

Conclusion

I have mentioned only some of the instances, where, because of the lack of knowledge or total ignorance of the people's culture of which language is part and parcel, an outsider may blunder here and there linguistically and socially. Such linguistic and social trippings may unnecessarily develop animosity towards another people.

It is therefore important that in order to effect better communication between two cultural groups there should first be the readiness of each group to mutually meet each other by getting a good grasp of their culture and their language.

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Cultural and Demographic Aspects of Economic Development

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Economic and political behavior, health and procreation are related aspects of popular culture. A fundamental change in any of these spheres tends to bring changes in the others.

It is fashionable today to refer to low-income countries as "the developing nations" but this may reflect an uncritical optimism. Ways of behavior are changing throughout the world, but in some countries the forces tending toward the deterioration of levels of living are stronger than those favorable to progress. The balance between retrogressive and progressive forces is precarious in many countries, including the Philippines. The factors affecting this balance are in large part cultural, demographic and social, rather than purely "economic" in a restricted sense.

The economic and social development of nations that have already achieved a clear "take-off" in this process took place in the context of demographic and social conditions that were generally quite different from those prevailing today in the Philippines. We need not deal in detail with obvious contrasts, both in ecology and in politics, between the Soviet Union and the Philippines, but will direct our attention to conditions in Europe and Japan in the early stages of their industrialization. We select Sweden as representative of European nations in this respect, because its development was relatively late and achieved without the advantages of imperial dominance.

The demographic contrast can be summarized on a few indices. We have mid-nineteenth century data for Sweden, but

the earliest official statistics for Japan are for the year 1920. However, we know that the demographic situation at that time, was not very different, except for some improvement in mortality, from that of the late nineteenth century. The contrast runs as follows:

	<u>Sweden</u> 1850	<u>Japan</u> 1920	<u>Philippines</u> 1960
<i>Total fertility</i> (number of children born alive per woman living through the childbearing years)	5.0	5.3	6.8
<i>Birth rate</i> (per 1,000 population)	36	35	46
<i>Growth rate</i> (percentage increase of the population per year)	1.0-1.2	1.0-1.5	3.2
<i>Dependency ratio</i> (persons under 15 plus those 65 and over per 100 persons 15-64 years)	60	68	97

Pre-industrial Europeans in the eighteenth century reduced their family obligations, even when death rates were higher than in the Philippines today, by a practice that required considerable fortitude—namely postponement of marriage until on the average brides were 25 years or over and grooms 28 or over when first married. There was less postponement of marriage in Japan during the late Tokugawa era, but population increase there was severely checked by frequent resort to abortion and infanticide. Growth rates in Western Europe almost never rose above one per cent per year prior to 1850, or above 1.5 per cent thereafter. During the critical 1870's and 1880's in Sweden natural increase was about 1.2 per cent, but the average net increase during this 20-year period was reduced to 7/10 of one per cent per year by the emigration of those pushed out of agriculture by technological changes and not yet needed in industry. After 1890 the expanded industries absorbed the rural exodus and emigration tapered off. The birth rate in Japan has always been lower than in other Asian countries.

So far as we know, and some evidence on this subject goes back a long way, the birth rate was never over 35 per thousand, whereas it is still over 45 in the Philippines. The population was nearly stationary in the late Tokugawa era, and annual increase never rose above 1.5 per

cent except during a few years immediately after the last war. It is now declining toward zero.

Rapid population increase impedes economic advance in various ways. Several of the most critical aspects of this relationship can be stated briefly.

(1) The age structure of a population is mainly determined by its level of fertility. It is less strongly influenced by mortality and, contrary to common sense based on observation of the life span of individuals, low mortality at any given level of fertility tends to *raise* the proportion of children in a population. Within any broad range of mortality levels, the age composition of a population is mainly a function of its fertility level. If the birth rate is high the number of mouths to be fed will be large in comparison with the number of hands that can be put to work. One important economic consequence of this demographic fact is that high fertility reduces the proportion of income that can be saved for investments after meeting current consumption needs.

Another aspect of this relation, especially significant with respect to social progress, is the ratio of children of school age to the working adults who must provide for their support. In 1960, there were only 33 children under 15 years per hundred adults aged 15-64 in Japan and only 34 in Sweden, but 55 in the Philippines. So to maintain the same level of education, the average burden on each adult of working age in the Philippines is 60 per cent higher than in Sweden or Japan today. The adjustment to this differential is effected here in part by greater public expenditure on education than would be needed if the ratio of children to adults were lower, in part by raising the age of entry, and in part by reducing the volume or equality of educational services per pupil.

(2) If each member of a rapidly increasing labor force is to have productive resources at his disposal equal to those available to each worker before the new increments are added, an appreciable part of a nation's current income must be continually spent on widening the resource base, as distinct from investments that increase the average output per worker. We do not know the precise over-all ratio, but the latter is probably somewhere between 2 and 3. Thus with a 3 per cent increase in the labor force each year, 6 to 9 per cent of the current income must continually be paid out merely to avoid deterioration in output per worker. If the increase of population in this country were reduced to the highest levels ever attained in Sweden or Japan, this cost of "standing still" as regards resources per worker would be only half as large, about 3 to 4.5 per cent. An equal amount could then be added to a new productive investment without greater effort. The intensification of capital per worker would be some 25 per cent, more or less, higher at a given volume of gross investment.

(3) Rapid population increase creates structural problems in relations among different segments of the economy. Part of the increasing labor force can be absorbed by the expansion of manufacturing enterprises, but not so large a part as is sometimes supposed. The proportion of all economically active males at work or having a job in "manufacturing" including *crafts* has fluctuated around a fairly constant level at 7 per cent during the past seven years, according to the Philippine Statistical Survey of Households. (The figure was 7.0 per cent in October, 1956, 7.2 per cent in October, 1962). The proportion engaged in agriculture has remained equally constant at about 70 per cent (68.6 per cent in October 1956, 69.3 per cent in October, 1962). The figures for female workers show similar trends but are less reliable. There has obviously been a notable increase in the volume and value of manufactured products during this period. However, according to the last Economic Census in 1961, employment in manufacturing establishments with 10 or more workers absorbed only 2.7 per cent of the nation's labor force. A majority of all Filipinos will still be dependent on agriculture 20 years hence, and the economic and social health of the nation will still be largely determined by their level of prosperity or depression.

(4) It seems probable, though this cannot be demonstrated so simply, that with rapid population growth and associated changes in the distribution of the population, a larger proportion of total investment must be allocated to the sustaining infra-structure (transportation facilities, water supply, etc.) and to the social services.

(5) None of the preceding considerations takes account of possible limitations in natural resources. This does not seem, at present, to be a major problem in this country — though it may be that

the expansion or deepening of agricultural resources will soon, if it does not already, involve increasing costs per unit of equal productive capacity.

Finally, we must recognize that population growth acquires a momentum that cannot be quickly arrested. This is due in part to the fact that the children being born today swell the number of potential parents in the next generation. It also reinforces cultural tendencies associated with high fertility. One must consider long-range as well as short-range prospects. Mere continuation of increase at 3 per cent per year doubles a population in 23 years. At this rate of increase the population of the Philippines 100 years hence would be larger than the present population of India. Also, it must be noted that unless there is serious deterioration in levels of living—which, admittedly, may happen—the diffusion of medical knowledge and the application of sanitary principles will undoubtedly cause further acceleration of the rate of growth *if* fertility remains in the vicinity of its present level.

These considerations clearly indicate that the economic prospects of Philippine society would be significantly improved by a reduction in the frequency of births, and they give at least plausible support to the idea that such reduction is one of the essential conditions of sustained progress. These conclusions are now accepted by most, though not all, professionally trained persons in this country and, more vaguely, by many less educated persons.

Although demographic factors, as such, are important in economic and social development, other social conditions may be equally or more important. As the President of this society has stated in her address, culture and social institutions are crucial factors in a nation's economic prospects. There is a rather surprising agreement among scholars concerning the

key characteristics of Filipino culture. They are well known to Filipino sociologists, and I need not attempt to review them in this paper. These characteristics are in many ways admirable, and certainly delightful to those who have the privilege of living in this country. But they are not strongly pragmatic and realistic or conducive to thrift, economic enterprise, technical efficiency and high productivity—as contrasted with pre-industrial European, Japanese, or Chinese Society. They also affect issues of civic discipline and the stability and objectivity of political action and administration.

The motivations for restraints on marriage and fertility both in early modern Europe and in Japan were obviously economic. This is evidenced by the dramatic change in behavior among Europeans who settled in the new world of open spaces and expanding opportunity. Their total fertility shot up from about 5 to about 7.5 children per woman, and then gradually declined throughout the nineteenth century especially in the older established communities.

The interesting suggestion arises that the restraint of fertility prior to the introduction of modern techniques of family limitation, and popular response to new techniques as they become available, is indicative of the relative intensity of economic motives in various cultures. In other words, strong motivation toward the restraint of fertility is symptomatic of cultural milieus that also generate strong motivations for intensity of economic effort, savings, a reputation of creditability in financial affairs, and economic enterprise—traits which, whether or not they are otherwise commendable, are conducive to economic progress. Differences in economic development between North America and the countries between the Rio Grande and the Rio Plata may be due in part to such differences in cultural heritage.

Apart from its direct effects on a nation's economy, the reproductive behavior of a society is a significant index of its social structure and culture. The significance of religion in this respect can easily be over-emphasized or misinterpreted. As everyone knows, the Philippines is a Catholic country and the Catholic Church is just beginning to emphasize the ideal of responsible parenthood and still severely restricts the means by which this can be effected—as did the other Christian churches throughout the nineteenth century. But neither Catholic nor Protestant teachings prevented the spread of family limitation in Europe. Contraceptive practices began in France, and spread with equal force through Catholic and non-Catholic countries, except in Ireland. There, ever since a famine in the 1840's, families have been severely restricted by extreme postponement or avoidance of marriage, so that only one-third of the men and about half of women aged 25 to 35 years have ever married. On the European continent, family limitation within marriage is generally as prevalent in Catholic as in non-Catholic countries. In the United States, according to a comprehensive survey in 1955, over 80 per cent of all fecund Catholic wives, aged 30-39 years, had regulated their fer-

tility in some way. Among Catholic wives married 5 years or more who regulated births, only about one-half (45 per cent) relied exclusively on the rhythm method.¹ The proportion conforming to the teachings of the church in this respect is higher among well educated women than among these with less schooling. I suspect that it is higher in the United States than in most European countries. If Catholicism seems to be a more formidable obstacle to family planning in the Philippines, or in Latin America, than in Europe this must be attributed to associated conditions or to differences between the nature of Catholicism in the former regions and in metropolitan Europe.

Human fertility can be viewed as an index of the basic aspects of the social structure of a society. If so, it is not readily susceptible to rapid change. To optimistic aspect of this analysis, which may seem generally to be rather pessimistic, is that changes in agriculture, industry, family hygiene, education and family planning will all tend to reinforce one another. Progress along any one of these lines can be expected to facilitate progress in other directions.

¹ Freedman, Ronald, P. K. Whelpton, A. A. Campbell: *Family Planning, Sterility and Population Growth* (New York: Mc-Graw-Hill, 1959), pp. 104-189.

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