

DILEMMA IN NATIONAL INTEGRATION: THE TASADAY AS A CASE IN POINT

Editor's note. The panel discussion on national integration opened with the showing of about 15 slides on the Tasaday, the small band of cave-dwelling food gatherers discovered in South Cotabato in June 1971 (see PSR 20 [3]). After this Dr. Robert B. Fox, Director of the Panamin Research Center, reviewed for the audience basic information about the cultural minorities of the Philippines: how they are legally and socioculturally defined; how many they are (69 groups in all); how they range in numbers (from 500,000 Maranao Muslims through 120,000 Ifugao to 811 Agta and 25 Tasaday); and who works with them (for the smaller groups, missionaries or Panamin). Dr. Fox was followed by Eric Casiño, Teodoro Llamzon, and William Henry Scott, whose papers are published below.

National Integration and National Language

TEODORO A. LLAMZON

March 17, 1972

The language situation in the Philippines today is described in terms of total number of languages, official languages, lingua francas, and medium of instruction.

If language is a symbol of national unity, which language(s) is it important that the Tasaday should learn? Perhaps the solution of Fr. Antoon Postma, S.V.D., missionary to the Mindoro Hanunoo, should be considered. While seeing that they learn more and more about Hanunoo language and culture, he also has them learn Pilipino and English.

The problem of national integration is of great interest, especially from the point of view of language. The Tasaday group is a relevant case. Let us first take a look at the language situation in the Philippines today, and then consider the problems which a group such as the Tasaday face in such a situation.

As you all know, there are about 100 to 150 languages in the country today. Of these, the eight major languages — Tagalog, Cebuano, Hiligaynon, Waray, Iloko, Pangasinan, Bikol, and

Pampango — are spoken by more than 95 percent of the total population; the so-called "minor languages" are spoken by the other 5 percent of the population.

There are three official languages, namely: Pilipino, English, and Spanish. Of these, Pilipino (based on Tagalog) was declared the National Language in 1937. Although English and Pilipino are spoken throughout the Islands, it is not true that one can speak either English or Pilipino to anybody and be understood. Rather, there

appear to be three de facto common languages — we may perhaps call them *lingua francas* — in the Philippines today: namely, Iloko in the North, Cebuano in the South, and Tagalog in between these areas. If one were to single out one language which is spoken by the greatest number of Filipinos at this time, one would have to say that that language is Pilipino. More than 12 million spoke it in 1960; today, the majority of Filipinos speak it.

Since 1902, English has been used as the medium of instruction in Philippine schools. Spanish has been taught as a compulsory subject in college since 1954; and Pilipino, in grade schools and high schools since 1940. One may say that English has come to be the language of some Filipino homes, but in general, its use has been confined to the school and to formal and international occasions in government and business. For the most part, the average Filipino still speaks his mother tongue at home and on intimate occasions. Spanish continues to be the language of a small percentage of the people.

The question now arises: how does a language group, like the Tasaday, integrate itself into this situation? What is the relationship between Tasaday and the National Language, on the one hand; and Tasaday and Cebuano, the de facto lingua franca of their territory, on the other? If language is not only a tool of communication, but also a symbol of both national and ethnic identity, then which language should have priority of acquisition for a small language group like the Tasaday?

Looking at the problem from a wider viewpoint, one could also ask the question: should the Tasaday learn English and Spanish, the official languages of the country; or should they be exempted from this task in view of their special circumstances. If they should be so exempted, what steps should be taken to protect them from the exigencies of modern life? Is modernization so equated with westernization in this country that it is impossible for these people to be modernized without at the same time learning the western ways of life and language?

I do not think that many would dispute the right of government, in principle, to require its

citizens to learn a language for purposes of communication or for national unity and identity. On the other hand, I think that most will agree that the vernacular is important and should be safeguarded, since it is not only the language of the home but also the symbol of ethnic unity and identity.

Thus, the problem of national integration, as far as its linguistic dimension is concerned, is in my opinion the problem of determining how the various languages now functional in the Philippines — the National Language, the official languages, the lingua franca of the territory, and the various vernaculars — can be made to fit into the various domains of activity of the language groups in the country, including the Tasaday.

Perhaps, at this point I should take time out to describe a model which I saw in the field actually working and succeeding in helping a language group get integrated. I would not want to state here that this is *the only* model which will work; rather, the intention here is to present this model as a possible solution to this problem. I am referring to a settlement of about 35 Mangyan (mountain) families in the hills of Mansalay, Oriental Mindoro.

The small village of Panaytayan grew around a school run by a Dutch missionary by the name of Antoon Postma, of the Society of the Divine Word. Father Postma is a man with a deep appreciation of Mangyan culture. He himself can speak, read, and write Hanunoo Mangyan. In his school, the young Mangyan are taught how to read and write Hanunoo and to appreciate Hanunoo literature. They are taught, for example, the *ambahan* (songs and legends) which Father Postma himself has collected from their elders. In addition, they are also taught English, Pilipino, arithmetic, geography, and the other subjects they need to cope with modern life.

The most important feature of this project is that no attempt is made to change the way of life of the Hanunoo; instead, every effort is made to improve and modernize it. The villagers are taught hygiene, such as regular use of the bath and the toilet, how to conserve water, and how to cook balanced meals. When I visited him, Fr. Postma was actually setting up a water tank with the help of the village young men so the

families could enjoy running water. I spoke to one or two young Hanunoo in Pilipino and obtained a response from them. I had no doubt that I could also speak to them in English and be understood.

Panaytayan, then, is a possible solution to the problem; and I propose it to you for discussion and consideration.

Note

This is the slightly revised version of a panelist's paper read February 17, 1972, in the public lecture series, "Social Issues '72," at the San Miguel Auditorium, Makati, Rizal, under the sponsorship of the Philippine Sociological Society, Inc. Fr. Llamzon, a Jesuit, received the Ph.D. in linguistics from Georgetown University in 1968. He is at present an assistant professor, department of language and linguistics, Ateneo de Manila. Besides, he heads the Linguistic Society of the Philippines and edits its journal.

The Igorot: An Integrated Cultural Minority

WILLIAM HENRY SCOTT

March 8, 1972

It is proposed that the Igorot, or mountain people, of the Cordillera Central of Northern Luzon are already integrated into the Philippine national scene. This is evidenced by the 1968 division of the old Mountain Province (an American-Indian-style-reservation idea) into four provinces, each like any other regular province of the Philippines. But there are five other marks of integration: first, physical survival and growth as a group; second, economic viability through subsistence activities and wage earning; third, education at par with general Philippine education; fourth, conditions of peace and order; fifth, participation in the body politic of the Republic. The Igorot have achieved all five.

How was this done? To begin with, the Igorot people had the advantage of being both vigorous and proud. Again, their environment allowed them to experiment at different kinds of jobs — farming, mining, road labor — without leaving their homeland. Education came to them, even in their remotest barrios, and now the third generation of Igorots are themselves teachers. If Ilocano lowland teachers or foreign missionaries made any Igorot feel inferior in some respect, the antidote was in the "handful of straight-shooting, hard-drinking cowboys" who served as governors and lieutenant-governors during the American regime. They *liked* the Igorot people. Let those who lay hands on Tasaday destiny do likewise.

I want to talk about the *real* Filipinos — I mean, the Filipinos born on the Cordillera Central in Ifugao, Benguet, Kalinga-Apayao, and the Mountain Province. At least, that is what General Carlos P. Romulo calls them. I know many people think he said in his book, *Mother America*, that the Igorots weren't even Filipinos at all. But in a talk in the U.P. auditorium in December of 1968, he said (I heard him with my own ears) that he had been misunderstood and misquoted. What he *really* meant was that the Igorots were the *real* Filipinos.

The Igorots have been one of the best pub-

licized minority groups in the country and the object of much talk about national integration. But I want to propose the thesis that they are *already* integrated into the Philippine national scene. I would claim that the division of the old Mountain Province into four separate provinces in 1968 was dramatic evidence that his integration had already taken place. For the old Mountain Province was created early in the American regime with the idea that the Igorots were not ready for the democratic form of republican government that lowlanders would presumably enjoy. It was President McKinley's idea

that a sort of American-Indian-style reservation be set up — one of those atrocities of American history, as Dr. Fox says, although I don't know whether President McKinley thought of it on his knees or not — a reservation where they could preserve their own quaint customs, "surrounded by a civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform." Certainly the Igorots have showed themselves neither unable nor unwilling to conform to the civilization that surrounds them. In 1968, by the due process of popularly elected representatives to the national legislature, they introduced a bill that voted the old Mountain Province out of existence.

Of course, I suppose I should produce some criteria for making such a statement. What are the evidences that the Igorots are already integrated? What do we mean by the national integration of the Tasaday, for instance? What is it that is wanted for them as they enter the 20th century? As I take it, there is no possibility for them not to do so: perish they may, but to remain in the Late Stone Age they will not be permitted. Well, let me pick out five points of more or less validity and you can think of others.

First, I suppose there is the matter of the mere biological survival of this minority group — that the 24 should go forth, multiply, and become 48 instead of 12 or even none. Second, that they should be economically able to make a living in the modern world. Third, that they should receive as good an education as any other Filipino. Fourth, that they should live in peace and order under the laws of the land. And fifth, that they should play their full role in the body politic of this Republic and determine their own destiny within it. Let me apply these five criteria to the ethnic minorities on the Cordillera, not as a social scientist exhibiting statistics, because I am not one and do not have any, but simply as an historian reporting specific events to illustrate an actual movement of Philippine history.

First, as far as the Igorots are concerned, any long-time resident can see, even without the benefit of statistics, that their general health is improving. When I first came to the Philippines 18 years ago, an old missionary just about to

retire told me you didn't see the fine male physiques you used to when *she* first came out. What she was really commenting on was the fact that Igorots wear more clothes than they used to and that a lot of less athletic types were surviving on better diet, medicine, and hygiene than should have by stricter Darwinian laws of natural selection. And as far as sheer biological survival is concerned, the Igorots have it made. In the bad old days when half a man's children died the first year and those who didn't died before the age of 10, the wise man who wanted two or three sons to support him in his old age tried to see that his wife had 15 pregnancies or so. Nowadays, however, while grandfather may be out back sacrificing a white chicken for fertility, some social worker is sitting in the sala explaining how to keep from having any more grandchildren.

Economically speaking, no Igorot can reasonably expect to starve. Dr. Fox has already alluded to the spectacle of paved streets, two-storey houses, and flush toilets in one of the most remote barrios on the Philippine road system, and there is no community of 100 people on the Cordillera without G.I. roofs, plastic bags, hot Tru-Orange, and *ginebra* San Miguel. Thousands of mountaineers are wage-earning miners, carpenters, truck-drivers, road foremen, government clerks, school teachers, or college professors — or practice such profitable trades as doctor, priest, or bishop. Although I cannot actually claim there are old men in G-strings playing the stock market, I do know barefoot holders of Lepanto Mining shares. When our college kids come home from Manila to lecture their parents and me on the plight of an oppressed peasantry, I ask them if they personally know one Igorot who has less food, less clothing or less shelter today than he did 10 years ago, and so far none has answered in the affirmative. Of course, I realize this isn't much of an economic analysis, but it probably does indicate that the Igorots are integrated into the 20th century Philippine economic system.

In education, the four mountain provinces compare favorably with the state of the nation in general. In the national exams administered 10 years ago, the public school median was

higher than the median of the country as a whole, and of the top 10 private schools, the only one outside Manila was in the Mountain Province. An Igorot topped the English entrance exams to the U.P. 18 years ago, Igorot students regularly win competitive scholarships to half a dozen foreign countries, and Igorot educators hold professorships not only at home but abroad. There are a dozen universities and colleges on the Cordillera, and high schools in towns that cannot even be reached by motor car, and when my own mission was considering opening a junior college in an Igorot community of 12,000, we were able to interview the parents of 500 students studying away from home. And if one last statistic is needed, it may be found in the fact that when Igorot students decided to unite to protest the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in their provinces in September 1971, they were able to list more than 2000 collegians in Manila alone.

The state of law and order in the mountain provinces was the very issue which roused those Igorot students to public protest in front of Malacañang in the first place, for when the privilege of the writ was restored to the Ilocos region but not the Cordillera, they considered it a distortion of fact to imply that the Ilocos area was more peaceful than the mountain provinces. I think I can sharpen the picture by saying that in my classes I always argue against the Marxist interpretation of history as class warfare by asking my students, "What is your personal experience: do *cocheros* ice-pick governors and governors shoot *cocheros*?" My lowland students always get the point but my Igorot students have never seen a *cochero* ice-pick another *cochero* or a governor shoot a congressman. But when I bring them down to the lowlands, they learn quickly enough: in the Ilocos two of their classmates were killed in the boys' comfort room over a matter of haircuts — you will excuse my mentioning the subject in Makati — and in Manila they stood helplessly by as a barroom full of taxi drivers stoned one of their companions caught cheating at cards. In fact, now that I stop to think of it, perhaps this is one area in which the Igorots are not yet fully integrated.

As far as political self-determinism is concerned, what more need be said than what I have already said — that Igorots elect all their own councilors, mayors, governors, and congressmen and have voted their old reservation-like Mountain Province out of existence? Perhaps just one more thing — that some former students of mine are proudly carrying I.D. cards for "Statehood U.S.A." while their classmates are waving red flags for "National Democracy." How integrated can you get?

Now, how did all this integration take place? Well, it is not an easy question, and the historian can only put his finger on a few of the factors.

In the first place, the Igorots were a strong, proud people before the process of integration even began. Both individually and racially they had adjusted to a rugged environment by hard work, spartan perseverance, and real ingenuity in the face of cruel necessity. Masters of the mountains they had conquered and defenders of their liberty against foreign aggression, they looked down with dignity on a conquered lowland world from which they were never really isolated: they maintained a 350-year monopoly on the richest gold trade in the archipelago, sabotaged the Spanish tobacco monopoly, and came and went as they pleased. They were not only a proud and vigorous people, but they knew it. I was reminded of this a few months ago when my brother was visiting from the States and I hired a garage car from Baguio for the trip to the mountains; I asked the driver to have a cup of coffee while we got ready, and then went into the kitchen and asked my own boys if he were an Igorot or an Ilocano. An Igorot, they said, and when I asked how they knew, they replied, "He sat right down and drank the coffee, didn't he?"

In the second place, their economy was substantial enough to permit a certain amount of change and experiment. Some manpower could be spared to take advantage of occasional work or roads or more permanent employment in the mines. When they were laid off or got tired of working, they could be reabsorbed at home, bringing their cash gains with them for local investment. Thus they were able to improve their lot gradually without migrating to other

regions, disrupting their own economic structures, or burning all their cultural bridges behind them. And the mines, all within a few days' hike, provided the right opportunity. Men could work for a year or two and then go home, build a house with a G.I. roof and rest up, often returning again under renewed economic pressures or incentives for improvement. Igorot miners were themselves aware of these very advantages; as they put it, "If we want to quit, we can always go home and live off our *kaingin*, but the poor Pangasinanes can't even get a camote to eat if their landlord doesn't give it to them."

So, too, education came to the Igorots *in situ*, so to speak, without disruptive breaks in their local society. A half century of self-sacrificing lowland teachers did the trick, hiking in to the remotest barrios to adjust patiently to sporadic attendance, poor attention, and a complete lack of PTA-type relationships, without open conflict with either parents or pupils. As soon as somebody became literate enough, he was likely to be taken into the system: the first Igorot school teacher our mission hired in Sagada was a fourth-grade graduate. So in the first generation there came to be many with some taste of schooling; in the second, real functional literates; and by the third, hometown boys were coming back from normal school to introduce novelties in the way of hygiene and medicine, politicize adults and supervise elections, plant new crops and open stores to sell new products, put their income in circulation by loaning it out at interest, and replace battle-scarred old headhunters as the most prestigious and influential members of the community.

But equally important were the agents of change themselves and the attitude they took toward the cultural minorities being nationally integrated. The most numerous bearers of innovation were Ilocano school teachers who not surprisingly found their charges in G-strings, unkempt hair, and uncouth names reprehensibly primitive and showed it. American and Belgian missionaries perforce added to the subtle sense of degradation not only by the mere presence of their health, wealth, energy and education, but by consciously seeking, as one of them put it, to inoculate the Igorot with the germ of dis-

content so that he would be inspired to progress. No doubt the sense of inferiority so imbued did, in fact, move the Igorot to hanker after the advantages of integration, but the whole history of northern Luzon might have been different had there been no antidote for such psychological debilitation. Fortunately, however, there was such an antidote. It was the behavior of that handful of straight-shooting, hard-drinking cowboys who served as governors and lieutenant-governors during the American regime, who worked, fought and loved as hard as the Igorots themselves, respected them and had their respect. Their diaries and correspondence give the prescription — they considered the Igorots brave, upright, honest, reliable, hardworking, good-natured, and easy to get along with. In a word, they *liked* them.

Well, these, then, are some of the historic factors that lay behind the integration of the Igorots. I am even more than usually thankful this evening that I am an historian and not a social scientist, because historians are only asked what happened to the world while social scientists are asked to do something about it.

Do the historic details of what happened to the Igorots have anything to say to Panamin's or anybody else's relationship to the Tasaday? Probably not. The Tasaday are already a people with their own environment, and their pride and vigor, or lack of it, are already determined, I suppose; we cannot expect to import any gold mines for them nor can Congress pass an act granting them dignity or *amor propio*.

As I was thinking about all these problems that will fittingly fall on such broad sociologist shoulders as are mustered here tonight, it first occurred to me that it would be a lot easier to give some helpful advice than it would be to move mountains — or governments. But, on second thought, I am not so sure. Because I can only think of one clear instruction to give whatever agents of change are going to lay hands on Tasaday destiny: *like them*.

Note

This is the slightly revised version of a paper read February 10, 1972, in the public lecture series, "Social Issues '72," at the San Miguel Auditorium, Makati,

Rizal, under the sponsorship of the Philippine Sociological Society, Inc. Dr. Scott, a lay missionary of the Philippine Episcopal Church, has spent two decades in the Philippines, most of those years in Sagada, where

he established the Igorot Study Center. Recognized as a colleague by anthropologists, he prefers to call himself an historian (Ph.D. history, University of Santo Tomas 1968) at least on occasion.

Integration and the Muslim Filipinos

ERIC S. CASIÑO

March 24, 1972

The negative stereotype that many Filipino Christians have of Filipino Muslims, or "Moros," has an historical basis. It is perpetuated in a neglect of some of the great Muslim heroes of the past. But the Muslims also have certain false ideas about Christians. The difficulty is a two-way sociopsychological problem. Part of the answer is in travel and interaction. More important is a mutual understanding of Islam and Christianity, and of the common pre-Spanish, Malayan culture that unites all Filipinos, regardless even of religion.

We are living in a very unrealistic situation. For a people preoccupied with nation building, we certainly have a lot of illusions. How can we speak of building one solid nation when our southern Filipino brothers remain oppressed? We call them all sorts of names, like juramentados, polygamous, pirates, cut-throats, and fanatics. How can we possibly be united with them to make an indivisible nation?

Having traveled through most of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan and having studied one Muslim village intensively, I feel privileged to have seen the great disparity between the image we have of them and their actual social and cultural life. On grounds of that experience I suggest two ways in which we can go about re-adjusting our thinking regarding the peoples of the South. First, we can trace the origin of this negative image. How did the image come about and how can we correct it? Second, we can strive to know the Muslim Filipinos as they really are today. What do they have that we share in common?

It seems that our greatest difficulty will be overcoming an image problem. We Christians have an entirely erroneous image of our Muslim brothers. That is one type of colonial mentality

that is hard to beat. What has colonial mentality have to do with this, you may ask. The answer is that the origins of Christian-Muslim dissent in this country may be traced to the Spaniards.

Before Magellan came to this country, the Spaniards had already been fighting Muslims in the southern part of the Iberian peninsula. When the Spaniards reached our country, you can imagine their great surprise when they again encountered Muslims. Naturally, they called them Moros, as they did in Spain, and automatically considered them enemies. It was inevitable that the Spaniards would attribute unflattering characteristics to them. The Spaniards were the first to propagate the negative stereotype of the Muslim Filipino by which we are blinded even today.

The northern Filipinos who fell under the Spanish dominion acquired through some sort of osmosis the negative stereotype their colonizers had towards the Muslims. Thus, a racially single or related people was torn apart by Spanish propaganda and religious policies. It was a simple case of divide and rule. Everything was aggravated when the Spaniards used Christian Filipinos in their wars and expeditions against Mindanao and Sulu. Christian Filipinos fought

against their Muslim brothers. How quickly they forgot that before the Spaniards came, they were led by Muslim chieftains like Raja Soliman and Lakandula and others who were related to the ruling Muslim families in Brunei.

In retaliation for all that harassment and persecution, the Muslim warriors and slave-traders attacked the Visayas and Luzon. These events proved to Christian Filipinos that what the Spaniards said about the "Moros" was true. What started as Spanish propaganda ended up becoming a Christian Filipino experience.

Today, three-fourths of a century after the Spaniards left our shores, the mutual feelings of distrust and suspicion still prevail.

The Christian bias can still be seen in the fact that although Soliman and Lakandula are regarded as Filipino heroes, the Muslim leaders from the south, like Sultan Kudarat of Cotabato or Sultan Badaruddin of Sulu, remain virtually unknown to most hero-worshipping nationalists.

During the Filipino-American war at the turn of the century, resistance movements led by Aguinaldo and Del Pilar in Luzon and by the Leyteños and Warays in the Visayas are remembered with nationalistic pride; but the heroic resistance of the Joloanos on Mt. Bagsak is relegated to historical footnotes. Filipino orators eulogize Lapu-Lapu for repelling the Spaniard but are silent on the much more significant exploits of the peoples of Mindanao and Sulu. I have yet to see a southern Muslim hero's statue side by side with that of Lapu-Lapu, Lakandula, and Luna.

Of course the Muslims also have negative images of the Christian Filipinos. They also need clarification. Muslims in the South consider the people of Luzon and Visayas lackeys and slaves, if not traitors to their nation. In the final analysis, Muslim-Christian dissent is basically a problem of image. It is a social-psychological problem.

What can we do about the Muslim image? First, it will help to remind ourselves and realize that the image is historically conditioned and not intrinsically imbedded in Filipino thinking. There is no historical determinism preventing us from altering our thinking and seeking more

realistic and positive images of our Muslim brothers. The image is a product of provoked hostilities; it can be softened through better knowledge.

The road to better mutual knowledge is to encourage greater interaction between Muslims and Christians through travel. "See the Philippines and the Filipinos" should be promoted among the younger generation of both northern and southern Filipinos.

But to correct a wrong image is only half the solution. The other half is to build a positive image. One way to know Muslims is through their religion, Islam. Islam, like Christianity, has an existential and an institutional aspect. The existential meaning of Islam may be appreciated through an analysis of the semantic basis of the words "Islam" and "Muslim" (or Moslem). Both words come from the word *aslama*, an Arabic verb meaning "to surrender or submit to God." The word "Islam" is a verbal-noun meaning "surrender or submission to God." And "Muslim" or "Moslem" is a noun meaning "a person who submits to God; a believer, one of the faithful."

The root-letters in *aslama*, *islam* and *muslim* are s-l-m which connote submission or proper subordination to divine authority. Thus Islam also implies the blessings resulting from a proper subordination of man to his creator, namely, peace, order and salvation. All this is the existential meaning of Islam and is very close to the Christian ideal of love of God and one's neighbors.

The existential similarity of Islam and Christianity finds part of its explanation in their common semitic root in the Old Testament Revelation. Just as one can speak of a Judaeo-Christian tradition, so one can speak of a Judaeo-Muslim development, the main difference in the two being in their interpretation of the Revelation of Abraham. As Norman Daniel has pointed out in *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh, 1960):

The essential differences that separate Christianity and Islam are about Revelation. For Christians the prophetic preparation of the Jews leads to a single event, the Incarnation, which is the inauguration of the Messianic Kingdom; for Catholics this Kingdom is the

sacramental life of the Church . . . For Muslims too there is just one Revelation, of the only religion, Islam, or submission to God; but it was made again and again through successive prophets. Mohammad's was the final prophecy, but his was not more "Muslim" than that of Jesus, or Moses, or Abraham . . .

If there is a difference in the Christian-Muslim interpretation of Revelation, there is likewise a difference in how the ideal of submission to God's Will is to be interpreted in daily social life. Thus the institutional apparatus historically created by Islam and Christianity to carry out God's will in the world has tended to be divergent. However, although the institutional structures are different, there are nevertheless a number of elements and practices that are remarkably similar. Both Islam and Christianity enjoin daily prayers, almsgiving, fasting, weekly community worship, piety in daily living, and pilgrimages. The differences and similarities between Islam and Christianity may be compared to two branches of the "tree of knowledge" planted by God in the Garden of Eden, in which Muslims also believe.

Now that we have seen the problem of image, we can take a brief look at the problem of the reality. How are the Muslim Filipinos in real life? To answer this is to say something of their culture and society. We often tend to forget that Muslim Filipinos are Filipinos. And the basis of this affirmation is not only geographical but cultural and social as well.

For if you scratch a Christian and a Muslim Filipino and remove the historical overlay of intrusive superficialities, you will discover a common Malayan nature that antedates both Islam and Christianity. In other words, they share a common sociocultural patrimony that

proclaims their similarities more than their differences. Similarities are found in their family structure and economic organization.

Among Muslims as among Christians, a Filipino is equally related to relatives of his father and mother, a kinship system which phrase-mongering anthropologists call bilateralism. Likewise in their economic organization and subsistence base, that is, their methods of farming, fishing, building a house, making mats, and trading, Filipinos of the north and the south are generally alike. Living in a Muslim village is not very different from living in a barrio in Cebu or Bulacan or Bicolandia.

Thus whether we look at the Muslim Filipinos through their religion (which shares the same roots as Christianity) or through their culture (which has the same Malayan base as that of the rest of the lowland Philippines), we are bound to encounter positive similarities. These are the factors that can supply the base for creating a new image that leads to national consensus. Northern and southern Filipinos may appear to belong to the opposite horns of a historical dilemma, but we must remember that the two horns belong to the same carabao, which is the Filipino nation slowly but steadily moving towards a larger, brighter world.

Note

This is the slightly revised version of a paper read February 10, 1972, in the public lecture series, "Social Issues '72," at the San Miguel Auditorium, Makati, Rizal, under the sponsorship of the Philippine Sociological Society, Inc. Mr. Casiño is curator of the anthropology division of the National Museum. His doctoral dissertation, to be submitted to the anthropology department of the University of Sydney in 1972, is on the Jama Mapun, a Muslim people of Cagayan de Sulu Island, Sulu.