

## FEATURE ARTICLE

### ON THE "POWER OF THE POOR," POWER AND DEVELOPMENT

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Political power or power can be defined as the ability to influence the behavior or will of others. To speak of power in international relations, that is, power of a nation or a group of nations vis-à-vis another nation or a group of nations, one has to speak of the structure of the international system, the internal structure of the nations involved, and the position the nation occupies in the international structure. The problem of power is the problem of changing or keeping one's position in the international structure and the academic problem of power is defining the political parameter of the overall international system, knowing why nations change or lose their positions in the international structure, and determining the new rules of the game, the new power configuration, and, if you wish, the game matrix of the new parameter. To a large extent, the new political parameter and the shape of the world to come will never be solved in theory but only in fact or practice since there are "accidents" in history, the things that are not incorporated in theory that actually take place.

The end of the cold war, detente, the oil embargo and the new urgency that the problem of development has taken on in the last two decades seem to invite definitions of new political parameters and configuration of power since, it has often been said, the world is becoming more multi-polar. There seems to be a need for what Hedley Bull has described as a "reformulation of ideas in relations to changing circumstances and (the restatement of these ideas) in the idioms of the times."<sup>1</sup> In this regard, some Third World scholars, bent on the basically sound idea of "seeing" things differently in the coming new world order, have been talking about the "bargaining power of the poor" or the "power of the poor" as a force in inter-

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1. Hedley Bull, "The Theory of International Relations: 1919-1969" in *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 51.

national relations and the changing balance of economic power in favor of the developing nations.<sup>2</sup> This seems to be an interesting proposition, both policy-wise and academically. It is an admitted fact that international relations as a discipline is mainly an American discipline and one of its most neglected aspects in research are the instances when the weak were able to offset their weakness in dealing with the powers and how the weak nations themselves deal with each other.<sup>3</sup> The question that this essay tries to answer is: does the so-called "power of the poor" fill this gap? In other words, is there really a "power of the poor"? The significance of this question is not so much whether the gap in the discipline is filled or not but that, as new power configurations take shape, there is a danger that ideological smokescreens will proliferate in viewing concepts, functions and uses of power. Anticipating the conclusion of this essay, the recent positing of the "power of the poor" can be such an ideological smoke-screen that blurs the real alternatives facing the people of the Third World. We have Third World leaders professing anti-imperialism while asking for more aid, relaxing domestic investment laws to accommodate foreign investors, incurring monumental international debt, in short, calling for a greater integration of their nations into the world capitalist system and relations of unequal exchange. What is to be made out of events like these? Expectations are raised by these leaders about the bargaining power of the poor (and with it their own image in the international scene). This can be misleading. This is not to say that there are no leaders in the Third World who are not genuinely anti-imperialist and socialist. But all may suffer from the same ideological smokescreen. This essay will also try to portray some considerations that must be taken into account to be realistic in viewing the relations between power and development.

### Some Comments on Power

It is understandable why the "power of the poor" was posited at all. Josef Stalin once commented (perhaps nostalgically), "in our

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2. Regarding this "seeing things" differently, sample a recent comment by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. When hearing comments that Vietnam is nothing more than a proxy of the Russians in Southeast Asia, he said he doesn't "see things that way." He also added that "it's a mistake the big powers have been making in the past. It does not help to provide viable, stable relations in Southeast Asia. . . I do not agree with the view of some foreign observers who tend to see them (the Vietnamese) as proxies of the Russians." (*Japan Times*, Sept. 20, 1978.) The point here is not whether he is right or wrong but that his comment epitomizes the search for a different view of the world.

3. Stanley Hoffman, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus* I (1977): 58-59. See also Mushakoji Kinhide, "Dai-san Sekai no Seijigaku, II," *Kodomon Igo no Seijigaku* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1976).

days it was not the custom to reckon with the weak."<sup>4</sup> This is a stunning comment by marxist standards. Based on the general consensus on what the urgent problems of the world are today — the agenda of the United Nations and its agencies, the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, the Vietnam war, the demand for a new international economic order by the peripheral nations, and, if we forget for a while the artificial divorce between political science and economics — the days that Stalin referred to seem to be over. The events of the last four decades that ended those days are not entirely the designs of the great powers; they were also brought about by the developing nations themselves through their independence movements, revolutions, wars of national liberation, regionalism, attempts at organizational unity, and one very successful cartelization of export products. All these involved the exercise of political will and power on the part of the peripheral nations. Due to these events, especially the cartelization of export products, it is tempting to say that there is a real power of the poor.

The idea of the power of the poor is not totally new at an age when trade unionism has become an institution on the national level. As a concept in international relations, it is something we are not accustomed to. Since this is definitely power in the context of asymmetric relations, Johan Galtung's typology of power is relevant. According to the typology, there must be distinction between two types of power: the power-over-others and the power-over-oneself defined as autonomy. There are three types of power-over-others and also three channels through which these three powers are expressed. They are ideological power expressed through culture, remunerative power (goods to offer) expressed through trade and economy, and punitive power (force, threat of violence) expressed through the military. The combination and handling of all these is what is known as politics. Reaction to power pressure, i.e., attempts to assert power-over-others, can lead to any of the following ideal type situations:

1. Balance (Symmetric relations)

<i>Country A</i>	<i>Symmetric relations between two nations can lead to</i>	<i>Country B</i>
Ideological power	Balance of ideas	Ideological power

4. Quoted in E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Year Crisis, 1919-1939* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1964), p. 13.

5. Johan Galtung, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973), Chap. 3, pp. 33-47.

<i>Country A</i>	<i>Symmetric relations between two nations can lead to</i>	<i>Country B</i>
Remunerative power	Balance of dependence	Remunerative power
Punitive power	Balance of military might	Punitive power
<b>2. Asymmetric relations</b>		
<i>Country A</i>		<i>Country B</i>
Ideological power		Submissiveness
Remunerative power		Dependence
Punitive power		Fear

In the case of asymmetric relations, ideological power of A succeeds only because B has no strong national ideology and is thus "submissive"; its economy is disarticulated and determined from the outside and thus dependent;<sup>6</sup> and, as a result of submissiveness too, there is no strong national identity and cohesion, and, thus, "fear." Lack of cohesion results in low level social organization which affects all aspects of social life, including the military. Hence, to counteract power-over-others one must have power-over-oneself:

**3. Counteracting by power-over-oneself**

<i>Country A</i>		<i>Country B</i>
Ideological power	A U T	Self-respect
Remunerative power	O M O	Self-sufficiency
Punitive power	M Y	Fearlessness

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6. See Dieter Senghaas, "Multinational Corporations and the Third World: On the Problem of the Further Integration of Peripheries into the Given Structure of the International Economic System," *Journal of Peace Research* XII (1975): 257-274. Also, Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*, Vol. 1 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).

The sources of power-over-others and power-over-oneself are three: what a nation "is," resource power, and structural power, i.e., position of the nation in the world structure and hierarchy. "Is" is mainly the possession of natural resources. Resources are the ideology, culture and language from which ideological power comes; population (labor force), land (area) and capital (GNP, etc.) from which remunerative power comes; and military expenditure, and military soft and hardware from which punitive power comes. Although Galtung is not explicit, it would seem that the level of "is" and resource power result in a certain structural position of power and, needless to say, is historically determined. Such structural power may in turn affect the "is" and resource power. In short, this is simply the relations between development and the international system. Position in the structure or structural power has three aspects in the case of asymmetric relations: exploitation, fragmentation, and penetration. Exploitation is unequal exchange in a vertical and single division of labor; fragmentation is divide and rule (or being divided and ruled); and penetration is the presence of a western indoctrinated bridgehead or ruling elite in the peripheral nation.

Self-respect and fearlessness, if translated into more manageable terms, refers to national integration and cultural renaissance in the domestic society. Self-sufficiency is overcoming dependence, changing form of dependence or shifting from peripheral to semi-peripheral status (to be explained in more detail later). The former takes us back to theories of national integration and the question of nationalism. The latter takes us to dependency theory and theories of imperialism. In reality, nations are at different levels of national integration and different intensities of feelings of nationalism and identity, and forms of dependence have changed and are changing. The three types of power-over-oneself interact and affect each other negatively or positively.

The "power of the poor" was posited in the context of asymmetric relations, in a plainly hierarchical and unequal world. As Robert Tucker has said, "The history of the international system is a history of inequality par excellence" and is likely to remain so. Not only is there inequality between the rich and the poor but there is also inequality between the poor and the very poor. Inductively, it would seem that the severity of one's poverty results in lower structural position and less structural power, with the "is" and resource power correspondingly low. The converse is also true. This implies that unequal or different structural positions result in divergent interests in the international system. This should not be overlooked

in conceptualizing the "power of the poor"; otherwise there is the danger of falling into ideological traps. It seems that the conceptualization of the "power of the poor" falls precisely into this error. What is the "power of the poor" so far as it has been posited to date?

### The "Power of the Poor"

The description of the concept of the "power of the poor" adopted here was taken from Mahbub Ul Haq's, *The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third World*.<sup>7</sup> According to the concept, the basis of the power of the poor will be the numerical superiority of the people of the Third World. The rich nations are a shrinking population that comprises only 30% of the present world, and will comprise 20% by the end of the century, and 10% by the mid-21st century. With the decreasing number of the rich, power will inevitably flow out from them in the form of reverse dependency of the rich on the poor for labor, natural resources and market. This will be so especially for cartelized raw materials, the substitution for which would be costly. As for non-cartelized raw materials, the rich will depend on the poor not for the raw materials themselves but on the value added which the rich get through processing, shipping, advertising and distribution of these commodities. This, together with the spread of nuclear weapons, regrettable as it may be, would neutralize the power of the rich.

The power of the weak will also rise from the prospect that there will be a growing importance of common resources of mankind, especially, the sea beds.<sup>8</sup> Since the sea beds are not subject to colonial exploitation, the rich can only use these resources through international agreements and cooperation *if* the poor country has territorial jurisdiction over the resources. The alternative for the rich is to risk war. Last but not least, the support of OPEC for the poor

With OPEC's support, the international monetary order can be restructured simply, through the device of the OPEC members insisting on payment for their oil exports in SDRs rather than reserves of the rich nations. In trade, OPEC can financially support buffer stocks or even a commodity bank. New trade channels can be opened between OPEC and Third World nations. The Third World can renegotiate past external debts and past contracts and leases given to

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7. Robert Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977), p. 3.

8. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, pp. 169-183.

multinational corporations. The disruption this renegotiation (or default) may cause in the flow of resources to the poor can be relieved by flows from OPEC who will be on stand by to help. The voting power of OPEC and its influence on international financial institutions can be increased and they can work to their advantage and also that of Third World nations.

The power of the poor will somewhat be enhanced by the fact that the rich are also interested in changing the international economic order. Haq seems to separate economic power from political power. According to him, the real power of the poor is political, expressed through united votes in the United Nations and the willingness to disrupt the lifestyle of the rich (in what way, it is not clear). This will make the rich consider the cost of disruption against the cost of accommodation and can lead to an international New Deal (the term is Haq's).

The power of the poor, it is accepted, is still in the "bud" and must be nursed by political unity, collective bargaining from pooled resources, continuing study and research by Third World scholars on the concept of power, establishment of a secretariat to coordinate and develop negotiating positions for discussion with the rich nations in international forums, working through the UN and at the same time seeking changes within its structure, and stressing the need for a new international economic order.

What comments can be made about the "power of the poor"? Offhand, it is not a concept at all; what have been described are actually scenarios and strategies which have never been put into practice with any noticeable results. The dilemma is simple: there is not enough research at present to help in conceptualizing such a power, to give flesh to simply "seeing" things differently. Haq seems to have pulled the rug from under his own argument when at the end he says that, after all, all that was said is only "prelude to negotiations". Let us not be too harsh for the moment and let us just say that the flaws in conceptualizing the "power of the poor" is also an indictment of the discipline of international relations and its present orientation for it has its dice loaded against such a proposition.<sup>9</sup>

The more important reason why the positing of the power fails is that it was based on the dubious assumption that the Third World nations are homogeneous in their interest, i.e., they are all more or less in the same stage of development and hence have the same interest in the form that the international economic order will

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9. Haq included the space as one of the common resources of mankind in his discussion. It was excluded here since the Third World is not involved at all in space exploration.

have.<sup>10</sup> In short, it is assumed that the Third World nations are more or less all in the same structural position in the world system. There are contradictions among the rich and also among the poor and the essence and source of these contradictions are overlooked, thus making it tempting to assume homogeneity of interest within the two groups of nations. Stated in another way, it is made to appear that there are only two structural positions in the world system that gives rise to structural power and that all the rich occupy one position and all the poor occupy the other. It is in this assumed homogeneity that the "power of the poor" falls into an ideological pitfall and becomes unrealistic.<sup>11</sup> This error probably arose from some over-enthusiasm after the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and seeing the Arabs "kick the Americans around."<sup>12</sup> This is understandable. It could have been caused by a prevalent bimodal conceptualization of the world found in dependency theory instead of a tri-modal world. It could have resulted also from a lack of clear conceptualization of the world other than the vague sense of common colonial legacy and those provided in short range foreign policy goals. Still the error remains.

### Structural Power and Development

Haq seems to be vaguely aware of the difficulties facing the conceptualization of the power of the poor when he suggested that one way it can be nursed is to have

. . . serious analysis (in) the institutes of the Third World on the major components of political and economic power today, how they are developed and how they are changed over time and how the Third World can adopt a coherent and purposeful strategy for engineering a change in world power relations. While their politicians fight in the vanguard, academicians of the Third World must supply the relevant analysis.<sup>13</sup>

Setting aside the part about a coherent strategy and politicians fighting in the vanguard, the important question then is how power develops and if this is clear, the danger of ideological pitfalls is lessened.<sup>14</sup> One way the problem can be approached is to focus on

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10. See Hoffman, *op. cit.*

11. This problem has also been dealt with from a different angle in Tony Smith, "Changing Configuration of Power in North-South Relations since 1945," *International Organization* XXXI (1977) 1-27, and in Robert Tucker, *op. cit.*, Chap. 3, *passim*.

12. This was actually heard from a Filipino foreign policy analyst shortly after the oil embargo in early 1974.

13. Haq, *op. cit.* p. 182.

14. The reason for the exclusion is both space limitation and to avoid controversies in the elite and class structure of Third World nations.

structural power for it seems that on the international level, this expresses levels of development of the nation involved. Since power in the international level is also clearly a function of structural positions, a concept of a tri-modal world composed of peripheries, semi-peripheries and cores seems to be more relevant than a bi-modal world composed of peripheries and cores. Here, core status could be synonymous with core structural position, and hence core structural power. In the same way, there can be semi-peripheral structural power and peripheral structural power.

Development or change of status in the world system is as much a problem of political power as it is of economics. In a world of interdependence and linkages, political power in the domestic society is the starting point of development. Development according to Immanuel Wallerstein is the problem of

How is it possible to install and maintain in state power a regime with the will and possibility to transform the social structure (in a way that would make possible a dramatic rise in productivity and investment) when the possibility is based on somehow insulating the government from various pressures to consume its surplus immediately? To be more specific, the issue is less how to install such a regime than how to maintain in power over a long period of time, perhaps thirty or fifty years, during which time sufficient capital accumulation can take place, a national economy erected, and national (as opposed to sub-national) strata or classes could efficiently be organized so that state machinery is structurally resistant to outside intervention, internal secession, and palace coup d'état.<sup>15</sup>

The Maintenance of such a regime can be seen in terms of the control of the three main sectors of society – the internal cadres (ruling elite, technocrats, middle class), external world and workers.<sup>16</sup> Force, up to a point can be used to control the cadres (the problem that the cadres inevitably form a part of those who will be restrained notwithstanding) and ideology. The problem of the outsider is the problem of imperialism. Lastly, the workers can be subject to more egalitarian or ideological controls.<sup>17</sup>

The point or moment when development becomes a political problem is when development requires a "breakthrough" which is necessarily a political breakthrough that in turn makes possible the

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15. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The State and Social Transformation: Will and Possibility" in *Underdevelopment and Development: The Third World Today*, ed. Henry Bernstein. (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 280.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*

far more gradual economic progress.<sup>18</sup> The movement with the will to develop to gain power is a difficult political problem. Once power is gained, to retain power against counterforce, especially external, is also a difficult political problem and it is at this point that development becomes a problem of international politics for the developing nation. Recalling Galtung's typology, the problem of overcoming "submissiveness" and "fear" and transforming the nature of dependency or breaking it, starts with a political moment, and takes place — in most cases it has already taken place — at a particular congruence of international and domestic events. In recent history such a congruence seems to have taken place sometime before the Second World War and still is continuing until the present. This was the time of congruence of the new international "sensitivity" to inequality and the demand for more egalitarianism on the part of the developing nations.<sup>19</sup>

That political moment, though engulfed in the larger wave of congruence of international and domestic events, clearly did not take place at the same time for all Third World nations possessing unequal natural resources, resource power and structural power. Other than the obvious difference in structural power between the rich and the poor, there is a difference in structural power of Third World nations. Besides casting doubts on the homogeneity of interest of Third World nations as mentioned earlier, it also invites a possible conceptualization not of a bi-modal world but a tri-modal one. Core, semi-peripheral and peripheral statuses as said earlier are structural positions which results in a certain structural power in the international system. The problem of "how power is developed" is largely a problem of changing positions or status, assuming that domestic power of regimes of developing nations is preserved. *These moments of change in status and structural power can abstractly be thought of as problems of foreign policy of nations, with the political parameters of the world more or less clear to policy-makers and intellectuals of the developing nations.* What follows is a brief description of how status changes, based exclusively on Wallerstein. It has been vastly simplified.

There is already plenty of literature on the concepts of core and periphery associated with dependency theory. In almost all of them, as Wallerstein has pointed out, the shift from periphery to a higher level of development is treated as a shift from periphery to core status and overlooks an intermediate semi-periphery stage.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 282.

19. See Robert Tucker, *op. cit.* Chap. 2, *passim*.

What is the basis for knowing whether a nation is semi-peripheral or not?

According to Wallerstein, to know who does what in a system of unequal exchange, one must observe "the wage pattern and margin of profits of particular products at particular moments of time."<sup>20</sup> In such a case, a semi-periphery stands in-between the core and periphery in terms of the kind of products it exports and in terms of wage levels and profit margins. The singularity of a semi-periphery is that it trades with the core with *one mode of production* and with the periphery with *another* mode of production. The main interest of a semi-periphery in trade, however, is to reduce external trade, even if it is balanced since one of the major ways to increase aggregate profit is to capture an increasingly large percentage of its home market for its home products.<sup>21</sup>

The second characteristic is that the interest of the state machinery of the semi-periphery in the control of the market is greater than that of the periphery since the semi-periphery cannot depend on the market to maximize its profit margin in the short run. Thus, economic decisions are politicalized, especially at the moment of breakthrough from peripheral to semi-peripheral status and strengthening of semi-peripheral status.

A shift from peripheral to semi-peripheral status is a "move from the former pattern (colonial) to that of having a higher wage sector which produces *part* of what is consumed on the internal market but still is dependent on other parts of national consumption."<sup>22</sup> Not all Third World nations are in a position to claim a shift from peripheral to semi-peripheral status since international events and their own industrial and technological bases vary in levels of development. Hence, particular international events in an international economic order will favor certain nations with higher levels of industrial and technological bases and never favor others. There are nations that are never favored and hence never move. From this,

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20. Immanuel Wallerstein, "Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation Within the Capitalist World Economy," Paper prepared for the Conference on Development in Africa, Ottawa, Feb. 16-18, 1974, p. 4. Wallerstein also dealt with this concept in his other works like *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the 16th Century* (Academic Press: London, 1976), "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* XVI (1974), and "The World System Perspective in the Social Science," *British Journal of Sociology* XXVII (1976).

21. *Ibid*, 1973.

22. *Ibid*, p. 6.

it follows that most of these nations will have different interests in the international economic order. As proof of this, Wallerstein points out the divergence of interest of Third World nations during the Santiago meeting of UNCTAD in 1972 that made them unable to come out with a common stand on certain issues. Also, the United Nations has drawn up a list of "hard core" poor nations: 16 in Africa, 8 in Asia and Oceania, and only one in Latin America (Haiti). Thus, "it is not clear that those politico-economic decisions on the re-allocation of world resources, such as those favored by the Group of 77, would in fact do very much to alter the relative status of these "hard core" countries."<sup>23</sup>

Why do some nations improve their status and others do not? Basically, Wallerstein states, "the case (is) that only a minority of peripheral countries can fit into an expanding world market or conquer part of a contracting one at any given time and those who do, of course, manifest their 'success' by this missing 'extra ingredient.'" It would seem to be more fruitful to look at the possible alternative strategies in the light of the fact that only a minority can "make it" within the framework of the world system as it is than to search for the universal recipe. . ."<sup>24</sup>

Historically, Wallerstein enumerates three strategies by which nations have broken away from peripheral status.<sup>25</sup> The first took place with the adoption of import substitution policies during times of world economic contraction. It involved bold state action which was taken at a time when the metropolises were suffering from recession and against the agricultural oligarchs whose power was weakened with the drop of export earnings. This was the case of Mexico, Brazil, and South Africa during the depression and Russia and Italy during the 19th century. This strategy was adopted mainly by nations with relatively strong industrial and technological base. But as it is already known, this strategy led to technological dependence which can lead to a monopolistic structure in the domestic society since capital goods imports can only be done by relatively large firms. It is also subject to political contradictions at home among the conservative oligarchs and national bourgeoisie. This adds pressure on the state machinery. The resolution of this contradiction leads to the search for external markets and the abandonment of the domestic market. At the same time, the peripheral nation becomes a purveyor of

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23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*, p. 7

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-12. The terms that Wallerstein uses for these three strategies are "strategy of seizing the chance," "development by invitation," and "self-reliance."

products no longer manufactured in the core and receiver of industries that have lost their comparative advantage in the core.<sup>26</sup> Also, this strategy did not solve the problem of low agricultural productivity.<sup>27</sup>

Another strategy is through the penetration of multinational corporations which transform traditional leaders into planters, limits unemployment and creates income for workers after the initial colonial conditions had already disrupted the traditional social structure. This strategy takes place in a time of world economic expansion and is adopted by countries with less industrial base and peaks lower than the import substitution strategy.<sup>28</sup>

Lastly, there is self-reliance or autarchy. Complete autarchy is impossible since there is a need to comply with the world economy as well as the development of international cooperation. Nationalization becomes limited, sovereignty is curtailed and the economy becomes dependent.<sup>29</sup>

Needless to say, the historical cases of semi-peripheral development have all remained subordinate in the economic hierarchy. The problem of breakthrough from a semi-periphery into the core is basically the problem of having a "market large enough to justify an advanced technology, for which it must produce at a lower cost than existing producers."<sup>30</sup> This is usually done by prohibitions, quotas, tariff, lowering of production cost by the state instead of lowering prices of imported goods, subsidies, increasing internal levels of purchasing power, and affecting consumer taste through propaganda or ideology. Again, the problem of breakthrough of a semi-periphery, as in the case of the "extra-ingredient" of the periphery, is a matter of "nearly perfect mix." Historical cases have been that of Britain, Germany, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. These cases, however, will not be repeated since there have been changes not only in technology but also in political conditions.<sup>31</sup> The model of the 20th century is the Soviet Union. It has a long history of isolation, strong state structure and control, large territory, and population. The Soviet Union did it at a time of world economic expansion. This implies that it will be very difficult for other nations

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26. *Ibid*, p. 12-13.

27. See Samir Amin, "Self-Reliance and the New International Economic Order," *Monthly Review* (1977).

28. Wallerstein, *op. cit.* p. 11.

29. *Ibid.* p. 11-12.

30. *Ibid*, p. 13.

31. *Ibid*, p. 14.

less endowed than the Soviet Union to make a breakthrough even at a time of world economic expansion. The picture becomes more dismaying at a time of contraction, especially for the peripheries. The contradictions in times of contraction are between the cores themselves, between the cores and semi-peripheries, with the former fighting to avoid "slippage" and the latter to get a larger share of the market. The semi-peripheries also fight each other or form alliances among each other to obtain a larger part of the world market. At this time the semi-periphery's role as sub-imperialist state becomes obvious. As for the peripheries, the outlook is simply gloomy since the weak always gets squeezed in times of contradiction with the decline of their exports and protectionist barriers in the cores. Only the peripheries with strong technological base may use the impetus of the crisis to launch an import substitution policy. The rest simply stagnate.<sup>32</sup>

It seems that the shifts from periphery to semi-periphery and from semi-periphery to core status and slippages will be perpetual as long as the world capitalist system exists. It would only stop when a socialist world government is established. Wallerstein emphasized that even if a nation is socialist, the fact that it belongs to a world capitalist system means that it participates in the world market on the same principle of profit.<sup>33</sup> This is so because socialization of the means of production within the boundaries of a nation state is not the defining characteristic of a socialist system. It is not clear how a socialist world government will come about. It would seem then that strategies that can pull a nation out of the capitalist world system and the perpetuity of status changes is non-existent at the moment. This is not the same as saying that increase rural productivity, collectivization, and creation of an integrated national economy as suggested in what Samir Amin calls "popular development for the masses" and the subsequent strength of united liberated nations as a force in international politics is not possible.<sup>34</sup> It would in fact appear that such a strategy is subsumed in a tri-modal world and manifests itself through the changes of status of nations who have carried out this strategy. Here, it seems again that the tri-modal concept of the world has met the same fate as the bi-modal concept of dependency theory. The problem is that after going beyond dependency, the question of the shape of the world to come is not known.

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32. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

34. See Amin, *op. cit.*, 1977, pp. 15-21.

## Conclusion

By way of conclusion, what is left for Third World nations and revolutionary governments to do? Basically, one should be realistic about the limited alternatives of courses of development in the present world. Status shifts are taking place and the world is becoming multi-polar. The task of Third World nations and their scholars is both empirical and theoretical, revolving around what Haq has suggested on the development and elements of power, but this time with the knowledge of limited alternatives and hence less danger of ideological pitfalls. At the same time, another task is what Anuoar Abdul Malek described as "careful intelligence":

The world enters at an accelerated pace into an era of great mobility where, paradoxically, the growth of power potential held by the principal states will permit a dialectic improvement of positions (valorisation) far more subtle than at present, wherein careful intelligence on the part of national and revolutionary movements in the dependent sector of the world will enable them to take advantage of, in the sense of bringing into being, optimal international alliances likely to bear enormous autochthonous effort of liberation and of revolution.<sup>35</sup>

Lastly, in viewing changing power configurations, two things can be added which may be relevant to the problem of power and development. One is what Silviu Brucan has called *systemic power*. It is

. . . unlike the traditional power embodied in a nation state and backed up by military strength or modern technological potential. (The) new type of power can be defined properly only in relational terms within a certain system; its effectiveness in changing the behavior of the system stems from its capability to cause disturbances in the functioning of that system. We call it systemic power in the sense that it does not act in every international issue but only within the boundary of its own system; its influence is felt to the extent which its decisions affect elements interacting in that system. . . . Systemic power exists and functions so long as the conditons of effectiveness are maintained.<sup>36</sup>

Although Brucan seems to apply the concept only to oil exporting countries, the coverage of the concept can be extended to apply to other systems and regions.

35. A. Abdel Malek quoted in Wallerstein, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

36. Silviu Brucan, *The Dialectic of World Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1978), pp. 61-62.

Second is what Robert Tucker has described as the "disjunction between power and order," i.e., the holders of power are no longer the guarantors of order.<sup>37</sup>

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37. Robert Tucker, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-16.