by the end of 1977.

*This evaluation study was conducted by the U.P. Planning and Development Research Foundation for the Ministry of Human Settlements from February to July 1984.

EVALUATION OF INTERAGENCY LOCAL PLANNING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM:
SAMPLE MUNICIPALITIES



In July 1978, the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) was created by Presidential Decree No. 1396. The creation of the MHS placed town planning in the country on a firmer basis. Through the Letter of Instruction No. 729, the Ministry was directed to "prepare or cause to be prepared, land use plans and zoning implementation and enforcement guidelines for urban and urbanizable areas..." The Human Settlements Commission was reorganized into the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) charged with the responsibility of providing support to the town planning assistance effort. It was directed to field planning assistants initially to 329 third and fourth class target municipalities with the ultimate goal to have the plans of 1,548 towns and cities completed by 1983.

By virtue of their mandates, four other agencies had functions that substantially affected the preparation and implementation of plans at the local level. For instance, pursuant to the provisions of LOI No. 7, the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) was responsible for: 1) the development of public plans and programs on community development, including environmental planning; and 2) administering technical assistance programs to local governments in the formulation and implementation of development plans. The National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) was directed to undertake through the Regional Development Councils (RDCs) the following: 1) coordination of all planning and programming activities of all local governments; and 2) extension of planning and other related forms of technical assistance to local governments.

The Ministry of the Budget through P.D. No. 1375 (May 16, 1978) was vested with the responsibility to: 1) review, evaluate and take appropriate action on annual principal and supplemental budgets and other financial statements covering all funds of local governments, including the review and formulation of recommendations on resolutions of local legislative bodies involving appropriation of local funds; 2) examine and process the application of local governments for cash advances, and budgetary aids with respect to their budgetary implications; and 3) provide technical assistance to local governments in the preparation, authorization,

execution, and accountability phases of the budget process. The Ministry of Finance (MOF), by virtue of PD No. 477 (June 3, 1974) was given the responsibility to: 1) formulate and execute fiscal policies that could promote the financial stability and growth of local government; and 2) provide local governments with policy guidelines in the preparation and adoption of sound financial plans and adopt and enforce the necessary measures that will improve local treasury operations and foster effective financial management at the local level.

As a means by which the above-mentioned agencies could integrate their efforts and promote resource-sharing, particularly in town planning and zoning, the Inter-Agency Local Planning Assistance Program was launched on July 13, 1980. The main objective was to extend technical assistance to local governments in upgrading their capabilities in town planning. A memorandum of agreement was signed by the five national agencies (NEDA, MHS, OBM, MOF and MLG) providing for the cooperating agencies to pool their resources as well as technical expertise, and synchronizing their respective programs affecting town planning and zoning. A national inter-agency technical committee was created to serve as the coordinating body responsible for the formulation of guidelines and procedures involved in the preparation, review and approval of town plans and zoning ordinances.

The Program had targeted the completion of 300 town plans per year, or a total of 900 town plans by the end of 1983. As of December 1983, a total of 1,168 municipalities had availed of the government assistance to local government units in the preparation of town plans and zoning ordinances. Of this number, 159 received assistance under the NCC-TPHZ (1977-1979), 347 under the HSRC program (1980) and 662 under the Inter-Agency Town Planning Assistance Program (IATPAP). Obviously, the output for the last program indicated underperformance and it became necessary to determine the reasons behind its failure to meet the target. An evaluation of the program was undertaken from February to July 1984. The MHS financed the project which was conducted by the Planning and Development Research Foundation, Inc. (PLANADES).

Evaluation Approach and Methodology

The evaluation project identified three levels or areas to be investigated: the policy level, process level and product level. A number of questions were raised concerning decisions on policies. How far were policies adhered to in cases of conflict? How much consideration was given to local values and initiative? Were there changes in policies in response to local pressures? Did the Inter-agency Committee commit adequate funds in support of the program?

At the process level, the analysis centered on the mechanism and mechanics of delivering the program to its intended clients. Various organizations and institutions at the regional, provincial and municipal levels that were designated to carry out the implementation of the Program were studied to evaluate their administrative and technical capability. An appraisal was made of the planning capability of the municipal personnel, who were charged with the duty of drafting the municipal development plans and the zoning ordinances.

Development plans and zoning ordinances of selected target towns were evaluated at the product level. Plan review, however, was limited to those aspects which could shed light on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the technical assistance received. Investigated were the results of technology transfer as manifested in the completed plans and the planning capability of the municipal planners as a result of the training obtained by them from the planning assistance teams.

The study started in February 1984 with several teams fielded in the twelve regions to conduct interviews of key informants at the regional and municipal levels. The respondents at the regional level consisted of the Chairman of the Regional Coordinating Council (a counterpart of the National Inter-agency Technical Committee), the HSRC regional technical coordinator, the NEDA regional executive director and the members of the regional technical review committee, a body that reviewed the municipal plans of target municipalities.

Interviewed at the municipal level were municipal mayors and municipal development coordinators of selected municipalities. There were three sample towns in each region or a total of 36 towns.

In addition to interviewing informants, important documents were collected and studied. Among them were laws, agreements, policies and guidelines issued at the onset and during the effectivity of the Program.

SURVEY FINDINGS

A. The Program as Implemented

1. Organizational Framework

The implementation of the Town Planning Assistance Program at the regional level required the existence of organizations that could oversee the execution of policies and the carrying out of activities designed to achieve program objectives. There were two such organizations charged with the duties of overseeing proper implementation of the Program. These were the Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) a counterpart of the National Coordinating Council (NCC), and the Regional Technical Review Committee (RTRC). The RCC was vested with the following functions: a) manage and implement the Program in the regions based on the policies and directives emanating from the NCC; b) coordinate local planning assistance and review activities; c) monitor the progress of the program; and d) submit for indorsement to the Regional Development Council (RDC) the town plans of the cities/municipalities within the region. The survey showed that these functions devolved almost entirely on the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) and on the RTRC since the RCCs were preoccupied with other activities.

The Regional Technical Committee (RTC) which was also interagency in composition was assigned the task of reviewing the town plans before these were adopted by the respective municipal legislative bodies. Most RTRC members were found to have some training in town planning or in allied fields. The Provincial Development Coordinator of a province participated in the review if the plans being reviewed belonged to the municipalities of his province.

Planning activities at the municipal level were carried on by the Municipal Development Staff (MDS) headed by the Municipal Development Coordinator (MDC). Often, the MDS was a one-man organization. In some

cases, the MDC had a clerical assistant and during the period of plan preparation his staff was augmented by contractual workers or by personnel on detail from other offices. Most of the towns surveyed had their MDS formed even before 1981.

The HSRC regional office had a representative assigned to each town to assist in the preparation of the town plan. Each planning assistant, however, had to cover more than one town and the number depended on the accessibility of the towns from the regional capital.

2. Pre-Planning Stage

Targeting of the towns for assistance generally was a decision done in Manila. However, changes in the choice of the towns were allowed using the following criteria:

- a. Growth potential, based on population trends, topography, presence of roads, and favorable characteristics of the site.
- b. Location of major national development projects.
- c. Adjacent municipality of urbanizable areas.
- d. Integrated area boundaries.
- e. Receptivity of the mayor and willingness of the local government unit to shoulder expenses as reflected in the Sangguniang Bayan resolution.
- f. Presence of a municipal development staff as provided by Memo Circular 76-110 of the Ministry of Local Governments.

The signing of the Memorandum of Agreement between the HSRC and the local government unit signaled the official start of the assistance program for a specific municipality. Since most of the municipalities covered in the survey belonged to the lower income classes, the amount appropriated by the individual municipal government as counterpart fund rarely exceeded ₱10,000.

Majority of the town planners interviewed had attended training courses and seminars in town planning. Nearly fifty percent of them had their training even before the launching of the program. But their training was considered inadequate by the RTRC members who attributed the defects of the plans reviewed to the lack of planning skills of many of the town planners.

3. Town Plan Preparation

Preparation of the plans in the municipalities surveyed was generally the job of the MDS supported by the technical assistants sent by the HSRC regional office. The town planners in the interviews claimed that they acted either as coordinator of the project or coordinator of the data collection activity. A few resented the fact that they merely acted as assistants to the HSRC representatives who did most of the work in town planning.

In most cases, the personnel of national agencies in the field participated in the planning process by furnishing statistical information and office reports and by discussing with the planning staff and town officials the problems and needs of the different sectors. Occasionally, barangay captains were present in the workshop to discuss the problems in their villages. The HSRC technical assistants provided the main ideas concerning methods and techniques. The NEDA regional office and the PDS extended assistance although of a limited scale. The municipal officials played consultative role at certain stages of the process.

The forms of assistance made available by collaborating agencies consisted of: training the municipal planning personnel; issuing planning guidelines and other literature; and assigning HSRC technical assistants to the municipalities. No cash assistance was extended. The mayors expressed satisfaction over the assistance given. As to the involvement of the personnel of collaborating agencies, the MHS/HSRC was perceived to have provided the greatest assistance.

In the sharing of responsibility, the HSRC planning assistants performed the more difficult tasks of plan-making such as: "goal formulation," "drafting the sectoral and land use plans and the zoning ordinance," "map making," and "writing of the report." The town planners organized the municipal staff to collect important data and reports and held public hearings on the draft plan. Preparation of the local development investment program was a responsibility assigned to the town planners.

Guidelines for the preparation of the plans were availed of completely by the planners except at the stage when the LDIP was drafted. Town mayors in one third of the sample municipalities considered their old

plans in the preparation of the recent one. One mayor reported that the old plan of his town was already obsolete and it was necessary to collect new data and generate new development concepts. Most of the old plans were products of the development technical assistance program of MLG.

Of the several causes of delay in the completion of the town plans, the "lack of appropriate data" was the most common among the municipalities studied. The other reasons for the delay were: a) incompetence of the local planning staff; b) narrow-mindedness of vested interest groups; c) lack of enthusiasm among local officials; d) financial constraints; e) inaccessibility of the municipality; and f) inadequacy of personnel.

"Attendance in public hearings" was the only significant activity that one might categorize as citizen involvement in planning. Perhaps, the citizens were not interested in the other aspects of the planning process. Twenty eight (or 82 percent) of the planners interviewed reported active participation of the citizens in public hearings. The citizens were concerned about the effects of projects and of the land use scheme upon their property.

4. Technical Review of the Town Plans

a. Regional Level

The job of reviewing the town plans at the regional level belonged to the RTRC, the membership of which as stated earlier consisted of the five coordinating agencies (MHS/HSRC, MLG, NEDA, MOF and OBM). The RTRC members viewed their role as representatives of their individual agency, checking parts of the plan which were most relevant to the functions of their agency. For example, the NEDA representative would be interested in the convergence of local projects or proposals with the regional plans, that in the formulation of municipal development objectives, the municipal planner should have taken into account the demographic, economic and physical characteristics of the region. The MLG member would stress in his review the effectiveness of the local mechanism for carrying out the implementa-

tion of the plan. The MOF and the OBM members would examine the fiscal policies, financial resources and budget-making aspects of the plan. Finally, the one from HSRC was expected to scrutinize the land use scheme and the development control measures proposed.

Completed plans were reproduced in limited copies, by the HSRC office, to be distributed to the RTRC members. A date was chosen for the review activity. The RTC attended to all the problems and issues concerning the review procedure.

Variations in the review procedure occurred. One approach was for each of the RTRC member to receive a copy of the town plan, and after reading it, wrote his/her comments on a prescribed form which was submitted to the Chairman of the review committee. Another approach was to discuss the individual criticism of the plan in a review session, with all RTRC members attending. The local officials were often invited to the session and would take note of the suggested changes in the plan.

The provincial development coordinators interviewed were less articulate about their role in the review. This fact was shown in the variation of the answers given. Some of the more typical answers were:

- *"looked at the development thrusts of the town"
- *"provided data for the municipalities"
- *"checked consistency of the town plans with the provincial plan"
- *"provided technical assistance"
- *"protected the interests of the municipalities"
- *"coordinated for the HSRC activities within the province"

Most RTRC members favored the review procedure they adopted because, according to them, it was convenient to each one who had other tasks to be done. In assessing the plan, each member had a specific area to focus on.

A great majority of the RTRC members claimed that the planning guidelines given by the HSRC were useful. More members, however, believed that strict compliance of the guidelines was not necessary. So, deviations from the guidelines were allowed, especially if justified by the objectives of the plan as well as by the prevailing situation. One criticism of the guidelines was that they did not take into consideration culture differences—their applicability in rural environments. Responses of the RTCs concerning the guidelines did not differ substantially from those of the RTRC members.

Most plans passed the review, although quite a number were returned to the town planning coordinators for improvement. The more common defects found were: 1) proposed programs and projects were not consistent with standards, defined objectives, and established priorities; 2) insufficient data to support the plan and some maps were poorly made; and 3) haphazard analysis of problems as evidenced by unrealistic assumptions, listing of irrelevant projects, and defective land use plan.

Respondents from the regions generally favored the continuance of the technical review requirement and advanced the following reasons for their stand: 1) consistency of the town plans with the the regional plan including priorities can be checked; 2) competent personnel to review the plans are available at the regional level; 3) review at the regional level is preferable to one at the national level because plan defects can be corrected faster; and 4) vital information needed can be provided easily by the regional offices of national agencies.

Transferring the review requirement from the region to the province was objected to by the RTCs and the RTRC respondents. The arguments against such move were: 1) lack of expertise at the provincial level; and 2) the NEDA and the HSRC have no provincial offices. A slightly higher percentage of the provincial development coordina-

tors endorsed the idea citing the following advantages: 1) the PDC is in a better position to review municipal plans; 2) the review committee can easily conduct ocular inspection of the municipality; and 3) closer relationship exists between the province and the municipalities.

b. National Level

Municipal plans which passed the review at the regional level were reproduced and forwarded to the HSRC central office for final review and confirmation. Checked at the national level review were the land use requirements to meet development programs and projects and the environmental and geographical implications of the proposed plans and policies. The technical reviewers at the HSRC central office, however, were quite slow in performing their function as some town officials at the time of the survey were still awaiting the confirmation of their town plan after one year of submission.

5. Plan Implementation

Only two aspects of plan implementation were covered: the preparation of the Local Development Investment Program (LDIP) and the issuance of locational clearance in connection with applications for land development by land owners and developers. The mayors were asked to identify local projects listed in their LDIP—which were funded, started, or scheduled for implementation. Numerous projects were cited such as construction and widening of municipal streets, improvement of public markets, rehabilitation of government buildings such as the municipal building and the barangay hall, and operation of slaughterhouses and management of irrigation systems. The town planners in confirming the mayors' statements about the municipal projects said that the LDIP was in fact the basis of their infrastructure budget. However, it was difficult during the interviews to determine whether the LDIPs were derived from the municipal development plans.

Most town planners interviewed said that they issued locational clearances to land developers to allow developments that con-

formed with their zoning ordinance. In some municipalities, the HSRC regional office took action on the applications for locational clearance.

One significant finding about the MDS was that a sizeable number of the town planners (71% of those interviewed) believed that their staff lacked the capability to implement their town plan. The needed skills were in the fields of: drafting, engineering (civil), statistics, development economics, administration, project analysis and research.

As regards the financial resources of the municipalities, the mayors cited the measures they had undertaken to increase local revenues. The most common measures adopted were as follows:

- 1) intensified tax collection;
- 2) increased municipal fees and charges;
- 3) implemented tax mapping project;
- 4) imposed new tax ordinances; and
- 5) sought assistance from the National government

B. Comments on the Program

Various groups commented favorably on the Town Planning Assistance Program. The mayors admitted that the towns benefited much from the Program. The benefits frequently mentioned were: 1) the municipality now has a plan which can provide direction for its development; and 2) the people have become aware of the importance of planning.

Those interviewed at the regional level echoed the comments of the municipal mayors on the growing awareness of the people on the value of planning. It was also observed that the planning personnel of the municipalities have gained skills in plan formulation while the cooperating agencies (which implemented the Program) have learned to work together.

There was consensus on the suggestion to continue the Program. However, important steps were recommended for action to improve the implementation of the Program. Some of the recommendations were: 1) to strengthen the skills of the planning staff of each town through adequate training; 2) to achieve greater coordination among participating agencies by sharing the cost and by clarifying the role of each; and 3) to improve certain administrative matters such as the

review procedure, public hearings and the release of funds.

C. Obstacles to the Full Attainment of Program Objectives

1. Problems of National Significance

Foremost among these problems is the flaw in the interagency set-up which precluded somewhat the smooth interagency coordination. For instance, in the preparation of the town plans, only the HSRC technical assistants were in the forefront of all planning activities. Complaints were aired that some RTRC members were not informed of the schedule of activities related to town planning. The HSRC personnel charged that other member agencies gave the Program a low priority.

Another problem that might be mentioned is the system of plan review which is highly centralized. The review and confirmation of town plans by the HSRC central office appear to be unnecessary. The requirement of a national review adds one more tier in decision-making which can certainly cause delay in the implementation of the town plans. It was not unusual for the officials of a municipality to wait for about a year for the approval of their municipal development plan. The items to be checked by the technical reviewers at the national level were matters that could be adequately attended to at the regional level.

The selection of the target towns was another area which did not require central authority decision. The RCC is capable of performing this particular job.

Again, the emphasis of the Program was on the production of plans. Every town had to meet the deadline of completing the plan even to the extent of having the plan written by the HSRC technical assistants (coming from the regional capital) who might be unfamiliar with local values and aspirations. The objective of institutionalizing planning or transferring technology is lost or becomes harder to achieve.

2. Problems of Local Significance

These problems are purely local in nature and can be resolved without action at the ministerial level. They are considered unique

to certain municipalities or regions and do not require changes in policies.

One problem which might be placed under this category is the inadequacy of the local planning personnel to undertake planning activities including the implementation of plans. Either the MDS is miserably understaffed or the planner lacks sufficient skills. As stated earlier, the RTRC members cited as one of the causes of the delay in plan preparation, the lack of planning capability of the municipal planning staff.

Of course, the municipalities included in the field survey were mostly of the lower income classes and, therefore, had limited revenues to spare for the hiring of additional planning personnel. For lack of personnel, the planner had to perform other tasks unrelated to planning.

Some RTCs complained of the lukewarm attitude of local officials toward town planning. The mayors were disinterested and uncooperative. There were also reports of local squabbles among vested interest groups. However, this problem seemed to have been confined to a few municipalities.

A more common problem among municipalities studied was the lack or insufficiency of data collected for planning purposes. This problem caused the delay in the formulation of plans. Cooperation of the national agencies with branches at the municipal level was often sought in the gathering of secondary data. Generally, the heads of these branches (of national agencies) participated in workshops where they assisted in the formulation of sectoral plans. The NEDA regional office sometimes furnishes the missing data.

As observed, the involvement of the citizens in the planning process was limited to attendance in public hearings on the completed draft of the plan. This type of participation resembles what western planners call "tokenism", or "placation" making the citizens feel that they have a part in plan-making.

A very serious problem that affected the quality of the review of plans at the regional level was the relatively short time given to the RTRC members to read the drafts. There was very little time to read the drafts because these were made available only shortly before the review. Since the municipalities had to shoulder the cost of reproducing the

plans, and with very meager fund allocated for this purpose, the distribution of the copies of the plans had adversely been affected.

The study showed that no cash assistance was extended to the municipalities. Perhaps cash assistance should be available for the reproduction of plans to facilitate the review procedure.

ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF FINDINGS

Impact of the Program on Attainment of Objectives

The objectives of the program as stated in the Manual of Operations (Sec. 2.0, p. 6) which are culled from the Memorandum of Agreement between the participating agencies are vague and unclear.

There is an apparent mix-up of final and instrumental objectives, of ends and means. At any rate, a close perusal of program documents would indicate the following dominant themes, which could be taken as the objectives of the program:

- a. the transfer of planning technology from higher to lower levels;
- b. institutionalization of the planning process at the municipal level;
- c. coordination among cooperating agencies (horizontal) and between these agencies and local governments (vertical);
- d. the preparation of town plans with improved quality;
- e. to ease the financial burden of local governments through cost-sharing arrangements; and
- f. to promote citizen participation in the town planning process.

Admittedly, these objectives do not lend themselves to easy quantification. Hence, the survey instrument used, namely, the semi-structured interview schedule has been adopted to deal with this difficulty.

1. *Technology Transfer*

There are two levels at which the transfer of planning technology can be evaluated: national-regional and regional-municipal. The vehicles for effecting such transfer are the seminar-workshops, planning guidelines, and the actual town planning exercise.

At the national-regional level, it can be asserted that the regional technical staff of HSRC seemed to have benefited most in terms of planning skills acquired. This can be deduced from the observation that more and more, the responsibility of assisting towns has shifted to the HSRC. At the onset of the program, the composition of the planning assistance teams (PATs) was invariably inter-agency. However, at the time of this evaluation (three years later), the membership of the PATs if they were still existent, was confined to members of the HSRC regional technical staff.

This trend seems to have reached its extreme in the case of one region. At the time of the visit, the TPAP was being carried out by MHS and HSRC only. Each of these agencies has organized a PAT and is assisting a set of target towns. The plan review is done as well by these two agencies by merely exchanging and cross-checking the plans they have prepared.

For sure, representatives from the other participating agencies have benefited to a certain extent from their attendance in various regional seminars and workshops conducted in connection with the program. But their failure to sustain their involvement in all stages of the planning process, particularly in plan preparation, has limited their opportunity to reinforce their knowledge through actual experience.

Obviously, the most effective vehicle of technology transfer is the practical exercise which exposes the participants to actual situations. This is facilitated by the availability of planning guidelines and space allocation standards also developed by HSRC. In fact, the members of HSRC regional technical staff have become so adept at using the guidelines that they are largely instrumental in the prompt completion of most town plans.

The application of planning guidelines and standards is not without inherent dangers though. For one, it has reduced planning to a replicable technique which, after repeated applications, becomes "smooth and easy." This is only partly true. The other facet of the truth is that planning skills cannot be entirely taught. Analytical thinking, creativity and innovativeness which are requisite attributes of a planner cannot be lectured in a

seminar nor developed under conditions of haste (concern for targets and deadlines). These attributes of the planner are rather "caught" after long years of exposure to challenging situation but not necessarily under the pressure of trying to meet quantitative targets. At best, the program has given rise to a cadre of planning technicians, not planners in the strict sense of the term.

The "planners" at the regional level may be forgiven their technician's approach to town planning. After all they are not expected to stay long in the towns. Their over-riding concern is the production of the plan document within the target period. To stay over extended periods of time in the assisted town, though necessary, would only delay the completion of the project. Consequently, the technology that they acquire consists mainly of the ability to apply data analysis and projection techniques and to adopt a limited number of development concepts and strategies which sometimes do not fit local conditions. This can be inferred from the stereotyped town plans produced as exemplified by the penchant for adopting the "nodal growth point" development strategy and the "circumferential-radial" urban morphology, to cite only the glaring examples.

Finally, whatever expertise the program participants at the regional level may have acquired cannot be entirely attributed to the program. The majority were found to have participated in similar activities under previous assistance programs (such as the NCC-TPHZ and the HSRC town planning assistance programs). Quite a few had been involved in the much earlier program of the then DLGCD—the Direct Technical Assistance Program. Most of the RTRC members have had to rely on their stock knowledge derived from previous experience.

At the municipal level, the nature of technology transfer and the extent to which this has been carried on are more difficult to determine. This is because the responsibility for producing the final output is shared by the local counterpart staff and the Planning Assistance Team (usually HSRC technical staff). Data gathering is admittedly the major contribution of the local staff but the analysis and projection of growth is invariably a joint undertaking. The same is true with

other activities in the plan preparation process. But since, generally, the PAT has assumed the responsibility of producing maps and writing and editing of plan report, it is difficult to assess the extent and quality of participation of local counterparts. In extreme cases, plans are prepared right in the regional offices of HSRC or MHS ostensibly to speed up the process to be able to meet targets. This arrangement, no doubt brings down local participation to its minimum. In such cases where the local staffs are mere suppliers of data, there is hardly any technology transfer to speak of.

The experience of Region XII may be cited as atypical. The 45-day live-in seminar-workshop which only this region conducted may have had a far-reaching impact on technology transfer. Being placed in the company of like-minded individuals over an extended period of time in an atmosphere that promoted consultation and competition, the local participants could have undoubtedly learned much from the experience. More than the obvious benefit of completing the target number of plans within a short period of time, this novel approach did make sure that the plans were prepared by the local participants themselves. Why the approach was not repeated in subsequent years or replicated in other regions is, however, a little surprising.

If there is any sector that deserves the maximum benefit of technology transfer it must be the local planning staff. In this respect, unfortunately, the program as carried out has left much to be desired.

Finally, a sizeable proportion of the town planners (44%) interviewed reported having attended planning-related seminars before 1981. To such an extent, the present program cannot claim complete credit for whatever planning skills local technical staff may have acquired.

2. Institutionalization of Planning

Any program of assistance must have as a hidden objective the eventual elimination of the need for such assistance. This assumes that, over time, the assisted party should be able to acquire the capability to undertake the same set of activities on their own or with the minimum of outside help.

This can happen only when the technology acquired is so thoroughly imbibed by the learner as to become, as it were, second nature to him. In addition, the structures and mechanisms for the continuous application of the technology acquired should be firmly established. Above all, the personnel who man the structures do not only possess the requisite preparation but are also assured relatively permanent tenure to see to the repeated application of the technology learned.

Against the foregoing criteria the present program is found wanting. It is interesting to note that those who conceptualized this program have a rather restrictive view of institutionalization. In their view, institutionalization follows automatically from technology transfer as this passage from one program document attests:

"With the provision of direct technical assistance, it is expected that the local staffs will learn planning methodologies and will acquire the opportunity to sharpen their planning skills while on the job, thus institutionalizing planning at the local level." (Manual of Operations for Local Planning Assistance on Town Planning and Zoning, Vol. I, p. 7).

Granting for the sake of argument that institutionalization proceeds automatically from technology transfer, the fact that the program did not fare very well in imparting planning skills at the local level, as already noted earlier, it could not have done any better towards making planning an established practice at this level. The relatively minor role that the local staffs have had to play in the plan preparation process and the great stress given to the production of the plan document are not sufficient an opportunity to "sharpen"—not to say imbibe as second nature—whatever planning skills they may have acquired.

The existence of a more or less permanent planning staff in the municipality is another condition necessary to achieve the institutionalization of planning. It is perhaps a good fortune, though not to the credit of the program, that the Municipal Development Staffs had earlier been created through administrative issuances by MLGCD and, lately, by the enactment of the Local Govern-

ment Code. It became quite easy for the program to identify the local counterpart staff of the Planning Assistance Teams. Indeed, a good 75 percent of the sample target towns had already existing MDS at the launching of the town planning assistance program. However, the so-called MDS is, in most cases, a one-man staff consisting of the Municipal Development Coordinator. In some instances the MDC is assisted by no other technical personnel but only a clerk-typist. For purposes of the planning project, therefore, the target municipality simply hired a number of personnel on a short-term and temporary basis or else "borrowed" some employees from other agencies. After the project was completed the staff disbanded, leaving behind the MDC who is just about the only one on the staff with a permanent appointment.

Small wonder therefore that a high 71 percent of MDCs interviewed felt their MDS was not capable of undertaking the follow-through activities such as project development, land use controls, and monitoring necessary to implement their plans. Understandably, they have expressed the need for hiring on permanent basis—additional technical personnel on the staff notably engineers or draftsmen, economists or statisticians, and zoning administrators. These positions or their equivalent were existing vacancies in the local government plantilla but they remained unfilled due to unavailability of qualified persons or to the inability of the local government unit to pay competitive salaries for these scarce skills.

For all its noble intentions and laudable efforts the NITC-TPAP has barely scratched the surface of such a formidable objective as institutionalization of planning at the local level.

Finally, how much consideration does the program give to making planning an established routine in local governments? Is there an effort to make the town plan a useful tool for local decision making? Does the assistance extended to municipalities cover at least a complete cycle of planning-implementation-replanning, spanning possibly a number of years in order for the local planners and implementors to appreciate planning as a dynamic continuous process?

It is unfortunate that the program had to be confined to assisting municipalities pro-

duce their plan documents. And when the document has been approved, the town is left on its own. More often than not, the town plan ends up as just an additional volume that adorns the local executive's shelves.

To be sure, the HSRC—outside of the inter-agency arrangement—continues to assist the towns by training and deputizing zoning administrators. Through the HSRC's system of locational clearance and a nationwide network of compliance monitoring, land use regulation down to the municipal level is now more or less firmly established.

A similar action has yet to be taken by the other cooperating agencies either within or outside the framework of the program. In project development for instance, NEDA and MOF ought to be more actively involved, this subject area being the acknowledged strength of these two agencies. For its part, the OBM ought to teach local politicians to abide by the priorities set in the LDFIP, or else how to set such priorities based on both sound technical criteria and political acceptability, a task made easier if MLG trains local executives on development administration.

To repeat, the NITC-TPAP missed out this opportunity by limiting the assistance to town plans production only.

3. Inter-Agency Coordination

One of the instrumental objectives of the program is the setting up of an "inter-agency coordinative mechanism (to) enable participating agencies to pool together resources in terms of manpower, logistics and funds ... in assisting the local planning staffs."

This coordinative mechanism comes in the form of a national coordinating council composed of representatives of MHS, NEDA, MLG, MOF and OBM. The national council is replicated at the regional level and in each level, the council is backstopped by a technical committee which also draws membership from the five agencies. The council formulates the policies, lays down the procedures, oversees the implementation and monitors the progress of the program. Another inter-agency body at the regional level has the sole responsibility of making technical review of all completed town plans.

The original intention of the program is for all participating agencies to assist in concert each target town. The rationale for this

arrangement is that each agency has something substantial to contribute in particular aspects of the town plan. No single agency possesses all the requisite expertise in undertaking a decidedly multi-disciplinary activity. Hence, the participating agencies are expected to cooperate with each other, complementing each other's efforts to maximize the effectiveness of their combined assistance to local governments. The same inter-agency arrangement is to be maintained in all phases of the town planning process.

The mechanism turned out to be a perfectly symmetrical machine that couldn't work, or at least, could work only at the top-most level. If the inter-agency "pool of resources" ever took place at the regional and local levels this occurred only in selected phases of the planning process notably the conduct of the public hearing and the technical review of completed town plans.

Attempts to get all participating agencies involved in town plan preparation were made at the early stage of the program. Records showed the inter-agency composition of the first Planning Assistance Teams that were organized to assist local planning staffs. All the team members, however, with the exception of those from the MHS/HSRC have built-in handicap and that is, that they are doing this on top of their regular agency functions. Oftentimes, the demands of the program come in conflict with those of their own agencies and it is easy to see where their greater loyalty lies. Moreover, the resources of their agencies are not fully committed to their support since expenditures incurred in such activities are not provided for in their own operating budgets in the first place.

In no time, therefore, the representation of these agencies in the PAT became increasingly scarce, leaving only MHS/HSRC personnel to do the work. At the time of the survey it was found out that the HSRC regional technical staff had been unilaterally assisting target towns for some time. Except for the technical review process at the region, the inter-agency arrangement has virtually disappeared. In at least one region visited, the inter-agency mechanism has been completely dismantled.

This explains the near-unanimous (10 out

of 12) assertion of Regional Technical Coordinators of HSRC that their agency *actually* has assumed the major role in all aspects of the program with the rest playing only a minor role. In one region visited, the MHS/HSRC informants were prepared to assume full responsibility for town planning assistance.

This last remark raises a fundamental question: Is the inter-agency arrangement all that necessary? The answer, apparently is Yes and No.

If the laudable objective of the program as originally conceived, is to build local capability and institutionalize the planning process at the municipal level, then the inter-agency arrangement would indeed be an effective vehicle for attaining such an objective. For each agency definitely has specific contributions to make not so much in the process of coming up with plans as in actualizing them. As already discussed in the previous section, the opportunity for inter-agency cooperation is greater at the stage of plan implementation and less at the plan preparation phase. Necessarily, the program of assistance to a local government unit must extend over a period of several years to drive home the point that the planning process is by nature continuous and multidisciplinary in approach.

The program as carried out, unfortunately, took the shorter route. By limiting the program of assistance to the preparation of town plans—a particular expertise of HSRC—the participation of other agencies has been rendered superfluous. In fact, records show that in 1980, when HSRC was single-handedly assisting towns, a total of 347 town plans were completed in contrast to the 220 average yearly output under the inter-agency arrangement.

Another dimension of inter-agency coordination that the program hopes to achieve is that between the five agencies on one hand, and the local governments on the other. That this objective was not attained is pretty obvious considering that the local planning staffs saw only the HSRC representative most of the time. Perhaps, the only chance the local staffs had to meet an inter-agency group was during the conduct of public hearings or the review of town plans.

4. *Bigger Number and Higher Quality of Town Plans*

This is probably the greatest achievement that the program may be credited for. Although short of the original target of 300 town plans a year, an annual production of 220 on the average and an average increase of 10 percent is, by any stretch of the imagination, remarkable.

In quantitative terms, the program has completed more town plans in three years than the combined output of all assistance programs prior to and including the year 1980. As of December 31, 1983 full 75 percent of all towns and cities in the country had completed town plans. Of this completed plans, more than half (56%) can be credited to the present program. At this writing (mid-1984) nearly all the remaining towns will have been extended assistance.

This remarkable performance can be traced to the increasingly improved skills of the HSRC technical staff aided by the planning guidelines, the adoption of certain procedural short-cuts, and the generally enthusiastic support of local executives conditioned by their varying perception of the value of the town plan. Some respondents claimed that local executives wanted their plans completed quickly due to their desire to cut down on cost. Others saw their town plans as an instrument for facilitating the release of sought-after funds from the national government. Those who perceived otherwise were generally less cooperative.

The program also aims to produce better quality town plans in the sense of being more aligned with regional thrusts and national priorities. This is the main rationale behind the inter-agency technical review at the regional level. This also explains the use of standardized format and as far as practicable, content.

One way of assuring quality is through customer satisfaction, as it were. Local executives and town planners were asked whether they were satisfied with the quality of the plan document they have been assisted to produce. The answer was almost unanimously in the affirmative. This is understandable since most of them reflect the sheer excitement of having produced a plan for their town for the first time.

Regional informants, who have a longer exposure to planning, however, have expressed certain reservations. While conceding a number of additional features introduced in the present crop of plans which were absent in previous plans like the land use plan, zoning ordinance, and the LDIP, these regional respondents are not quick to look at them as improvements. Some informants viewed the present crop of plans as overly concerned about land use and the physical aspect of development. Others looked at the so-called LDIP as a mere "shopping list" of programs and projects, often assembled without regard for the actual resources and constraints available.

The researchers, after a content analysis of the town plans of the sample target towns, agree in general with the views of the informants. Other findings on the form and content of the town plans are discussed below:

a) *Standardized Format*

It is perhaps to the credit of the program, due to the widespread use of the town planning guidelines and the well-established review procedure, that town plans are now presented in standard format. Invariably, the first part of the report presents the profile of the town and the second part, the plan or more appropriately the plans of the land use, social and economic sectors. In some cases the two major implementation instruments, zoning ordinance and LDIP, form part of the plan. In others, these (the zoning ordinance mostly) are presented in another volume; the guiding principle, it seems, is that the thickness must be manageable. Maps, too, are generally well-prepared reflecting not only technical competence but also a familiarity with accepted cartographic symbols and color codes by those responsible in map-making.

b) *Stereotyped approach*

One inherent weakness of standardization is that it does not allow much room for individual differences. And yet every planning area has its own distinctive features which demand particular attention and approach. This is possible only if the planners in a

particular town devote much more time to understanding thoroughly their planning area than they have done so far. Almost without exception, all town plans evaluated suffer from a serious lack of analysis of the environment being planned.

Another factor contributing to stereotyped outputs is the minimal—if not complete absence of—involvement of the townspeople in the planning process. What often pass for development objectives of a municipality are not derived from the local citizens' aspirations but from the technocrats' perception. Consequently, the proposed plans and programs are largely the latter's prescription.

Nowhere is the foregoing observation more glaringly shown than in two aspects of the town plans: 1) the concept of physical development; and 2) the zoning ordinance. There seems to be a widespread fascination for the nodal growth point concept and the radial-circumferential urban form appears to be everybody's favorite. In fact, one plan confused the radial for the circumferential and it managed to get through plan review at all levels. The soundness of the nodal concept cannot be faulted, to be sure. For indeed in each municipality there are a number of barangays that perform certain central functions. Hence, they must be strengthened to ensure equitable access to services. And the radial-circumferential network being by far the most efficient, further enhances accessibility.

The problem lies in the failure of the zoning ordinance to respond to the desired physical development concept. Zoning ordinances carry a standard text. Only the delineation of use districts varies from town to town. Such use districts are delineated only in the poblacion; no such detailed zoning is attempted in barangays that are identified in growth points. The use regulations within these growth centers follow generally those for the non-urban area. These regulations are too general to serve as effective guidelines for the

management of the nature, intensity and location of development in the growth barangays.

The same stereotyped approach also pervades the sectoral plans. Some proposals do not quite address themselves to the real problems of the particular sector. For example, the plan for a southern town that had been seriously depopulated as a result of the long-running dissidence problem pushes vigorously for the adoption of the government's family planning program.

c) *Surfeit of unused data*

Almost to a man, respondents identified scarcity of data as one of the more outstanding problems encountered in the course of the town planning exercise. Yet, if one goes over the texts of the plan reports, he will get the impression that there is no lack of data. In fact, there appears to be an abundance of information that have little or no use at all. Obvious example: The history of the town is usually long and detailed maybe because this is readily available in town fiesta souvenir programs. Lengthy reference to local history acquires justification only if insights and perspectives gained from the past are brought to bear on the solutions to present and future problems. Unfortunately, the information on local history is hardly made use of in the plan report.

Another example is climatological data. Precisely because of their easy availability, these data often pose as irresistible temptation for town plan report writers to pad their texts with tables and graphs indicating rainfall, humidity, prevailing winds, and temperature. Often, however, the town planners abbreviate the period of observations to only five years which is too short a period to allow one to make generalizations with reasonable degree of confidence. Furthermore, one looks in vain for the possible application of these climatological data, which is to establish the water balance as a rough indicator of the quantity of water avail-

able for various purposes in the planning area.

A third example is demographic data —also because of the abundance of census information. All too often, town planners fall into the trap of amassing irrelevant details on the population characteristics such as ethno-linguistic backgrounds of the local population, their religious affiliation and even marital status. The age-sex structure, displayed in a population pyramid, is an indispensable part of the section in demography. But this essential information is used only in the analysis and projection of demand for school facilities. Its potential use as indicators of demand for other social services like health and housing remains untapped. Even information on mortality and morbidity and their causes is not translated into appropriate programs for health delivery. Finally the census information on internal migration hardly finds its way into the local population calculus.

Too often, respondents tend to denigrate the quality of information they have had to work with due to heavy reliance on secondary data. The assumption, of course, is that information derived from primary survey is more relevant, reliable and valid. This may be true if the primary survey is conducted in accordance with the rules of scientific investigation. How capable are the local planning staffs, despite assistance from HSRC (or probably NITC), to undertake scientific investigations?

But the level of detail required for the formulation of general plans like the comprehensive town plan is such that use of secondary data is sufficient. The trouble with secondary data is that they have been generated and presented for purposes other than planning. All it takes therefore is to reprocess and present them in a form usable for town planning. It is important, however, where secondary data sources have been extensively used, to indicate the degree of confidence that should be attached to certain inferences and

conclusions made, and to suggest additional detailed investigations where applicable in later stages of the plan-implementation continuum. Unfortunately, no town plan so far reviewed did this.

All town plans reviewed have left much to be desired in terms of selectiveness in the face of abundance of data, ingenuity in the case of scarcity, and judiciousness in either.

d) *Ineffective implementation instruments*

Three implementation instruments are included in each plan report: zoning ordinance, local development investment program (LDIP), and an administrative machinery.

i) *Zoning Ordinance*. Its obvious defects notwithstanding the zoning ordinance remains the most highly developed instrument for town plan implementation. This is due to the efforts of the HSRC to institutionalize land use regulations. Through a network of deputized zoning administrators in all towns with approved land use plans and through a nationwide system of locational clearance and compliance monitoring, the enforcement of zoning ordinances is now slowly but steadily gaining ground.

ii) *LDIP*. Unlike the zoning ordinance, the LDIP cannot count on a single agency for institutional support. The LDIP is a compendium of the capital investment proposals of all government agencies operating in the municipality. Except for the component that pertains to locally-funded projects, the municipality has no control over the implementation of most projects listed in the LDIP. But why call it "local" investment program when it is largely beyond the control of the local government? Is it not a better idea to confine the LDIP to consideration of proposals that are within the management and financial capability of the local government to implement?

- iii) *Administrative machinery.* This appears to be the least studied area. The plan report usually contains a chart showing the existing administrative structure of the local government, accompanied by a listing of the functions of each office. Then, without the benefit of analysis of the gaps between the existing structure and the personnel complement of the development orientation and management capability of existing staff, and of the availability of local resources, the plan proceeds to propose a new structure or recommend the filling up of vacant positions especially in the Municipal Development Staff.

Since this is meant to be an implementation instrument, one expects this portion of the report to be more detailed and specific about the nature of activities awaiting the local government bureaucracy as it gets down to the task of implementing the plans, as well as the type of skills required of new recruits or training programs for the existing staff. Also, since this is an implementation plan, alternative modes of program and project management like engaging the services of private consultants or farming out portions of projects to private contractors could be suggested.

5. *Fund Assistance to Local Governments*

One aspect of the town planning assistance program which is not explicitly stated as an objective but is nevertheless implied as such is the provision of funding support to local governments. Though not intended as a direct fund transfer to the target municipalities, the funding support for the program has had the effect of subsidizing the town planning project cost to as much as 50 percent or more. Program budget figures for the years 1982 and 1983 added up to about ₱4.5 million. Over the same period, a total of 461 town plans were completed. This yields an average subsidy of close to ₱10,000 for each target municipality.

For their part, the target municipalities have had to shell out a counterpart appropriation ranging from ₱3,000 to ₱20,000. Although the average local counterpart is difficult to ascertain from incomplete records, among the sample target towns the modal range is ₱3,000-₱10,000. It is safe to assume therefore that the financial relief to targeted local governments is indeed considerable. In a number of cases, particularly fifth and sixth class towns, the subsidy was almost to the full extent of the project cost. One fundamental question, however, is whether these poor towns, given their meager resources, would appropriate any funds available for town planning rather than for other priorities if given the choice. The answer to this question was not obtained due to certain practical constraints.

But if the assisted towns appeared to be generally pleased with their fund subsidy, some program participants at the regional level were not exactly happy. The technical personnel who actually assisted the target towns claimed they had no share in the honoraria for program participants. The monetary incentives reached only as far down as the RITC/RTRC level. In some instances, the mayors voluntarily gave an unspecified amount outside of their counterpart fund since the latter fund could not be used to pay the honoraria of personnel. Since the planning technology is as yet labor intensive, increasing the share of personal services vis-a-vis the maintenance and operating cost, to spread the dough, so to speak, to every direct participant in the program is quite reasonable. The poor technical staffs see it as a matter of justice and fairness.

Even among the regional participants who are entitled to monetary incentives, disappointment is widespread over the late release of funds. Due to late fund releases the cooperating agencies have had to use their own resources to underwrite the cost of their participation.

On the whole, the program has undoubtedly achieved economies of scale in its operation and is, relatively cost effective. This is based on the rough estimate of what it would cost an average sized town (upwards of ₱30,000) to come up with a comparable output with the help of private consultants.

Assuming a 50-50 sharing of the cost, the average total cost of the project per town should not exceed ₱20,000. Among the 12 regions, six spent per town plan less than the national average; the other six spent more. The low spending regions are Region 7, Region 6, Region 12, Region 5, Region 2 and Region 4 in the ascending order. Regions that exceeded the national average subsidy per town plan are Region 11, Region 10, Region 3, Region 1, Region 9 and Region 8, in the descending order. (Please refer to table below).

It would be instructive to delve into the comparative cost effectiveness of the program as carried out in each of the regions and within each region, the comparative performance of each province, and the factors that contribute to or hamper the efficient program implementation. This, however, is clearly outside the scope of the present evaluation study.

6. Citizen Participation

The program envisions people participation as one of its "components." It can also be very well considered as one of the objec-

tives of the program. In the formulation of town plans and zoning ordinances, participation from "all sectors of the population" through consultations, technical advice or direct involvement is strongly encouraged. The rationale for people involvement in all phases of the process is to "ensure plan/program implementation."

The program as implemented, however, is nowhere near the ideal of "participatory planning." The consultations envisioned merely took the form of selected residents as respondents to survey questionnaires. Perhaps, the closest thing to direct participation by citizens is that of volunteer groups like teachers and students who, in some cases, were coopted to conduct the primary surveys.

The first—and probably the only—opportunity for the townspeople to participate in the planning process is during the public hearing. The main purpose of the public hearing is to elicit popular reactions to specific portions of the plan. On hand to clarify issues pertaining to their respective sectoral responsibilities are the representatives of the cooperating agencies. Revisions are then introduced into the final draft before

Region	Total Budget Release (₱)	No. of Plans Completed	Average Subsidy Per Town Plan (₱)
I	₱ 411,580.00	35	₱11,759.43
II	376,550.00	43	8,756.98
III	362,201.20	28	12,937.76
IV	430,580.00	48	8,970.42
V	353,200.00	43	8,213.95
VI	345,910.00	44	7,861.59
VII	340,000.00	46	7,391.30
VIII	375,038.41	36	10,417.73
IX	384,999.62	36	10,694.43
X	395,504.86	28	14,125.17
XI	325,100.00	23	14,134.78
XII	405,854.43	51	7,957.93
PHILIPPINES	<u>₱4,506,518.52</u>	<u>461</u>	<u>₱ 9,775.53</u>

SOURCE: NITC Secretariat.

it is adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan.

Attendance in these public hearings is found to be limited to the municipal officials, barangay officials, and representatives of business, civic and other groups more prominently the real estate developers and owners of properties likely to be affected by the land use and zoning plan. And since, in each town, only one such public hearing is usually conducted, other affected groups cannot adequately air their views. Since attendance in these public hearings is invariably by class or interest groups, citizen involvement could be maximized by holding separate hearings to consider the specific reactions of particular sectors of the town's population. The desire to meet deadlines however has precluded the conduct of more than one public hearing thereby limiting the possibilities for more substantial and meaningful citizen participation.

Positive Aspects about the Program and Potentials for Improvement

1. More people involved

The program has mobilized hundreds of individuals who were directly or indirectly involved in the production of town plans and their supporting documents. The impact of their participation on their own skills, knowledge and awareness cannot be adequately assessed. There is no doubt that so many people have been introduced to the rudiments of town planning; and they received their training through immersion in concrete and actual situations. This type of training could not otherwise be achieved through formal instruction confined to the classroom.

2. Great expectations about what the plan can do.

On the part of the local officials of assisted towns, there is widespread optimism that planning will bring about good things for their municipalities no matter how vaguely they perceive these good things. Rightly or wrongly, the local executives look to their town plan as an important basis for future requests for, and grant of national aid. So far, no one sees the town plan as an innocuous, ineffectual document. But before the general

feeling of satisfaction about the plan, as well as the high expectation of what it can do turns into a big disappointment, something must be done to make the document a more effective tool for local decision making.

3. Initiation of local executives to planning.

Institutionalization of the planning process starts with the awareness and acceptance of the value of planning by local decision makers. Toward creating this awareness, the program has undoubtedly contributed a great deal. Acceptance, however, does not automatically come with awareness. It comes after results are seen and appreciated. It is true that institutionalization is not among the strengths of the program, overly concerned as it is with meeting quantitative targets. The program has, nevertheless, initiated local executives of targeted towns into the planning process. The next logical step is to establish the link between planning and decision-making so that politicians will have a reason for continued existence.

At least three bright prospects can be cited as providing the opportunities for the institutionalization of local planning. First, the local executives have expressed willingness to fill up the vacant positions in the MDS if they have the financial capability. Second, through the efforts of HSRC the mechanism of land use control is now being firmly established. Third, the LDIP is now made an integral part of the plan document. All it takes is to make the LDIP as the sole basis for capital budgeting.

4. An eye opener for participating agencies

Although the desired inter-agency coordination has not been ideal, the participation of other agencies not normally involved in undertakings of this nature has served as an eye opener for them. The inter-agency arrangement has led them to realize that they have a part to play—and that one agency's role is no less important than the other's—in the town planning process. That the participating agencies, with the obvious exception of HSRC, have not fully discharged their functions expected of them is due mainly to manpower and resource constraints. Given more resources committed to

such an undertaking, these agencies would have been willing and able to contribute more.

5. *More flexibility and creativity than blind adoption of guidelines.*

The use of a manual-type town planning guidelines, complete with worksheets, dummy tables, space allocation standards, projection formulas, etc., has helped in no small way the planning assistance teams. That the production of individual town plans was kept well within the target duration can be attributed largely to the availability of the guidelines. The application of a standard format enables one regional technical team to assist a number of towns simultaneously. Moreover, the existence of prescribed standards as a ready reference has given the PAT added authority. Familiarity with and adeptness in the application of such standards has given them greater confidence. But the most encouraging thing is the realization by those who have used the guidelines that the standards need not be followed to the letter. Given more time, they would rather exercise more judgement, flexibility, and creativity than adopt the guidelines *in toto*.

6. *More citizen involvement possible.*

Citizen participation in the planning process was limited to the public hearings that preceded the formal adoption by the Sangguniang Bayan of the draft plan. Going through available transcripts of proceedings in these public hearings one can surmise that the townspeople have more than passing interest in the town plan. That their remarks usually reflect their individual or group interest should not be frowned upon as parochialism. It should point to the need for broadening the people's attendance to get a fair cross-section of "parochial" interests that together sum up to what is known as popular perception of, and aspiration for the good life.

7. *Willingness to invest in planning.*

With few exceptions, target towns are generally willing to put up the counterpart fund as stipulated in the memorandum of agreement. They are so pleased with the result—town plan and appurtenant documents—that some believed it was a big bargain. If these towns could be made to see what planning can do for them, it would not be difficult for them to increase the level of their counterpart in future assistance programs. Or better yet, they might undertake planning entirely on their own account.

THE PLANNING OF BAGUIO CITY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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INTRODUCTION

With its planned and historical past, recent events and people from all over have made it into what it is today: a dynamic and beautiful city. People like Daniel H. Burnham, a world renowned architect who provided the plan of the development of Baguio in 1904, made the plan "that differentiates Baguio from the rest of the world." He was later immortalized with the naming of Burnham Park, which is almost synonymous to Baguio itself, the city's biggest and most beautiful park, after him.

And like any plan, its realization comes through its proper implementation. The product is now a blueprint of the history born out of efforts of planners and policy makers, with foresight and also the lack of it, who through the years contributed to the development of a city originally designed to be aesthetically beautiful.

Today, Baguio has grown beyond its living, but still along physical development as originally laid out. It could serve as a model of what a city should be: a place that "provides for such buildings as may be needed for governmental offices, for the service of the city itself, and for the healthfulness, convenience and recreation of the people; and all these functions are so arranged as to make a unified and orderly city."

The 1970s brought Baguio to a different concern of development undertakings. The high growth of its population created concerns related to the availability and

sufficiency of water, power, transportation system, housing, and other facilities of a population more than seven times the number of inhabitants it was originally planned for. This new concern is expected for, as Burnham suggested years ago, Baguio should not allow the scarring of its landscape and destruction of its environment.

Together with these concerns and towards the 1980s, Baguio still gives importance to Burnham Park which to this day remains as an important recreational site for its local population and tourist and visitors alike. What other city has produced parks as the foci of its life?

From the small hill station idea to a larger health and recreation center, Baguio has become not only the summer capital of the Philippines, but today it is also a university town, a religious seat and a convention city. It has expanded from its original recreation and health functions to emerge as vital education, trade and tourism center as well.

THE MAKING OF A CITY

Hispanic Hill Station

The Hill Station Idea

Unlike most settlements founded by the Spaniards in the Philippines, Baguio was not created to hasten the development of the mountain people in Northern Luzon. Neither was it created in order to facilitate the Hispanization of the area. Rather, Baguio was created as a typical

hill station¹ designed essentially to service Spaniards, Hispanized mestizos and other Europeans who resided in the hot and humid lowlands of the country (Reed, p. 17).

During the period of territorial expansion of the Europeans in the 19th century, a number of them experienced the cooler atmosphere of the uplands and soon came to recognize its recuperative effects. This awareness of the invigorating effect of tropical uplands brought the colonizers into establishing sanitaria in a number of army posts located in the mountains. One such sanitarium was built by the Spaniards in La Trinidad, Benguet, near the present site of Baguio (Reed).

The La Trinidad Settlement

It was only in 1846 that the Spaniards finally established a colonial administration in Benguet, where the Igorots had waged a three-century opposition to Spanish rule. Benguet then had 31 rancherias, Baguio being one of them with 21 scattered houses (The Town Plan of Baguio), and La Trinidad was designated as its capital. The development of La Trinidad as a hill station necessitated a military presence.

Like any other town, La Trinidad had private dwellings clustered around a nuclear area which consisted of a town plaza, a church with convento, town hall and tribunal and a school. As a hill station, it had military barracks, parade grounds and an armory. It had fine district houses surrounded by formal gardens. In addition, it had a small botanical garden which served both as an agricultural experimental station and a scenic spot.

The transformation of La Trinidad into a small colonial hill station began with the gradual expansion of its municipal tribunal and its subsequent conversion into a recuperative center for disabled soldiers (Reed). Although the Manila administra-

tion failed to establish a substantial hospital in Benguet, they did improve the standard lodging arrangements of the tribunal and increased its boarding capacity (Corpus, p. 108).²

In 1887, its capacity reached 300; and yet even under an already crowded condition, the recovery of patients was quite favorable. Benguet had steadily improved its reputation as many Spaniards and Spanish soldiers recovered there. Visitors to La Trinidad, originally attracted to the cool climate, healthful environment and beautiful scenery, stayed there for many months. Most often such visits were prolonged by frequent side trips to the nearby mineral springs known for their curative powers. Hispanic La Trinidad had already acquired its health and recreational functions years before the Americans came (Reed, pp. 52-54).

The Blanco Commission

Although La Trinidad, with its expanded health facilities, improved resort functions, and modern road connections to the lowlands still proved adequate, many Spaniards, toward the close of the 19th century, advocated the development of a major hill station in the Cordilleras.

The agitation for a large health and resort center pressured the then Gov. Gen. Ramon Blanco to dispatch an investigatory team to determine the feasibility of developing a hill station in the uplands and to recommend a suitable site. The Blanco Commission composed of an engineer, a physician and officer came up with a report which highlighted the following points:

1. the commission recognized and endorsed the growing public demand for a hill station;
2. the commission envisaged considerable savings of foreign exchange previously lost through annual departure of tourists and invalids to Japan, China and Europe;

¹A hill station is a form of settlement which originated during the European colonial dominion and is confined to the upland regions. Originally, hill stations served as exclusive health resorts or recreation centers. Many of those in Southeast Asian colonies have later been transformed into important multifunctional cities.

²The provision of hotel and boarding services and facilities in the municipal tribunal was not unique to Benguet. During the Spanish period, it was required by law to develop such facilities in all provincial towns for use by official visitors and tourists.

3. the commission concluded that the nearby village of Baguio proved to be a superior location in terms of ultimate development potential; (The same decision was made by the U.S. Philippine Commission in the early part of the 1900).³
4. the commission recommended the construction of a modern road to replace the trails which for long had served as tenuous connections between the mountains and the lowlands (Reed, pp. 55-61).

Unfortunately, every intention of carrying out the above basic recommendations was frustrated with the explosion of the 1896 Philippine Revolution. La Trinidad continued to function as the colonial hill station of the Spanish regime until the latter's demise. However, La Trinidad no longer developed beyond its status at the close of the Spanish era.

The development of Baguio as a major multifunctional hill station received firm government support only with the coming of the Americans at the turn of the 19th century.

American Heritage

Rules of Tropical Adaptation

Having to live in the tropics, the Americans were convinced that temporary residence in the lower altitudes is possible as long as they abide by certain rules of conduct, health and adaptation. First, all Westerners were obliged to adopt prescriptions of modern medicine and sanitation. Boiled drinking water, vaccinations, cold storage for perishable foods, household disinfectants and mosquito nets became hallmarks of tropical living. Second, exercise was necessary for good health and successful adaptation. Third, Westerners were instructed to practice moderate living habits. They were to avoid hard work, tension, excessive drinking and sex in order to maintain their health.

³In all categories deemed essential to the viability of a major hill station: healthful climate, ample water supplies, agricultural promise, fuel availability, recreational potential, communication linkages with the lowlands—Baguio seemed to rank first.

Fourth, a periodic furlough could reinvigorate weakened colonists who have long been absent from cooler climates. The privilege of frequent furloughs, however, was usually limited to a few like the wealthy businessmen, army and naval officers and ranking colonial bureaucrats. Most Westerners could not afford the tremendous expenses that long visits in Europe and U.S.A. entailed (Reed, p. 118). The hill stations therefore continued to serve as holiday centers and health resorts for the majority of the colonists.

The Worcester-Wright Commission

In 1900, the first assignment of the U.S. Philippine Commission was to select an appropriate highland site in Northern Luzon for the establishment of a major hill station (Reed, *The Town Plan*). A special committee, tasked with exploring the viability of Benguet as resort center, was headed by Dean C. Worcester and Luke E. Wright. Like their Spanish predecessors, the Worcester-Wright Commission strongly recommended the immediate development of an American hill station in Baguio (Reed). Dean C. Worcester wrote of Baguio:

"We were literally dumbfounded when within a space of a hundred years we suddenly left the tropics behind us and came out into a wonderful region of pine parks. . . trees stood on rounded knolls at comparatively wide intervals, the hills with elevation ranging from 4,500 feet to 5,200 feet were covered with short thick grass while along the streams were wonderful tree ferns. . . it took us but a short time to decide here was an ideal site for a future city!" (Baguio '69, p. 5).

Following the recommendation of the Committee, the Philippine Commissioners sanctioned the development of Baguio in what was their second official legislative action: Act No. 2 appropriated \$5,000 for the survey of a railroad route designed to connect Baguio with the lowlands (Reed, p. 120). This was the first of the many laws relating to Baguio which were enacted by the U.S. Philippine Commission during the American occupation. They testify to the considerable importance placed by the Americans to developing a major mountain city.

Summer Capital—Resort City

On June 1, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed a resolution officially declaring its policy "to make the town of Baguio, in the province of Benguet, the summer capital of the Archipelago..." (Baguio '69, p. 1). That declaration in 1903 has never been repealed to this day; in effect therefore, Baguio City is and will continue to be the summer capital of the Philippines. A succession of milestone events in the making of a summer capital-resort city became part of Baguio history:

- 1904—Pres. Theodore Roosevelt appointed Cameron Forbes, scion of a prominent American family, member of the Philippine Commission. The appointment of Forbes was to work towards the development of Baguio during those early years because of his avid interest in the future resort city. Forbes's acts so greatly helped in Baguio's physical growth that he is today recognized as the "first" booster and the "Father of Baguio." Then world-renowned American Architect Daniel H. Burnham made the plan "that differentiates Baguio from the rest of the world." Later, Burnham was honored and immortalized with the naming of the city's biggest and most beautiful park after him.⁴
- 1905—Construction of Kennon and Naguilian Roads, respectively.
- 1911 These were then the only two routes to Baguio from the lowlands.
- 1906—Camp John Hay (now known as John Hay Air Base) was opened for the first time to visitors. Also the auction sale of city lots for residential and commercial purposes was held through the efforts of Forbes, to raise funds for building the city (The Town Plan and Reed).
- 1908—The Philippine Military Academy was transferred from Manila to Constabulary Hill, Baguio (now known as Camp Henry T. Allen).


- 1909—The Charter of Baguio City, authored by Justice George A. Malcolm, took effect as Act No. 1963 on September 1.
- 1913—A race course, encircling Burnham Lake was established.
- 1916—The Baguio Public Market, a tourist spot in itself, was erected where it stands today.
- 1923—The 1923 Baguio Carnival and Exposition was successfully held in the present Football Field, between Harrison and Lakedrive, site of several summer fairs held after Liberation in 1945.
- 1925—Proclamation No. 64 which reserved for park purposes the Burnham Park Reservation, was passed.⁵
- 1937—E.J. Halseman, who was Baguio Mayor for 15 years from 1922, became the last American mayor, with his replacement by Sergio Bayan, an engineer, the first Filipino Mayor of Baguio.
- 1941—Japanese occupation of Baguio to (December 1941 to April 1945).
- 1945
- 1946—Amidst the ruins and the ashes of just-liberated Baguio, a visionary dreamt of Baguio as a University City. Thus, the seeds of Baguio as a college town were sown with the Baguio Colleges' establishment in 1946, followed two years later by Baguio Tech (now the University of Baguio), St. Louis University, the U.P. at Baguio, the transfer of PMA to its permanent site at Loakan, etc. (Baguio '69, pp. 1-3).

Thus, in half a century the mountain city had metamorphosed from a simple hill station into a multifunctional city: resort city, summer capital, and center of higher learning in Northern Luzon.


Other considerations of greater significance to planners should be pointed out in the development of Baguio City. It is the only other city in the country, aside from Manila, that is planned like the other great cities of the world. More than that,

⁴This architect became so enthusiastic over Baguio and its possibilities that he gave his services free of charge." (Kane, pp. 14-15)


⁵Possession, administration and control of the park reservation were transferred to the Philippine Tourism Authority by virtue of Presidential Decree 1762 dated January 6, 1981.




PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR THE PROPOSED TOWN SITE, 1905 (Burnham & Anderson)




EXISTING & PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS, 1909 (Parsons)




GENERAL PLAN OF IMPROVEMENT, 1913 (Parsons)



1917 ...



1928...



TODAY...

Baguio is possibly the only planned city in the country that has been developed with high degree of fidelity to the plan.

As mentioned earlier, the Burnham Plan served as the blueprint of Baguio's development. What Baguio has become can be traced basically to the Burnham Plan. Some present-day planning issues may also have arisen from its original planning premises.

BURNHAM PLAN OF BAGUIO CITY

Major Aspects of the Plan

The plan of Baguio (then a municipality) as embodied in a report to the then U.S. Secretary of War William Taft on October 6, 1905 by D.H. Burnham and Pierce Anderson⁶ was "intended merely as an outline of the general scheme" by which the new municipality could grow "into a composition of convenience and beauty" (Burnham and Anderson). Burnham considered the report as "frankly preliminary in character" as it lacks comprehensive study with engineering requirements and other details. The plan was a miniature version of the plan by L'Enfant of Washington, D.C. Burnham himself wrote that "it provides for such buildings as may be needed for governmental offices, for the service of the city itself, and for the healthfulness, convenience and recreation of the people; and all these functions are so arranged as to make a unified and orderly city" (Hines, pp. 197-217).

As expected, the Burnham Plan of Baguio was guided by the general principles of urban planning popular at that time. Major aspects found in the plan were the government and building sites, open spaces, parks, parkways and playgrounds and a radial street system and pattern adapted to the uneven contours. (Firmalino). The widespread acceptance of these principles encouraged the further development of the "City Beautiful" movement espoused by Burnham and other planners in the U.S. (Silao, p. 12).

Given the limits of the Baguio reservation, the general scheme of the townsite development of the future city assumed a population not exceeding 25,000. The relatively small design population is

intended to achieve the "finest possible result." Thus, it is necessary to concentrate business and public activities (municipal, provincial and national) in a single, compact composition (Burnham and Anderson). The best place for such activities which would serve as the urban center is the "Baguio Meadow." Burnham reported:

The Baguio meadow is about one half mile wide by three-fourths of a mile long, and is roughly elliptical in shape. The meadow is surrounded on all sides by low hills attaining an elevation of 100 or 200 feet above it. At two points, on the north and south, the encircling ridges sink nearly to the level of the central plain; the southern opening admits the new Benguet Road (now Kennon Road) from Manila and the northern opening gives exit to a small stream which rises in the valley and makes its way toward the north. The essential conditions are, therefore, an enclosed hollow dominated by low hills and connecting ridges. The central problem was finding the best location within this area for the principle elements of the town namely, business, municipal buildings and national government buildings (Hines, p. 197).

Burnham assumed that the best location for transaction of business and that of the business district should be "the North-western section of the meadow and the gentler slopes of the ridge to the Northwest." In another reference, it is mentioned that Burnham envisioned a common park at the center.⁷ The municipal center should be closely connected with the business center. The national center should be "reasonably accessible from the business quarter. . . and so treated in their approaches and surroundings as to make clear their pre-eminence over all other buildings in the city." From a higher elevation, therefore, the municipal and national groups would face one another from opposite ends of the meadows. (Burnham and Anderson). (They are to be situated at the opposite poles of the park's main axis.⁸)

⁷⁸These details are not found in the "Preliminary Plan of Baguio," as recorded in the U.S. Philippine Commission Report of 1905 which serve as the author's reference; however, they were mentioned in Reed's City of Pines, p. 124, with Reed referring to a certain article by Burnham ("Report of the Proposed Plan of the City of Baguio, Province of Benguet, Philippine Islands," Chicago, October 3, 1905, BIA 9002/10) which cannot be located at libraries in Manila.

⁶Anderson was one of Burnham's associates working with him in major projects like San Francisco, Chicago, etc.

Also, Burnham described the front view of the national center from the plain as "an incline of steps" and that the main approach to the center is by means of a street to the northeast along the hillside (Burnham and Anderson).

The other inclosing hills around the meadow shall furnish locations for various "semi-public functions whose building, of monumental character, will be in view of one another" (Burnham and Anderson).

The total effect of all these—"a business center surrounded by a crown of monumental buildings, the whole dominated by the groups of national buildings, could not be made equal to anything that has ever been done."⁹ Burnham in his report describes the urban core as:

If one will imagine the long main axis, expanded by an open green esplanade, stretching down from the municipal group through the business town and up to the green slopes to the dominant government center on the high hills, imagine certain transverse axis crossing the town and leading up the incline to important building on the flanking hills; look for the green fields here and there and picture the entire composition hemmed in by the pine ridges of the highest hills, one will have before him an architectural group of unsurpassed effect and a business machine of the utmost efficiency.

The outlying sites such as Pakdal and the slopes towards La Trinidad shall remain available for the vistas of the rich and such public buildings, as universities, schools, hospitals and sanitarium, whose functions require detachment from the urban core. Pakdal site was chosen as the best place for developing fashionable quarters of from 3 to 10 acres per lot for the more wealthy people of the city (Burnham and Anderson). Small residences on the other hand, would locate at the lower slopes of the foothills that carry

⁹Similar experiences can be recalled here like the hill towns of Italy and France which presented cases "in which the lines of the level streets are carried steeply up to the hillsides to terminate the vista at points of special interests." Another example of course, is the street planning of Washington D.C., "where the step grades prevented the prolongation of the streets directly up the Capitol. By turning the streets aside to reach a higher level, the line of vision was maintained permitting the building to command the vista down the streets" (Firmalino).

the monumental buildings (Burnham and Anderson), at the hills surrounding the urban core (most likely Rock Quarry, the present site of Camp Henry Allen, Lucban Valley, Holy Ghost Hill and Engineer's Hill).

A big portion of the area was set aside for an army post, Camp John Hay. Its ample spaces could provide for a number of large barracks, service shops, a hospital, an armory, officers' quarters, a parade ground, a golf course, tennis courts and other recreational facilities. Provided also in separate locations was a naval reservation of indeterminate use (now a residential area) (Reed, p. 126).

Since Baguio was the annual vacation place of the colonial elite in quest of rest, recreation and relaxation, Burnham reserved a large area for conversion into a country club to service ranking civil servants, Western businessmen, and rich Filipinos. The needs of moderate-income Americans and Filipinos were likely considered as well. Burnham strongly recommended the establishment of at least two major parks.¹⁰ He further suggested that "large portions of all surrounding hills should be declared public property and maintained as informal parks, (while) the tops of hills especially should be set aside as public reservations in order that their cresting of green may be carefully preserved" (Reed, p. 127). Indeed, this public reservation policy of the early American administrators has led to the preservation of valuable open space that present day cities are trying desperately to create.

A substantial area was allocated for the Gov. General's residence. It was to be located either at the "hill above the present sanitarium" on what is now the site of Baguio General Hospital (possibly Engineers' Hill) to make it visible to the governmental centers or at the end of the Pakdal Plateau, in case the Gov. General should "prefer to live further from official activities," called Outlook Point. The present location of the Mansion House must have followed this second, solitary choice (Burnham and Anderson).

The ecclesiastical center housing the archbishop's residence, the cathedral and other buildings may find a suitable location on "the triangular-shaped hill north of the present Baguio" (possibly Holy Ghost Hill).

¹⁰Also refer to footnotes 7 and 8.

The hotel site was difficult to locate but Burnham suggested the "high ground north of the town and not far from the present road to La Trinidad," possibly Lucban Valley (Burnham and Anderson).

Burnham likewise described the general street system that will connect these centers as follows:

"Except for the main axis running north-east and southwest between the municipal and governmental centers and the secondary axis running northwest to the business section, the roads and streets of Baguio would be of a necessarily irregular nature following the contours of the mountainous terrain" (Hines, p. 199).

The surroundings of the Baguio Plain, Burnham admitted, were "for the most part left untouched." Burnham reported that "no attempt has been made to lay out a system of roads for the entire reservation... pending completion of survey" (Burnham and Anderson).¹¹

Implementation of the Plan

The implementation of the Burnham plan was assigned to William Parsons, a young American architect who was appointed in November 1905 as the general architectural supervisor of all designs of public buildings and parks to be established in the country (Silao, p. 12). He, together with others, like Warwick Green and George H. Hayward, was responsible for the actual layout and construction of streets, residences and public buildings in Baguio (Reed, pp. 127-128). They were given considerable discretion in the interpretation of the original Burnham Plan (refer to the maps for the evolution of the Baguio Plan). William Parsons proved quite sensitive in the translation of Burnham's ideas. The others in his team, however deviated significantly from the formative design.

Certain events likewise significantly lessened the attention given to Baguio. One is the recall of Gov. General W. Cameron Forbes, who served as member of the U.S.

Philippine Commission from 1904 to 1909 and as governor-general from 1909 to 1913. Another is the resignation of William Parsons in 1913. The putting up of the national government center (the present site of the MOT-PTA Complex and the Baguio Colleges Foundation) never materialized due to the cost of transferring the Manila national bureaucracy to Baguio every year during summer (after Forbes' term).

Nevertheless, the Burnham Plan served as the powerful blueprint for the development of Baguio during the early decades of the 20th century.

The years that followed saw the evolution of the organization of space in Baguio into what it is today. The arrangement of public buildings in their present location, the City Hall, the business sector buildings on Harrison, Magsaysay and Session Roads in the commercial district, the Mansion House, Teachers Camp, the military reservation in Camp John Hay basically reflects the ideas of Burnham. It is notable that numerous common parks and recreation centers dot the city. There is the Burnham Park at the center of the city fronting the City Hall, Wright Park near the Mansion House, the Polo Field and the golf course and tennis courts inside Camp John Hay (Bayan Park in the Baguio map is not a park).

The residential areas proposed for the rich at Pakdal, Forbes Park (now Imelda Park) and the slopes towards La Trinidad however serve different purposes now. For the most part, Pakdal has become a residential area for the poor and is considered a slum area. Imelda Park now houses the Ministry of Human Settlements Provincial Office for Benguet and also features the prototypes of houses of different mountain tribes in the province. Along La Trinidad Road, nearer the city is fast growing into a commercial area, beyond are isolated houses; also a site for residences of the U.P. Baguio employees.

Lower income residences proposed to be located at the foothills surrounding the central business district have partly served its purpose. Holy Ghost Hill and Rock Quarry are rich residential areas while Lower Rock Quarry is a slum area. Lucban Valley is an ordinary residential area and some parts are occupied as slum. Camp H. Allen is presently the officer's quarters for the Phil-

¹¹ However, the preliminary plan discussed above was never, to the knowledge of this writer, revised to provide a more comprehensive and detailed plan of the city, like the one Burnham submitted for Manila.

ippine Military Academy. Cabinet Hill and Engineers Hill are ordinary residential areas.

Schools, universities, churches and hospitals are appropriately located. Elementary and secondary schools are likewise properly located near the residences of people they intend to serve: St. Mary Elementary and Brent School (international) near Upper Rock Quarry and Holy Ghost Hill, respectively. Manuel L. Quezon Elementary School and Rizal Elementary School are near the ordinary residential areas.

Almost a hundred hotels/inns pension and boarding houses scattered in the city, sometimes rising many stories high, are mostly not properly located and structurally designed, as proposed. They run counter to the idea of architectural unity envisioned in the Baguio Plan. Incidentally, the hotel boom came in the late 70s with the promotions of Baguio as a tourist destination; and the dormitories and lodging houses increased in number with the rise of student population in the city.

BAGUIO AFTER 1946

For certain, the Burnham Plan provided the existing physical pattern of the city. However, several legislations were passed in an attempt to further develop and improve Baguio's layout. In 1948, the first zoning ordinance of Baguio City, Ordinance 86, was passed in accordance with the general plan of the National Urban Planning Commission and pursuant to Executive Order No. 98 dated March 11, 1946 of the then President of the Philippines. Among others, this ordinance provided for the creation of a Baguio Coordinating Committee to control and direct Baguio's development (The Town Plan of Baguio). Unfortunately, due to the scarcity of planners and the lack of financing, the Committee remained non-functional.

Ordinance 86, which was amended by Ordinance 127 in 1951, authorized construction of more than one house/building on a lot. In 1954, Ordinance 188 amended the Revised Ordinance on Building and Building districts including the general provisions on electricity and sewage. In 1959, Ordinance 319 which provides for the subdivision regulation within the city, was passed. This

was followed by Ordinance 325 which provides for a government district embracing all existing government reservations and Ordinance 344 which governs the establishment and disposition of subdivision lots (Quirino-Magsaysay subdivision), was amended by Ordinance 412 known as the Subdivision Administration Ordinance (The Town Plan of Baguio).

Towards the 70's Baguio was plagued like other urban centers in the country with a host of problems on housing, squatters, environmental sanitation, peace and order, and public services. In 1968, an Urban Development Project which evolved basic guidelines for Baguio development, started the comprehensive planning and development of the city. The project provided commodity and technical assistance for the preparation of the Comprehensive Development Plan. The local participation through the Planning Staff of the newly created Baguio City Development Board coordinated project studies and plans and enlisted the cooperation and participation of the citizenry on a continuing basis.

In the course of the project, it was found out that:

1. the radial street pattern tends to converge traffic to the center contributing to downtown traffic;
2. the CBD (Central Business District), the recreation, educational, employment, shopping and religious center of the city and region, is the major traffic generator;
3. land use control deficiencies contribute to haphazard development of the city;
4. existing road capacities can no longer be expanded to accommodate increasing traffic volumes; and
5. the CBD is the terminus of regional traffic. (Task Force on Urban Development, Profile Report)

It may be recalled that the Burnham Plan called for the preservation of pine forests within and around the urban reservation. Burnham opposed dense settlement in the Baguio hills, anticipating a population of no more than 25,000 and that the business and government centers be close to one another. As called for in the plan, the existing road

system was designed for a small city only. The radial street pattern is also very much a part of the "City Beautiful" tradition.


With a current population of 175,000, Baguio is a city growing beyond its limits. Expectedly, the problems confronting the city are brought about by the expansion of the population several times over the design population. What the city planning office is doing about these problems confronting present day Baguio could be a good research for another paper. This paper shall now turn to the focal center of Baguio City—the Burnham Park.

BURNHAM PARK AND THE YEARS AHEAD

The height of tourism development in recent years has catapulted Baguio and its environs to the second leading tourist destination next only to Cebu.¹² Realizing the contribution of tourism as a major source of foreign exchange the national government centralized the planning, development, management and direction of all tourist

areas under the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) with the issuance of PD No. 1762. A portion of the Burnham Park reservation, 328,394.39 square meters was conveyed to the PTA for tourism development purposes. On December 9 of the same year, another decree, PD No. 2144, was issued stipulating which of the donated area will be developed for park and tourism requirements—Lot I, Lot II and Lot III—over a 5 year period (Lecture by PTA staff in Baguio, February 9, 1985). As of February 1985, the PTA Field Office in Baguio reported a 30 percent completion of Burnham Park Development, the remaining 70 percent targeted for 1985 and 1986.

Before 1981, aside from the lake, orchidarium and the athletic bowl, the rest of Burnham Park was covered with grasses. Today, added in Lot III fronting the City Hall are Rizal Park and the Rose Garden. The children's playground is at the Kisad (road) side of the Lake and the Plazas de las Montañas with the parade grounds at the Harrison (road) side. A grandstand which houses the PTA office is located at the



¹²NEDA Tourism Report for Region I, 1981.

center of this block facing the parade grounds. The orchidarium whichaces the lake opposite the Rose Garden was improved and was inaugurated in 1984 (PTA lecture). Please refer to the Burnham Park map.

Lot II, the area facing Harrison Road fronting the Baguio Colleges Foundation will be developed and so with the lot marked I, the vacant almost triangular area facing the Baguio General Hospital Circle between Governor Pack Road and Kisdad Road.

Tennis courts were put up between Children's Park and the athletic bowl; the city auditorium was erected across the athletic bowl facing the orchidarium. Two restaurants are presently operating inside the Park, one of which is the El Rancho at the Children's Playground (PTA lecture).

In sum, the recent upsurge in tourism promotion has brought about major improvements on the city's central park and enhanced its physical attraction. Of course, the other side effect of the tourism boom is the change in the city's skyline with the construction of high rise hotels, commercial establishments and related facilities.

CONCLUSION

The Burnham Plan of Baguio City, as researched, clearly provided the outline for the existing physical pattern of the city. Behind the realization of the plan is the interplay of historical forces more of which were unique to Baguio.

Policymakers like W.C. Forbes, planners like Burnham and architects like Parsons provided the greatest boost to Baguio's growth in terms of legislations and policy declarations for the resultant open spaces and site reservation; the plan for its development guide; and its realization through government financing and its implementation machinery. Moreover, these forces accentuated already present natural advantages, again peculiar to Baguio—its cool climate, scenic views, healthful environment and strategic location.

Present day problems of Baguio can be traced back to the limits of the Premises of the Burnham Plan; like its considered maximum population, its inadequate street system due to absence of complete survey and the heavy emphasis on the physical appearance and architectural design of the

city thereby neglecting other important aspects like development of facilities for the adequate provision of water, drainage, power and communications services. The development of Baguio having been predestined to serve the needs of the Westerners in their quest for healthful tropical living is elitist, "for the wealthy". The place being designed as a haven for the Americans and rich Filipinos has not provided for the needs of the "common tao" thereby creating present day slum problems. While the government of Baguio has taken some measures on the housing issue through disposition of subdivision lots, the problem has grown faster than the solution.

What is left for planners is to learn from the experiences of the past and start assessing the problems of today and plan for its resolution towards the future.

One basic contribution of the Baguio planning experience which should be replicated in all growing urban centers today, is the development of parks in various parts and adequate spaces of the city. With the growing problem of urbanization today, it is but practical to face the issue of open space from the outset.

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THE "KEY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM" APPROACH TO REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROCESS IN THE PHILIPPINES

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I. INTRODUCTION

To a large extent, planning in the Philippines has followed the "top-down" approach in the sense that the planning direction and initiatives mainly originated from the national level. Planning, on the other hand, generally follows a reverse process where national development goals are set ahead of any opportunity and constraints analysis. Planning from below has been considered as an alternative approach, but this has not been followed partly due to the institutional weakness of planning at the local level, including the lack of local planning expertise and financial resources and, more importantly, because of the analytical drawback of this approach. That is, while a plan may be evolved from this procedure and be greatly responsive to local needs and aspirations, it may lack the broad national development perspectives and not be fully cognizant of the realities of the international situation (e.g. balance of trade, economic stability and balance of power, etc.)

Thus, the current trend in development of planning in the country is toward a simultaneous "top-down" and "bottom-up" planning approach and the acceptance of the interrelatedness of economic and physical planning that leads to a more balanced and integrated approach to the formulation of development plans. The merging of these two planning approaches called the "Key Development Program" (KDP) approach, occurs in regional development planning where national priorities and regional thrusts are put together to evolve an appropriate development strategy for the region.

The Philippines has 13 regions including the metropolitan region or National Capital Region. Region IV or the Southern Tagalog Region is the region most proximate to the capital region. In fact, before 1975, when Region IV was organized it was then Region IV-A which included the metropolitan region. In 1976, a Presidential decree made the metropolitan region a separate region with its own planning commission.

In contrast therefore to the other regions in the country, Region IV exhibits an entirely different characteristic in terms of development. In addition, it is the largest in terms of territorial size (16%) and population (13%) and in terms of Gross Regional Domestic Product, it ranks second to the metropolitan region, with industry contributing 40 percent of the total output. However, the region is predominantly rural with about 63 percent of its population living in the rural areas and about 50 percent employed in the agricultural sector.

This paper focuses on the development and application of the "Key Development Program" approach in regional development planning process in the Southern Tagalog Region.

II. THE PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED SOLUTION

Southern Tagalog Region has a perspective development plan up to the year 2000 and a medium-term plan (1978-1987). In 1981, a five-year plan (1983-1987) was formulated and consequently updated in 1983 as a response to the economic crisis felt that year. At present, there is an Updated Regional Development

Plan (1984-1987). The medium-term plan followed a sectoral planning approach where sectoral plans for agriculture, industry, social services and infrastructure were incorporated. The regional plans were essentially sectoral plans. The spatial element or a discussion of the adopted spatial development strategy lacks the appropriate implementing mechanism that will operationalize a set of broad regional development strategies. Even in the organizational structure of the Regional Development Council (RDC), the agencies were grouped into specific sectoral planning committees and sub-committees called SECTAGS or Sectoral Task Groups. For instance, the agriculture planning committee comprised only those agencies directly related to agriculture.

This arrangement resulted in uncoordinated implementation of programs and projects and explains partly the existence of irrigation projects with no farm-to-market roads, school buildings without teachers, and others. It also resulted in overlaps or duplications of services delivery activities by the implementing government agencies at the local level.

It is also important to note here that government programs and projects are nationally conceived, meaning that any adopted development activities of the national ministries are usually implemented nationwide, except of course in the case of special foreign-assisted projects and regionally-initiated projects in the autonomous regions. The classification of national versus regional programs and projects is linked to the source of funding. In the case of the autonomous regions*, they are capable of generating revenues through taxation, thus enabling them to independently implement an activity specifically for their region.

*The establishment of the two autonomous regional governments in Western and Central Mindanao was provided for by presidential/legislative issuances as part of a comprehensive program to solve the so-called Muslim problem in the South. The autonomous regions have complete powers over the manner in which funds generated from their taxing and other revenue-raising activities are disbursed through the implementation of programs and projects supportive of the regional development plan.

The shift from the sectoral approach to the "Key Development Program" approach was triggered by the realization of these perceived problems. It was also a reaction to critical and strategic planning rather than detailed comprehensive planning. This innovative approach of the region was a call to depart from an orientation towards individual projects to a focus on concentrated activities with greater economic impact. Critical planning implies identification of specific programs to which more attention should be given. It also involves determination of strategic activities that will have direct impact on the attainment of regional objectives.

On the basis of this concept, key development programs have been formulated for the Southern Tagalog Region (Region IV) and are intended to be a short outline of programs of action which will substantiate the development strategies in the regional development plan.

Key programs are not meant to address every problem in the region. The term "key" implies a certain degree of priority or criticality. The criteria used in determining what is key, priority or critical are as follows:

- (1) the program's response or contribution to national development priorities;
- (2) the acceleration of economic transformation, as for instance: agro-industrial development, modernization of agriculture, energy development;
- (3) criticality in relation to less developed areas like improvement of health and nutrition and accessibility;
- (4) the gravity or magnitude of the problem being addressed, like food deficit; and
- (5) the geographical coverage of the impact of the problem.

III. FEATURES OF THE APPROACH

1. Project Packaging

In the KDP approach, a combination of mutually-reinforcing investments from different sectors required to achieve the development objectives and targets of the key program set for each area are identified. Each key program has a

list of action elements. The action elements are broad categories of projects and activities that are necessary to reach the objectives of the program. These said activities are interrelated and complementary in the sense that the elimination of one component from the package will reduce the contribution of the other activities to the overall impact of the whole package. The action elements are translated into implementable projects by the concerned agencies and institutions. To take the "Regional Food Efficiency Program" as an example, the action elements would be those needed to attain the program objectives such as irrigation water, farm-to-market roads, extension services, farmers' training and the like.

The basis for clustering projects under a program proceeds on the following considerations:

(1) *Closely complementary projects.* Complementary projects should be packaged and systematically executed. An example is open drainage and the reclamation of nearby agricultural land. Another example is rural industrial development and rural industries' skills training.

(2) *Common purpose.* Projects with a common purpose should be examined for interrelationships. It is possible that there are projects that are merely different approaches to solving the same problem. Also, there are instances in which one project is contributory to the other. In this case, it might be reasonable to integrate it with the other projects. Examples are beef cattle production and poultry projects, which are both geared toward increased food production.

(3) *Common infrastructure requirements.* There are cases of one infrastructure supporting two or more projects. A road, for example, can be planned to link an industrial site, an agricultural area, a port or an urban center. The maximum use of a common infrastructure that can support as many activities as possible is an investment to be preferred.

(4) *Common clientele coverage.* Projects whose planned service coverage is the entire population of an area, must consider common population projections as well as common

standard measures for establishing area requirements. Examples are social services and agricultural extension services which need to distinguish target clientele and their specific functional roles in order to forge linkages.

(5) *Common geographic area.* Compatible projects will tend to enhance each other, or at least, each will develop independently without having a negative effect on the other. In the same manner, separate projects serving a common area, if not integrated or coordinated, are likely to result in an expensive investment. Rice production and an irrigation project fall under this category.

(6) *Supportive projects.* Certain projects are by their nature supportive to another existing project. For instance, recurring expenditures considered as project costs such as maintenance and expenses to upgrade salaries of teachers are necessary for an existing school project. In such a case, it is advisable to cluster these projects together.

2. Program Area Targeting

The "Key Development Program" has to be applied in a specific spatial context in order to ensure complementarity and efficacy of the identified packages of programs. The key program is identified in terms of the area's specific functional role and its needs and potentials. This spatial strategy is in the form of an integrated Area Development (IAD) framework adopted in the region. The integrated areas are established on the basis of homogeneity particularly in production roles. Production areas have previously been identified, including the radius of their linkage with surrounding areas. Political and administrative boundaries are also taken into account to avoid future problems in implementation.

In consonance with the IAD concept which calls for multisectoral approach to ensure the achievement of planned goals and objectives, area targets are set to become the basis for identifying the component projects and activities corresponding to the action elements required for each key program in a specific area. The process of area targeting varies from one key program to another. Key program area targets

are distinguished from the project targets within a key program. The former are set on a macro-economic level and on a strategic basis while the latter are more of the operational targets of each specific project under the key program.

For instance, agricultural targets of a program are set in terms of expected productivity levels that could be achieved within the period in consideration. These are usually determined through a gap analysis based on the IAD profiles. Other program targets are set in terms of projected increase or decrease of selected development indicators that may represent the program impact. Targets set for the specific activities identified under the program are also established, such as the number of irrigation projects needed to reach a certain projected productivity level, the number of extension people required and the like.

IV. APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH TO THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PROCESS

The region adopts its own strategy consistent with national goals and strategies. The broad regional strategy of the Southern Tagalog Region (Region IV) is to utilize to the optimum the region's locational advantages and the immense resource potentials. This is two-pronged: one is the mobilization of private sector investments and build-up of agro-industrial capacity and the other, the strengthening of the productive capacity of the economic sectors in the region. These are expected to generate sustained employment and economic opportunities for the regional population.

In order to operationalize this strategy, a two-fold approach was adopted. Given the geographical expanse and diversity of the region, one approach is the translation of the strategy in spatial terms, i.e., delineating the region into program areas mentioned earlier as the IAD. This facilitates rationality and effectivity in planning and implementation by pinpointing public investments in an area based on its inherent characteristics and potentials. The other approach is enumerating and integrating the flow of public investments into six

Key Regional Development Programs reflecting the vital socio-economic areas where development activities are most needed.

The regional development planning process covers the entire cycle of planning, programming, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In order to understand the relevance of the approach to the whole process, there is a need to understand the role of the Regional Development Council (RDC)* in the region. In essence, the adopted Key Regional Development Programs become the implementing strategy of the plan through this body.

The RDC, in accordance with its mandate, is the principal development body in the region. It is organized into a Council Proper, an executive Committee and the Technical Staff. The task of coordinating the planning and implementation of developmental activities of all regions, however, is one of the major responsibilities of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) in their regional offices as the RDC Technical Staff.

The Key Regional Development Programs are aligned with the national and regional thrust in terms of: (1) achieving self-sufficiency in food; (2) developing alternative sources of energy; (3) generating employment opportunities and expanding the export sector to improve foreign exchange earnings; and (4) providing the basic social services and infrastructure facilities. These programs become the policy instruments through which the development activities of the government are coursed. They provide integration, linkage and

*The creation of a Regional Development Council for each of the administrative regions of the country was mandated in the Integrated Reorganizational Plan in 1972. The RDC is responsible for translating national development goals into specific regional objectives and for formulating and adopting development plans and investment programs for the regions. It also coordinates all planning and programming activities of both national and local entities at the regional level. The RDC is composed of the governor of the provinces, mayors of the chartered cities comprising the region, national assemblymen coming from the region, the heads of the regional offices of national line ministries and regional and subregional development authorities existing in the region.

direction to the various development programs and projects of regional agencies in a given sector. The Key Regional Development Programs and their objectives are shown in Figure 1.

Thus, to enhance the institutionalization of the Key Regional Development Programs, a Regional Program Management Group (RPMG) for each key program in the region is organized. These groups serve as the task forces or sectoral groups under the Regional Development Council. Each RPMG is chaired by the executive head of the lead regional agency. For instance, the Regional Food Sufficiency Program is chaired by the Regional Director of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. For each RPMG, a Technical Working Group (TWG) consisting of senior planners and budget officers of the agencies represented in the group forms the "workhorse". See Figure 2.

It is through this organizational structure that the entire regional development planning process operates. When Executive Order No. 589 called for the adoption of a Regional Development Investment Program (RDIP) as the implementing framework of the Five-Year Regional Development Plan, the "Key Development Program" approach facilitated the organization of the RDIP. The RDIP is conceived, among others, as a total resource budget (capital outlays and current operating expenditures) containing all possible investment areas in terms of programs and projects to be implemented in the region. As an investment program, it is also treated generally as a comprehensive listing of ideas about possible investments needed to be undertaken for a certain period aimed at enhancing capital formation and development services in the area. The RDIP seeks the synchronization of planning, project identification, investment programming and annual budgeting process. The annual components of the five-year program already become components of the budgets of regional line agencies which are consolidated to constitute the regional budgets intended for national government funding. The synchronization objective not only simplifies the programming efforts but also effects closer coordination between and among line agencies.

The KDP provides an implementing as well as institutional framework for the RDIP. Investments are properly classified in terms of the particular program they support. The key programs provide the basis for identifying additional investments in terms of new projects and a justification for continuing or realigning existing programs and projects. Based on the KDP's established objectives, thrusts and strategies, several action elements or necessary activities to meet the program's targets are identified. This, therefore makes the RDIP an exhaustive listing of investment requirements.

Using a sectoral orientation adopted before would not meet the objectives of the programming exercise. Taking the reality of limited public resources, programs and projects need to be coordinated and integrated. The project packaging features of the "Key Development Program" approach and the setting of area targets serve this purpose.

The RPMG, therefore, institutionalizes the integration aspect of the regional development planning process. The choice and proper scheduling of programs and projects are already means of prioritizing their implementation. The different elements contained in a program package are phased according to their functional relationship with each other. The key programs are taken as equally important by virtue of the factors considered in developing them. This does not mean, however, that the objective of minimizing if not totally eradicating intraregional disparities is lost in the process. While it is true that it is necessary to assess the relative importance of regional goals and objectives, the RDIP can serve its purpose effectively by aligning the IADs that should be the recipient of program implementation and corresponding fund allocations.

The "Key Development Program" package is assumed to contain the best combination possible of implementation programs and projects required to achieve a certain IAD target. Thus, the budget proposed by each individual implementing agency already consists of parts of determined contributions to a concerned Key Regional Development Program in the region.

Figure 1. Key Regional Development Program





Figure 2. Regional Development Organization



The regional budgeting process mentioned here refers only to the general budget of the national government from the General Appropriations Act passed by Parliament every end of the budgeting cycle. The budgeting cycle in the Philippines is prepared for a two-year period ahead of actual execution. This is appropriated sectorally which is then in turn divided among the national ministries under the sector. The national ministries allocate the amount to their regional branches and this amount serves as the latter's regional budget. The present budgeting process is the major limitation in the effective implementation of the "Key Development Program" approach. This will be explained further under the discussion on the weaknesses of the approach, but in brief, there is an existing gap between the programming and budgeting process in this respect.

The limitations experienced in the budgeting stage of the regional development planning process, significantly affected implementation. Because the programs and projects submitted for funding by the regional agencies are part of a package aimed at meeting a set area target, any deviation in amounts granted by the budget will mean reprogramming of activities rendering the key program inconsistent.

Similarly, monitoring and evaluation which is closely linked to implementation becomes generally paper work. Monitoring and evaluation of the plan implementation is of two parts: (1) project performance monitoring and evaluation which involves the assessment of accomplishment in terms of physical and financial targets; and (2) indicator monitoring and evaluation which involves the assessment of improvement in selected socio-economic indicators. Any feedback to plan formulation from monitoring and evaluation due to the mentioned limitation becomes misleading. Also, most monitoring and evaluation activities cover individual agency programs and projects instead of reflecting program package performance.

V. ASSESSMENT OF THE APPROACH AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are other institutional factors that contribute to the breakdown of the regional

development planning process but they are not considered in this analysis. The "Key Development Program" approach requires a reorientation of the entire planning process in the country and to some extent the strengthening of the administrative machinery of regional development.

There are inherent inconsistencies of the present system with the "Key Development Program" approach. First, sectoral orientation creates a feeling of individualized perspectives. The effort to promote coordination will always be difficult if the strategy is taken on a sectoral basis. The basic strength, therefore, of the "Key Development Program" approach is its potential to change the sectoral orientation of the planners and implementors in the region. Secondly, the system is constrained by numerous nationwide programs, maintained primarily to avoid displacement of the present staff of concerned offices. Thus, the practice perpetuates "agency-orientation". It might be quite correct to conclude that the "Key Development Program" approach in a sense will remain superficially effective. However, the influence created on the planners and implementors may later direct planning and implementation toward the desired framework of the approach.

Related to the above, another apparent strength of the "Key Development Program" approach is the creation of a consciousness of working for a common strategy. Each sectoral agency has a different strategy for implementation owing to the nature of its established function. The approach, however, integrates and at the same time links all agencies' strategies into a broader strategy. Membership in a particular RPMG motivates the agency planner and implementor to match their activities with each other. The approach has particularly contributed much to program rationalization.

The positive effects of the approach discussed earlier, however give a false sense of coordinative efforts when viewed from the budgeting limitations mentioned earlier. Implementation depends, by and large, on the financial resource given by the national government for a certain development activity. The problem is not due

to fund limitations but due to the system of fund allocation. Because funds are not granted on a package basis, there is no assurance that program targets are met. Although it is assumed that the agency program and project components are extracted from a package, there is no pressure on the national ministry to allocate the required amount.

Linked with this problem is the way national planning and budgeting operates in the country. National plans are composed of sectoral plans and programs, thus budget allocation is estimated on the basis of sectoral program fund requirements and ultimately channeled to sectoral ministries.

Also, the nature of nationally-conceived programs as described in the proceeding pages limits key program package components to existing programs and projects already being implemented by national ministry offices in the region. Most of the time, program packages have to accommodate these existing agency programs and projects, and their consistency with the key program strategy are by and large assumed.

A precise evaluation of the extent of influence of the Key Regional Development Programs in the region over the entire regional development planning process is difficult. Looking closely at the factors that limit the effective implementation of the approach points back to the existing national and regional institutional structure. To suggest a modification of the present structure to suit the requirements of the approach at this time is unjustifiable. There has to be a basis of comparison between the "Key Development Program" approach and the sectoral approach that will merit a claim of superiority of the former over the latter.

What the region could concentrate on at the moment is to strengthen the institutional linkages in the region and improve the basic features of the approach. For one thing, the area targeting methodology has to be fully accepted and followed by the regional implementors. Included in this is an evaluation of the IAD delineations. Another important concern is the creation of a system of quick programming techniques in cases when budget requirements are not met.

There is also a growing pressure from the RDC on the national ministries to abolish or change certain programs and projects that are found to be no longer responsive to existing needs. Private sector participation also needs to be aggressively encouraged especially in program packaging.

As a whole, the region should promote the approach for the other regions to adopt. This will expedite the institutionalization of the concept at the national level. So far, this is seen to be the best means of convincing national planners and implementors into considering the advantages of the approach. Otherwise, the Southern Tagalog Region will have to perform exceedingly well in order to prove the merits of the approach.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: RAISING LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES WITHOUT INCREASING TAXES

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Government Cycles

Government organizations, like their business counterparts, have different life cycles. The phases that an organization goes through during its life generally fall into four categories—growth, stability, retrenchment, and revitalization. Different political and management strategies are needed to set the course and properly guide an organization through these different phases. Strategy is concerned with defining purpose and developing goals and plans to chart an organization's future direction and growth.

The history of local governments in many countries including America can be divided into these same phases. These cycles, and their financial and operational variations, have impacted local governments just as they have private sector organizations. During this century, these phases have been chronicled in four distinct periods. During the growth phase of local government, services were generally expanded, and new programs were added in response to citizen demands. During the stabilization phase, the level of services was fairly constant, and citizens made few requests for more services. Minor adjustments to services were made, but limited revenues checked the overall growth of government.

The retrenchment phase forced public officials to consider such issues as which services to reduce, which to maintain, and where to expand needed services at the expense of less desirable programs. These changes were brought about by citizen

mandates limiting taxation and spending, fewer taxes from existing revenue sources, and a political philosophy of fiscal conservatism. Against this background, a new cycle of self-renewal, or revitalization, is taking place in local governments across America. This new strategy is based upon the premise of raising revenues without increasing taxes, and relies on the philosophy of offering economic development incentives to the private sector.

Public officials in local governments throughout the nation are now focusing their attention and efforts on strategies and incentives to stimulate economic development. Through economic development, local governments have been able to get a "new lease on life" financially by expanding revenues from existing sources, such as sales taxes, property taxes, business licenses, utility taxes, and related revenues, without creating new taxes or increasing existing taxes.

Virtually dozens of incentives are now being offered by public officials to achieve financial stability without increasing taxes. Many of these incentives are new and innovative. All have been created and fostered by a political philosophy emphasizing fiscal self-reliance, based on the belief that public officials should assume responsibility for their government's financial destiny. The emphasis on economic development also places a decreasing reliance on grants from higher levels of government. Some of these emerging economic development incentives are applicable to developing countries and are highlighted below.

Economic Development Incentives

Political Philosophy— The underlying political philosophy of elected officials frequently recognizes the need to stimulate economic development. A political philosophy of self-reliance, recognizing the need to expand a city's tax base and create jobs, sets the political background against which all economic development activities occur.

Political Climate — The climate created by a local government's political philosophy may serve to entice development. Elected officials favoring economic development, or specific types of projects, may make their intentions known through a number of different methods. News travels fast about the availability of economic incentives to the private sector.

Positive Staff Relations — The ability of a government's staff to work with the development community can create a healthy business atmosphere. The time spent by the staff explaining the rules, trying to work with property owners, and negotiating within predetermined guidelines, fosters a positive relationship with the private sector.

One-Stop Permit Process — Many local governments have implemented a one-stop permit process to facilitate the processing of development applications. Rather than make applicants go to several locations to obtain permits, they are issued at one central location. This saves the private sector both time and money when seeking approval of development plans.

Business Assistance Programs — Because of the increasing number of economic incentives offered by local governments, this type of program makes information about all incentives available at a single location. Existing staff members are educated as to all programs and resources. This information is made available to both existing and new businesses.

Enterprise Zones — A new phrase, which merely refers to an area targeted by local government officials for development. They are typically blighted areas, one where jobs are needed or increased revenues are desired to finance public services. Economic incentives may be offered in specific areas, subject to approval of the elected

officials.

Development Standards — Local government officials have the power to alter many development standards, such as parking lot coverage, setbacks, and landscaping, to name a few. Requirements may be waived, or lowered, depending upon the type of development, and the agreement negotiated. These changes usually require the approval of elected officials.

Business Retention Programs — These programs are designed to monitor the economic climate of important businesses and industries in a community. Staff members make contact with failing enterprises, offering financial and technical assistance, as appropriate. This helps maintain a healthy business climate where jobs and revenues are important.

Small Business Development — Sometimes referred to as "incubator" programs, both the public and private sectors are creating developments that offer amenities to attract and foster the growth of small businesses. These amenities include low-cost rental rates, small office spaces, and shared secretarial services.

Low-Cost Financing — Various forms of low-interest financing are available to the private sector. These programs typically save the developer a few percentage points below market lending rates. The project is usually the security for the loan, and the payments are normally made by the property owner.

Zone Changes — Local elected officials may approve and upgrade to the zoning applicable to a site, thereby permitting a higher land-use. Frequently, single-family residential zoning may be upgraded to multiple-residential, industrial, or commercial, depending upon the location of the site, and the type of development desired by the community.

Mixed Land Uses — Zoning within particular areas is usually standardized to protect property values and to separate different land uses. A trend is developing to permit commercial uses in residential developments, and vice versa, in order to generate additional revenues and jobs. Mixed land uses have been more popular in central city areas.

Density Bonuses — Many local governments are offering increased dwelling unit densities in selected areas. The number of residential units permitted can be increased, thereby enhancing the value of the development. Greater building densities can make a community more attractive to the development community.

User Fee Adjustments — Local governments charge a number of development-related user fees and charges, all of which can be lowered or waived at the discretion of elected officials. User fees and charges may be adjusted for application submittals, plan checking, building inspection, engineering, and related processing costs.

Tax Rebates — Local governments may provide tax rebates as a development incentive. Rebates typically involve property taxes, sales taxes, business taxes, utility taxes, and so forth. The amount returned, and the duration of the rebate, are subject to negotiation and usually based on the economic benefits generated by the project.

Redevelopment Project Areas — Redevelopment projects are formed in blighted areas targeted for economic revitalization. The property tax base is frozen upon formation. As development occurs, the increased property taxes called tax increments are spent in the project area to attract more businesses.

Tax Increment Financing — In redevelopment project areas, the additional property taxes (i.e., tax increments) received after the base year, can be spent in several ways. They can be used, with appropriate approvals, to finance on-site and off-site improvements, provide land subsidies, and for the acquisition of property for private development.

Off-Site Improvements — Local revenues, including tax increment funds, are most frequently used to finance off-site improvements such as curbs, gutters, sidewalks, storm drains, sewers, streets, street lights, and similar types of projects. An agency's financial participation, which is subject to negotiation, tends to increase based on the desirability of the project.

On-Site Improvements — Although not as frequent, tax increment revenues can be used to finance on-site improvements on projects in redevelopment areas. Surface

parking lots and multi-story parking structures are the most common types of improvements. An agency's financial participation, ownership rights, and maintenance responsibilities are subject to negotiation.

Land Subsidies — In redevelopment areas, tax increment funds may be used to purchase land for private development. This cannot be done outside of legally designated redevelopment areas. The extent of an agency's subsidy, which may be as high as 100 percent, is subject to prior agreement. Desirable industries, generating jobs and revenues, frequently request such subsidies.

Economic Development Corporations — Local governments, frequently together with business groups, have formed this type of non-profit organization. Their purpose is to offer low-interest financing and economic development assistance to the private sector. Several smaller agencies, which may have limited funds and staff expertise, commonly band together to form such corporations.

Knowledge of Available Resources — Other public and private agencies may offer forms of economic development assistance. A knowledge of these resources, which may be available from higher levels of government, chambers of commerce, colleges and universities, and economic development corporations, may be used to foster the expansion of existing businesses as well as to help attract new development.

The Future

Some local governments are in the growth phase of their life cycle, primarily in suburban areas where an expanding tax base can support new services. Others have reached a state of stability, where there is a match between available financial resources and citizen expectations concerning service levels. Many, however, are coping with fewer tax dollars and greater demands for services. For these local governments, a strategy of self-renewal and revitalization is necessary for economic survival. Since it is difficult if not impossible to raise taxes, economic development provides the most politically acceptable vehicle to improve a local government's financial health.

Many new and innovative techniques are

emerging to stimulate economic development. All require some form of partnership with the private sector. The number and types of incentives are still evolving and are limited only by the imagination and creativity of public officials. The only limitations that exist are the parameters established by existing state and federal laws. Since local governments have their own unique political cultures, and the decisions of public officials are subject to scrutiny by the electorate, the economic development strategy and incentives selected must be tailored to fit the needs of the community. Public officials in areas with a great need for additional

jobs and revenues must consider aggressive economic development strategies.

The bottom-line is that public officials, both elected and appointed, must assume responsibility for their government's long-term financial health. The political philosophy adopted will provide the background against which all economic development activities occur. The resulting political climate will determine both the type and number of incentives provided to the private sector. Economic development incentives that stress creativity and innovation, such as those described above, will continue to be developed in the future.

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The MINISTRY OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS study on "Town Planning under the Inter-Agency Local Planning Assistance Program" was conducted by the UP Planning and Development Research Foundation, Inc. The study team was composed of the following: Dr. Leandro A. Vitoria, Project Manager; Prof. Tito C. Firmalino and Prof. Ernesto M. Serote, Team Leaders; Mr. Alex Q. Cabanilla, Ms. Carmelita U. Liwag and Prof. Cynthia D. Turingan, Regional Supervisors; Ms. Delia R. Alcalde, Ms. Cynthia M. Alvarez, Ms. Athena F. Azarcon, Ms. Victoria A. Eugenio and Ms. Emily M. Mateo, Research Associates.

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