

ETHNICITY AND EDUCATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

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There are three distinct minority groups in the Philippines – the ethnic Chinese, the Muslim Filipinos, and other cultural minorities. The relations between them and the Christian majority have undergone various degrees of strain. Under these circumstances, whether education would be able to serve as an instrument for integrating the Chinese and the Muslim minorities into the Filipino society is doubtful.

There is hardly any nation in the world which does not have, residing within its borders, one or more minority groups. The minorities add color and richness to the society by their variegation, but they may also contribute to political instability. The minorities are distinguishable from the majority in terms of such characteristics as race, religion, language, pigmentation, geographical location, mode of life, political ideology, and others. Some of these differences are difficult to reconcile and often constitute a source of intergroup tensions and conflicts. In countries with authoritarian governments, the minorities are usually suppressed by force, their activities are closely monitored, and their opposition is not tolerated. Democratic governments, on the other hand, seek a peaceful co-existence with them, by granting them representation, in the hope that they would reciprocate by their loyalty. In any case, education is employed as one of the measures to bring about national integration. Parenthetically, no nation feels obligated to adhere to the principles of democracy when it perceives the actions of its minorities as subversive and as a threat to its survival.

The Republic of the Philippines has within its borders at least three distinct minority

groups – the ethnic Chinese, the Muslim Filipinos, and other cultural minorities. The relations between the Christian majority and the three minority groups have been marred by conflicts over the years. The present paper is an attempt to analyze the constituent components of the Philippine population, to examine their intergroup relations, to study the provision of education for them, and to ascertain its role in the integrative process, with a plausible prognosis.

Ethnic Groups

The Lowland Christians

The principal source of cultural differentiation among the vast majority of Filipinos is language rather than race, religion, social, or economic factors. Ninety percent of all Filipinos are Christians – virtually all of them Roman Catholic – and live on lowland coasts and in valleys. They form eight distinct linguistic groups, are often unable to communicate with one another, yet constitute a culturally homogenous society, with a long history of harmonious relations and a strong sense of national identity. They have a common racial extraction, culture, history, religion, and are collectively known as the lowland Christians.

Each linguistic group has a recognized core region, although there is a fair degree of mixed residential patterns and intergroup marriages, and members of some groups are found all over the country, especially in urban areas. The existence of two lingua francas,

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Pilipino and English, has facilitated intergroup communication. The lowland Christian groups include the following: Tagalogs, Cebuanos, Ilokanos, Ilongos, Bikolanos, Warays, Panganguenos, and Pangasinenses. In addition to the eight major Christian groups, there are twelve minor groups. They generally inhabit the isolated territories – small islands or coastal strips separated from the interior by mountains.

The Chinese

Records show that the Chinese established trade links with the Philippines during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), and some Chinese merchants and craftsmen settled there. During the early period of the Spanish rule, the Chinese immigration was welcomed because of their skills, energy, and capital resources, and gradually they formed the commercial and artisan classes of the country (Eitzen, 1968: 222-223). The Spaniards, however, soon became alarmed by and suspicious of the growing economic power and increasing population of the Chinese, and took measures to curb their dominance. Throughout their rule, the Spaniards remained ambivalent toward the Chinese, and their policy vacillated between encouragement and repression. On the one hand, they viewed their control of trade and commerce as a menace; on the other, they needed the services they performed.

After 1850, the Spaniards liberalized the immigration policy, and, as a consequence, the Chinese population increased from 8,000 in 1850 to 100,000 in 1885. During this period, the Chinese scattered all over the country and came in contact with the Filipinos. Because of their monopoly of trade and commerce, they incurred the wrath of the natives.

During the period of American control, the policy toward the Chinese was further liberalized, and almost all businesses, domestic and foreign, came to be placed in their hands. By the end of the American control, there was widespread hatred and hostility toward the Chinese in the country. The Fili-

pinos generally came to regard the Chinese to be guilty of unethical business practices, charging exorbitant interest rates, monopolizing trade, controlling politics through bribery, syphoning capital from the country, and managing to circumvent the law. Since independence, the Philippine Government, out of nationalistic fervor, has enacted laws to control the traditional Chinese economic dominance. These actions have tended to exacerbate the already present cultural differences, social tensions, and mutual exclusiveness.

Anti-Chinese attitudes are held by most Filipinos on the belief that this minority controls the economy, engages in illegal activities, is clannish, and owes its allegiance elsewhere (Go, 1972: 396-397). The Chinese seek to protect themselves from the discriminatory actions of the Government and the natives through the formation of their exclusive segregated organizations. Also, they strive to perpetuate their language and culture by educating their children in their own schools. Thus, through business organizations, extended family ties, fraternal associations, and their own schools, the Chinese, by and large, remain a close-knit group resistant to assimilation into the Filipino culture, although many have become part of the Filipino society (Eitzen, 1968: 231).

Anti-Chinese prejudice is also based upon the Filipino perception of the Chinese as being associated with the communistic subversive activities in the Philippines (Tasker, 1978c: 22-24). There has been at all times a large volume of illegal Chinese immigration into the country. The Filipino apprehension is heightened not only by the continuing illegal Chinese immigration, but also by its political implication of revolution instigated by the Chinese communists (van der Kroef, 1967: 115-123). Defiance directed against the Government by the Chinese youths in concert with the pro-Peking radical element in the Philippine academic circles was at least partly responsible for the proclamation of martial

law in 1972 (Samonte, 1970: 161-173; *The Economist*, 1977: 60-63; and Tasker, 1977d: 8-9).

Marriages between the two groups, mostly involving Chinese men and Filipino women, have been frequent throughout the long history of Chinese presence in the Philippines. However, lately, there has surfaced resentment toward and disapproval of such a practice, at least among the more nationalistic Filipinos. When a Filipina marries a Chinese, she and her family are presumed to have done so for monetary considerations, and they become objects of derision. As most of the political and economic advantages resulting from the matrimonial alliance have now been lost, the number of Chinese-Filipino marriages is on the decline. Unmixed and unassimilated Chinese have always had a tenuous position in the society, have experienced considerable difficulty in regard to citizenship, and are frequently the targets of prejudice, discrimination, and resentment. The Chinese mestizos — offsprings of Chinese-Filipino marriages — who have accepted the Filipino culture have been generally accepted into the society. But it is becoming increasingly common to use the same opprobrious terms for the Chinese mestizos as for the ethnic Chinese (Weightman, 1967-1968: 315-317).

Chinese men usually prefer to marry Chinese women. However, because of the imbalance in sex ratio in the past, inter-racial marriages have been extensive, a long history of pogroms and discrimination notwithstanding. The Chinese community fully accepts the half-Chinese offspring provided that the mestizos have an orientation into the Chinese culture. During the Spanish colonial period, when restrictions were placed upon the Chinese, it was difficult for the Chinese community to Sinicize the mestizo children, who therefore invariably adopted the language and culture of their Filipino mothers. With the beginning of the American control and removal of the restrictions, the Chinese wasted no time in establishing their schools. Now, in many

Chinese schools the majority of the students are mestizos who are systematically exposed to the Chinese culture and are readily accepted by the Chinese community. They are, however, ostracized by the Filipinos and subjected to the same political, economic, and social restrictions as the ethnic Chinese (Weightman, 1967-1968: 320-321).

In the Philippines, all Chinese mestizos do not necessarily owe allegiance to the Chinese community. In fact, some of its bitter enemies as well as staunch supporters have hailed from the mestizo segment of the society. The mestizo population, with Chinese or Spanish ancestry, has produced some of the great heroes, political leaders, and literary figures of the country. Members of this group still dominate politics, business, finance, arts and sciences, education, literature, civil service, and the professions. The elite mestizos of both Chinese and Hispanic extraction have extensively intermarried. These Filipinized mestizos are the fiercest rivals of the ethnic Chinese and their Sinicized mestizo allies (Weightman, 1967-1968: 320-321).

There are about 300,000 Filipinos of Chinese descent and another 300,000 Chinese who have not yet taken Philippine citizenship (Wideman, 1976: 24-26). In 1975, President Marcos relaxed the requirements for citizenship (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1975a: 29). Yet, not very many applied for it. They feel that citizenship provides them with hardly any advantage and that it does nothing to reduce the general suspicion with which they are looked upon by the Government and the natives (Bathurst, 1975: 20-41). They complain that the Government treats the naturalized citizens as foreigners and strips the Chinese Filipinos of citizenship and reports them if they are found involved in the slightest infraction of the law (Jiang, 1963: 194-195; Stockwin, 1975: 15-16; and Sindayen, 1978: 23-24).

The Chinese have equally strong antipathy toward the Filipinos, which in part stems from

their traditional ethnocentrism and in part is a reaction to the Filipino anti-Chinese sentiment. They exalt their descent from the Chinese lineage and disparage the Filipino culture. In return, the Filipinos discount the Chinese claim of superiority and reject their culture. The Chinese maintain social seclusion from the Filipinos and strive to minimize all social contacts with them. They shield their women from coming into contact with the Filipinos. Their desire for social segregation partly explains the popularity of the separate Chinese schools in which the number of girls is larger than that of boys. The Filipinos likewise maintain social distance from the Chinese.

In order to encourage the Chinese to seek assimilation into the Filipino society and to curb their economic dominance, numerous legal measures have been enacted. The Chinese view them as needless restrictions designed to harass them. They contend that Filipino politicians and administrators deliberately contrive circumstances that make bribery and extortion inevitable. They hold the Philippine Government in low esteem, if not contempt, and consider the Filipino political system as possessing a predilection for venality. The consequence is that the laws affecting the Chinese are seldom enforced rigorously (Jiang, 1963: 195-199). There is little in the history or in the present state that portends cooperation and compromise in the Chinese-Filipino relations. The Chinese schools have contributed in no small measure to the continuation of the schism between the two cultural groups (van der Kroef, 1967: 131).

The Filipino anti-Chinese feelings over the centuries are, to a large extent, the result of the policies pursued by the Spaniards and the Americans during their rule of the country. The ameliorative measures taken by the Philippine Government have been generally restrictive of the Chinese activities. Legislation limiting foreign commercial enterprises, aimed primarily at the Chinese, has been enacted, and pressures to increase restric-

tions continue. Even though Chinese domination of the domestic trade has waned, mistrust of the Chinese is pervasive, and the general stereotype of clever and unscrupulous Chinese merchants persists (Go, 1972: 395-396). The Government wants to integrate the Chinese into the society (Vreeland *et al.*, 1976: 94). Since the declaration of martial law in 1972, efforts have been made to Filipinoize the Chinese schools in the country (Tasker, 1977e: 83).

The Muslim Filipinos (Moros)

Islam was introduced into the Philippines some two hundred years prior to Christianity, often with armed force. Arab traders and proselytizers from Malay Peninsula and Indonesian Islands brought it to the Sulu Islands about the middle of the fourteenth century. From there it spread to Mindanao, and it reached the Manila area by 1565 when it was intercepted by the Spaniards and repulsed to the south, where it remains concentrated to-date, covering about one-third of the country.

By the time the Spaniards started colonizing the Philippines and converting the people to Christianity, most inhabitants of the southern part had already adopted Islam. Although the Spaniards found it comparatively easy to colonize and proselytize the rest of the Philippines, the Muslims in the south presented a stiff, well-organized resistance. The so-called "Moro" wars between the Spaniards and Muslim Filipinos lasted for more than 300 years. The Muslims remained opposed to Christianization as well as to the Spanish colonization (Tasker, 1977b: 21).

During the United States control of the Philippines, the Americans fared hardly better than the Spaniards in subduing the Muslims. Since the Muslims recognized the intentions of the Americans as not very different from those of the Spaniards, they again offered fierce resistance. The American armed forces finally ended organized Muslim opposition

by 1915. In the peace treaty, the Muslims were guaranteed freedom of religion. The Americans tried to lay the groundwork for civilian administration and followed the policy of assimilating the Muslims into the Filipino society. The Christian Filipinos moved in large numbers into the south under the United States protection for integration. This, however, only reinforced Muslim fears of American colonization. With the independence of the country, the Muslim hostility toward the Filipinos became more intense.

Muslims in the southern Philippines refer to themselves as the *Bangsa Moro* (Moro nation), and do not consider themselves citizens of the Republic of the Philippines. They identify themselves with the international Islamic fraternity and dissociate from the country's Christian majority. Whether through armed conflict or peaceful negotiations, they strive to secede to live by their own codes of social, economic, religious, and political ethics. The Muslim feeling of being a separate people has persisted throughout history. They take pride in the fact that they have successfully resisted the attempts of subjugation, colonization, and Christianization by the Spaniards; pacification, colonization, and incorporation into the body politic by the Americans; and assimilation and integration by the Governments of the Commonwealth and the Republic of the Philippines (Mahmoud, 1974: 221-223).

The Muslim Filipinos constitute the single most important exception to the general cultural homogeneity of the populace. Racially and linguistically, they are indistinguishable from the rest of the Filipinos, but their religion and way of life make them a culturally different group. They are divided into a number of subgroups in terms of linguistic differences and religious practices. In fact, there is a greater cultural heterogeneity among the Muslim than among the Christian Filipinos. But they present a front of solidarity against the Christians to protect their religion and culture.

The enmity between the Christian and

Muslim Filipinos is the most serious problem in intergroup relations. It had its beginning in the Spaniards' mobilization of the natives to augment their forces to fight against the Muslims. The Muslims interpreted the participation of the Christian Filipinos, although forced, as an act of hostility, which aroused their hatred, resentment, and suspicion. Both groups have carried out destructive and often brutal attacks on each other's settlements for centuries. To the Muslims, the Christians appear to be a force bent upon destroying their religion and their identity. To the Christians, the Muslims represent an alien group inimical to their society. The Christians consider the Muslims backward and inferior; the Muslims regard the Christians as infidels, worthy of contempt. The militant Muslim minority has expressed its hostility through ceaseless insurgency, insurrection, and separatist movement. In the recent decades, attempts by Christians to settle in the predominantly Muslim areas have accentuated the traditional animosity (Magdalena, 1977: 299-313).

With the beginning of the Mindanao independence movement in 1968, the Muslim Filipino drive for secession became a serious challenge to the Government. When President Marcos declared martial law in 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), with the active support of other Muslim countries, started rebellion with a full-scale guerilla war (Tasker, 1978a: 41-42). By 1975, over 100,000 Government troops and 20,000 rebels were engaged in warfare which displaced an estimated 1.5 million people in the South and cost the lives of several thousand civilians and soldiers on both sides (Tasker, 1977a: 18-20). Under international pressure, a cease-fire was arranged in 1976, which only collapsed in mid-1977 (Tasker, 1977c: 13-14). Because of the moral and material support of the whole Islamic world to the Muslims of the Philippines, neither weapons nor diplomacy have so far succeeded in halting the MNLF's campaign for establishing a separate state in the south with its own army and administration (Tasker, 1978b: 21-23).

In an effort to promote Christian-Muslim harmony, the Government has initiated several programs and has created the first steps toward a regional government in predominantly Muslim areas in Mindanao. However, these have been largely ineffective because armed conflict continues and the peaceful settlement in the southern Philippines remains a hope (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1975b: 21-23; Tasker, 1978d: 22-23; Machado, 1978: 202-209).

Other Cultural Minorities

The other cultural minorities are diverse among themselves and culturally different from other ethnic groups. Although they may be considered as interesting survivors of prehistoric Philippine cultures, the numerous small communities of pagan peoples that inhabit isolated regions are of little social, political, economic, or cultural consequence to the mainstream of the society. The groups inhabiting the mountainous regions of northern Luzon are generally called Igorots. Similarly, the minorities of Mindanao are sometimes lumped together under the name of Manobos. They possess great variation in culture, degree of advancement, and integration with the society.

Western beliefs, institutions, and ways of life are increasingly being accepted by many mountain people through a generally selective process. The Government seeks to integrate them by introducing educational, economic, and health facilities, rather than by direct imposition of drastic changes. Christian Filipinos, in search of the rich natural resources of the mountainous interior, often regard the cultural minorities as savages, and engage in conflicts with them. Thus, relations between Christian Filipinos and members of various minority groups have been frequently violent.

Cultural minorities in Mindanao have likewise been exploited and harassed by both Christians and Muslims. While many tribal

groups have moved further into the interior to avoid hostile contacts with the Christians and Muslims, others have become more acculturated. Those in northern Mindanao have accepted the Christian culture, whereas those in southern Mindanao and Palawan, the Muslim culture.

Education

Spanish colonial policies created the typical dual system of education, one for the Filipino youths and the other for the children of resident Spaniards. Education for the Filipinos was designed to convert them to Catholicism. Schools for them, known as catechism schools, were started to provide instruction in Christian doctrine, reading, and writing. Some also included in their program the teaching of Spanish, arithmetic, and various handicrafts. Most of them were small, with an enrolment of about 20 or 30 boys, and were located in few places. Therefore, almost until the early years of the seventeenth century, educational opportunity was not available to the vast majority of Filipinos. However, during the 17th and 18th centuries, Catholicism and the catechism schools spread throughout the country, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century almost every Philippine town had its own school. The catechism schools were fairly popular until the early part of the nineteenth century, but during its latter part, the Spaniards — established private elementary schools, with emphasis on secular education, gained preference.

The Spaniards established a complete education system on the Spanish model, from primary to university level, for their own youths. Nonetheless, it was possible for some Filipinos to benefit from it and their enrolment increased substantially in the institutions of higher education.

About the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Filipinos established private elementary schools which were an imitation

of the catechism schools. Later they began to emphasize secular education. By the end of the nineteenth century, emphasis on secular education distinguished the private elementary schools from the catechism schools.

Filipinos also established Latinities, the private secondary schools, during the latter part of the nineteenth century, which were duplicates of the first two years of Spanish secondary schools. They were made possible by the Educational Decree of 1863 which permitted the first two years of secondary education under private, certified instructors. However, in order to qualify for a degree, the Latinity graduates had to finish their education in one of the recognized Spanish secondary schools and to pass an examination administered by the University of Santo Tomas.

European-born Spaniards despised the Philippine-born Spaniards, they both despised the mestizos, and all three looked down upon the Filipinos. To combat Spanish racism, the Filipinos sought an education identical or superior to that for the Spaniards. They found the catechism schools inadequate and started private schools on the pattern of Spanish academic institutions (Schwartz, 1971: 202-218).

For the majority of Filipinos, prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, education was mainly a process of Christianization by the priests. All instruction was in local dialects. Children were taught to recite the catechism from memory, make their confessions, and receive communion. Talented boys were taught some Spanish, and many of them became clerks, printers, and government employees.

During the Spanish rule, formal academic education was available primarily to children of the Spaniards. Emphasis at all levels was given to literary and religious training. A limited number of secondary and higher educational institutions were founded by the Spanish colonial government. Most schools beyond the primary level were privately man-

aged and had religious affiliation, a feature that still characterizes many schools to date. Spanish was the language of instruction at all levels, and discipline was strict.

Under the American colonial administration, a centralized system of public education was introduced at the primary level. The language of instruction was changed to English, and religious instruction became optional. Teacher training and vocational training programs were introduced. Secondary and higher education remained largely under private management.

After World War II, various efforts were made to expand education. One of the most innovative schemes was the Barrio Education Movement, which was a self-help program to start schools in the rural areas (Orata, 1977: 201-412).

Soon after martial law was declared in 1972, the government enacted the Educational Development Decree which specified extensive reforms in the philosophical, curricular, moral, pedagogical, and administrative structure of the educational system (Education in Asia: Notes, 1973: 7-9). Other policy changes announced in the early 1970's included the use of Pilipino and English as languages of instruction at all levels in specific subject areas, and the use of Arabic as a language of instruction in the areas which have concentration of Muslim population (Philippine Studies, 1974: 325-337). The impact of English as the language of instruction has been enormous. It is the universal language of government, commerce, mass communication, and education, and is spoken by about 45 percent of the people, second only to Pilipino, the official national language of the country, spoken by about 55 percent of the people (Perlman, 1976: 119-126).

Educational institutions in the Philippines are classified into public and private schools. Public schools are financed and operated

by the national, provincial, and local governments while private schools are operated by religious organizations (sectarian schools), and private corporations (proprietary schools). Only a few of these private proprietary schools are non-profit institutions. Most of them are owned by stockholders and operated for profit.

Both public and private schools offer three levels of schooling: elementary, secondary, and collegiate. Elementary education covers six years – four years of primary and two years of intermediate education. There are, however, a few private schools that require three years of intermediate education. Secondary education consists of a four-year program offering different combinations of general and vocational training. The three major types of institutions are general high schools, barrio high schools, and vocational high schools. The general high schools offer two years of general education followed by two years of college preparatory or vocational program. Barrio (barangay) high schools are “self-help, help-others” non-profit educational innovations started in 1965 in rural areas. Their curriculum consists of integrated academic and vocational subjects. They provide education to all the children of all the people, especially those living in the most remote barrios, at little or no extra cost to the government. They provide them with the kind and quality of education most relevant to their needs. Finally, they give the learners work to do to earn their tuition fees and thereby help them finance their education. By 1977, there were about 2,000 barrio high schools established in all parts of the country, in every province and in most cities, with a total enrolment of about one-third of a million students (Orata, 1977: 402-406). Vocational high schools provide work skills and offer terminal programs for students to enter labor force. They include industrial, agricultural, fishery, and technical high schools. In 1963, the national comprehensive high schools were started in different parts of the country. They provide

highly enriched and varied curriculum offerings.

Institutions of higher education offer programs ranging from liberal arts education to law and medicine. Almost one-half of them are concentrated in Manila area. Most institutions of secondary and post-secondary education are privately managed. Approximately 92 percent of the elementary school children enrol in the public schools, while 65 percent of the secondary and 92 percent of the collegiate students enrol in the private institutions (Ronduen and Nelson, 1975: 536-545).

The Ministry of Education and Culture controls, regulates, and supervises both public and private education in the country. The Board of National Education is the highest policy-making body. The Ministry, operating through its various divisions and bureaus, implements the policies of the Board (Cruz and Coldado, 1975: 3).

Accreditation, effective regulation, and bilingualism are the three most pressing issues facing education in the country. Other problems include over-production of college graduates, educated unemployed (Piron, 1972: 338-346), imbalance between training of college graduates and manpower needs, large number of unaccredited proprietary institutions, over-concentration of students and educational institutions in the Manila area, questionable standards at some institutions, and at least before martial law was declared, student activism (UNESCO Bulletin, 1972: 1973-174).

The Philippine government is making determined efforts to upgrade the quality of education at all levels through such measures as employing National College Entrance Examination and Philippine Aptitude Classification Test, establishing quality control in education, making education socially and nationally relevant, eliminating private educational institutions of questionable quality, locating colleges and universities in the provinces, promoting Pilipino as the national language, stimulat-

ing voluntary accreditation, discouraging use of private educational institutions for profit-making, and instilling the spirit of Filipinization (Perlman, 1976: 119-126; Hunt and McHale, 1965: 127-138; Isidro, 1969: 150-156).

One of the tasks of the Philippine government is to integrate the minorities educationally and culturally. The efforts have been fairly successful so far as the Igorots and other groups are concerned. But the Chinese and the Muslims are determined to resist assimilation. In order to perpetuate their culture, the Chinese have placed strong emphasis on educating their children in their own schools. Already in existence in the closing decades of the Spanish colonial period, there were, by 1975, about 160 Chinese elementary and secondary schools with about 70,000 students and about 4,000 teachers. The schools have two curricula: one is based on the standard course in the Philippine public schools and the other stresses Chinese language and culture. The primary purpose of the Chinese school system is to keep the child Chinese and thus impede the assimilation process. "The admitted ideal of the schools maintained by the Chinese community for its own children is to form good Chinese citizens and good Philippine residents" (Eitzen, 1968: 230).

The Chinese schools vary greatly in size and quality. In small towns, they may be nothing more than one-room one-teacher institutions, imparting instruction in the Chinese language after the students are free from attending the regular public schools. Others, such as those in Manila, may have as many as 3,000 students, regular curriculum, and modern facilities. After World War II, the Chinese schools had adopted the Taiwanese curriculum and were supervised directly by the Taiwanese educational authorities. However, as a consequence of the revelation of communist infiltration in some Chinese schools, the Philippine government asserted its authority to supervise and control the Chinese schools (van der Kroef, 1967: 115-123).

Today, the Ministry of Education and Culture directly supervises and controls the Chinese schools, although they are largely left alone in the implementation of their Chinese language curriculum. The atmosphere in many schools (conversation, values, festivals, and rituals) is almost entirely Chinese. Therefore, their periodic affirmation of their loyalty to the Philippines is not likely to convince even the most casual observer of their sincerity, and suspicion of their anti-national attitude, if not subversion, persists until this day. The Chinese schools serve more to reinforce Chinese identity than to foster identification with Filipinos (Go, 1972: 396-397).

Despite the overt official anti-communist stance of the Chinese schools, concern over their political role remains serious. This has been accentuated by the resurgent radical left in the Philippines (including the domestic Chinese segment) and the emergent People's Republic of China. As a result of these developments, the conflicts of political appeals and loyalties among the Philippine Chinese have been greatly intensified.

Another minority that is continuously waging war against the Republic of the Philippines and the Filipino culture is the Muslim population of the south. The cultural and religious animosity which the Spaniards engendered in the minds of the Muslims under their policy of "divide and rule" has progressively deepened. The Americans, in the earlier years of their occupation, used force to subdue the armed resistance of the Muslim Filipinos. After restoring order, they tried the educational approach to integrate them into the national body politic. They introduced universal compulsory primary education. However, most Muslims refused to send their children to school as they viewed public education as a ploy to alienate them from their faith. They suspected its Christian character, and they abhorred the concept of co-education. References in the textbooks to pork-eating and swine-raising were sacrilegious to them. The instructional materials contained accounts of

glory of Christian heroes, and only uncomplimentary references, if any at all, about Muslims, usually associated with piracy and smuggling.

Over the past decades, with the independence of the country, the Republic of the Philippines has made concerted efforts to accelerate cultural integration and to promote national unity through economic, social, and educational programs. As a consequence, the education of the Muslim Filipinos has considerably advanced, but not their integration. Private institutions are providing extensive educational opportunities in the remote and inaccessible parts of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. Public education is also being extended into all Muslim areas. The main problems of education in the Muslim communities, as in the Christian communities, are lack of school buildings, inadequate textbooks and instructional materials, and poorly trained teachers. Hence, the quality of education is poor and the attrition rate high. The poverty of the communities, the great distances separating towns, the poor and impassable roads, and the insufficient means of transportation militate against the provision of education.

The establishment of the Mindanao State University in 1961 has provided a major thrust for the uplift of the Muslims. The primary purpose of the University has been to accelerate the educational advancement of the region, to provide trained manpower for its economic development, and to promote the Muslim welfare. The University has organized a number of colleges in specialized disciplines, and conducts the "Classroom of the Air" to improve professional competence of teachers. It has established high schools with college-oriented curriculum in a number of towns to offer preparation for admission to institutions of higher education. It has inaugurated an extensive program of community high schools in distant areas, with a vocational bias. These schools offer the local youths an opportunity for extended education and for acquiring technical skills. The University is

also geared to providing higher education appropriate for the economic needs and resources of the different parts of the region. Thus, the Mindanao State University is considered as the springboard for the multiphasic development of the Muslim region.

The Philippine Broadcasting Service, with its relay broadcast from Manila, has brought the Muslim population in contact with the current political, social, and economic developments in the country. The radio service seeks to penetrate the geographical isolation of the Muslim communities caused by natural barriers and lack of transportation, and attempts to steer them into the mainstream of the national life.

The integration program of the Republic of the Philippines is predicated on the postulate that if the Muslim Filipinos are provided with more roads, schools, health facilities, civic centers, and industries, and if they are taught modern methods of farming, given more scholarships for higher education, and offered more jobs in the government, then, in time, they will come to identify themselves with the Philippine nation. While the Muslim Filipinos do, in fact, want all these, they fear integration would lead to the loss of their identity. It is this resolve to preserve their identity that, in part, would explain their response—generally hostile and negative—to the policies adopted toward them in the past by the Spaniards and the Americans and more recently by the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, the Muslim Filipinos generally have a low standard of living, poor health and sanitation, high rate of illiteracy, and are not in the mainstream of the national life.

Muslim Filipinos draw their cultural, religious, and educational inspiration from fellow Muslims in other parts of the world. In fact, because of religious affinity, some identify themselves more closely with the Muslims of Malaysia and Indonesia than with the Christians of the Philippines. The resurgence of

Islam in other countries after World War II has had a profound effect upon Islam in the Philippines. New mosques have been built in Muslim areas, and additional religious schools have been started. The teaching of the Quran, the Arabic language, and the principles of Muslim morality have been intensified. Some teachers are sent to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to study religion, and some are imported from those countries. Pilgrimages to Mecca have become more common and religious and cultural bonds with the Muslim countries more firm. Religious literature is published in larger quantities and is widely distributed. Many Islamic societies for social and religious purposes have been established, and they strengthen the bond of solidarity among the Muslims.

Conclusion

The Philippines is in a very unenviable position and its unity as a nation is at stake. Of the three minority groups, only the aborigines have registered any progress toward integration into the Filipino society. The Chinese, through their business organizations, fraternal associations, family ties, and schools, continue to maintain their exclusiveness and resist assimilation into the Filipino culture, with questionable evidence of their loyalty to the Philippines. They, by and large, find the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a dominant power of the region quite comforting. Another group, that cuts across the ethnic lines and which is held together by the

common ideology of communism, draws its membership from the Philippine academic circles as well as the domestic segment of the Chinese population. This group is engaged in ceaseless subversive activities with the avowed purpose of establishing a communist government. The members of this group undoubtedly receive moral and material support from the People's Republic of China located so conveniently close to the Philippines. The Muslim Filipinos, on the other hand, form a culturally and religiously alienated group, who are determined to carve out a sovereign state from the Philippines for themselves. They defy the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines, are engaged in rebellion, and receive moral and material support from some other Islamic countries. They suspect the educational efforts of the Philippine Government as a ploy to obliterate their identity, organize religious and educational activities to foster their own culture, and are opposed to integration with the Christian Filipinos. It is a striking phenomenon that in almost all countries of the world governed by the non-Muslims, the Muslim minorities stay in perpetual agitation. Thus, the external factors not only continue to hamper the process of integration, but have unleashed forces of destabilization in the country which partly led to the imposition of martial law in 1972. Under these circumstances, the odds are against education serving as an instrument for integrating the Chinese and the Muslim minorities into the Filipino society.

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