

# Political Development After Martial Law: An Evaluation

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Three years of martial law have passed. Expectedly, political literature evaluating its performance has mainly consisted of either eulogies, whether sincere or self-serving, praising the "unprecedented achievements" of the New Society; or outright condemnation of its record which supposedly falls short of the critic's libertarian or socialistic ideals.

This paper does not attempt to strike a middle ground between these two positions. Such a petty exercise is uncalled for, especially since it concerns the future of a nation. Instead, this examination of the present political situation is based on two premises:

- 1) The form of government that serves the interest of a developing nation is authoritarianism with a populist ideology.<sup>1</sup>
- 2) Experimentation with authoritarianism, as with democracy, will inevitably invite errors in judgment on the part of formulators of public policy.

Authoritarianism, as used here, refers to a political system in which "the government's power is large, concentrated, and easily mobilized, and . . . the government manifests a determination and ability to use this power to carry out its policies."<sup>2</sup>

## I. The Record of Modernized States

The history of developed democratic countries has shown that the initial requirements of political development, national unification and economic and bureaucratic rationalization are

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achieved through a strong, central government. The political modernization of England and France, the world's oldest surviving democracies, was initiated by two authoritarian rulers, Henry II and Louis IX. Both asserted the authority of the national government and curtailed the power of the nobles.<sup>3</sup>

Similarly, the autocratic German empire founded by Otto von Bismarck in 1871 sealed the integration of the German nation. The spirit of *Obrigkeitsstaat* (the state as commanding authority) brought about an atmosphere of discipline, efficiency, and honesty -- distinctive qualities that are now associated with the German people. The consolidation of the policy gave so much impetus to the economy that, by 1900, Germany had outdistanced France in industrial power.<sup>4</sup>

A political system akin to the state centralism of Germany was adopted by the Meiji government in Japan in its first two decades of rule. The feudal domains were abolished in 1871, and universal conscription was introduced.<sup>5</sup>

But what is little known is that the United States of America had her share in the exercise of centralism. The Federal Constitution, which was adopted in 1787, ran counter to the individualist ideals of the Revolution. The American Founding Fathers, who were mostly concerned with stability, devised the Electoral College for choosing the President, created a powerful judiciary, and entrusted the choice of senators to the state legislatures. Most of all, the executive branch of government was given immense powers. Samuel Huntington, a noted political analyst, gives the following observation on the American presidency:

In function and power, American Presidents are Tudor kings. In institutional role, as well as in personality and talents, Lyndon Johnson far more closely resembles Elizabeth I rather than does Elizabeth II. Britain preserved the form of the old monarchy, but America preserved the substance. Today, America still has a king, Britain only a crown.<sup>6</sup>

Not content with the centralization of government that the 1787 Constitution had wrought, the Federalists attempted to repress the opposition party which was formed in 1797. The following year, the Alien and Sedition Acts were passed and gave the President "the power to order out of the country any alien whom he thought dangerous to the public peace of whom he had reasonable grounds to suspect of plotting against the government." Such aliens were left without recourse to the courts. The Acts, which also concerned citizens "who severely criticized the government," considered it

"unlawful to combine and conspire in order to oppose the legal measures of the government" and to "publish a false or malicious writing against the government of the United States, the President, or Congress with the purpose of stirring up hatred against them . . ."7 All those arrested and convicted under these Acts were Republicans.<sup>8</sup>

In the economic sphere, there was substantial government intervention and investment aimed at aiding the development of commerce and industry. The federal government invested in the Bank of the United States and imposed protective tariffs and inspection standards for the benefit of domestic industries. Charters were granted to new business corporations, and franchise was given to companies to protect them from competition during their early growth.<sup>9</sup>

As late as the twentieth century, direct steps were taken by the federal government to curtail the activities of business monopolies. Theodore Roosevelt influenced Congress to create a new Department of Commerce and Labor, which would be empowered to investigate large business corporations. In 1912, Woodrow Wilson established the Federal Reserve System which provided more flexible currency and credit arrangements and better regulation of banking. He procured the enactment of the following: an anti-trust law, which prohibited interlocking directorates that prevented competition; an eight-hour law for interstate railways; a child-labor act; and a federal farm loan system. The President also formed the Federal Trade Commission, which policed the operations of corporations.

## II. Criteria of Political Development

The requirements of political modernization posited by Western political scientists also bear out our claim that conditions in developing societies demand authoritarian rule.<sup>10</sup>

The first generally held requisite of political development is *increase in the capacity* of the political system. Greater effectiveness and efficiency in the system entail coordination of all its parts. To effect coordination, governmental power must be extended to most functional areas of society. This recognized management principle is a *sine qua non* to the other goals of political modernization, which are differentiation and equality.

*Differentiation*, the second requirement, is the process of specialization of political roles and structures. Here, the capacity of the poli-

tical system is instrumental in the rationalization of authority, which involves replacing traditional and familial authorities by a single, secular, political authority, separating occupational roles from kinship, and distinguishing an integrated system of legal norms from religion.<sup>11</sup> But an important corollary of the modernizing polity's differentiating function is the reinforcement of interdependence among the complex roles and structures in the political organization. Integration and harmonization of bureaucratic functions are necessary to prevent wastage of resources and needless duplication of activities.

The last element of political modernization is a general spirit of *equality*. It means that the application of norms in the government's relations with the population must be universal, and that political recruitment must be based on achievement rather than on birth or other ascriptive factors. The egalitarian dimension of political development includes mass participation in political activities, whether through suffrage or through forms of popular involvement sponsored by authoritarian regimes. By sustaining citizen awareness of their equal privileges and deprivations, the modernizing elite presupposes a continuing bond between the government and the people. Like structural differentiation, popular rule can be achieved if the government commands a high level of capacity in implementing its decisions and in penetrating all sectors of the political community.

Mass mobilization must also be accompanied by mechanisms which afford corrective feedback from the people. Thus, new political institutions need to be developed in order to organize increased participation by groups throughout society. These institutions must allow adaptation to new types of social goals in a manner that prevents the systems from fossilizing.<sup>12</sup>

Needless to say, these requisites of political development correspond to the economic and social facets of modernization. Accompanying political capacity must be economic growth sufficient to increase both production and consumption regularly. Political equality must be met by a commensurate increment of social mobility and a differentiated political structure should be complemented by a diffusion of secular-rational norms in the social order.

But the basic problem in modernization is how to simultaneously achieve its political, economic, and social objectives. It is not uncommon to find societies whose gains in the political or economic dimensions are neutralized by their failings in the social dimension.

Within the sphere of political development alone, conflicts sometimes arise among its three objectives of capacity, structural differentiation, and equality. States in the early phase of modernization usually opt for increased capacity through the accumulation and concentration of power as a priority in political development. As described earlier, the broadening of participation in Western Europe and the United States came after the rationalization of authority and the differentiation of structure.<sup>13</sup> The Philippine experiment in democracy has shown that efforts to increase political capacity, differentiation, and equality fail in a licentious society. Like other former colonies, our adoption of the formalities of democracy preceded the integration of our nation.

While the presently developed nations had to attain the unity and stability that nation building requires before they could launch a campaign for popular participation, many new nations learned, if not actually experienced, beforehand the mechanics of liberal democracy from their colonial masters.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, party loyalties tended to reflect tribal, factional, or personal rivalries rather than differences in policy preferences.<sup>15</sup> As frustrations arise from these inevitable shortcomings in the political process, peoples in the early stages of nation building are driven to believe that "we can never be fit for a democracy."

### III. Political Imperatives in the Third World

But the more compelling reason for authoritarianism is the Third World's struggle for survival in the primitive and competitive society of nations. The less developed countries are faced with limited time, dwindling and unevenly distributed resources, resultant unrest and disunity, and foreign exploitation. The modernization of developed states was aided by wars, expansionism, and revolutions which have the cathartic and integrative effect that intensifies national consciousness. On the other hand, Third World countries are barely recovering from the onslaught of colonialism and are continually warding off incursions from the stronger powers. Confronted with unequal competition from these early modernizers, developing nations have to race against time to achieve a stage of development which took advanced states centuries to reach.

The energy crisis is one of the major arguments for time-saving centralized governments in the Third World. In a paper entitled "World Energy Resources," Dr. Serafin Talisayon underscored two stark realities concerning the state of world ecology:<sup>16</sup>

- 1) Around the 2020's 90 per cent of global oil reserves shall have been exhausted;
- 2) In this same period, most of the globe's metal reserves will have been depleted.

These constraints have clear consequences on the politics of developing nations. Not only are strong governments necessary for the efficient implementation of economic programs which cushion the inflationary effects of the oil crisis. Centralization is required for the purpose of rationing and conserving remaining resources. Greater effectivity in organizing raw material cartels, which will rectify trade imbalances with industrialized nations, also necessitate authoritarianism.

Moreover, the worsening of the energy problem has clear implications for social and political organization. Towards the year 2000, many societies will be compelled to nationalize industries. Collectivization of housing, education, and transportation can only be effected by governments capable of swift and forceful decisions. Anticipation of such developments is reflected in the policy statements not only of the martial law government but also of the different political movements that challenge its authority.

#### **IV. Assessment of the Philippine Experiment**

Our evaluation, therefore, of the New Society will not be based on libertarian or constitutional criteria.<sup>17</sup> Rather, we shall concern ourselves with its performance as an authoritarian government that has taken up the objective of steering the nation towards development.

Any attempt at social restructuring must be accompanied by a restructuring of personal and social values. This is a crucial area which the New Society has neglected. The mass media continues to project counter progressive values that defeat the modernization programs of the government. Examples from public leaders are not visible enough to inspire the population. There are talks about comprehensive plans for value transformation being drafted by "think-tanks" but until now nothing concrete has been produced. In the Department of Education and Culture, the textbook writing and training programs of the Social Studies Center are seeking to inject development-oriented ideas into the school system. However, the effects of this timely effort will be limited to precollegiate students. What needs more social reeducation is the adult segment of the population, which exerts moral influence over the youth.

Thus, we continue to witness inefficiency among public servants, purposelessness among the youth, general apathy among the citizenry, the persistent occurrence of crimes, and vices characteristic of the Old Society. Consequently, the government's political capacity and promise of political equality, the very justifications for authoritarianism, suffer.

Another problem that the state faces is the question of how to arrive at quick decisions without isolating itself from the people. The pitfall of many well-meaning but security-conscious authoritarian rulers is the emergence of a *cordon sanitaire* that prevents significant inputs from reaching them. Articulation of interests becomes limited to a few conduits who almost always manage to transmit to top policy makers only "acceptable" information. Thus, programs are founded on false premises about popular needs and sentiments, and find little relevance to the masses. On the other hand, thinking citizens have little choice but to resort to "subversive" manifestoes or less tame alternatives to give vent to their frustrated feelings.

There are signs that the martial law government might be on its way to this predicament because of the marked absence of a servomechanism through which feedback may be received, processed, and acted upon. There are, of course, the barangays but they have not been so institutionalized and revolutionized as to afford an honest, dynamic interaction between the state and the citizenry. Their discussions have been limited to local matters. And where local affairs are openly deliberated upon, they usually touch on such trifle issues as beautification, traffic regulations, and parades. There are attempts to measure indicators of political participation in the New Society but there are obvious constraints to these studies.<sup>18</sup>

It is a pity that the present regime, with its gains in the fields of economic growth and bureaucratic reorganization, has not maximized the resources and opportunities under its control to usher in a genuine social transformation. Lacking is an effective two-way flow of information. From the state down to the people must come reinforcement of secular-rational norms so vital to the development of a nation. From the people upwards to the policy makers must emanate feedback that will monitor and correct the operations of the political system.

## V. Recommendations

### *Value Change*

The start of cure, they say, is one's admission of the illness. Many

are misled into thinking that Philippine society can progress without changing social values that are mistaken to be inherently Filipino. It is about time we accept that such "national" traits as passivity, fatalism, unreliability, bashfulness, extravagance, tardiness, parochialism, etc., are not permanent features of our heritage and identity. They are rather values and attitudes characteristic of tribal and feudal societies which have no place in a modernizing nation. These "traditional" habits can also be found in the backwoods of Europe and America, and are no more Filipino than the *fiesta* and the *pancit*. Unfortunately, many reputable sociologists, most of whom are Westerners, would want us to believe that these values should be cherished and could even be positively developed. While *hiya*, *utang na loob*, and *pakikisama* served their purposes as forms of social control among our nomadic ancestors and our rural folk who were bound by tenancy, they certainly are disfunctional to our new generations who are seeking to build an achieving society.

What the government must stress should no longer be the romantic life of *magbubukid* but norms that are associated with the modern man such as rationality, system, precision, predictability, and punctuality. These are qualities that should be acquired even by a worker or a peasant for they positively contribute to their liberation. A population that is progressive, disciplined, and socially conscious can be more easily mobilized for productive ends.

### *A National Ideology*

These secular-rational values can be meaningfully transmitted to the people in the form of a national ideology. An ideology or any set of beliefs and attitudes can be more voluntarily internalized if it motivates and stirs individuals to action. It must not be merely imposed from above and rooted in fear but must spring from the history, the sentiments, and the cry of the masses.<sup>19</sup>

The term "ideology" is pregnant with connotations which, for the uninitiated, are mostly bad. "National ideology," as used here, refers to a comprehensive, categorically stated set of ideas which provides:

- 1) an explanation for the historical development of a nation;
- 2) a clear conception of national objectives and the specific means to attain them; and
- 3) a projection of the transformed society, once national objectives are achieved.



In this definition, ideology assumes a positive, rather than a negative, role. But the more important question is not so much what ideology is as *what it is for*. A national ideology should serve the function not only of legitimizing the political system but, more significantly, of modernizing society. It finds its fulfillment in a political base that is authoritarian, and through a mass party system that is revolutionary. The national ideology, proclaimed in unmistakable terms, must penetrate and must be resolutely implemented in all sectors of society. Presenting as it does a model of individual and social behavior, the state must be unswerving in realizing basic ideological principles and overwhelming in inspiring the people.

President Marcos himself has acknowledged the need for such an ideology:

It is this social and economic setting of Philippine democracy that calls for radical change, but because the political culture abets the *status quo*, that too has to be radically changed. The question is whether these objectives necessitate the formulation of an ideology. Now, an ideology should reflect the historical experience, hopes, fears and expectations of a people. No two nations are exactly alike, no two revolutions. And living as we do in a revolutionary age, the ideology towards the remaking of society or the making of a new society must necessarily reflect the tendencies of the times.

In this sense, an ideology need not be a rationalization or a distorted explanation, let alone the justification of special or class interests; it must fill a general and vital need of human beings in a given community.<sup>20</sup>

Indeed, a common *Weltanschauung* shapes the degree and nature of popular participation in the economic and political development of the nation. That participation, once associated with the common good and the national spirit, becomes volitional and no longer bases itself on fear and habitual adherence. The early modernizers, as well as developing nations with a rich, ancient past, are fortunate to have had the traditions and historical milestones that inspire the population towards constructive action. For the Philippines, which is not only a young nation but a young civilization as well, there must be a more resolute and conscious effort to develop a national ideology.

### *Five Foundations*

For an ideology to be truly Filipino, it must anchor itself on the history and the positive values which were shaped by that history. In formulating the foundations of our national ideology, we must seek

to include only those values and institutions which contribute to progress.

As the national ideology is committed to the Filipino masses, the first pillar must be SERVICE TO THE PEOPLE. This is an imperative that has roots not only in nationalism but also in all religions. Education, the mass media, industry and commerce, the arts, and the government must dedicate themselves to the liberation of the people from the shackles of ignorance, poverty, and exploitation. Government, as the nerve center of society, must lay down specific guidelines for all its agencies and all sectors to see to it that they always conform to this humanitarian desideratum. The interest of the masses being the *conscience* of society, safeguards must be instituted to realize and sustain what is universally acknowledged as the popular good: decent existence, national pride, and cooperative spirit. It might be necessary to train vigilant cadres who will exemplify and enforce the value of rationality, efficiency, and integrity. Leaders of all levels must show the way to clean and modest living, and selfless service to the national community. Efforts to instill civic consciousness and ethics in the lower levels of education become futile if the adult population does not demonstrate seriousness in improving themselves. It is in this sense that ideology plays an *educative function* especially for the out-of-school, adult segment of the population which exerts much influence on the younger generations.

Service to the people must be the rationale for the second pillar, which is CONSCIOUSNESS OF NATIONAL GOALS. The population must be fully aware of the requisites and priorities in national development. For the people to enthusiastically participate in nation-building, they must know their stakes and be aware of where national efforts lead to. What are the long-range objectives? What is the ideal society that we are working for? What are the costs? What are the rewards? The government must be frank to the people in imparting its expectations from them and the methods to be employed throughout. The population cannot be wholehearted in sacrificing for future generations if they are given piecemeal information about national programs. Having transmitted the ultimate goals, all activities must be tied to them in order to minimize wastage and duplication.

To temper our idealism about what we can do, we should also remind ourselves about *what we cannot do*. In order to prevent national frustration in the development process, the third task of

ideology is to imbue the nation with CONSCIOUSNESS OF RESOURCE LIMITATIONS. Industrialization, as a modernization goal, must be redefined. The dwindling of fuel deposits 25 years from now, the unabated exponential growth of population, the deterioration of the environment — all these factors have consequences for the quantity of production and the quality of life. The people must be taught by the national ideology to conserve resources, practice family planning, protect the environment, recycle, and be prepared to limit their consumption. Their "champagne tastes" must be brought down to the capacity level of their "beer pockets." As mass media plays a pivotal role in this value reorientation, commercials must be mindful of the national policy of austerity and energy conservation.

It is not enough that people are united in their service to their fellowmen, resolute in the pursuit of national objectives, and unflagging in the conservation of resources. The cultural aspect of modernization is equally important. This involves the discovery of a national identity, a sense of history, reinforcement of national unity, and a common medium of communication. Thus, we proceed to the fourth pillar, NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS, which provides the moral stuff and the soul of a nation.

The search for identity — what we are — is intertwined with awareness of the past — what we have been. The national ideology must assist in reinforcing the confidence of the people in themselves. This calls for a *reinterpretation of Philippine history*. Reinterpretation does not mean distortion for nationalistic ends. It is enough that the people be exposed to the truth — to the scientific findings of scholars — that there is no inferior race; that culture is relative; that the absence of a precolonial empire was not due to the laziness and stupidity of our ancestors but to the sparseness of our population then, so that there was no need to build empires; and that colonialism thwarted our ingenuity and initiative. Our leaders and educators should not be permitted to downgrade our record as a people. While admitting our weaknesses, we should not stop at self-criticism but should offer positive alternatives.

Consciousness of our history requires *appreciation of our cultural communities* or what we call the national minorities. It is necessary not only for the cause of national unity but also for the attainment of national identity that the ideology places our non-Christian brothers on the same footing as that of the majority. The state

should maximize its efforts to harness the valuable manpower resources of our hardy and fiercely patriotic non-Christian brothers.

Historical and nationalistic consciousness also entails a speedy development of a *national medium of communication*. The vital role of communication in nationbuilding cannot be over emphasized. The government should decide as soon as possible what form the national language must take and, having decided that, should give language-development efforts all the support that they need. The national ideology can provide further impetus to the growth and dissemination of the national tongue.

Aside from nurturing our nationalism it behooves us to develop CONSCIOUSNESS OF OUR ASIAN ENVIRONMENT. Our geographical location is a fact from which we cannot escape. Moreover, it is with our Asian neighbors, who are crucial members of the Third World, that we share proximate interests. Political and economic realities that recently came to the fore magnify the interdependence that gravitates us towards our blood brothers in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and China. The national ideology must assist in exposing our people to the cultures and traditions, as well as to the national problems, of their countries. To maintain consistency, the mass media must be instructed to promote good relations with Asian governments. In the area of value transformation, there is much that the austere heritage of our oriental brothers can teach us. The humility and selflessness of Buddhism and Hinduism, the humanness of Islam, the humanitarianism of China, and the nationalism and discipline of Japan are values which blend well with our indigenous predispositions and which can refine the competitive, aggressive, and acquisitive ethic handed down to us by the West.

The five pillars of the proposed national ideology for the Philippines, therefore, are the following:

1. HUMANITARIANISM or service to the people;
2. FUTURISM or consciousness of long-range national objectives;
3. ENVIRONMENTALISM or consciousness of resource limitations;
4. NATIONALISM or consciousness of national identity;
5. PAN-ASIANISM or consciousness of the Asian environment.

In explaining the past, HUMANITARIANISM and NATIONALISM form the ideological foundations. In guiding the present and the future of our nation, HUMANITARIANISM and NATIONALISM

LISM provide the motivation; FUTURISM, ENVIRONMENTALISM, and PAN-ASIANISM the direction. Taken together, these value-premises constitute the encompassing ideology that could supply our people a reason for being; jolt them out of their lethargy, and catapult them to social progress.

### *A National Party*

For the ideology to be internalized and reinforced, the whole society must be thoroughly politicized. This process of political socialization can best be achieved through the organization of a mass one-party system.<sup>21</sup> Starting from the barangay, the national party will have chapters that correspond to all levels of government. These chapters will serve as watch-dogs which will evaluate the performance of elected officials and civil servants. They will also be the forum of the people for the airing of their grievances as well as the main agency for the transmission of the national ideology.

Serving as the vehicle for political participation as well as political socialization, the party organization will hence facilitate the flow of information downwards and upwards. This system will make popular rule more real. For purposes of ensuring grassroots participation, each barangay chapter will elect a representative to the town chapter which, in turn, will send its delegate to the provincial chapter. Provincial chapters will choose among its membership representatives to the national party organization.

The party system must incorporate dynamic members among the youth, intellectuals, and the common people. Its cadres should strictly enforce guidelines of behavior in different sectors — schools, government agencies, mass media, etc. — as well as link the elites and various interests. In other words, shared values and goals would be constantly reinforced by a personalized pattern of contact.<sup>22</sup>

A significant sector to be incorporated is, of course, the military. There must of necessity be a politicization of the army if it is to retain its dynamic role in modernization. It is often said that the military is the most modernized segment in developing societies. Its members stress efficiency and tend to be impatient with politics and procrastination. But this asset is their very weakness when it comes to formulating an ideology-based development strategy. Army men are primarily administrators, not mass mobilizers.<sup>23</sup> With the proper ideological orientation, however, they could be institutionalized as veritable leaders of modernization.

### *Urgent: Feel the Pulse of the People!*

The above recommendations are long-range. What is more important is for the national leadership to immediately provide channels of communication with the people, especially with those who have valid grounds for criticism. If nothing is done about it, growing alienation will erode the credibility and effectivity of the government.

The President could consider the idea of holding regular conferences with critics of the government without expecting them to lose their political identity and be coopted into the establishment. The talks could also include a few representatives of the working class picked at random from the streets, factories, and other places. These should not be token meetings but should be regarded as reliable sources of public opinion. As authoritarianism imposes limitations on public discussions, untrammelled freedom of expression must be allowed within the privacy of the palace. There might be some value in the idea of "democratic centralism" which involves democracy in the decision-making process and authoritarianism in policy-implementation. The reverse is catastrophic — authoritarianism in policy-making but anarchy in administration. Public reactions that are not allowed to reach national leaders will find their logical outlet in anomic behavior.

There is no better time to realize the progressive transformation of our people than in the present period of our history where the political machinery and the national disposition are conducive to positive change. Evasion of this responsibility will be a serious omission for which posterity will hold the leaders of the New Society accountable.

### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>This subject was discussed in a lecture delivered by the author before the National Historical Commission on September 17, 1975. The lecture entitled "Authoritarianism and Political Modernization: The Philippine Case," was published in *Dialogue* (October, 1974).

<sup>2</sup>Charles Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 102.

<sup>3</sup>Recommended sources on the subject of early modernization in Western Europe are Samuel Huntington, "Political Modernization: America v. Europe," in Richard Bendix *et al.*, *State and Society: A Reader in Comparative Political Sociology* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968); Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the Revolutions* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1955); Max Beloff, *The Age of Absolutism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); J. E. Gillespie, *The Influence of Overseas Expansion on England to 1700* (New York: Columbia University Studies, 1920); T. B. Packard, *The Age of Louis XIV* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1929); and Sidney Painter, *The Rise of Feudal Monarchies* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1951).

<sup>4</sup>On German political history, the following works were consulted: K. S. Pinson, *Modern Germany* (New York: Macmillan, 1954); J. S. Schapiro, *Modern and Contemporary European History: 1815-1940* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940); B. E. Schmit, *England and Germany: 1740-1914* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967).

<sup>5</sup>Yanaihara Tadao, "A Short History of Modern Japan," in Tobata Selichi (ed.), *The Modernization of Japan* (Tokyo: Maruzen Co., 1966); George Beckman, *The Modernization of China and Japan* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). A comparison of German and Japanese political development is found in Richard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of our Changing Social Order* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1964); pp. 177-213.

<sup>6</sup>Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

<sup>7</sup>J. Spencer, Bassett, *The Federalist System* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), pp. 258-259.

<sup>8</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 37-40.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 48-50.

<sup>10</sup>For the different definitions of political development, see Lucien Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 33-34; Alfred Diamant, "Political Development: Approaches to Theory and Strategy," in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 3-26; Samuel Huntington, "Political Modernization: America v. Europe," in John L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), *Political Development and Social Change* (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1971), pp. 49-51.

<sup>11</sup>Huntington, *loc. cit.*

<sup>12</sup>Diamant, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>13</sup>Huntington, *loc. cit.*

<sup>14</sup>S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Influence of Traditional and Colonial Systems in the Development of Post-Traditional Social and Political Orders," in Hans-Dieter Evers (ed.), *Modernization in South-East Asia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 13.

<sup>15</sup>Guy Hunter, *Modernizing Peasant Societies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 236; Milton J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," in Montgomery and Siffin, *op. cit.*, p. 73; John Badgley, *Asian Development: Problems and Prognosis* (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 138; Gunnar Myrdal, *The Challenge of World Poverty* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), pp. 208-216; Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 135.

<sup>16</sup>Serafin Talisayon, "World Energy Resources," Unpublished manuscript.

<sup>17</sup>Examples of recent works critical of martial law based on constitutional and libertarian grounds are the monograph published by the Civil Liberties Union and one which is entitled "Message of Hope."

<sup>18</sup>See, for example, Elsa Jurado, "Indicators of Political Opportunity and Political Welfare," *Workshop on Statistical Methods for Social Indicators*, Social Indicators Project, Development Academy of the Philippines, April 30, 1974.

<sup>19</sup>Guidelines for formulating a national ideology were first broached by the author in a paper he read at the University of the Philippines, Baguio City, December 9, 1974.

<sup>20</sup>Ferdinand Marcos, *Today's Revolution: Democracy* (Manila: Malacañang, 1971), p. 116.

<sup>21</sup>Samuel Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore (eds.) *Authoritarian Politics in a Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party System* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 9.

<sup>22</sup>Esman, *op. cit.*, p. 79; W. Howard Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 108-144.

<sup>23</sup>Esman, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95; Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, *op. cit.*, p. 243.