

Transnational Social Movement: Examining its Emergence, Organizational Form and Strategies, and Collective Identity

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The transnationalization of collective action has brought about new ways of conceptualizing crucial elements in political mobilization such as the role of the state and the domestic context in the struggle, organizational form, strategies, and collective identities of social movements. These views imply rethinking the role of the state as the primary site of struggle because of its being embedded in an increasingly influential global polity, that it is advantageous for transnational networks to operate in a less structured organizational set-up to afford activists greater autonomy and flexibility to pursue other causes, and that activists can cast aside individual identities and rally behind an all-inclusive identity like being anti-neo liberal globalization. However, the paper argues that discarding conventional frameworks for social movement analysis can be problematic in comprehending transnational mobilizations. In line with this, it might be prudent to still regard the state and domestic context as the primary site of resistance, that coalition networks should be more structured to efficiently pursue their goals; and that networks should be more sensitive to identities by way of consciously addressing the needs of specific sectors in a coalition for instance.

Key words: globalization, transnational social movements, state, organizational form and strategies, identities

INTRODUCTION

Transnational mobilization has been an increasing focus of globalization research (e.g. Smith and Johnston 2002; Cohen and Rai 2000; Richter, Berking and Muller-Schmid 2006). This has been largely brought about by the connection being made by the literature between processes related to globalization and the transnationalization of collective action. Increasing interconnectedness coupled with the perceived inequities brought about by the neoliberal agenda of globalization has been bringing together activists across the globe to form collective political mobilization.

This paper aims to engage the literature on the transnationalization of political mobilization with the attempt to examine the implications of this form of contention to issues salient to social movement organizing. Specifically, the literature review aims to address the following questions: What factors led to the emergence of the transnationalization of collective action? Why do activists involve in this kind of political mobilization? What are the implications of transnational political mobilization on how contention is conceptualized – along issues relating to the role of the state or domestic context in the resistance, organizational form and strategies, and collective identities of social movements?

The paper is divided into three main sections. The first part is devoted to defining the characteristics of the current wave of the transnationalization of collective action. The next part examines the processes that gave rise to this form of collective contention. The third part discusses the implications of the transnationalization of political mobilization on the role of the state or domestic context as site of resistance, organizational form and strategies, and collective identities of social movements.

CHARACTERIZING TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Although variously defined, the following definition of social movements is a useful starting point. Social movements are a “distinct social process consisting of the mechanisms through which actors engage in collective action: are involved in conflictual relations with clearly defined opponents; are linked by dense informal networks; share a distinct collective identity” (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 20). Social movements are distinct from political and interest groups although they are often compared with each other. Social movements are different in the sense that they are networks which may or may not include formal organizations, depending on shifting circumstances. In view of this, a

single organization regardless of its dominant traits is not a social movement. Although the organization may be involved in a social movement process, it is not identical to a social movement as the two illustrate different organizational principles (ibid. 25).

Transnational social movement has been variously referred to as global social movement (Cohen and Rai 2000; Della Porta et al. 2006), global civil society (Keane 2003; Lipschutz 1992; Scholte 2003; Kaldor 2003), or international civil society (Colas 2003). Global social movements are defined as "supranational networks of actors that define their causes as global and organize protest campaigns that involve more than one state" (Della Porta et al. 2006:18). Global civil society has been used to "refer to those independent NGOs and social movements that operate across national boundaries" (Kaldor 2003:559). However, Colas (2003) offers a definition of international civil society as not necessarily referring to the social movement actors but as an "international space created by the expansion of capitalist relations of production where modern social movements pursue their political goals" (264-5).

Meanwhile, Khagram and Alvord (2006) define transnational social movement activities as "phenomena and dynamics that cross, alter, transcend, and even transform borders and boundaries." By referring to the activities as transnational, they are contrasted with "dominant types of ostensibly bounded and/or bordered units, actors, structures, and processes that are typically associated with notions of ... nation, State, nation-state, and nation-state system" (66). Moreover, Piper and Uhlin (2003) characterize social movement organizing as transnational when either of the following factors is present:

First, it may focus on transnational issues, related for instance, to the environment or health problems. Second, the actors themselves may be transnational, either in the strong sense of having an organizational structure that is not territorially bounded and including citizens of more than one state (like transnational advocacy networks), or in the weaker sense of being concerned with issues in a country other than where the activists are citizens (such as solidarity groups supporting an independence movement in a foreign country). Third, transnational methods and strategies may be applied (e.g. e-mobilization and other net-based activities). Fourth, the targets of activism may be based in one or several countries than where the activists themselves are located, thus requiring crossborder interaction (5).

Some of the literature on transnational activism examines the networks or organizations that facilitate the political mobilization. For example,

Keck and Sikkink's (1998) groundbreaking study defines transnational advocacy networks as made up of "relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services" (2). Tarrow (2001: 11 cited in Kolb 2005: 99), on the other hand, defines transnational social movement organization as "socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interaction with power holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor."

A number of literature prefer the term transnational over global or international to refer to crossborder activities of social movement actors (e.g. Khagram and Alvord 2006; Tarrow 2005; Piper and Uhlin 2003). Khagram and Alvord (2006) cite the following reasons on why this is so:

First, most crossborder or crossboundary civic organizations and activities are probably not global in scope, orientation, or mind-set. Second, even those campaigns, organizations, networks, and/or movements that claim to be global do not involve or reach all corners of the planet. Third, the term "transnational" directs our attention to activities and organizational forms that may cross levels (local, national, regional, international etc.) as well as borders (65-66).

Transnational social movement is not a new phenomenon. Keck and Sikkink (1998) contend that historical precursors to the current wave of transnational activism include the nineteenth century campaigns to abolish slavery in the United States, the international movement for women suffrage, and the elimination of foot-binding practices in China. Tarrow (2005) likewise espouses that when examined via the two mechanisms in which transnational activism operates namely the diffusion of movement across borders and international mobilization, then this form of mobilization is not new. Diffusion of movement across borders is manifested in the nineteenth century anti-slavery movement that spread from England to France, the Netherlands, and the Americas. An example of international mobilization is illustrated in the campaign that made the First of May an international worker's holiday which was transmitted to Europe from the American eight-hour-day campaign through the socialist international. Moreover, Scholte (2003: 286) writes that prototypical global meetings during the nineteenth century were conducted by pacifists, anarchists, the first and second workers' internationals, Pan-Africanists, advocates of women's suffrage and Zionists. In addition, the International Red Cross has been providing humanitarian relief worldwide dating back to the 1860s.

If transnational activism is not new, what then is new and different about the contemporary wave of transnational activism? In their study of transnational networks, Keck and Sikkink (1998: 10) write that the dramatic increase in terms of "number, size, and professionalism, and the speed, density, and complexity of international linkages" among the later forms differentiate them from the earlier ones. Similarly, Tarrow (2005: 4-5) argues that the contemporary wave "involves a broader spectrum of ordinary people and elites, and that it extends to a wider range of domestic and international concerns." The factors that gave rise to the dramatic increase of transnational movement organizing will be discussed in the next section.

EMERGENCE OF THE CURRENT WAVE OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The latter part of the 20th century witnessed the growth of the transnationalization of political mobilization (Sholte 2003; Kaldor 2003; Tarrow 2000). This growth has been largely associated with the acceleration of processes related to globalization (Bandy and Smith 2005; Kaldor 2003; Falk 2005; Scholte 2003; Keily 2005). Although variously defined, the paper offers some definitions of globalization that might be useful for the understanding of the transnationalization of collective action. Globalization (is) "a process leading to greater interdependence and mutual awareness among economic, political, social units in the world, and among actors in general" (Guillen 2001: 236). Tarrow (2005: 5) associates globalization with the process of "increasing volume and speed of flows of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and forces that connect actors between countries. Held and McGrew (2002: 1) however write that globalization "denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of transcontinental flows and patterns of social interaction. It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human organization that links distinct communities and expands the reach of power relations across the world's regions and continents. All these definitions emphasize time-space compression that facilitates interaction among actors globally.

During the 1990s, the process of globalization has accelerated for various reasons including "the collapse of previously closed (mostly socialist) societies, the spread of neoliberal ideas, and above all, the development in information technologies" (Kaldor 2003: 560). The global interconnectedness opens up opportunities for citizens' groups to engage in transnational mobilization (Kaldor 2003; Lipschutz 1992). Kriesberg (2008) elaborates on this by

identifying four interactive trends in the contemporary world that tend to support the growth of nongovernment organizations, including transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs), namely: growing democratization, increasing global integration, increasing convergence and diffusion of values, and proliferation of transnational institutions.

Della Porta and Tarrow (2005: 7) write that three significant changes in the international environment helped facilitate the transnationalization of collective action. First, the development of forms of nonstate actions largely facilitated by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War “produced a wave of Western governmental support for NGO activity in both East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. This also led to the development of nonstate groups that might otherwise have been branded as ‘pro-communist’ in the days of the Cold War.”

Second, the advancement in communication technology and cheaper air travel allowed activists to collaborate with one another across borders. In relation to this, the increase in migration flows across borders stimulated the formation of “immigrant activism.” Finally, attention to the international environment has been emphasized by the “growing power of transnational corporations and international institutions, treaties regulating the international economy, and international events like the global summits of the World Bank, the Group of Eight, and especially the World Trade Organization” (ibid. 8).

Inasmuch as globalization provides the general context for transnational mobilization, its content, particularly its neo-liberal economic agenda, provides as much push for collective action. Social movement protests against the ill effects of neoliberal globalization have been the subject of various works on transnational contention (e.g. Cohen and Rai 2000; Della Porta et al. 2006; Halperin and Laxer 2003; Bandy and Smith 2005; Applebaum and Robinson 2005; Amoore 2005; Gills 2008). Mobilizations have centered on several issues resulting from the implementation of the neoliberal economic project, some of which are identified by Della Porta et al. (2006) in the following.

In the north (economic globalization) has brought unemployment, a decrease in job security, and an increase in unprotected working conditions, with frequent trade union mobilization in both industry and agriculture. Also in the south of the world, the negative social effects of the neoliberal policies imposed by the major international economic organizations, forcing developing countries to make substantial cuts in social spending, have triggered fierce protests.

Already weak political regimes have allowed private exploitation of natural resources as well as development projects with major environmental impact... A main claim of the movement, which is now finding new support from unexpected quarters, is the perniciousness of neoliberal policies for economic development (11).

Falk (2005) characterizes this movement as "globalization from below" to oppose the excesses of "globalization from above." The latter is associated with "the growing power of corporate capital vis-à-vis countervailing forces, which is reflected in the dominance of transnational corporations, global finance, and the decline of the 'compassionate state'" (Kiely 2005: 139). The movement for "globalization from below" is also referred to as the "global justice movement" (Evans 2008).

IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

To effectively challenge "globalization from above," the countervailing mobilization must be "global, broad based, cross-sectoral, and capable of collective action." Hence, social movements have been "seeking to communicate across borders, to develop common grievances, and to organize in the pursuit of international alternatives" – toward the realization of a "globalization from below" (Bandy and Smith 2005: 231).

The transnationalization of political mobilization has implications on issues related to contentious political actions such as: on how to conceptualize the role of the state or domestic context in the contention, as well as the organizational form, strategies, and collective identities of social movements. Changes in the organizational form, strategies, and collective identities of social movements take place as activists mobilize beyond national borders.

Role of the state and domestic context in the resistance

Studies on social movements have mostly regard the state as the site of contention (e.g. Tilly 1984 as cited in Smith and Johnston 2002). Nonetheless, Smith and Johnston (2002) write that the capability of the state to influence domestic and economic decision-making may require rethinking amid the acceleration of global integration processes. The state's capability to decide is increasingly constrained by "an expanding web of commitments to other international actors." The states' entering into treaties and intergovernmental organizations signify a "more interdependent and densely integrated interstate system. This means that states have adopted limitations on their capacities

for independent action in exchange for greater security and predictability in the broader system" (1-2).

For instance, a state may enter into international agreement to uphold human rights norms. In return, it gains security "against the possibility of mass flows of political refugees across its borders that would result from other states' human rights violations." In economic realm, states give up their autonomy to regulate their domestic economies "in exchange for both access to other state's markets and greater predictability and transparency in global economic relations." Moreover, globalization processes have given rise to transnational entities and actors, including "transnational corporations, international nongovernment organizations, transnational banks, and global criminal networks" that pose challenge to states as "predominant players in the international arena" (ibid.).

Nonetheless, Smith and Johnston (2002: 2) qualify that states continue to be relevant in understanding global political processes, "but it does show that many contemporary, state-level political conflicts are at least partly shaped by global forces." They added that the appreciation of national polities being "nested in an increasingly influential global polity that affects political conflicts" require giving attention to the global system in order to better understand domestic political struggle.

The recognition of the interaction between domestic and international context to explain the emergence and outcomes of transnational political mobilization has been the subject of recent theorizing. Sikkink's (2005) interactive model for instance illustrates this interaction. It argues that the openness or closedness of international and domestic institutions affect transnational political mobilization.

International political opportunity structure refers mainly to the degree of openness or closedness of international institutions to the participation of transnational NGOs, networks, and coalitions. It can be operationalized by "looking at the formal and informal mechanisms or procedures for inclusions and participation in different international institutions." For instance, the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) institutions "have provisions for NGOs to seek and be granted consultative status" and at the same time many have "developed practices that permit some NGOs to speak at meetings and present written materials for inclusion in the record." In contrast, the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has no provisions for NGO participation (Sikkink 2005: 157).

Domestic political opportunity structure refers “primarily to how open or closed domestic political institutions are to domestic social movement or NGO influence.” Like in the case of international political opportunity structure, this can be operationalized by examining formal and informal mechanisms or procedures for participation on different issues (ibid.). Sikkink’s framework essentially contends that more open domestic and international political opportunity structures facilitate the emergence of and positive outcomes for transnational collective mobilizations. Another point she emphasized is that opportunities and threats are not objective structural factors but are perceived by the activists.

The interplay of domestic and international structures is also analyzed by Risse-Kappen (2008). He writes that the impact of transnational actors and coalitions on state policies is likely to vary depending on the conditions of domestic structures and international institutions. Accordingly, the impact may vary because of:

1. differences in domestic structures, i.e. the normative and organizational arrangements which form the “state,” structure society, and link the two in the polity; and
2. degrees of international institutionalization, i.e. the extent to which the specific issue-area is regulated by bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes, and/or international organizations (460).

Risse-Kappen puts forward the proposition that “under similar international conditions, differences in domestic structures determine the variation in the policy impact of transnational actors. Domestic structures mediate, filter and refract the efforts by transnational actors and alliances to influence policies in the various issue-areas” (466).

Transnational actors have to overcome two main hurdles before they can influence policies. “First, they have to gain access to the political system of their `target state.’ Second, they must generate and/or contribute to `winning’ policy coalitions in order to change decisions in the desired direction.” Their ability to influence policy changes is affected by the “domestic coalition-building processes in the policy networks and on the degree to which stable coalitions form sharing the transnational actors’ causes” (ibid.).

Risse-Kappen’s emphasis on the importance of the domestic context is likewise raised in other works (e.g. Laxer and Halperin 2003; Lewis 2002; Rootes 2005). The domestic context still largely shapes the contours and

direction of transnational mobilization, and primarily provides the opportunities and resources for political mobilization. As articulated by Laxer and Halperin (2003) in reference to the anti-neoliberal globalization struggle:

What we are concerned with is being clear about where political action works best in opposing globalism. Trying to reduce the power of corporations and capital in the global arena will produce limited results unless joined by strong efforts at national and local level. If a significant organized domestic constituency is lacking, external actors usually accomplish little. Crossborder solidarities depend on the ability of nationally and locally mobilized forces to forge links with similarly mobilized forces abroad (15).

Transnational mobilization, therefore, is more likely to appear in conditions where there are open domestic political opportunity structures and corresponding support from existing local civil society groups. And when pursued with the presence of these elements, the mobilization will likely result in positive outcomes (e.g. Lewis 2002; Piper and Ford 2006; Law 2002; Sim 2003; Rothman and Oliver 2002). This is shown for instance in a study conducted by Tammy Lewis (2002) on transnational social movement organizations working on the conservation of environment in Ecuador, Chile, and Peru. Lewis' study concludes that "transnational SMOs pursued conservation projects in countries with more open political structures and active voluntary sectors than in countries where preservation was most urgent for the local and/or global ecology" (7). The mobilizations succeeded in influencing conservation policies and practices, such as the establishment of national parks and management of protected areas by domestic NGOs largely because of the more open domestic political opportunity structures.

Also, the studies of Piper and Ford (2006), Law (2002), and Sim (2003) on transnational political mobilization in Hong Kong show that activism for migrant workers' rights thrived in the area because of the government's tolerance for political mobilization. Moreover, the relevance of the domestic context as resource for political mobilization is shown in the case of the Filipino activists who largely facilitated the activism in Hong Kong. The Philippines' relatively conducive environment for social movement mobilization and its long tradition of activism nurtured the activists in Hong Kong. The mobilizations yielded positive outcomes such as the non-implementation of a planned drastic wage cut on the salaries of domestic workers during the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in Hong Kong; the authorities' reduction of agency fees for the renewal of work contracts; and

the enactment of voting rights for Filipino migrants (2003 Absentee Voting Rights Bill in the Philippines RA 9189).

Moreover, the study of Rothman and Oliver (2002) on the antidam movement in Brazil articulates as much the importance of the local context in transnational struggle. They said that “the initiative for protest and resistance always began with the local people, as did the initiative to seek external resources. External agents were reactive, requesting for proposals, or entering an area after the disruption has started” (128).

This section emphasizes that even though states are nested in an increasingly powerful global polity committing themselves to transnational institutions, which can in turn affect their decisions on domestic matters, this does not mean that states should be relegated to the background as targets of protest actions. Decisions on whether to commit to transnational arrangements are still largely made by the state. In addition, the undiminished relevance of the domestic context lies in its being the primary provider of resources for transnational activism. Two factors are especially crucial in the domestic arena: the open political environment and local civil society groups that lend support to transnational activism. Social movement entrepreneurs should therefore be able to continue to nurture the domestic arena if they aim to engage in transnational activism.

ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND STRATEGIES

Transnational activism also creates new strategies and forms of organization (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005; Smith 2007). This change is captured in Jackie Smith’s (2007) study of the 1999 protests at the Third Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, Washington which analyzes the strategies or “repertoires of actions” employed by those involved in this form of political mobilization. In the Seattle protests, the study suggests that a division of labor existed between groups with local or national ties and those with transnational ties such that the former took on mobilization roles while the latter provided information and the framing of the campaign and struggle in general. Likewise, an examination of the tactics employed shows that “national protests `repertoires’ have been adapted for use in global political arenas,” while there is also evidence of “protest innovation in response to global political integration and technology.” Although the study merely focused on one protest episode, it nonetheless suggests that transnational protests affect the organization and character of social movements (468).

Smith identified the following as some of the older or existing protest forms used in Seattle: teach-ins which were first used in anti-Vietnam war protests; press center and press conferences for mainstream media; irreverent and humorous street theater and puppet shows; and disruption tactics such as blockade of international conference site, civil disobedience, and vandalism against corporate sites (480-482).

Although earlier 'protest repertoires' are adopted, other tactics are "innovative in the sense that they target multilateral arenas and that they often involve TSMOs." These tactics "often rely on new technologies, ironically the same ones that have fueled the global economic expansion the protesters resist." The innovations include the creation of transnational associations and "transnationally oriented movement media" exemplified in NGO newspapers presenting "counter-hegemonic interpretations of negotiations and highlight the proposals and activities raised by challenger groups" (483).

Moreover, the activists borrow from official templates for their collective action. For example, they organized a People's Assembly to parallel official deliberations. Another means of borrowing official forms is by "getting sympathetic experts or even movement activists onto national delegations to international meetings." Another form of borrowing involves "dramaturgy in the application of international legal principles." In Seattle, the "Global People's Tribunal on Corporate Crimes Against Humanity" dramatically "brought to trial" corporate practices around the world. The lawyer-activists facilitating the event "educated the audience and 'jury' on the relevant international law and tribunal procedures." At the end of the "proceedings," the Tribunal "indicted" the governments whose laws allowed the operation of the guilty corporations (483-484).

Another innovation is electronic activism extensively using Internet sites and electronic list serves enabling the expansion of communication with dispersed constituencies and audiences. The communication networks enabled the organizers "to almost instantaneously transmit alternative media accounts and images of protests to contrast those of mainstream, corporate-owned media outlets" (484).

Smith's study concurs with what is documented in other studies (e.g. Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Della Porta et al. 2005) with regard to the repertoire of contention employed by actors in new transnational contention, such that activists are reverting to the more contentious forms of collective

action. This is contrary to the conclusion of a study conducted in the 1990s (e.g. Marks and Mac Adam 1999 as cited in Della Porta and Tarrow 2005) predicting that social movements will tend to shift from contentious to more contained forms of collective action as they change the focus of their activities from the national to the international level (241). This is because the targets of protests at the international level (such as the WTO) exhibit the same low democratic accountability and transparency like those at the national level.

Change in strategy is also manifested in “the ease with which activists who enter politics in one campaign can shift smoothly to cognate campaigns, and the rise of composite movement organizations.” For example, after 11 September 2001, “many activists from the global justice campaign moved rapidly into antiwar activities, often framing their new target as an extension of their opposition to global social injustice.” This flexibility is not only evident among the new activists but is also seen in the nature of their organizations. Since the 1990s, there is a trend of a shift from single issue to multi-issue organizing among transnational movement organizations. This trend is especially evident in the global South where for example dictatorship and corruption “provide opportunities and threats that encourage the formation of broad-based opposition groups instead of the focused campaign coalitions” (212). The adoption of multi-issue frame is also manifested in the movement’s identification of linkages between issues, such as between environmental protection and human rights or between peace and human rights (Bandy and Smith 2005; Mittelman and Chin 2000).

Moreover, the central unit of transnational contention has veered away from the bureaucratic movement organizations and has been replaced by “spokes councils and working groups... (that) mediate between the need for coordination and group autonomy.” The Internet has facilitated the existence of these new forms of organization. In between protest events when activists go back to their localities, they “remain in touch with one another through friendship networks, e-mail contacts, and, increasingly, through online internet connection.” The Internet is credited for speeding up the “organization of event coalitions and eases the maintenance of between-event coalitions. It is at the core of a new type of movement organization, one that is no longer dependent on fixed, place-based activities” (Tarrow 2005: 210).

However, there is growing concern about the lack of formal organizational structure of transnational networks (Bandy and Smith 2005; Chase Dunn and Gills 2005), as diffused movements are likely to suffer from weaknesses or

limitations in actions. Bandy and Smith (2005) explain why the need for a more formal organization structure:

Formalization of transnational ties both helps to sustain long-term cooperative action by routinizing transnational contacts and facilitating the mobilization of resources for transnational action. Most of the goals of social change advocates require long term action over many years to both promote a change in policy or governance structure and then to sustain public awareness and monitor policy implementation. Thus alliances formed on an ad hoc temporary basis find that they must develop more formal organizational routines to facilitate cooperation. This can happen even when activists resist formal structures that can inhibit their flexibility or autonomy (4).

To summarize, the advent of the use of Internet offers innovations on how political mobilization is organized. Among the changes it helped facilitate, is the less formal organizational structure for transnational networks. The less structured set-up affords activists greater flexibility and autonomy. Campaigns and mobilizations can also be conducted on an ad hoc basis because of the facility of communication among the activists. However, there may be need to reflect on the effectiveness of the less structured set-up. Advocating for social change requires long term, sustained action. And this can only be facilitated if the activists operate within formal organizational structure which can give a semblance of consistency, planning and coordination of the activities of movement members.

COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

Collective identity is typically understood as “a shorthand designation announcing a status—a set of attitudes, commitments, and rules for behavior—that those who assume the identity can be expected to subscribe to. These identities are frequently a reflection of ascribed characteristics (e.g. race, class, gender, or sexual orientation) but they can also reflect beliefs, ideologies, or loyalties” (Nepstad 2002: 135). Two main themes can be extracted from the literature dealing with collective identity in the context of transnational mobilization. One, the emergence of the anti-neoliberal globalization as master frame for collective mobilization and two, the more flexible identities of activists such that they can straddle between domestic and transnational mobilizations and can have overlapping memberships in loosely structured networks (such as being members of the labor and environmental movements at the same time).

The construction of a collective “we” is a crucial issue in transnational mobilization. Organizers should be able to frame the issue of contention so as to mobilize sympathizers from a wide array of activists across the globe. Framing is used here in the tradition of how Snow et al. (1986) theorized the concept for social movement analysis. Snow et al. note that social movements “actively engage in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers... They frame, or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists” (McAdam 1999: 338-339). Social movements should also be able to “frame social problems and injustices in a way that convinces a wide and diverse audiences of the necessity for and utility of collective attempts to redress them” (McCarthy, Smith, Zald 1999: 291).

Judging from the wide participation of activists in the anti-WTO mobilizations and World Social Forums, movement organizers are able to cast the anti-neoliberal globalization as a shared master frame for the mobilizations (Della Porta et al. 2006). Activists from different localities and issues such as those working on indigenous peoples in the Philippines, environmentalists in Indonesia, or labor activists in Latin America come together to these mobilizations and relate their issues to the neoliberal agenda of globalization.

Meanwhile, Della Porta and Tarrow (2005: 237) write that transnational activism transforms activists into rooted cosmopolitans with flexible identities and multiple belongings. “Rooted cosmopolitans” are those who are “rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in regular activities that require their involvement in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts.” While activists with “multiple belongings” are those with “overlapping memberships linked within loosely structured, polycentric networks.” For example, activists may be both members of ecological and labor movements and employ both labor and ecological approaches to global issues. Flexible identities are referred to as “identities characterized by inclusiveness and a positive emphasis upon diversity and cross-fertilization, with limited identifications that develop especially around common campaigns on objects perceived as “concrete” and nurtured by search for dialogue.” With flexible identities, diversity is stressed as a positive asset for collective action. Della Porta and Tarrow add that: “Concrete common campaigns are perceived not only as built upon a minimal common denominator, but as the basis for the development of a shared understanding of external reality. Notwithstanding

multiple belongings, activists stress the important role of 'subjectivity' and individual involvement."

All these imply that identity will be less of an issue in transnational mobilization. However, a volume by Bandy and Smith (2005) on transnational coalitions shows that identity is still much of an issue in these mobilizations. One of the most common identity conflicts discussed in the case studies is that between activists of developed and developing nations, with "the Northern activists often assume paternal or imperial roles and their Southern counterparts who articulate nationalisms or regionalisms" (239). This is similar to the observations made by Eschle and Stammers (2004) and Piper and Uhlin (2003) about the tendency of transnational networks to be dominated by certain organizations or Northern-based activists.

Conflicts can also be seen in the issue of gender where a study on fair trade coalitions show limited women's movements participation in the network. MacDonald (2005) writes that "the coalitions that have emerged against free trade in the Americas are not free of exclusionary practices. In particular, while such issues as labor and environmental rights have become prominent elements of anti-free trade campaigns, the gendered dimensions of trade have gained relatively little exposure." Women's movements have not been in the thick of trade campaigns and have been slow to mobilize at a transnational level to protest trade agreements (21-22). Among others, MacDonald attributes this to the difficulty encountered by women "who are attempting to interpret and critique complex trade agreements to translate their analysis into terms that are comprehensible to the average women who make up the base of women's movement" (37).

Differences in religious beliefs were also pointed out by Cullen (2005) as a major tension in the Platform of European Social NGOs (the Platform) on the issue of reproductive rights. The Platform is a formal NGO coalition comprising of 39 local, national, and international organizations constituted to defend the interests of disadvantaged social groups across the European Union (EU). Among those represented are women, older people, people with disabilities, unemployed people, migrants, people living in poverty, gays, lesbians, young people, children and families, and those working on issues such as social justice, homelessness, health, and racism (71).

Identity conflict is also discussed in the context of the discussion on democracy issues in transnational networks. Piper and Uhlin (2003) for instance raised the issue of how networks practice the kind of democracy

they are advocating at the transnational level within their ranks. In relation to this, questions about the “constituents, mandate, representative status and accountability of transnational civil society actors” have been raised. The question of representativeness is highlighted by the dominance of Northern-based activists in transnational networks. The problem is not only confined to geographic distribution as a large number of transnational activists tend to be well-educated, middle class people thus prompting a comment that rather than being a “globalization from below,” contemporary transnational activism seems to be more of a “globalization from the middle” (Piper and Uhlin 2003).

Similarly, Ayres (2003) raised the problems of representation and accountability in the movement against neoliberal globalization. He writes:

One of the more erroneous popularized assumptions is to equate NGO representation in the movement against neoliberalism with global representativeness, if not outright support amongst civil society constituencies in various domestic settings. For the most part, the activism inspired by NGOs and transnational social movement organizations, which is at the heart of the mobilization against neoliberalism, is limited to much smaller number of committed and professional social activists (31).

There is, therefore, a need to examine the celebratory collective identity that has been put together via the anti-neoliberal globalization or global justice movement frame amid the problem of identity conflicts confronting transnational networks that are mobilized under this overarching advocacy. Moreover, the tendency of transnational coalitions to work on multi-issues may conflict with the necessity of focusing on the specific needs of movement constituents. When the advocacy of the network is dispersed, it is likely that it will miss addressing the needs of specific sectors that members identify with.

CONCLUSION

Processes related to globalization facilitate the growth of transnational collective action. While globalization provides the context for the political mobilization, its content espousing the neoliberal agenda provides as much push for contention. The transnationalization of collective action is also facilitated by the acknowledgement that any effective movement against neoliberal economic globalization must be transnational in scope.

Some literature celebrates the newness in transnational contention, casting perspectives on how to conceptualize anew the role of the state and the domestic context in the struggle, organizational form, strategies, and collective identities of social movements. These views imply rethinking the role of the state as the primary site of struggle because of its being embedded in an increasingly influential global polity, that it is advantageous for transnational networks to operate in a less structured organizational set-up to afford activists greater autonomy and flexibility to pursue other causes, and that activists can cast aside individual identities and rally behind an all-inclusive identity like being anti-neo liberal globalization. However, there are problems and conflicts with these conceptualizations as discussed in the paper. Hence, there might be a need to revisit conventional frameworks for social movement analysis and apply these to transnational mobilization. In line with the points raised earlier, it might be prudent to still regard the state and domestic context as the primary site of resistance, that coalition networks should be more structured to efficiently pursue their goals; and that networks should be more sensitive to identities (by way of consciously addressing the needs of specific sectors in the coalition for instance).

Given the fact the even national movements face difficulties to survive, transnational networks “must traverse even larger gaps in power, wealth, ideology, culture, strategic interests, and organizational forms” (Bandy and Smith 2005). Hence, more studies should be conducted on transnational mobilizations with the aim of uncovering the problems and challenges they face in their organizations. The compendium by Bandy and Smith (2005) is pioneering for examining crossborder coalitions along this line of inquiry. However, like most studies on transnational social movements, all the case studies, except for one, focus on European and American experiences. Hence, there is a need to study transnational coalitions in other parts of the world for example Asia. Also, Bandy and Smith’s volume focused more on broad based coalitions with less formal organizational structure. It would therefore be a welcome addition to the literature studies dealing with transnational collectivities with fairly organized structure and juxtapose their experiences with the less structured networks.

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The International Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Anti-Marcos Movements¹

Arjan Aguirre

This paper aims to make sense of the relationship between the transnational nonstate actor, International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) and the Philippine revolution of 1986 (EDSA 1986). Through an investigation of the events that took place prior to the revolution, it claims that IFOR helped shape the outcome of EDSA 1986 through its assistance in the mobilization of the nonviolent anti-Marcos movement in the years prior to the February 1986 revolution. First, at the structural level, following the death of Ninoy Aquino, the favorable conditions both in the domestic and international political opportunity structures allowed the anti-Marcos movements to work hand in hand with the IFOR operatives. Second, at the agentic level, the series of fora, seminars, and workshops on active nonviolence organized by IFOR from 1984 to the weeks leading to the revolution had facilitated the diffusion of the principle and methods of active nonviolence to the anti-Marcos movements. Through frame alignment, the mobilization of anti-Marcos movements became possible during the critical moments of the revolution. This mobilization facilitated the further opening of the domestic political opportunity structures (opening of the political access in the Marcos regime after the snap elections, realignment of the anti-Marcos elites, participation of influential allies, low level of political repression, and opening of the media access) during the days leading to EDSA 1986.

Keywords: social movements; political opportunity structures; international political opportunity structures; domestic political opportunity structures; social movement repertoires; frames; frame alignment; active nonviolence; revolution.

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, Stephen Zunes wrote a seminal article on the 1986 People Power Revolution (EDSA 1986). In an attempt to spell out the roots of the nonviolent revolution in the Philippines, Zunes (1999) discussed the involvement of a transnational nonstate actor, International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) to the revolutionary process of EDSA 1986. The article claimed that the nonviolent revolution is by far a product of an organized mobilization of nonviolent anti-Marcos movements brought by the conjunction of these two sources (Zunes 1999). On the one hand, the mobilization of the anti-Marcos forces, which are composed of the radical, moderate and reformist groups, had laid down the necessary conditions in undermining the praetorian state of the former dictator, Ferdinand Marcos (Marcos). In the aftermath of the assassination Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. (Ninoy) on 23 August 1983, the use of armed struggle by the radical movements and nonviolent protest actions of the moderate and reformist groups had kept the Marcos government preoccupied in all fronts. On the other hand, the arrival of the IFOR operatives in 1984, represented by the couple, Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr assisted the anti-Marcos struggle through the introduction of the principle and methods of active nonviolence to the moderate and reformist anti-Marcos forces (Zunes 1999). The series of workshops, fora and seminars organized by IFOR from 1984 to 1986, it further argued, had been helpful in transmitting and reproducing the needed ideational resources that facilitated the mobilization of the nonviolent anti-Marcos forces and the people at large during the critical moments of the political crisis in February 1986 (Zunes 1999).

For the current scholarship on EDSA 1986, the findings of Zunes may be a good source to stimulate the resurgence of the theoretical vibrancy that once dominated the literature. The narratives that convey the genesis of nonviolent social movements in EDSA 1986 perfectly capture the link between anti-Marcos movements and the nonviolent outcome of the revolution. They speak of the introduction and usage of active nonviolence as a principle and method of political action in EDSA 1986. In particular, they specifically tell us of the actual interaction and negotiation that took place between the nonviolent anti-Marcos movements and IFOR on the concept, repertoire and practice of active nonviolence. However, while the recent discovery serves as a boon for EDSA 1986 scholarship as whole, a bigger question now confronts the scholars and historians – where should the scholarship proceed from these recent discoveries on EDSA 1986?

This paper attempts to take the lead in engaging the scholarship to a more comprehensive and theoretically informed understanding of the events in EDSA 1986. Inadvertently, I identified three important pitfalls that prompted me to write this paper. First, the article failed to explain the interaction or the link that was established between IFOR and anti-Marcos movements. Second, Zunes also fell short in elucidating how the anti-Marcos movements actually appropriated the principle and method of active nonviolence. Lastly, the work did not provide clearly explicate the impact of IFOR to the outcome of EDSA 1986. With these problems, I aim to address the following research questions: Given the repressive tendencies of the Marcos government, how did the IFOR and anti-Marcos movements managed to network with each other? While they already agreed to be nonviolent, why did the anti-Marcos movements still appropriated the principles and method of active nonviolence of IFOR? Despite the immanency of the downfall of Marcos after the snap election, how did IFOR contribute to the nonviolent change of regime on 25 February 1986?

Using the recent theories of social movement, I argue that in a relatively open political opportunity structure, transnational nonstate actors may increase the likelihood of success in a revolution through its ideational influence and support for the networking capabilities of revolutionary movements. Moreover, I explain the accounts on the origins of EDSA 1986 by specifically claiming that the opening in the Marcos regime in the 1980s allowed IFOR to increase the likelihood of a successful revolution in EDSA 1986 through its influence in the choice of strategy (repertoires) and alignment of interpretative orientations (framings) among the anti-Marcos movements.

THE ROOTS OF THE REVOLUTION

The rift in the relationship between the Marcos government and the elites came from three different sources from 1969 to 1986. From 1969-1971, the Philippines experienced the economic crisis of the late 1960s to early 1970s (Daroy 1988). This economic crisis was coupled with the political crisis brought by the nationalist fervor of the late 1960s and 'First Quarter Storm' of the early 1970s (Daroy 1988). As a response to these crises, some intellectual elites from the nationalist movements went underground and allied themselves with the armed group of the old Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). However, despite the rise of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) and other national democratic movements that came as an offshoot of the split-up in the PKP, the larger

population remained submissive in the regime. The proliferation of mass actions headed by the emerging national democrat movements did not mobilize the larger populace against Marcos. Also, the traditional politicians' relationship with the regime was colored by the traditional political relation between the incumbent and opposition. The elections of 1971, for instance, saw the participation of the traditional political elites in the electoral process under the Marcos presidency (Thompson 1995).

During the period of 1972-1982, the Philippines also experienced an economic downturn beginning in the late 1970s. Aside from that, the repressiveness of the regime (mass arrests, tortures, etc.) caused serious political crisis in society. As a response to these crises, the traditional opposition politicians, social democrats, some business elites, some clergymen went underground and finally became parallel revolutionary movements (e.g. the social democrat-led Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas [PDSP], Light a Fire Movement [LAFM] and April Six Liberation Movement [ASLM]) to the CPP-NPA and other national democratic movements (Thompson 1995; Tiglao 1988). However, just like the previous period, the emergence of these groups and their eventual participation in the revolutionary struggle that was started in the first period did not mobilize the popular movements and the larger majority of people at that time. Due to the repressive policies and militarization of the regime, the eventual growth of anti-Marcos movements (national democrats, social democrats and other traditional political elites) lagged behind in tapping the larger public in their efforts to reform the political system or oust the dictator. During this period, only a number of successful mass actions against the regime were organized and participated by the nonaligned general public. Among these major mass actions were the 'Alay-Lakad of 1974' of Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO) and the noise barrage of 6 April 1978 which gave birth to emerging new revolutionary ethos of the evolving anti-Marcos movements (Olague 2005; R. Intengan & F. Gonzales, personal communication, 21 February 2009; Thompson 1995; Tiglao 1988).

In 1983-1986, the economic crisis of the early 1980s aggravated by the brutal assassination of Ninoy and the fraudulent snap elections facilitated the slow yet steady unification of the elite and the popular movements. After the death of Ninoy in 1983, most people and the large segment of the business elites responded positively to the mobilization during the funeral of Aquino and the numerous demonstrations, protests and mass actions against Marcos that followed. In these mass actions, cause-oriented groups emerged to

reinforce the earlier efforts of the anti-Marcos movements that time. The Catholic Church also became increasingly critical of the regime and was very influential in supporting the anti-Marcos movements. During this period, most of the business class, the Catholic Church, and some people in the military eventually worked hand in hand or in parallel with the national democrats, social democrats, traditional opposition politicians, and some business elites in cutting their ties with the Marcos regime.

STRUCTURAL FACTORS IN THE EMERGENCE OF NONVIOLENT ANTI-MARCOS MOVEMENTS

More importantly, the period 1983-1986 also saw the interaction between the domestic and international social movements. The burgeoning anti-Marcos demonstrations and various anti-Marcos movements (elite/popular groups) opened up domestic political opportunity structures in the Marcos regime. They provided opportunities for domestic movements to internationalize their struggle. To reinforce the growing revolutionary struggle against Marcos, anti-Marcos movements together with some Church people sought the help of IFOR in spreading the nonviolent option among its ranks.

IFOR is a nonprofit, nonstate and voluntary entity that operates beyond the Westphalian territoriality to address the failure of states in maintaining peace and rejecting the use of violence across the world. As a transnational nonstate actor, IFOR emerged as a transnational pacifist advocacy group that acted through a network of pacifist activists to promote the philosophy and methods of active nonviolence. Since 1919, it had rapidly increased its membership, activities, and coverage of their operation in many countries across the world (Ferguson 1984; Deats 2001). With its goal of promoting peace and nonviolence, IFOR had maintained a network of peace activists from various places. Since its inception in 1919, it has never ceased in campaigning for the end to violent conflict in various parts of world (Ferguson 1984; Deats 2001). Lastly, IFOR's campaigns were usually directed against the failure of the globalizing state and market institutions in maintaining peace and ending the use of violence. The proliferation of violence and threat of war across the globe really contributed to its popularity since 1919.

Before I go to the discussion about its participation in EDSA 1986, I will now attempt to make sense of the dynamics between the international and domestic realms of activism after the death of Aquino. Drawing on the ideas of Sikkink (2005), the effort to internationalize the domestic anti-Marcos struggle may be understood through the dynamics between the domestic

and international political opportunity structures. According to Sikkink (2005), the concept of political opportunity structures, both at the domestic and the international levels, means the ‘access to institutions, or how open or closed domestic and international institutions are to network or social movement pressures and participation’ (Sikkink 2005: 155). Looking at Table 1, the relationship between the two political opportunity structures can be understood in four models which are structured into two realms. For the domestic realm, political opportunity structures refer to the level of openness or closedness of the domestic political institutions to various domestic social movement influences (Sikkink 2005). The international opportunity structures, on the other hand, pertain to the degree of openness or closedness of the international institutions to the participation of transnational social movements (Sikkink 2005).

Table 1: The Interactive Model in the Domestic-International Structures Dynamic Multilevel Governance (Sikkink 2005: 156)

Domestic Opportunity Structure	International Opportunity Structure	
	Closed	Open
Closed	A. Diminished Chances of Activism	B. Boomerang pattern and Spiral model
Open	C. Democratic Deficit/ Defensive Transnationalization	D. Insider/Outsider Coalition Model

In Model A – *Diminished Opportunities for Activism*, both the international and domestic opportunity structures are closed for activism at the international and domestic levels. In relation to the revolutionary process, this suggests that by any means, both actors will have a hard time forwarding or internationalizing their claims for change and thus have lesser chances of succeeding in their goal. Model B – *Boomerangs and Spirals*, on the other hand, speaks of an open space in the international opportunity structure for revolutionary movements. Despite the absence of opportunity at the domestic level, revolutionary movements may use the ‘boomerang pattern’ or ‘spiral model’ in strengthening activism; by boomerang pattern, I meant the effort of the domestic actors to internationalize their political claims in a repressive environment (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Sikkink 2005). On the other, the spiral model speaks of a more dynamic version of the boomerang effect which highlights the interaction between the international and domestic (Risse &

Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 2005). The third model, C – *Democratic Deficit/ Defensive Transnationalization*, depicts the opposite of the boomerang/spiral model. For this view, issues that sprang out because of discontent in the internationalization of their domestic lives lead activists to bring their claims and operate on their own at the international level. In revolutions, this situation does not speak of any help or contribution in the revolutionary process. The actions that were described here only depict the actions of domestic movements against international organizations or institutions. For the last model, D – *Activists within and beyond Borders: Insider/Outsider Coalitions* model, the situation is quite new. In an open domestic and international opportunity structures, the tendency for both domestic and international actors is to mix different modes of activism and according to Sikkink (2005), to favor domestic political change while keeping the international realm open for further action. In revolutions, this allows us to make sense of and understand the simultaneous actions of transnational nonstate actors and domestic movements in the revolutionary process.

Going back to EDSA 1986, the initial interaction between IFOR and the emerging nonviolent anti-Marcos movements can be initially explained through Boomerang pattern or the effort of the domestic actors to internationalize their political claims in a repressive environment and Spiral model or the Insider/outside coalition model or the dynamic version of the boomerang effect which highlights the interaction between the international and domestic movements (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Resse & Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 2005). During 1983-1986, the international political opportunity structures were very accessible to the domestic anti-Marcos movements. The repressive regime of Marcos did not extend to the suppression of the right to travel. In fact, since the 1970s, people like Raul Manglapus of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP) and the groups such as the International Association of Patriotic Filipinos (IAFF), Anti-Martial Law Coalition (ALC), National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines (NCRCLP), Union of Democratic Filipinos (KDP) and the Friends of the Filipino People (FFP) had used the international arena to criticize the Marcos regime across the US (Muego 1988). For the domestic political opportunity structures, the period saw the rapid transformation in the level of openness of the Marcos regime to social movement influence. The growth of movements and mass actions spurred by cause-oriented groups during those years had to a certain extent weakened the citadel of the military-backed regime. During the early transformation stage in the political opportunity structures under Marcos, the

anti-Marcos movements opted to use the Boomerang pattern and the Spiral model (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Resse & Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 2005) in establishing connections at the international level.

IFOR made its first contact with the anti-Marcos movements through a letter from a Sr. Marlen discussing the gloomy political situation in the Philippines at that time. IFOR representatives came to the Philippines in February 1983 to assess the situation and formally establish links with the anti-Marcos movements. From then on, IFOR answered the call of the anti-Marcos movements by organizing lectures/seminars/workshops on active nonviolence. Through IFOR representatives Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr, the anti-Marcos movements learned first-hand the principles and the toolkit or method of nonviolence (Deats n.d., 2001; Goss-Mayr 1998).

During the months before the snap elections, the nonviolent anti-Marcos movements started to shift towards the insider/outsider coalition model or a situation where both the domestic and international contexts are open for activism or influence. In this situation, both transnational and domestic social movements tend to mix different modes of activism to favor the domestic political change while keeping the international realm open for further action (Sikkink 2005).

Marcos' decision to hold parliamentary elections in 1984 and snap elections in 1986 relatively opened the political opportunity structures in the Philippines. As will be explained later, the increasing political access in the domestic structures after the death of Aquino, allowed both the domestic anti-Marcos movements and IFOR to work side by side in engaging the Marcos regime. On the one hand, some anti-Marcos movements, Aksyon Para sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan (AKKAPKA), the Catholic Church and some business elites decided to participate in the 1984 and 1986 elections. On the other hand, IFOR and AKKAPKA continued its work in promoting the principles and methods of active nonviolence in various parts of the country. Thus, while working with National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), AKKAPKA and IFOR operatives Jean Goss, Hildegard Goss-Mayr, Stefan Merken, and Richard Deats simultaneously organized lectures/seminars/workshops on nonviolence throughout the country (Deats 2001).

At the domestic level, the mobilization of the various anti-Marcos movements during this period can be explained by the five core dimensions of political opportunity structures (Schock 1999). In the literature, political opportunities would mean as the 'consistent – but not necessary formal,

permanent or national – dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics’ (Tarrow 1998: 20). In explaining the domestic revolutionary movement mobilization in the structural sense, I made use of the five (5) core dimensions in the political opportunity approach used by Schock (1999) in his study on EDSA 1986: increasing political access, influential allies, divided elites, declining state repression and press freedom.

When I say increasing political access, it means the opening of spaces in the political institutions that enable movements to influence the functions of government. For the concept of influential allies, this pertains to the existence of social and political groupings extending support in the mobilizational, financial and leadership aspects of the movement organization and mobilization. As regards to the idea of divided elites, this underscores elite realignment and their eventual support for or participation in revolutionary struggle brought by the changing social, economic and political policies. Declining state repression relates to the state actions that impede collective actions or movement mobilization. Finally, press freedom pertains to the relatively free flow of information that facilitates or constrains revolutionary movement mobilization.

In an open political opportunity structure, social movements enjoy the opportunity to influence their lawmakers, government agencies and judicial bodies. To bolster this effort, they can easily seek help from other groups like political parties, nongovernmental organizations and other social movement organizations. This may also extend to certain elite groups that have the same goals and interests as theirs. Lastly, under this condition, these efforts are done freely yet relatively regulated by the state. On the other hand, in a closed political opportunity structure, social movements are faced with a highly centralized government with a propensity to thwart any mass actions. Their efforts are further undermined by the relative absence of potential allies from both other organizations and the elites. Finally, this attempt to introduce change in the society is not tolerated by the government.

As regards the increasing political access aspect, the years that came after the brutal assassination of Aquino saw the slow opening of Marcos regime to political activism of the anti-Marcos movements. The elections of 1984 and 1986 can be seen as an opportunity for anti-Marcos movements to gain representation in the government. By fielding candidates, the anti-Marcos movements exerted effort to get a share of the political pie under Marcos regime. On the part of Marcos, the opening of the electoral environment did

not affect his clout in the government. Being the incumbent president, Marcos and his allies obviously had an upper-hand over the opposition groups in influencing the outcome of the elections. During the 1984 and 1986 elections, Marcos and his allies used the huge resources of the regime to ensure the electoral victory of Marcos and his allies (Thompson 1995). However, despite this inequality in the electoral exercise, the emergence of NAMFREL came as a boon to the anti-Marcos movements' decision to participate in the parliamentary and presidential snap elections. In safeguarding the electoral process (during the campaign, casting of votes, counting and proclamation), NAMFREL indirectly supported the anti-Marcos electoral efforts in gaining seats in the government. In fact, the participation of NAMFREL helped Corazon Aquino and her allies to claim the presidency against Marcos (Hedman 2006).

In the aspect of *influential allies*, the period also saw the participation of the military, Catholic Church and some groups in the US government (Diokno 1988). These groups extended moral, organizational or diplomatic support to the anti-Marcos movements' struggle. The rise of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and the eventual withdrawal of support by some disgruntled military officers during the February uprising further undermined the military-backed regime of Marcos. On the part of the Catholic Church, the series of Catholic Bishop's Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) pastoral letters and then Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin's homilies and statements that criticized the regime motivated the conservative sector as well as independents to participate in the struggle (Ofreneo 1987). Various groups, especially in the business sector, were motivated by the critical stand of the Catholic Church against Marcos. For the US government, the statements of some senators and administrative officials against Marcos diminished his political legitimacy here and abroad. To support the opening and safeguarding of the electoral process in the Philippines, NAMFREL as well as other movements received financial and tactical support from some US politicians and agencies (Thompson 1995).

With regard to *elite realignment*, the years after the death of Aquino saw the rapid transformation in the movement of elite groups towards the anti-Marcos movements. After the assassination and eventual decision of the Catholic Church to openly denounce the regime, numerous elite groups began to support the growing anti-Marcos movements (Diokno 1988). The Makati Business Club (MBC), Philippine Chamber of Commerce, Inc. (PCCI), Bishops-Businessmen's Conference (BBC) to name a few, aligned themselves with some traditional opposition politicians, elite martial law victims, and the

Catholic Church in criticizing the Marcos regime. Like the influential allies, the business elites were very supportive of the mobilization of the larger populace against Marcos. Many business elites in Makati allowed the area to be used for anti-Marcos demonstrations, protests and other mass actions rallies over which initially took the form of indignation rallies over the killing of Aquino (Diokno 1988). Also, the business elites in Tondo and Makati were significant in providing financial support to anti-Marcos movements in their mass actions (Diokno 1988; Burton 1989; Thompson 1995). In addition, many business elites even became involved in some major mobilization efforts by the anti-Marcos movements (Diokno 1988). The reemergence of NAMFREL, for one, had shown how the business elites from MBC as well other business groups became significant in ensuring the clean and orderly exercise of elections (Diokno 1988). In the snap elections, NAMFREL mobilized a wide network of priests, nuns and community organizers to ensure a clean and orderly election. By exposing the massive electoral fraud and violence, NAMFREL motivated the anti-Marcos movements to denounce the proclamation of Marcos after the elections.

The developments that unfolded after the death of Ninoy had only intensified the mobilization of anti-Marcos movements already in place at that time indicating the *decline of state repression*. Contrary to most social movement scholars, the repression by the Marcos state that started in early 1970s actually became the impetus for the growth of anti-Marcos movements. Because of political repression, killings, salvaging, torture, and disappearances during the Martial Law regime, Marcos' popularity rapidly dwindled. The propensity of the regime to use repression and violence actually facilitated the emergence of movements against the regime (Wurfel 1998). Instead of cowering before the Marcos regime, the period of 1972-1982 saw the emerging movements going underground and operating abroad (Tiglao 1988; Muego 1988; R. Intengan, & F. Gonzales, personal communication, 21 February 2009). The foundation of the Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (KDSP) in 1971 and the eventual rise of PDSP in 1973 were the results of the clandestine underground mobilization of social democratic movements that time (Tiglao 1988; R. Intengan & F. Gonzales, personal communication, 21 February, 2009). On the other hand, the traditional political elites who were forced to go on exile abroad established numerous movements in the US and other parts of the world. The emergence of MFP, Anti-Martial Law Coalition, to name a few was rooted in the political harassments, intimidations, threats caused by the repressive government of

Marcos (Muego 1988). For the older movements, the CPP-NPA managed to receive support from the people during the period of 1970s-1980s. During this period, the national democrat revolutionary movement grew bigger and expanded their operations from various parts of the country (Rocamora 1994). From 1973 to 1977, the communist insurgents managed to establish nine self-reliant regional committees (Tiglao 1988). In 1983-1986, these movements were reinvigorated and went aboveground to participate and even organize numerous anti-Marcos mass actions.

With regards to *press freedom*, the years that came after the death of Ninoy Aquino capped the slow growth of an independent media sector in the Philippines. Since 1977, *Malaya* (1977) and the *Pahayagang Malaya* (1982) by Jose Burgos as well as *Mr. & Ms.* provided alternative information to emerging critical mass against Marcos that time (Gonzales 1988). In the aftermath of the Aquino assassination, the 'alternative' media emerged to provide information and analysis that were absent from the Marcos-controlled press. Together with the print media, the Catholic Church revised the programming of *Radio Veritas* to broadcast live the investigation hearings and analysis on the death of Aquino (Gonzales 1988). The proliferation of the mosquito press and Veritas enabled the people to receive valuable information related to the death of Ninoy Aquino and the needed facts to amplify their claims and contentions against Marcos. During the uprising, the Church-sponsored *Radio Veritas* became the lone voice of anti-Marcos movement. It was through this form of media that people got to know what was happening during the four-day revolution. Through the guidance of June Keithley, the people were mobilized immediately to various sides of Camps Crame and Aguinaldo. The information and details that were broadcasted kept millions of people abreast with the developments on the opposing sides. In fact, the siege of Channels 7 and 4 clearly showed the vital role of media during that historic event to both parties (Brisbin 1988).

AGENTIC FACTORS IN THE MOBILIZATION OF NONVIOLENT ANTI-MARCOS MOVEMENTS

Going back to our discussion on the link between IFOR and EDSA, the mobilization of anti-Marcos movements through the domestic political opportunity structures was influenced by IFOR's diffusion of the nonviolent repertoires and the framings of active nonviolence. In the years 1984-1986, IFOR organized numerous lectures/seminars on nonviolence for various people coming from the clergy, politicians, organizers, civic leaders,

professionals, activists, academics, students and common folks (Goss-Mayer 1998; Zunes 1999; Deats 2001). In these lectures/seminars/workshops, IFOR laid down the foundation for the emergence of the local nonviolence movement called AKKAPKA in 1984. As discussed earlier, both IFOR and AKKAPKA worked to propagate active nonviolence in the Philippines. Through the efforts of IFOR and AKKAPKA, various people from different sectors and political groups were introduced to the principles and practical uses of active nonviolence. Also, as stated earlier, during the snap election, AKKAPKA became significant in supporting the nonviolent confrontation between a major portion of anti-Marcos movements, and Marcos through electoral exercise. Through their support for the effort of ensuring a clean and honest election, anti-Marcos movements were motivated to engage Marcos through an electoral showdown. Throughout the four-day uprising in EDSA, numerous nonviolent actors who attended the lectures of both IFOR and AKKAPKA put into effect the teachings of nonviolence in the midst of the growing tension between loyalist soldiers and rebel military men.

At the agentic level, IFOR was highly responsible for diffusing the methods of active nonviolence to the domestic anti-Marcos movements. Using the concept of *interactive transnational diffusion* (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002), the repertoire of active nonviolence in EDSA 1986 came out as an offshoot of an interactive (centripetal and centrifugal) and deliberate transmission of ideas, experiences, skills and methods of active nonviolence through a series of lectures/seminars/workshops attended by the clergy, politicians, community organizers, civic leaders, professionals, activists, academics, students and common folk from 1984 to 1986.

The process of transnational diffusion of repertoires stems from the response of social movement organizations to the 'protest cycle' or the existence or creation of conflict, broad sectoral and geographical extension, new and old SMOs, new 'master frames' of meaning and the 'invention of new forms of collection action' (Tarrow 1995). This response can be categorized according to groups engaged in the protest cycle – *spin-off* and *initiator* (McAdam 1995). The latter refers to the social movements that set off an identifiable protest cycle while the former speaks of the social movements that get their impetus from the initiators (McAdam, 1995). The process of transnational diffusion speaks of the initiator movements that transmit the items of contention or ideas, skills and meanings to spin-off movements. In this case, McAdam (1995) further notes that initiator movements usually come from open political opportunity environments while spin-off movements emerge from closed and repressive governments.

As a reaction to the western-centric view of the earlier scholars, Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) devised an interactive model of transnational diffusion by explaining the specific responses from both the initiator and spin-off movements. Instead of subscribing to the linear transmission of objects of contention (from west to east), the interactive model introduced a more discursive approach in understanding the transnational diffusion. To understand this conceptual innovation, the specific responses of initiator and spin-off movements present in the interactive transnational diffusions of repertoires are sorted as follows:

1. Hyper-difference and over-likeness or the critical appraisal of the repertoires
2. Dislocation and relocation or the meticulous consideration of its applicability
3. Brokerage and collective appropriation or the actual negotiation before implementation.

Hyper-difference and over-likeness stage refers to the attempt to link the initiators' or producers' interpretative constructions to that of the receivers' perceptions. Receivers assess whether (over-likeness) or not (hyper-difference) the items (e.g. ideas, information or skills) that are being transmitted are applicable to their context. The *dislocation and relocation* stage enables the receivers to weigh down the pros and cons of adapting the items that they received from the initiators or transnational nonstate actors. Receivers in this stage may perceive the applicability of the item (dislocation) or produce innovative means to make them applicable (relocation) to their context. Finally, *brokerage and collective appropriation* denotes the output of the transmission process. Revolutionary movements, in this stage, may establish new or strengthen the links with the initiators or transnational nonstate actors (brokerage) or may alter and devise new ways of making the items they received from the initiators applicable (collective appropriation).

Transnational diffusion of nonviolence entailed the existence of a 'protest cycle' or the emergence of ideas and methods of active nonviolence that were crafted or created from various experiences of protest actions in the past (Tarrow 1995). In transmitting the items of contentions (contents of protest cycle), the anti-Marcos movements may be seen as *spin-off* movements or movements that were mobilized because of IFOR's diffusion of active nonviolence. On the other hand, IFOR being the transnational nonstate actor qualifies as the initiator because of its ability to accumulate and diffuse various items of past protest cycles or ideas and methods of active nonviolence across

the world. Through the relative opening of the political opportunity structures (increasing political access, influential allies, elite realignment, decreasing repression and press freedom) during the early 1980s, IFOR got the chance to participate in the domestic revolutionary struggle against Marcos.

In EDSA 1986, the interactive or nonlinear transmission of active nonviolence between IFOR and anti-Marcos movements passed through three vital junctures from 1984 to 1986. Hyper-difference and over-likeness or the attempts to link IFOR's interpretative constructions on active nonviolence to anti-Marcos movements were seen in the series of lectures/seminars/workshops on active nonviolence from 1984 to 1986. In every meeting, the attendees were asked to reflect on and situate themselves in the struggle against Marcos (S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009). The role-playing sessions and the teachings on truth and love, among other things, helped them find their nonviolent nature as human beings (IFOR 'Active Nonviolence'; S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009). The systematic transmission of the concepts of active nonviolence through the reflection of the self to the source of injustice transmitted to attendees the message of the universality of nonviolence in all human actions. Through this recognition, the attendees had seen the over-likeness of active nonviolence and the Philippine context within the concept of the human person.

The dislocation and relocation stage which involved consideration of its applicability in the struggle against Marcos also took place during the series of lectures/seminars/workshops of the IFOR operatives. In the lectures, apart from the philosophical backdrop of nonviolence, IFOR representatives also presented the different stages of active nonviolence:

- 1.) Preparation – analysis of the conflict, preparation of groups, and development of strategy;
- 2.) Methods – Dialogue (negotiation), direct action, noncooperation and civil disobedience, fasting and hunger strikes and a constructive program (IFOR 'Methods of Non-Violent Action').

Because of the concern about the applicability of active nonviolence methods in the Philippine case, Goss-Mayr (1998) and her husband then shared their stories and experiences from Latin America and other stories of peace advocates around the world. In these stories, the couple stressed the different obstacles, hardships, and successes of various active nonviolent movements around the world. These anecdotes and success stories of active

nonviolence moved and inspired the attendees (Deats n.d., 2001; S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009).

Finally, brokerage and collective appropriation speaks of the actual experience of active nonviolence from the IFOR lectures/seminars/workshops that produced a domestic pacifist/peace movement in 1984 (Deats n.d., 2008; Schwenk 1986; S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009; T. Baltazar, personal communication, 20 February 2009). The formation of AKKAPKA, established a new link and strengthened the existing relations between the anti-Marcos movements and IFOR (brokerage). Through their collaborative relationship, active nonviolence was made widely known to the public. However, despite its IFOR lineage, AKKAPKA chose to refine some aspects of active nonviolence in the Philippines (collective appropriation). As explained earlier, AKKAPKA added new concepts to the extant instructional materials they got from the visiting IFOR operatives. First, they introduced 'active nonviolence' as the 'third way' between violence and apathy. Active nonviolence was presented as the 'active, creative total respect for human life' response of the people towards violence. Second, the six 'Ps' (proclaim the truth, protest the injustice, penetrate the conscience of the adversary, part from injustice, persevere, and pay the price) were devised to augment the conceptual appeal of active nonviolence. Active nonviolence was presented to the larger majority as a coherent system of ideas that accentuates some the societal values in the Philippines. Lastly and more importantly, active nonviolence was used by AKKAPKA against the growing popularity of the armed struggle by the national democrats (i.e. CPP-NPA) (T. Baltazar, personal communication, 20 February 2009).

Also at the agentic level, IFOR helped link together various interpretative orientations of different people in the anti-Marcos movements. Looking back at the those numerous lectures/seminars/workshops of IFOR and AKKAPKA on active violence, Jean Goss, Hildegard Goss Mayr, Fr. Blanco and other AKKAPKA workers acted as signifying agents that actively generated or produced a collective action frame or set of meanings and interpretation that eventually became motivated potential nonviolent actors to participate and support the anti-Marcos movements in EDSA 1986. In the creation of the master frame, the lectures/seminars/workshops generated the 'diagnostic framing' or the identification and attribution of the source of problem (Snow & Benford 1988). Second, IFOR and AKKAPKA operatives identified the 'prognosis framing' or the proposed solution to the problem (Snow & Benford 1988). Lastly, the attendees learned the 'motivational framing' or the rationale

for engaging in collective action (Snow & Benford 1988). As recalled by an AKKAPKA alumnus, Raul Socrates Banzuela (personal communication, 27 January, 2009), the seminars/workshops were clear enough to articulate the principle, tool of analysis and methods of active nonviolence. Through a combination of success stories and theories, he added, the couple was able to engage the attendees on how to frame the political crisis in the Philippines and how the active nonviolence can be used as an alternative form of struggle against the former dictator (R. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009).

Also, using the concept of frame alignment processes, IFOR contributed to the growth of anti-Marcos movements in the following ways. First, IFOR contributed to the participation in and support for the anti-Marcos movements by potential social movement actors through frame bridging or “linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem” (Snow, Rochford, Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986: 467). Through their lectures/seminars/workshops, IFOR helped create a mass base of potential nonviolent political actors. In this form of frame alignment, the anti-Marcos movements did not have a hard time tapping these groups for their activities or asking for their support. The AKKAPKA group of Soc Banzuela demonstrated this in EDSA 1986. After hearing the call of Jaime Cardinal Sin and Butz Aquino, Banzuela and his AKKAPKA friends all met in *Isetann* (S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009). Despite the absence of a formal organizational decision to join the people in EDSA, IFOR alumni and AKKAPKA members immediately participated in the mass gathering to protect the military rebels. Also during the days of the uprising, IFOR and AKKAPKA alumni and members were asked by Fr. Blanco to join the people in EDSA. As recalled by an AKKAPKA member “Fr. Blanco went to the TV station encouraging all those who had seminars on active nonviolence since June of 1984 until February 1986 and said, ‘You are the most prepared people. Go there!’” (S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009).

The contribution of IFOR to the anti-Marcos movements is also seen through *frame amplification* or the effort to clarify and invigorate a particular interpretative frame (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986). In the literature, this is understood as coming from – i.) value amplification and ii.) belief amplification. Regarding value amplification or “identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic to prospective constituents but which have not inspired collective action for

any number of reasons" IFOR's lectures/seminars/workshops on the philosophy of active nonviolence motivated the potential nonviolent actors to make the anti-Marcos movements as their avenue to demonstrate their nonviolent commitments (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986: 469). In Sister Rocca's case, her deep appreciation of the Church teachings on nonviolence was amplified by the IFOR's (through AKKAPKA) lectures on the principles and practical uses of nonviolence. This then led her to proceed to Camp Crame and speak with the soldiers during the four-day uprising (Deats n.d.). With regard to belief amplification or the effort to augment the articulation of people's conviction towards a particular issue, thing, etc., IFOR's lectures/seminars/workshops on the philosophy of active nonviolence influenced the potential nonviolent actors to participate in numerous demonstrations, protests and other mass actions against the Marcos regime (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986). In the case of Teresita Baltazar, her learning experiences in the AKKAPKA lectures convinced her to participate in numerous nonviolent protest actions following the death of Ninoy Aquino (T. Baltazar, personal communication, 20 February 2009). This initial participation eventually led to a deeper involvement in the nonviolent anti-Marcos movements (e.g. AMA) (T. Baltazar, personal communication, 20 February 2009).

Third, IFOR also contributed to the anti-Marcos movements through frame extension work or the effort to encompass the extant value, belief, or frame interpretative systems that are already incidental to the goals and objectives of the social movement (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986). Through their lectures/seminars/workshops many people became aware of the nonviolent option against Marcos. In the case of Rizalino Rivera, another alumnus of AKKAPKA and EDSA 1986 veteran, his participation in EDSA 1986 was partly due to his prior knowledge of a nonviolent option (R. Rivera, personal communication, 16 February 2009). Aside from the goal of ousting Marcos, the dominant nonviolent atmosphere that he felt during the four-day uprising made him stay with the nonviolent crowd in EDSA.

Lastly, IFOR contributed to the anti-Marcos movements through frame transformation or the effort to address the absence of frames that could be similar or congruent to the goals and objectives of the social movements (Snow, Rochford Jr., Worden, & Bendford 1986). Through their attendance at IFOR lectures/seminars/workshops, many people got a glimpse of the philosophy and practical use of active nonviolence. According to Banzuela, his experience with Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr was for him '*life-*

changing' (S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January, 2009). The reflection sessions during IFOR meetings (lecture/seminar/workshop) altered the frames of the individual. The couple had made their attendees realize their culpability in sustaining injustices in society (Goss-Mayr 1998; S. Banzuela, personal communication, 27 January 2009). Apart from teaching methods of active nonviolence, the couple imparted the philosophy of nonviolence – truth and love. This philosophy of nonviolence was the impetus for some secular people to join the nonviolent uprising in EDSA.

PARTING THOUGHTS

In making sense of the logic behind the emergence and mobilization of nonviolent anti-Marcos movements in EDSA 1986, I shed light on the contribution of IFOR through the discussion of the structural and agentic levels of analysis of EDSA 1986. At the structural level, I argued that IFOR made its presence due to the changing configurations of the interaction between the domestic and international political opportunity structures in 1983-1986. This facilitated the internationalization of anti-Marcos struggle and eventually allowed the parallel efforts to spread the principle and methods of active nonviolence among anti-Marcos movement actors. To explain the changing domestic political environment, I emphasized the effect of the slow emergence of the five dimensions of political opportunity structures during the period of 1983-1986 to the weakening of Marcos' power. At the agentic level, I further made sense of the developments in the structural level through the discussion of the impact of transnational diffusion of the active nonviolence repertoire and the process of frame alignment during the period of 1983-1986. In the paper, I posited that through the effort of IFOR to influence the nonviolent anti-Marcos movements, the lectures/seminars/workshops had created the master frame of active nonviolence and had the following effects on the people:

1. Created a mass base of potential nonviolent political actors;
2. A. motivated the potential nonviolent actors to make the anti-Marcos movements their venue for demonstrating belief in active nonviolence;
B. influenced the potential nonviolent actors to participate in numerous protests and other mass actions against the Marcos regime,
3. Helped crystallize and propagate the nonviolent option against Marcos

4. Changed the outlook on the philosophy and practical use of active nonviolence.

Having said all of these, the story of EDSA 1986 and IFOR really provided a strong case that shows the possibility of rethinking the conventional understanding on social movements and their relationship with revolutions. Through this paper, I intend to spur future discussions on the changing contours of the transnationalization of social movements. The discussions that I have made on the impact of the changing domestic and international political opportunity structures, transnational diffusion of repertoire, production and alignment of frames to social movement mobilization and outcomes aim to raise the awareness of social scientists and theorists of the changes that continue to unfold in social movements across the world. On top of that, the paper also invites scholars to the possibility of finally having transnational nonstate actors as one of the major actors in the theory revolutions. In my discussion of EDSA 1986, I showed how transnational nonstate actors may likely to increase the likelihood of success in a revolution through their ideational influence and support for the networking capabilities of revolutionary movements. In theorizing revolutions, this study also serves as a challenge to social movement and revolution scholars for the long awaited convergence (Goldstone 2001). The dearth of literature on the relationship between revolutions and social movements should continue to inspire scholars and scientist to persist in their search for theories and frameworks to further our understanding of revolutions and social movement actions. Lastly, and most importantly, this paper also aims to pique the curiosity of both local social scientists to reflect on these recent finding on the social movement mobilization in EDSA 1986. With this work, I hope, would reawaken the interest of EDSA 1986 experts to revisit their conceptualizations of EDSA 1986 and perhaps spearhead the rise of the theoretical vibrancy in the scholarship of EDSA 1986.

NOTE

- 1 Taken from my masteral thesis entitled "The Nexus between Transnational Non-State Actors and Revolutions: International Fellowship of Reconciliation and EDSA 1986."

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WALK: Framing a Successful Agrarian Reform Campaign in the Philippines¹

Lennart Niemelä

In 2007, farmers from Sumilao in the Mindanao province of Bukidnon walked 1700 km from their homes to the capital, Manila, in an attempt to win back the 144 hectares of land that should have been distributed to them via the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Not only were they successful, but their victory was perceived as a landmark event by the people in the agrarian reform movement. *The Sumilao Walk* affected how later campaigns were organized, in particular the likewise successful 2009 national CARPER (CARP Extension with Reforms) campaign. This study aims at understanding the processes behind the mobilization strategies that formed the basis of an ultimately successful campaign. Collective action frame theory constitutes the theoretical framework. The Sumilao farmers' campaign conclusively led to two important outcomes. It strengthened horizontal relationships in civil society between agrarian reform SMOs and increased cooperation between the agrarian reform movement and the Catholic Church, facilitated by a shared non-violence methodology.

Keywords: agrarian reform, social movement organizations, and collective action frame theory, active nonviolence

“Walking long distances is a high form of struggle.”
– Risa Hontiveros

INTRODUCTION

Agrarian reform has been a long standing issue in the Philippines and has brought about many political and socio-economic problems, for instance, landlessness, an unequal distribution of property and power, bureaucratic

inefficiency, and corruption in various state institutions (see Putzel 1992: xxii).

It is argued that the Philippines is a difficult setting for the implementation of agrarian reform because of the merging of continuing patterns of inequality with democratic institutions (Riedinger 1995: 15). According to Martin (1999: 188, 201), the US colonial policy resulted in dual principles, where land entitlements were coupled with "safeguards which protected claimants of prior property interests," which is inherent in all subsequent attempts at land reform and thus continues to haunt agrarian policymaking. According to a study² by Shin & Wells (2005: 93), although democracy is preferred at regime level, preference for democratic process is remarkably low: 75 percent for democratic regime and 48 percent for democratic process,³ respectively. This divergence is related to a low average level of freedom and a high average level of corruption⁴ (ibid: 98-99). Democratization in the Philippines appears to be problematic as the state has been characterized in studies as an elite democracy, cacique democracy, weak state, oligarchic democracy, low-intensity democracy, patrimonial oligarchic state and clientelist electoral regime (Quimpo 2008: 21-22).

Agrarian reform addresses problems of poverty alleviation and national economic development, but also, by definition involves a redistribution of not only land, but political power (Putzel 1992: xx; Riedinger 1995: 2). Riedinger (1995: 15) argues that political liberalization by itself will not bring about agrarian reform, but it makes government more responsive to reformist pressures.

[C]ertainly for AKBAYAN, and for me as a member of AKBAYAN, agrarian reform is very, very much about democratization, not just economically empowering the rural sectors, politically empowering them as well to be able not only to shape, influence and select policies and make their leaders accountable, but to exert political power themselves directly through their organizations or through their leaders who enter the electoral arena[...] It's also democratization in terms of shaping a democratic culture for citizens in the rural area as well, where the worst poverty conditions are seen in the Philippines.

- R. Hontiveros 2009, interview, 27 February -

Following the installation of a new regime under President Corazon Aquino after the ouster of Marcos in 1986, the 1987 Philippine Constitution, mandated that an agrarian reform program be undertaken by the State. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) enacted in 1988, which is

based on the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL or RA 6657) is a continuous program that would not end until its goals are reached. This was reiterated in the Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion 9, Series of 1997. The funding for the program has been given budgets for 10-year periods since 1988. However, when the funding ended in June 2008 and was only extended with a six-month period, it caused worry for a paradoxical situation: "Ending the implementation of CARP without completing the acquisition and distribution of lands covered by the program will result in the anomalous situation of having persons owning landholdings in excess of the allowable retention limit under the law" (PEASANTech 2008).

In 2007, farmers from Sumilao in the Mindanao province of Bukidnon walked 1,700 kilometers from their homes to the capital, Manila, in an attempt to win back the 144 hectares of land that should have been distributed to them via CARP. As expressed in informal talks and interviews with informants, not only were they successful, their victory was perceived as a landmark event by the people in the agrarian reform movement.

THEORY AND METHOD

Designed as a case study of the Sumilao farmers' campaign, this study aims to understand the processes behind the mobilization strategies that formed the basis of an ultimately successful campaign. It hopes as well to provide proponents of agrarian reform, particularly in the Philippines, insights that may be useful in campaign work.

In order to analyze the walk as a social movement, the study utilizes the collective action frame theory, systematized by Benford & Snow (2000) as the theoretical framework where collective action frames are seen as the result of the active, processual production and maintenance of meaning by social movement actors for "constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers" in order to provide inspiration and legitimacy for action (Benford & Snow 2000: 613-614). Ten semistructured interviews were conducted with various actors in the agrarian reform movement. Informants were chosen by utilizing the snowball effect in combination with maximized sampling. Transcripts of interviews were analyzed using narrative analysis which fits well with the choice of theory as narrative analysis emphasizes the connections interviewees' make between events, how they make sense of them, and how they understand their own roles in them (Bryman 2004: 412-413). The particular mode of narrative analysis used is structural analysis which

emphasizes “the way a story is related” and “the use of narrative mechanisms for increasing the persuasiveness of a story.”

FRAMING PROCESSES AND THE SUMILAO FARMERS’ CASE

The Sumilao farmers’ case

The farmers of Sumilao, in the province of Bukidnon on the island of Mindanao in the Southern Philippines, were organized as a tribal group, the Higaonon tribe (A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February).⁵ In 1996, a time of increased advocacy on agrarian reform, the Higaonons and the farmers from the surrounding areas formed the People’s Organization (PO), MAPALAD. MAPALAD later joined the provincial federation PALAMBU which became a member of the national federation PAKISAMA. A.J. Bag-ao (ibid.) said that organizing work was facilitated by these already existing structures when she first met them in 1996.

The Sumilao farmers were not aware of the status of agrarian reform implementation in their area. They were encouraged by BALAOD Mindanaw to inquire about this from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (ibid.) from which they learned that it was being processed. However, the farmers later found out that they had been issued titles when they received a cancellation order from a Regional Trial Court. One hundred thirty-seven (137) farmers were awarded Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) in 1995. When the farmers learned that they already owned land they had spent years processing for through CARP, they occupied and tilled the land until 3 days later when armed goons drove them out by firing upon them and letting their carabaos loose (ibid). The landowner was able to retrieve the property through a connection with the Executive Secretary of then President Fidel V. Ramos (S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March).

In 1997, some of the farmers launched a hunger strike in Cagayan de Oro and Manila, supported by Agrarian Reform Now (AR Now), PAKISAMA and a PHILDHRRRA affiliated NGO. “It lasted 28 days. High drama” (ibid.). It received wide attention from the agrarian reform movement, media and the public as well as politicians as it neared the 1998 presidential elections.

The hunger strike resulted in a win-win decision by President Ramos to give 100 hectares to the farmers and 44 hectares to the landowner (ibid: A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February). However, the landowner managed to get the Supreme Court to retrieve the 100 hectares. The Supreme Court

decision in 1999 was so technical that “[e]ven lawyers found it difficult to understand”, it “(has to be) discussed in law school” (A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February).

Following the 1999 final decision by the Supreme Court, one of the farmers committed suicide in protest (S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March). The farmers then turned to the new administration under Joseph Estrada⁶ who promised to help them (ibid.). As nothing happened for five months, the farmers went on a hunger strike. President Estrada’s response was aggressive that consequently, the Sumilao farmers joined forces with the movement that later proposed the impeachment of the President, successfully removing him from office during the EDSA II uprising in 2000.

Over the years since 1996, they went on hunger strike. They went on land entry knowing that they were already owners. They even attempted to stop the traffic and lie down on the road. They were imprisoned for several times but they adapted. They went on a lot of dialogues and joined all major conferences just to say something about their case. They wrote letters and then they lost in the Supreme Court in 1999.

A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February

And then finally they said, “Ok, we lost. We lost”. And they waited [...]

S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March

The walk as form of protest

Genesis and dramatization

S. Banzuela (2009, interview, 5 March), national coordinator of the national federation of farmers PAKISAMA, emphasized that discursive and strategic processes were part of their agenda: “One of the basic strategies of PAKISAMA in pushing and in advocating for Agrarian Reform is to identify a policy precedent land case that can dramatize and highlight the issue, especially the importance of Agrarian Reform, and to highlight the issue also in the implementation of Agrarian Reform.”

It is ironic that what opened up as an opportunity for the Sumilao farmers to reclaim their lands was a technicality considering that they lost their lands also due to a technicality. A provision in the Rules of Conversion stated that the plan for conversion should be fully implemented after five years. However, when five years passed in August 2004, there was still no sign of activity within the 144 hectares area (S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March; A.J.

Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February). The land owner sold the property to the San Miguel Corporation in 2002, which planned to construct a piggery on the property. However, such use was not part of the approved conditions for conversion of the land.

In November 2004, the farmers sent a petition to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), asking them to include the property again in its land reform program since it had not been converted (*ibid.*). The petition work took two years. PAKISAMA was in an organizational crisis between 2003 and 2006 and was consequently unable to offer assistance to the farmers. During this period, the pleadings and organizational work were carried out by the NGO BALAOD Mindanaw.

PAKISAMA's crisis ended in July 2006 when a Unity Conference was held (S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March). The elected chairperson at the conference was a Sumilao farmer who brought attention to the farmers' plan to take action. A proposal for funding was submitted to the International Land Coalition (ILC) in July 2007. Subsequently, USD 20,000 was approved for the project.

The farmers were agitated and a sense of urgency to do something followed when the San Miguel Corporation started the construction of buildings and roads on the property: "When they saw four concrete buildings being constructed, and when they saw a boar the size of a cow [...], [t]hey said, 'We have to stop this. This cannot go on because if we allow San Miguel to continue building structures, whatever we do will be useless as we will not be able to plow cemented fields anymore [...]. And they already started constructing roads.' So they were really worried" (A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February).

The decision in September 2007 to do the 1,700 kilometers walk was the outcome of a planning meeting that S. Banzuela, and then PAKISAMA president, Crispino Aguelo, convened with the farmer leaders of SALFA, MAPALAD, the San Vicente Landless Farmers Association, BALAOD Mindanaw, PHILDHRRA and BMFI (*ibid.*). Expressed during the meeting was the need to dramatize the case as a peaceful protest, but the farmers felt that they could not repeat the hunger strike they did 10 years ago. There was also the question of how to pressure government from so far away (S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March; J.D. Capacio 2009, interview, 18 February).

A.J. Bag-ao (2009, interview, 18 February) mentioned that there were a number of inspirational sources for the walk. The leaders had all gone through

a peace-building formation program during which, some were inspired by “The salt march” – a movie on Gandhi. Back then, there were already talks about an ‘exodus’ among them. It is unclear who spawned the idea for a walk during the brainstorming, but as J.D. Capacio (2009, interview, 18 February) puts it: “What I’m sure of is that even if [the Sumilao farmers] didn’t start the idea, at some point they owned it and they embraced it. That’s why it came to be. If the farmers are not really sure of the form, it would manifest and it would not really succeed.” The walk was set to begin on the 10th anniversary of the hunger strike, October 9 (S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March).

The impact of exodus

Members of the agrarian reform community felt that there was a need to raise awareness on the issue (A.J. Ledesma 2009, interview, 13 March; A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February) because it has been lost in the minds of the general public. A.J. Bag-ao (2009, interview, 18 February) relates this loss of awareness to the Supreme Court’s revocation of then President Ramos’ decision to award them land. The farmers had already gotten media attention and when the Supreme Court ruling came, the technicality of the ruling was so complex that it escaped the news pages and was little known outside the legal community.

The time of the walk’s arrival in Manila was deliberately planned to coincide with Congress’ decision on extension of CARP in December 2008 (J.D. Capacio 2009, interview, 18 February), as a way to generate support and “put [agrarian reform] in the minds of the public again.” Walking, being a time consuming endeavor, also symbolized that agrarian reform is a continuous, live issue (A.J. Ledesma 2009, interview, 13 March). The walk generated impact not only in the rural areas, “but on the urban people as well because, my God, it boggles the mind!” (R. Hontiveros 2009, interview, 27 February).

Suddenly Sumilao is a walking distance. Bukidnon has become walking distance. Manila. No one has ever...the concept of distance. Well. This is amazing. Many groups here, later, urban poor groups: “My God, we are very near Malacañang.⁷ We don’t march every day. Why don’t we march to Malacañang every day?”

S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March

I think [...] it provides a visual for the urban centers to see that [...] this is still a rural country and there are a lot of people coming in from rural areas and they constitute a bigger number.

A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February

A.J. Bag-ao (*ibid*) further relates this impact on the urban mind to the effectiveness of the walk in reaching out to the public. For example, the distance of the walk and the physical struggle of the walk were related to the physical hardships of being a farmer (A.S. Garcia 2009, interview, 2 February; J.D. Capacio 2009, interview, 18 February; R. Hontiveros 2009, interview, 27 February). It was viewed as a form of demonstration, interpreted as being an active event naturally inherent to the farmers and what they can do. The physicality of the walk was promoted as being lively and active, and was contrasted with the previous hunger strike which was seen as less lively than walking (J.D. Capacio 2009, interview, 18 February). "Death through hunger" was "a last resort," carrying little energy and hope (A.S. Garcia 2009, interview, 2 February). A.S. Garcia (*ibid*) further contrasts the hunger strike with the walk by viewing it as waiting for something to happen instead of making something happen. Agrarian reform must be earned. The walk also made the Sumilao farmers' issue in particular, and agrarian reform in general, personal.

During the planning of the walk, 100 volunteered. But BALAOD Mindanaw could not handle 100 people due to accommodation issues (A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February). They used physical fitness as a criterion to limit participation to 50 volunteers. However, when the walk began, a few farmers discreetly joined the marchers, bringing the total number of participants to 55. "I think the number of farmers walking was significant and the fact that they were able to come here together, you know, you see a lot of faces walking."

I.J. Chan-Gonzaga (2009, interview, 17 March) also observed that when the farmers walked from one parish to another, one diocese to another, speaking to the bishops, they made the walk personal. It was no longer the abstract notion of a 'farmer,' but a face and a name that was fighting for his land. Cardinal Rosales who used to be bishop of Malaybalay during the time of the farmers' hunger strike, also saw it as a personal matter. The Cardinal's engagement with the Sumilao farmers' campaign was unique considering his position as a leading authority in the Catholic Church.

He knows the people personally. He knows the place. And I think he got fed up with all these news that that's barren lands. I think he got so irritated because he mentioned this during his homilies: "I would say

mass there every month. And I remember clearly that that's not barren land." He said, "I see irrigation of natural water supply. It's not even created by the National Irrigation Agency. It is a natural irrigation." He kept repeating that again and again and again. And he was pointing to the farmers, "I know you! I know you!" and then he was asking for names and the farmers would reply "*patay*," or dead already. So he knew them! I think what made him really engage was that these were people he knew. These were farmers he broke bread with.

I.J. Chan-Gonzaga 2009, interview, 17 March

The public also viewed the walk as a farmers' expression of duty which was manifested in the way they displayed discipline and decisiveness as they managed to walk the distance as a group (A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February). *The Philippine Daily Inquirer* mentioned this as having captured the imagination of the public, according to S. Banzuela (2009, interview, 5 March).

The Sumilao Farmers' case reached resolution in 29 March 2008 when the San Miguel Corporation agreed to donate 50 hectares to the Sumilao farmers and to place 94 hectares under the CARP Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme thus covering the entire contested 144 hectares property (AFA 2008a; KAISAHAN 2008).

Analysis of the walk as a form of protest action

This section provides an analysis of the processes that led to the walk as a form of action, and its impacts. The action oriented function of collective action frames is divided into three core framing tasks: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational framing. The core framing tasks addresses the problems of consensus mobilization and action mobilization (Benford & Snow 2000: 615).

Diagnostic framing is the task of identifying the problem (ibid.) – in this case, the failure to properly implement agrarian reform. Prognostic framing attempts at formulating a solution to the problem. It "addresses the Leninesque question of what is to be done," and on reaching consensus in this matter as well as how to mobilize for action (ibid: 616-617). Prognostic framing takes place within a social movement industry (SMI) as well as in relation to the social movement organization's (SMOs') "opponents, targets of influence, media, and bystanders." Prognostic framing is usually where SMOs differ from each other, for instance the SMOs on the far left of the political spectrum proposed the GARB as opposed to CARPER.

Motivational framing provides adherents with a vocabulary for engaging in collective action and for sustaining participation, and is articulated as severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety (ibid: 617). These vocabularies can be emphasized in different combinations which can affect their outcome as either complementary or contradictory.

In addition to the three core framing tasks, there are three overlapping processes which affect the way frames are “developed, generated, and elaborated”: discursive processes, strategic processes and contested processes (ibid: 623). Discursive processes refer to speech acts and are further divided into two processes: frame articulation and punctuation⁸ (ibid: 623). The former aligns experiences and events in a coherent fashion since an emerging collective action frame is not necessarily new in its ideational sense, but in its interpretation. The latter highlights issues, events or beliefs that can be conceptualized to link events or issues and symbolize “the larger frame or movement of which it is a part.”

Strategic processes, or frame alignment processes, are goal oriented and aim to recruit new members, mobilize adherents and acquire resources (ibid: 624). Four such processes are identified: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation. Frame bridging links “two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem.” Frame amplification “involves the idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or beliefs.” Frame extension involves the incorporation of outlying issues into an SMO’s interests and frames with the aim to increase adherents (ibid: 625). Research on frame extension was not carried out, but the call for CARPER was at times merged with rallies against President Arroyo’s proposed charter change (that aimed to keep her in office beyond the mandate period). Frame transformation is the changing or replacing of previous understandings and meanings. Contested processes refers to challenges to actors’ reality construction from opponents or from actors’ who proposes opposing interpretations, but will not be elaborated here.

The form emerges

The conception of the walk as form corresponded to a prognostic framing task – what needed to be done to achieve implementation of agrarian reform for the Sumilao farmers? This study identifies discursive and strategic processes that guided the planning of the demonstration.

PAKISAMA implements an agenda that explicitly addresses punctuation and frame amplification. The Sumilao farmers' case was identified as being able to set a policy precedent and as such the choice of form aimed to punctuate, to discursively highlight agrarian reform in general. This study identifies three different types of strategic processes that guided the shaping of the walk as form: frame bridging, frame amplification and frame transformation.

As the methodology of Active Nonviolence has long been a practice by PAKISAMA, a peaceful form was sought and the walk was likely a result of frame bridging between an agrarian reform frame and a nonviolence frame. As frame amplification, PAKISAMA also sought a dramatic form in order to reopen peoples' minds to the issue, to invigorate agrarian reform. The choice of drama was a consequence of a frame transformation process. As a hunger strike was seen as not being alive, the movement sought to breathe new life into the issue. A novel form of expression was needed and new methods, a new drama, had to be found.

Vocabularies of severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety were utilized to bring about action, summarized as follows:

Severity	Urgency and Efficacy	Propriety
Poverty and landlessness were conditions the farmers had to endure and their need to address this was most tragically expressed in the suicide of a Sumilao farmer following the Supreme Courts' decision.	When the San Miguel Corporation began converting the land and built constructions on the property, the farmers realized that the land could become useless to farming. If it continued unhindered the loss of the farming lands would be final.	The hunger strike had been an inactive, waiting, form and following the frame transformation, the re-evaluation of what methods to use, the walk was an active, physical endeavor, making something happen.

The Banasi and Calatagan farmers

The successful Sumilao campaign created a new buzzword in the land development discourse: '*Mag-Sumilao ka*', to '*Do a Sumilao*', meaning to do the impossible, and specifically to walk (A.S. Garcia 2009, interview, 2 February; S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March). "Sumilao became a poster boy for the CARPER issue" (I.J. Chan-Gonzaga 2009, interview, 17 March), "the icon of agrarian reform" (J.D. Capacio 2009, interview, 18 February).

PAKISAMA's intended punctuation of agrarian reform was therefore deemed successful.

The success in turn led to frame amplification – i.e. how CARP can serve the interests of the farmers, and punctuation, by highlighting the Sumilao case as a symbol of the agrarian reform movement, especially the CARPER movement as a whole. The effect the Sumilao campaign had on other farmer groups; e.g. the Banasi and the Calatagan farmers respectively, would inspire subsequent actions. In November 2008, a group of farmers from Banasi, Bicol, walked 444 km to Manila.⁹ According to A.S. Garcia (2009, interview, 2 February), this was “a product of the Sumilao walk.” Like the Sumilao campaign, the outcome of the Banasi farmer's walk also became a success story. The cancellation of their land titles was reversed.

The Banasi farmers previously joined the Sumilao farmers in their walk as they passed their area but did not continue on to Manila (ibid). The experience, however, inspired them to organize a walk of their own, promoting their own local issue. The Banasi walk was coordinated by SALIGAN and two farmer leaders from Sumilao, paralegal Renato “Ka Rene” Peñas and Yoyong who visited them as officers of PAKISAMA. The experience of the Sumilao walk also taught the Banasi farmers that the Church can be a useful ally that can provide food, logistics and links to networks from the parishes to the highest leaders of the Church. The support of Bishop Pabillo and Cardinal Rosales had become highly symbolic during the Sumilao campaign because they were known to be influential. Having been contacted by SALIGAN and seeing the campaign to be timely, Bishop Pabillo offered further contacts and provided the Church as a haven for the farmers.

Upon reaching Manila, the national attention they received compelled the Office of the President to act as there were also allegations that someone in the Office of the President is related to the land owners. The victory was further attributed to the Church's successful influence on Cabinet Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III in the Office of the President. Secretary Bello was moved by the farmers. Being of the opinion that there was “foul play inside the bureaucracy,” “the Banasi walk created a venue for him to exercise what he wanted to do.”

The other group of farmers from Calatagan also walked with the Sumilao farmers in December 2007, supporting them in their case (J.D. Capacio 2009, interview, 18 February).¹⁰ “The Calatagan farmers felt the need to support this, [the Sumilao farmers] needed to be victorious so that we could [...] hold

on to a victory, a success story and claim to the world that agrarian reform works." The contested lands in Calatagan were, however, still locked in dispute between the farmers and Asturias Chemical Industries, which happened to be also owned by San Miguel Foods Inc. In supporting the Sumilao farmers, the Calatagan farmers wanted to show that they could also mobilize for their own case, which they proceeded to do in April 2008 (ibid).

During the Sumilao campaign, the Church asked the Calatagan farmers to remain silent about their own case so as not to confuse issues and "get the ire of Ramon Ang," the owner, who gave the Sumilao farmers a chance at negotiations (ibid). Since the Calatagan farmers walk in April 2008 onwards, the Church, in particular Bishop Pabillo, Cardinal Rosales and the Archbishop of Lipa, Batangas who had supported them in the past, gave its full support to the farmers.

FRAME BRIDGING AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

A church of the poor

"The 1960 national census, the last one which listed religious affiliation, had 83.8 percent identifying themselves as Roman Catholics[...]", a figure which Carroll (2004: 55) doubts has changed much over the years, even though there has been a rise in number of smaller non-ecumenical sects. It follows that in a dominantly Catholic nation, the ability to mobilize resources through the church's network of churches, schools, universities and organizations is of no little importance.

Prior to the Sumilao walk, the Church was not expected to offer assistance beyond the provision of space and issuance of statements (A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February). The Church was already involved with the Sumilao farmers 12 years before when the local church in Cagayan de Oro was first approached by the farmers. However, most of their previous involvement consisted of singing at masses, saying mass for the hunger strikers and offering counsel (A.J. Ledesma 2009, interview 13 March; I.J. Chan-Gonzaga 2009, interview, 17 March). Very explicitly, I.J. Chan-Gonzaga (ibid) stated, "We got involved in agrarian reform precisely because of Sumilao." The walk opened up a new venue for support and resources from the Church (A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February).

A.J. Bag-ao (2009, interview, 18 February), executive trustee of BALAOD Mindanaw, said that during ground working, its focus was not on the Church, but on other NGOs and farmers organizations that the farmers met with prior

to the walk, asking them to hold forums and provide accommodation in the provinces that they would pass. “We never thought that the church will be very instrumental in making sure that we get to Manila safely.” Involving the bishops was an initiative from the farmers who felt that the church had been supportive of them ever since the hunger strike.

Bishop Ledesma of the Archdiocese of Cagayan de Oro, the first major city in the walk, and Bishop Pacana from the Diocese of Malaybalay, under which Sumilao belongs, are Jesuits. There was therefore a Jesuit network that could facilitate the walk (A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February; I.J. Chan-Gonzaga 2009, interview, 17 March). I.J. Chan-Gonzaga (2009, interview, 17 March) explained that “by sheer affiliation and fraternal cooperation, we realized we have to be on top of this.”

The Jesuits’ networking efforts had a motivational effect on how the planning proceeded during the walk as there emerged a sense of duty among the participants towards the Church:

In fact, when they walked—they started the walk—they brought with them a tent thinking that there would be circumstances when they would sleep on the road. But when the Bishop heard about that plan, he said: “Oh, no, so we will contact other parishes and make sure that your route will be close to a church”. When you stop for the day, you’re closer to a church. That’s why sometimes we’d get there at 5 pm, or 6, or 7, or 9, or 11, because we wanted to come closer to a church although initially that was not the plan. We said, wherever we feel tired, we will stop, but because the bishops had already said: “Oh, the next Church said they already prepared dinner” so we had to, oh, move a little bit. So it was at least 40 km per day, but there were times when it was 35 or 56 depending on the proximity of the next, of the nearby parish who committed to provide food and shelter for the night.

A.J. Bag-ao 2009, interview, 18 February

When the Sumilao farmers reached Manila, they proceeded directly to the Church of the Gesù – located inside the Ateneo de Manila University campus where the socio-political arm of the Jesuits, the Simbahang Lingkod ng Bayan (SLB) has its office. Cardinal Rosales said mass there for them (I.J. Chan-Gonzaga 2009, interview, 17 March). I.J. Chan-Gonzaga (ibid.) explained that the Cardinal’s involvement sent a signal not just to the Jesuits but to the Church in general that “This is a call to the religious and to the clergy.” He further mentioned that “I have a letter here for the president that I want the farmers to hand carry to Malacañang and I want the seminarians

and the sisters to make sure that the farmers reach the gates of Malacañang.” Consequently the Church held a procession to Malacañang where, Chan-Gonzaga observed, President Arroyo “had no choice but to accommodate them precisely because of that.” The pressure the Church exercised on Malacañang led to a meeting between two of the farmer leaders and the President.

As a consequence of the Church’s action in behalf of the Sumilao farmers, other farmer groups began approaching the Church for support as well:

[T]hat’s why this year all of a sudden all the other farmer groups thought we were the ones responsible and actually we’re not. The only thing we were able to do was to bridge the farmers and the church and now that that’s bridged, for me, we’ve done our part, but they always come back to us [...]. So at the same time we’re trying to help and we’re helping precisely because it is a mandate of the church.

I.J. Chan-Gonzaga 2009, interview, 17 March

In 1992, the bishops and lay people held the Philippine Plenary Council of the Philippines II (PCP II), during which it was declared that the Church would be a church of the poor, taking their needs in consideration and encouraging the rich to share their resources with them (ibid). The PCP II is likened to Vatican II which, with the 1968 Bishop’s Conference in Medellin, led to fundamental changes within the Catholic Church (Kamrava & Mora 1998: 331-332, 337-338). In Latin America at the time, the adopted agenda for social justice by the Church was conducive to the growth of civil society. It followed therefore that the development of grassroots neighborhood organizations, and consequent horizontal relationships within civil society in Chile and Brazil in 1980 was facilitated by church involvement.

Between the mid-1940s until the beginning of the 1970s, two developments occurred analogous to each other (Carroll 2004: 56-57). The Catholic Church developed its programme on social justice and established the Institute of Social Order to undertake social development. The other major Christian churches followed their example in the 1960s. Subsequent to the social justice agenda that followed Vatican II and the Bishop’s Conference in Medellin was the emergence of liberation theology which in the Philippines served as inspiration, alongside writings of Mao and Professor Jose Maria Sison,¹¹ for peasants, students and some Christians during the rise of the communist movement in the 1960s. The National Democratic Front (NDF) served as an umbrella for Maoist civil society organizations, such as the

Christians for National Liberation (CNL), which was headed by a Catholic priest.

The engagement of the Church in the local Sumilao farmers' case which subsequently developed into involvement in the national CARPER issue was thus aided by an already existing social justice paradigm. A.J. Ledesma (2009, interview, 13 March) related the conditions of the rural poor and landless to the identification by the Church of such as social justice issues which needed to be addressed. It was also a way for the Church to reiterate its position as a church of the poor. I.J. Chan-Gonzaga (2009, interview, 17 March) further highlighted this by saying that: "for the first time, the church was able to say that we are still pro-poor." There was a need for it as the major criticism against the Catholic Church was that it has forgotten "how to mingle with the poor" and that it has "become too comfortable having dinner with politicians and landlords."

I.J. Chan-Gonzaga (ibid.) argued that there is a need for asset reform in the Philippines in general. If agrarian reform can be properly implemented, other asset reforms will follow. Successful implementation of CARP in the Sumilao farmers' case concretized the urgency for this through the walk. The Sumilao campaign opened up an educational process on agrarian reform within the Church, as the farmers managed to talk to a third of the dioceses in the country during the walk. This facilitated an opening for discussions on the issue of CARP within the Church because the farmers were not only bannerizing the local disputed 144 hectares, but also CARPER. This subsequently led to the defense of the call for agrarian reform at the Association of Major Religious Superiors.

Active Nonviolence

Another factor that played an important part in this movement was the walk as a peaceful form of protest. Nonviolent strategies had played an important part in the EDSA Revolution, or People Power revolution, that led to the ouster of President Marcos in 1986. Many of the social movement organizations as well as the bishops went through workshops in non-violent strategies prior to EDSA Revolution and had adopted such. This was to be contrasted with the strategies of the radical left.

After President Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972, the Church became divided into three camps (Carroll 2004: 57-58): the conservatives, who supported Marcos and amongst whom the majority of the bishops were found, along with congregation superiors and individual

priests and nuns; the moderates, comprised of a minority of (younger) bishops, the leadership of the Associations of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP) and individual Church people who felt that Martial Law was oppressive and impeded development; and a handful of religious authorities who were linked to the radicals, those who joined the revolutionary left, consisting mostly of Church people working in direct contact with the poor. Apart from the tensions this caused within the Church, it also affected relations with the state (Carroll 2004: 58-59). Bishops, who otherwise rejected the left, refused to expose their fellows to a military known for violating human rights. Likewise, moderate organizers sought protection in rebel camps. Furthermore, moderates and radicals often shared a background in common church-based training programmes which facilitated contact. However, it also made church programmes open to infiltration by the left. As a consequence, the military viewed all community organizers as potential communists. These tensions led the bishops to make an official stance of their own which resulted in a joint pastoral letter in February 1983, "A Dialogue for Peace," where they criticized the oppressive government and human rights violations on the parts of both the right and the left.

Following the assassination of Marcos-critic Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino in 1983, which was believed to have been staged by the government, protests steadily built and crystallized into two divisions (Carroll 2004: 61-62). The "yellow stream," which wanted a "parliamentary and reformist" solution to economic and political problems caused by the Marcos regime, consisted mainly of leading people from the Church and businessmen close to it as well as those who were mobilized as a result of Aquino's murder. Many also sought social change to be achieved through non-violence. The "red stream" consisted of the organizations allied with the left, priests and church workers amongst them, and militant organizations of workers, peasants and urban poor; those disgruntled with the elites and the inability of the government to address fundamental socio-economic issues in society. These issues were to be resolved even through means of armed struggle.

Aiming for peaceful change, the "yellow stream" re-established the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) and, with Cardinal Sin, urged participation in the 1984 National Assembly election (Carroll 2004: 62-63). The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) took a neutral stance focusing on maintaining honest elections. The "red stream" boycotted the elections. However, the opposition succeeded in mobilizing a high turnout of votes.

In 1986 the economic conditions and violence had escalated and President Marcos called for a snap election to gain mandate against a presumed fractioned opposition. Again, the “red stream” urged boycott.¹² NAMFREL was now backed by the CBCP, supporting the candidate Corazon “Cory” Aquino, the wife of the assassinated Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino. The official election results were perceived to be fraudulent and was publicly condemned by the CBCP. This positioning of the bishops upset not only President Marcos, but also the Vatican. Carroll (2004: 64) stated that the bishops “situated themselves within the Christian community, not above it.” They reported what they saw and asked people to, in a spirit of non-violence, to act upon it, respecting the individuals’ agency regarding political choices. What followed were the mass mobilizations that ousted Marcos, as called by Cardinal Sin. Carroll (2004: 54) attributed the nonviolence practices taught in seminars by church-based active non-violence groups as conducive to the success of the mass mobilizations.

The concept of Active Nonviolence was introduced in the Philippines through a series of workshops in 1984 by John Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayer from the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March). One workshop was held for the bishops and two for NGOs and SMOs. The movement *Aksyon Para sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan* (AKKAPKA) was formed to combat injustice using Active Non-Violence (ANV) methods and principles.

I happened to be one of those who participated in that workshop. And I was convinced to the point that I left my previous organization to join that movement. Because I felt that [...] this is the movement to topple Marcos’ dictatorship.

S. Banzuela 2009, interview, 5 March

In PAKISAMA’s reading of events, the EDSA revolution did not just happen by people saying “Let’s do this.” In S. Banzuela’s estimate, “at least some 6,000” people participated in AKKAPKA workshops. One of them was Butch Aquino, the brother of Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, who was leading one of the marches during the EDSA rallies.

Following the EDSA revolution, PAKISAMA incorporated ANV into its political education program, using the materials of AKKAPKA. One of the participants in and trainers of ANV in the early 1990s was Peter Tuminghay, a farmer leader of MAPALAD, which is a member organization of PAKISAMA. This affected the outcome of the planning for the Sumilao farmers’ campaign

in 1997 when the initiative for a hunger strike suggested by Tuminghay was adopted instead of the suggestion of the community organizers to take up arms.

Frame bridging

The processes that led to the conception and legitimization of the walk as form of protest had consequences on how the Catholic Church became involved in the agrarian reform movement. Successful frame amplification personalized the issue and galvanized support from the Cardinal, and arguably from other Church people as well. The walk itself also became a method by which the farmers educated the communities they passed on agrarian reform. This consequently facilitated the educational process on the issue within the Church. The successful outcome inspired other farmers' groups to seek support and resources from the Church, a call which the latter could not ignore.

Aligning the agrarian reform frame with the Church's already existent social justice frame, the motivational vocabulary that called the church to act can be translated as following:

Severity	Urgency	Efficacy	Propriety
The Church felt a need to improve upon its reputation as a church of the poor.	The urgency of the case translated into urgency for the Church to act for it as it opened up an opportunity to show itself as a church of the poor.	There was a Jesuit network to facilitate immediate action.	According to the social justice agenda introduced by Vatican II and the 1968 Bishop's Conference in Medellin and further developed for the Philippines during PCP II, it was the duty of the Church to be pro-poor and to seek to resolve social justice issues. Agrarian reform addressed both issues of poverty alleviation and the right of land to the tiller.

The ANV frame was already shared by SMOs in the agrarian reform movement and members of the Catholic Church since the mid-1980s.

Considering that social movements differ the most in their methodologies—in how they address what needs to be done and how it is done—this study argues further that frame bridging between the agrarian reform movement’s agrarian reform frame and the Church’s social justice frame was facilitated by an intermediate frame, the shared ANV frame, that provided a common approach.

CONCLUSION

The Sumilao farmers’ walk became a landmark event in the recent history of agrarian reform in the Philippines. As the campaign became a success story for implementing CARP, this study was interested in understanding the processes leading to a successful campaign.

The prognostic framing task, what needed to be done and what form the demonstration would take, was partly addressed bearing in mind that the Sumilao farmers had exhausted almost every option of expressing their situation after years of futile struggle for their lands. Furthermore, the prognostic framing task corresponded to parallel discursive and strategic processes. The Sumilao farmers’ case was identified as being able to set a policy precedent for future land disputes and as such the campaign could punctuate, and discursively highlight, the need for agrarian reform in general. As there was a need to invigorate agrarian reform as an issue, there was in the same fashion a frame transformation of the understanding of how to conduct a demonstration. The decision to walk was seen as being active and lively in itself which was in contrast with the previous hunger strike in 1997 that was seen as passive and self destructive. The frame transformation called for a new way of dramatizing the issue, a new frame amplification to reopen peoples’ minds to the issue.

The motivational framing task articulated as severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety, that moved people to act were the socio-economic context of the farmers, ongoing land conversion which would make the farm lands useless, the need for bystander support, and a sense of duty to retrieve their lands by physical action.

Getting the Church on board proved instrumental for the Sumilao campaign’s success. The Church managed to provide a platform of political support for the farmers’ cause and logistics for the 1700 kilometer walk. Building bystander support was also facilitated by having the Church as an ally considering that Catholics constitute a large majority in the Philippines.

The Sumilao campaign set in motion a process of consolidating support from the Church which would continue during subsequent farmers' campaigns and later the CARPER campaign.

This study argues that one of the key elements for the successful frame bridging between the agrarian reform frame and the Church's social justice frame, i.e. what made interaction and cooperation possible, was an intermediate, shared, Active Nonviolence frame. Since the mid-1980s this methodology for executing demonstrations was shared by both SMOs in the agrarian reform movement and members of the Catholic Church. As SMOs often differ from each other when it comes to the prognostic framing task, this can arguably underscore the importance of shared methodologies in frame bridging processes.

The Sumilao campaign also facilitated the building and strengthening of horizontal relationships within civil society. However, it is felt that there is a need to accelerate that capacity:

It's a bit slow probably because also the mass movement in general has suffered a decline and has needed to really pick up the slack. That decline has been part of an overall durability of the traditional political set-up because even though there have been periodic political crisis and then late last year, this unprecedented international financial crisis really calling into question many of the basic dominant economic premises and even some, on the side, political premises. The mass movement hasn't been strong enough to take advantage of the opening and present itself as an alternative on many key issues. The same for the agrarian reform movement and in general, parties like us who support them or support the whole democratization struggle [...]. So there's a greater capacity for networking on their part and our part but we have to accelerate it and really use the basis of unity which is the CARPER Bill, which is the fundamental concern for agrarian reform as a way to consolidate that networking even for the long-term and even for other related struggles all within that democracy rubric. So yes, we have a lot of housekeeping to do and to do better.

R. Hontiveros 2009, interview, 27 February

The networking between SMOs that began during the Sumilao campaign thus continued with CARPER where the CARPER campaign in itself was an instrument to strengthen those ties.

Last 6 June 2009, the CARPER Bill was passed, extending funding for CARP for another five years (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2009a). Further studies

that focus on the relationship between collective action events and collective action, for example, how the Sumilao campaign affected the discourse on agrarian reform, the implications it had for the subsequent mobilizations in March 2009, and the outcome of the CARPER bill, could prove insightful.

NOTES

- 1 This article is based on the author 's master 's thesis in Asian Studies, Lund University, with the same title.
- 2 Based on the 2002-2003 East Asia Barometer Surveys.
- 3 Percent of respondents with a net preference for democratic (as opposed to authoritarian) regime or process.
- 4 As measured by Freedom House's 7-point indices of political rights and civil liberties in 2004 and according to Transparency International's Global Corruption Report 2004.
- 5 For additional details see BALAOD Mindanaw (2007); AFA (2008a); Philippine Daily Inquirer (2007).
- 6 Reid (2001: 781-782) argues that Estrada was able to emerge as the following President out of a reaction against Ramos' failed neoliberal programme. His pro-poor agenda played out favorably, combined with the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Estrada's supporters were mainly amongst the poor and the excluded in society who identified with his background (Carroll 2004: 69-71).
- 7 The presidential palace.
- 8 Benford & Snow (2000: 623) alternatively calls 'punctuation' frame amplification,' but as the term is also used with a different meaning when discussing strategic processes, 'punctuation' is used instead to avoid confusion over the terms.
- 9 For additional details see AFA (2008b).
- 10 For additional details see Calatagan March (2008).
- 11 Chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and founder of its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA).
- 12 This was one key event that eventually led to a major split in the left in the early 1990s that reverberates throughout Philippine political society even today. A detailed account can be found in Rocamora (1994).

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Philippine Catholicism as Disruptive Public Religion: A Sociological Analysis of Philippine Catholic Bishops' Statements, 1946 to 2000¹

Roberto E. N. Rivera, S.J.²

This paper examines the issue of church-state separation by looking at the experience of the hierarchical Catholic Church, specifically the cardinals and bishops, in engaging various societal issues. Utilizing the work of religious studies scholars on power distribution and ideological structure in a religious context as well as privatized and deprivatized religion, this study focuses on the experience of Philippine bishops from 1946 to 2000 to address the broader research question of how the role of the Catholic Church in a colonized country affects the Catholic hierarchy's ability to take a progressive stance on political, economic, and social problems once the nation has gained independence. In line with this, the study also examines a number of "themes" relating to the Catholic Church's role in the Spanish colonization of the Philippines. The Philippine case has been chosen over comparable Latin American cases because of the fairly long period of Spanish colonization undergone by the country, its experience with other colonizing powers such as the United States and Japan, as well as its relatively late attainment of political independence in 1946. The paper finds that this protracted period of colonization would have a profound effect on the public pronouncements to be made by the Philippine Catholic episcopate. Content analysis of the Philippine bishops' pastoral statements from the period of 1946 to 2000 show that until the early 1960's, these statements reflected a restorationist agenda of unbridled Church influence in the public domain. Only later would the bishops become more sensitive to the decline of Catholic Church influence and the autonomy of the secular sphere, with the Catholic Church advocating issues relating to social justice and equality as a "deprivatized"

institution. The paper concludes with some remarks on the unique trajectory taken by the Philippine Catholic hierarchy in confronting societal problems.

Key words: Philippines, separation of church and state, religion, bishops, colonialism

INTRODUCTION

The term “disruptive religion” has been introduced into the lexicon of the sociology of religion by Christian Smith (1996), who posits that that religious faith carries within it the seeds for social mobilization, precisely because it is involved in devising meaning systems that help make sense of reality. These meaning systems hinge on divine realities that exhibit a certain dualism in the face of earthly situations. On the one hand, belief in the divine transcends these earthly realities. On the other hand, such transcendent beliefs provide a solid basis for judging the earthly order. Thus, while belief in the divine may lead religious believers to maintain conservative positions, such belief also gives religion the potential for “disruptive collective activism” (Smith 1996: 5-6).

In this age where the separation of church and state is the norm in many countries, the role of religion in social and political movements continues to be highly contentious. This paper examines a specific aspect of this storied history by looking at the experience of the hierarchical Catholic Church; i.e. the cardinals and bishops, in terms of engaging various societal issues and serving as a catalyst for “disruptive collective activism.” The broad research question for this work will ask how the role of the Catholic Church in a colonized country affects the Catholic hierarchy’s ability, once the nation has gained independence, to take a progressive stance on political, economic, and social problems. In this regard, I shall focus on one case—the experience of the Philippine bishops—to provide an initial and tentative answer to this query.

The paper shall proceed as follows: I will begin by explaining the theoretical framework—based primarily on Weber’s (1946) ideas on “religion in the world” and Burns’ (1992) conception of power distribution and ideological structure—to be used for this investigation. I will then explain the

rationale for choosing the Philippine bishops' experience, as well as citing briefly the examples of other countries, to keep the case study "comparatively informed." After examining some "themes" relating to the Catholic Church's role in the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, the bulk of the paper will analyze how these themes shaped the public pronouncements made by the Philippine bishops from 1946 to 2000. Utilizing thematic and textual analysis of select statements, I shall chart the development of the Catholic Church's engagement of social and political issues, under the leadership of its prelates. I will conclude with some remarks on the unique trajectory taken by the Philippine Catholic hierarchy in facing problems within the public sphere.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND CASE STUDY SELECTION

This section shall deal with theoretical and methodological concerns that will factor into our investigation.

Weber

Within the social sciences, the tension involved in the engagement of religion with the world has been the subject of much speculation. Among the classical sociologists, the ideal-typical description of this tension is provided by Max Weber. He asserts, for instance, that "the tension between brotherly religion and the world has been most obvious in the economic sphere" (1946: 331). Because the rational economy is focused exclusively on the dynamic of the market and the increase of money, it has an "impersonal nature" that makes it less accessible to "any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness" (1946: 331). The resolution of this tension takes two paths. One is external in nature, involving the outright rejection of economic goods, as what Weber terms "religious virtuosos" (e.g. monks) are apt to do. The other is the Puritan ethic of "vocation" which "rationally routinized all work in this world into serving God's will and testing one's state of grace" (1946: 332), a thesis Weber fully develops in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.

This tension in religion's engagement of the world is even more evident in the political sphere, with Weber citing the state's preoccupation with power and its monopoly on "the legitimate use of violence" as "meaningless to any universalist religion of salvation" (1946: 334). Initially, therefore, Weber's assessment of religion's involvement in politics is quite pessimistic. Such involvement is the result of either "the entanglement of religious organizations in power interests and in struggles for power," or for "the use of religious

organizations for the political taming of the masses" and "the need of the powers-that-be for the religious consecration of their legitimacy" (1946: 337-8). Weber, however, envisions the possibility of a rationalized religion developing "organic social ethics" which avoids both the polity's cooptation of religion and religion's utter rejection of matters political. Through organic social ethics, the world is considered "an at least relatively rational cosmos in spite of all its wickedness" and bears "at least traces of the divine plan of salvation" (1946: 339). This opens the possibility of religious involvement in politics, with a rationalized faith confronting the realities of a rationalized social order.

Weber provides the important insight that while certain elements of religion may be diametrically opposed to the economic and political order, the same processes of rationalization which affect society allow religion to confront the world. In its engagement of the world, religion tries to recognize the autonomy of society while responding to the exigencies of the faith. It is a fine balancing act that will be treated time and time again in the contemporary literature on religious mobilization.

Ideology and Power

In his analysis of the Catholic Church's adjustment to the forces of modernization from the late nineteenth to the twentieth century, Burns (1992) utilizes the construct of *ideology* to explain the Catholic Church's stance vis-à-vis the important issues of the day. In Burns' formulation, ideology is not simply a set of beliefs, but rather it is also a "hierarchy of issues enforced through the exercise of power" (1992: 12). In other words, ideology can be conceived of as a structure: people with more power within this ideological structure will be able to control the development of issues on top of their hierarchy of issues. For Burns, therefore, ideology is not static but a dynamic social structure. It includes "understandings and priorities which pattern our social participation," with distributions of power shaping the ideological structure and thus affecting the manner in which individuals, groups, and institutions can participate accordingly (Burns 1992: 13). Burns then proceeds to explain how the ideological structures in Europe shaped the Roman hierarchy and consequently, the manner with which the worldwide Catholic Church was able to confront issues around the world. I shall appropriate Burns' notions of ideology structure and power distribution, and apply it to a more specific context: that of colonization, and its effect on how the Catholic Church hierarchy is able to participate in a post-independence setting in addressing concerns both within and outside its "hierarchy of issues."

In a limited manner I shall also be appropriating what Casanova (1994) would call the current status of the Catholic Church as a “public religion,” to describe the current role of the Church in the modern world. With the diminished influence of the Catholic Church and the separation of church and state in numerous countries, the Catholic Church finds itself recognizing the autonomy of the secular world, but intervening during very specific circumstances. These legitimate opportunities for intervention would include defending basic human rights (e.g. against the abuses of absolutist states), to challenge “the absolute lawful autonomy of the secular spheres [when it disregards] extraneous ethical or moral considerations” (e.g. the arms race), or to defend the “traditional life world” (e.g. anti-abortion issues), and other related situations (Casanova 1994: 57-58). Although Casanova’s investigation of this hypothesis has been limited, his description of public religion can help us describe the outcome to be examined in this study.

Choosing the Philippine Case

In considering the “universe of cases” for this study, I have already noted in the introduction how I aim to look at countries which were formerly colonized by Catholic powers, and which after independence had episcopates adopting progressive stances on social, political, and economic issues. Aside from the Philippines, most of the cases here would fall within Latin America, and here Burns (1992) provides a useful delineation. He identifies three paths of church-state relations in the continent from the late nineteenth century. First are countries where even with the separation of church and state, the Catholic Church remained conservative because of its ties with powerful and wealthy elites: he cites Mexico and Venezuela as examples of these. Next are those countries where states continued to be allied with the church, with Catholicism remaining conservative as well, as in Argentina and Colombia. Finally there are those countries where Catholicism experienced some form of alienation from the state and ruling elites, thus leading to an activist Catholic Church, such as Brazil and Chile (Burns 1992: 159).

Thus a full blown comparative study based on similar outcomes would involve comparing the Philippines with countries such as Brazil, Chile, and others fitting the same mold. I maintain, however, that a comparatively informed case study is warranted for the Philippines in this case for the following reasons. First would be the unique situation of the Philippines of having been conquered by not one but two colonial powers – Spain and the United States (as well as the Japanese occupation of World War II). Second

would be the fairly long period of Spanish colonization undergone by the country from 1521 to 1898, nearly four centuries. Finally there is the late granting of independence for the Philippines (1946), unlike its Latin American counterparts which were on the way to nationhood in the early nineteenth century. As will be shown later, this extended period of colonization would have a profound effect on the public pronouncements to be made by the Philippine episcopate. I shall now focus on the Philippines in the next sections, and will return to these comparative considerations at the conclusion.

CHURCH AND COLONY

What are the main characteristics of Philippine Catholicism in the years prior to the granting of Philippine independence in 1946? While an exhaustive recounting of Philippine Church history will not be possible here, several dominant “themes” in Philippine Catholicism during this period can be identified. These themes can serve as starting points which will help better explain the transitions made by Philippine Catholicism into a “public religion” and the ideological structure faced by the Catholic episcopate after the nation’s sovereignty was granted.

Instrument of conquest

Perhaps the overarching theme of the Catholic faith in the Philippines during the Spanish era is that it was undisputedly instrumental for the Spanish colonization of the islands. In the Philippines, this union was manifested especially in the *Patronato Real*, the arrangement wherein the Pope granted the kings of Spain the right to rule any lands that they have yet to discover, with the corresponding obligation of supporting the material needs of the church in these territories (De La Costa 1965: 31). Eventually, such an arrangement would cause much conflict, especially on the issue of whether the king had any authority on spiritual matters. But in general, the import of the *Patronato Real* was clear. The missionaries would have the support of the Spanish government in the islands, while the missionaries would be the concrete presence of the government, especially on the village level. Such an arrangement would have mixed results (Arcilla, 1984: 31-32). The general populace would benefit from the protection of the clergy especially in the face of abuses of the civil government, most notably in exacting taxes and forced labor under the *encomienda*³ system. On the other hand, the association of the church with government, as will be explained later, will lead to a hostile attitude toward the Spanish friars as nationalist aspirations

began to inspire the nascent revolutionary movement in the mid-nineteenth century.

One important aspect of this theme is that in the final decades of the Spanish regime, and with liberal governor generals (reflecting government changes in Spain) taking over in the Philippines, the privileges and support enjoyed by the Catholic Church in the islands began to wane. When the Americans took over as the new colonial power at the dawn of the twentieth century, their implementation of the separation of church and state further divested the Catholic Church of its status (De La Costa 1965: 251-252). In addition, the influx of Protestant groups and the emergence of a schismatic Philippine Church—the *Iglesia Filipina Independiente*—would usher in a period of strife and dissension for Catholicism from within and without.

Anti-Catholic sentiments and the nationalist movement

Another important development that would color the disposition of the Catholic Church in the Philippines for years to come would be the increasing anti-Catholic character of the nationalist movement. Many of the luminaries of the Philippine revolutionary movement were adherents of Masonry, and expressed very strong anti-Catholic sentiments. But as Schumacher (1987: 251) points out, Masonry was more of a symptom rather than a cause of the anti-Catholic—and specifically anti-friar (i.e. the Augustinians and Dominicans)—character of dissent against Spain. The causes for the anti-Catholic and anti-friar turn taken by the revolutionary movement are complex. They can be summed up briefly in two important points.

First is the fact that the stirrings of nationalism actually began with elements of the Filipino clergy who were clamoring for equal treatment from their Spanish counterparts and from higher ecclesiastical authorities. Both Spanish church and civil authorities considered the Filipino clergy not only inferior, but also a threat to established rule. Distinguished names such as Frs. Pedro Pelaez, Mariano Gomez, and Jose Burgos would clamor for equal treatment for the native clergy, and eventually for all Filipinos (Schumacher, 1981: 6-15). After a failed mutiny in the Cavite province in 1872, the Spanish authorities took the opportunity to crack down on the dissenting priests. Fr. Burgos, along with Frs. Gomez and Jacinto Zamora were implicated in the failed plot and subsequently executed, while the rest of the leadership of the Filipino clergy were exiled to the Marianas Islands (De La Costa 1965: 179-180).

However, this was not the end of dissent against Spanish rule. Many of these nationalistic Filipino priests had taken under their tutelage idealistic and talented laymen who would eventually form the bulwark of the revolutionary movement. A number of these men would have the opportunity to study in Europe, exposing them to liberal ideas which would further fuel nationalistic aspirations (Arcilla 1984: 85-87). Thus among the new generation of lay leaders there was a brewing resentment against the Spanish friars, especially after the execution of Fr. Burgos and his associates. Many of these leaders would eventually join Masonic lodges, becoming virulently anti-Catholic in their rhetoric altogether.

A second cause of anti-Catholic sentiments in the revolutionary movement ties in with the deterioration of social and economic conditions in the Philippines in the late 19th century. As life became more difficult in the islands, the nationalist clamor increased. The Spanish friars, on the other hand, were quick to dissuade the restive Filipino populace from any opposition. Ironically, therefore, the Spanish friars who were once considered the "kind face of empire" by many Filipinos were now seen as defenders of a corrupt and increasingly hostile regime (Schumacher 1987: 261).

The anti-Catholic tenor of the revolution would persist in the Philippine political scene all through the American occupation, when the American regime implemented the separation of church and state and in the first several decades of the independent Philippine Republic. As late as the 1950s, many leading politicians were affiliated with Masonic lodges, and a manifest Catholic allegiance in the political realm was a major liability for both groups and individuals (Schumacher 1987: 355). It would be some time before Catholicism would again be a force in public governance, and such influence would be very different from what the church had been accustomed to under Spain.

Primacy of evangelization and education

One final theme which can help clarify the transitions from pre-colonial to post-independence Catholicism is the primacy of the evangelization and education work of the Catholic Church in the Philippines. The need for Spanish missionaries to evangelize the country in the faith and in the name of God and king is self-evident. What is striking, however, is the simultaneous development of the educational system along with these evangelization efforts. The missionaries first established schools to teach catechism, but quickly they realized this would not be possible without teaching rudimentary reading

and writing skills as well. These catechetical centers therefore became centers of education as well, and throughout the nearly four hundred years of Spanish rule represented the bulwark of educational efforts in the islands. The missionaries, notably the Augustinians, Dominicans, and Jesuits, also established several institutions of higher learning (Arcilla 1984: 34-36; Schumacher 1987: 141-152).

The educational efforts of the church are very important because it was not until 1863 that government established the first normal school to train primary school teachers and mandated that the education of all children in the islands would be obligatory (Arcilla 1984: 77). However, because of the lack of resources government efforts at establishing an education system, the church made up for this slack giving the missionaries an unprecedented influence both as educators and ministers. At the same time, the educational institutions they established, especially the centers for higher learning, would also open the eyes of the Filipinos who attended these schools to progressive ideas. Indeed, some of the leaders of the revolutionary movement such as Jose Rizal, Marcelo del Pilar and others who would later adopt anti-Catholic sentiments received at least part of their education from Catholic schools.

The net result of this integration of evangelization and catechetical efforts is that the Catholic Church in the Philippines would be very protective of this privileged place she had in the educational system in the country. Under the Americans, religious instruction would be removed from public education (Arcilla 1984: 113). The Catholic Church still maintained control of its private educational institutions, but the establishment of a public school system (De La Costa 1965: 253) diminished the Catholic influence in education, which the bishops would try to reclaim after independence.

PHILIPPINE BISHOPS' STATEMENTS

The thematic background on Philippine Catholicism before the declaration of Philippine independence has illustrated the privileged place of the faith under Spanish rule, and its successive decline with the anti-friar stance of the revolutionary movement, along with the separation of church and state later imposed by American rule. Once the Philippines became an independent republic in 1946, how did the church reengage secular society—most especially the state—in its differentiated, secularized form? This section sifts through the pronouncements of the Philippine bishops as a primary source to see how these statements show the progress (or initially, the lack thereof)

made by the Catholic Church in adjusting to a new ideological structure where Catholicism had less power, thus adopting its role as a public religion. This is by no means an exhaustive treatment, since it will focus mainly on statements by the bishops on issues relating to the secular sphere, and excluding doctrinal pronouncements, of which there are many.⁴

1946 to 1965: Testing the waters

This period spanning the declaration of independence from the United States to the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council can be described as a time wherein the Catholic hierarchy confronted issues that revealed some of its aspirations in recovering even partly its preeminent position of power in Philippine society. This was also a period when the hierarchy confronted pressing social issues, mainly by invoking traditional Catholic social doctrine.

Masons and protestants

Perhaps the most striking example of how the Catholic Church during this period seemed to be looking back to its previous dominance of Philippine society was the focus of numerous pronouncements on groups and movements that were perceived as threatening Catholic beliefs or actively proselytizing among Catholic faithful.

The Masons, for instance, were one prime target of this effort. In 1954, the Catholic Welfare Organization⁵ in its "Statement of the Philippine Hierarchy on Masonry" (14 January 1954) reminded the Catholic faithful that Masonry is inconsistent with the Catholic faith. This in itself is not new as the Catholic Church does ban membership to Masonry among the faithful. However, what is striking here is the timing of the statement, coming as it does at the heels of the government effort to incorporate into the public school curriculum literary materials relating to Jose Rizal's work. Rizal, the national hero of the Philippines, was himself a Mason. Around this period, two statements from the bishops protesting the introduction of materials relating to Rizal into public education highlight the strong anti-Masonic sentiments. In the "Joint Statement of the Catholic Hierarchy of the Philippines on the Book *The Pride of the Malay Race*" (6 January 1950), the bishops charge that this work by Rafael Palma (who questions the accuracy of Rizal's retraction of Masonry) is driven by "Masonic and anti-Catholic elements." In the "Statement of the Philippine Hierarchy on the Novels of Dr. Jose Rizal; *Noli me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo*" (21 April 1956), the bishops maintain that although Rizal's nationalism and patriotism are to be extolled, the

erroneous views on Catholicism which he depicts in his two novels should not be taught.

Aside from Masonry and Mason sponsored interests, the bishops during this period also trained their sights on other perceived threats to the church. On 15 August 1954 the bishops issued their "Joint Statement of the Catholic Hierarchy on the YMCA." In pronouncements almost inconceivable in this age of Vatican II religious freedom, the bishops took pains to point out that the professed nonsectarian nature of the Young Men's Christian Association (along with the Young Women's Christian Association) was a form of Protestantism, albeit "one that shows little interests in beliefs." The statement ends with a stern and explicit ban for all Catholics from joining these organizations and using their facilities. Similarly, in the "Statement of the Administrative Council of the Catholic Welfare Organization on Religious Adherence" (18 June 1955), the bishops warn against the Moral Rearmament (MRA) Movement, another non-sectarian organization that professes to proclaim the "absolute dictates of conscience." The bishops counter by stating that Catholics "will find nothing in this movement which is not already contained, far more perfectly, in the doctrines of Jesus Christ as interpreted by the Catholic Church which He founded." Again, these pronouncements have a backward looking and polemic character to them, with no inkling yet of the principle of religious freedom to be introduced by the Second Vatican Council.

Efforts to influence education

Another sphere which the Catholic bishops sought to engage in during this period is the public school system. Much of their efforts centered on attempts to have religious instruction in the Catholic faith as an optional course in the public school curriculum. The Catholic hierarchy's vigorous lobby to have some form of religious instruction integrated into public schooling is strongly evidenced in their "Joint Pastoral Letter on Education" (10 April 1955), which sought to have the constitutional provision calling for such opportunities implemented by the Department of Education, prompting the Department to issue the corresponding regulations soon afterwards. Well into the mid-sixties, the issue was again raised in public, this time with the bishops backing legislation allowing public school teachers themselves to voluntarily teach religion in public schools (the previous Department of Education edict provided only for instructors and catechists supplied by the church). In the "The Philippines for Christ: Time to Launch a New

Evangelization" (8 December 1964) the bishops stressed once again the overall importance of religious instruction, and in the "Joint Statement of the Catholic Hierarchy on the Religious Instruction Bill" (6 June 1965) they branded those opposing this legislation as "enemies of the church" who had imputed to the hierarchy "the lowest motives and resurrecting the long dead anticlerical shibboleths and fabrications that have been their stock in trade for more than half a century." This time, however, the bishops were less successful in their lobby and the legislation was not passed.

The church also publicly opposed attempts by the Philippine House of Representatives in the late fifties to enact legislation which would prohibit individuals who are not natural born Filipinos from assuming positions as heads of schools, colleges, and universities. Among the reasons given were to avoid communist infiltration in education, and to ensure that nationalism will be inculcated properly in these institutions. The bishops, in their "Statement of the Philippine Hierarchy on the Nationalization of Schools" (28 January 1959) raised an outcry against the proposed legislation. They pointed out that the majority of private schools in the country are run by religious orders and congregations, with many of them still having foreign born heads and superiors in these schools. This protest was again raised in the "Statement of the Catholic Hierarchy of the Philippines on Nationalism" (3 December 1959). Subsequently, the bishops were able to block the passage of this particular law.

The attempts of the bishops to regulate the influx of perceived anti-Catholic and Mason-influenced works relating to Rizal have been cited already. All in all, these and the other aforementioned efforts hearkened back to a time when public education was high in what Burns calls the "hierarchy of issues" of the Catholic Church. Once again, this did not bode well for the Catholic Church's dialogue as a public religion with secular society.

Facing social and political realities

One major area of concern which preoccupied the bishops during this period is the various social and political realities that were dominant during the day. Beginning in 1948 with the "Statement of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy of the Philippines on the Social Principles" (20 January 1948) and later in extensive pronouncements on justice ("Joint Pastoral Letter of the Hierarchy of the Philippines on the Virtue of Justice" [22 January 1949]; "Social Justice: A Joint Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Bishops of the Philippines" [21 May

1949) the bishops would set the tenor for successive pronouncements on social issues by relying heavily on social doctrine as enunciated by the various popes in the “social encyclicals” starting with Leo XIII in 1891. In these and subsequent statements, the bishops would enunciate traditional elements of Catholic social teaching such as social justice, the universal purpose of goods, fair labor practices, among others in the face of the deepening “social problem” of poverty and inequality in the country.

Aside from commenting on the general social problem, the bishops would also employ traditional social doctrine in commenting on the conduct of Philippine elections. Starting with the “Joint Statement of the Philippine Catholic Hierarchy on Electoral Right of Catholics” (2 October 1951), the Philippine bishops have constantly stressed the obligation of Catholics as good citizens to vote, stressing that “The norm for judging a man worthy of your support is the true interests of God, of the church and the state.” This obligation would be emphasized repeatedly, notably in “Circular Letter of the Administrative Council of the Catholic Welfare Organization on Elections” (1 November 1955), and again in the “Joint Statement of the Catholic Hierarchy of the Philippines on the Eve of the National Elections of 1957” (11 October 1957). In the latter, the bishops also takes pains to reiterate that the Philippine Catholic Church is not out to influence election results through partisan politics.

One constant refrain which weaves through these and more specific pronouncements is the condemnation of Communism. In the already cited documents on the social problem, elections, and also on nationalism, the faithful are constantly alerted to the basic irreconcilability of the faith to Communist tenets. These are tempered, however, by warnings especially in the “Statement of the Administrative Council of the Catholic Welfare Organization (CWO) on the Accusations of Being Communists” (6 July 1954) that efforts against Communism should not deteriorate into “witch hunting.”

With the exception of pointing out the menace of Communism, the bishops’ sociopolitical pronouncements during this period are notable for their lack of specificity in pointing out particular problems, and the relative lack of sophistication in their analysis of societal realities and the formulation of possible solutions. For instance, the main facet of the social problem during these decades is that of agrarian unrest, with the HUKBALAHAP⁶ peasant rebellion raging in many rural areas, especially in the Northern Philippines, until the early fifties. Despite this problem, there is no in-depth analysis of

the agrarian problem or advocacy of the obvious solution (agrarian reform) in the bishops' statements. Also, with regard to the electoral exercises, there is no attempt to point out the obvious problem of "turncoatism" that plagued the political parties during this time. Whatever concrete action towards the resolution of the problem was seen as part of Catholic Action, that is, as an undertaking of the Catholic Church primarily in the spiritual realm, as evidenced in the "Preliminary Draft of the Episcopal Statement on Social Action" (1957). Embarrassingly, at times the hierarchy simply contradicted its own teaching, most notably its condemnation of the strike conducted by workers of the pontifical University of Santo Tomas (ref "Statement of the Catholic Hierarchy of the Philippines on the U.S.T. Strike" [13 March 1956]), despite constant exhortations in other pastoral letters on the respect of workers' rights (Fabros 1988: 66-81).

The lack of specificity mentioned above becomes problematic when placed side by side with the very concrete manner the hierarchy has dealt with perceived threats in the area of evangelization (against Masons and Protestants), and in protecting church interests in education during this period. Whether intentionally or not, the Catholic hierarchy seems to be communicating a restorationist agenda, aspiring for old powers and the privileged place it once held within the ideological structure.

1966 to 1982: Transitions

This second period encompasses the unrest in Philippine society in the late sixties caused by continuing severe poverty and Communist gains and the subsequent declaration of Martial Law by President Ferdinand Marcos. This can also be described as a time of transitions. The hierarchy, flush from the new perspectives gained from the Second Vatican Council, began to take more incisive views of social and political realities. On the other hand, the Philippine Church also struggled with a new reality: a government that was proving to be dictatorial and authoritarian, and the choice of critical collaboration with or opposition to such a government.

A new social analysis

The bishops' "Joint Pastoral Letter of the Philippine Hierarchy on Social Action and Rural Development" (8 January 1967) was a groundbreaking one in that it integrated the new form of "social analysis" popularized by the recently concluded Vatican II council. Utilizing a "signs of the times" methodology in analyzing Philippine society, the hierarchy pinpointed much

more exactly now the area of rural development as the crux of the nation's social ills. Furthermore, the bishops end up advocating solutions apart from those emanating from church groups, organizations, and Catholic action: the organization of rural workers, the formation of cooperatives and credit unions, and the strengthening of government social subsidies and social security measures.

This statement marks a turning of the corner in that from hereon the pastoral letters of what had become the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) would grow in sophistication in the tools of analysis employed and in the solutions prescribed. For instance, in the "Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Hierarchy of the Philippines on Evangelization and Development" (4 July 1973), the CBCP would have a very indepth analysis of developmental problems in the Philippines not found in previous statements. The same direct manner can be found in pronouncements on various issues. In the press statement "Urgent Appeal for Electoral Reforms" (1971), the CBCP supported the Philippine Commission on Elections in its lobby to have Congress pass several crucial electoral reform bills. In the "Statement on Drug Abuse" (29 January 1972), the bishops lend their voices to give recommendations on the drug menace. On the other hand, in the area of education, the bishops deliver a more toned down message, with their statements "On the Apostolate of Christian Education" (31 January 1976) and "Education for Justice" (14 September 1978) addressed specifically to Catholic schools and educators, not to the public school system.

Dealing with martial law

The main challenge dealt with by the bishops during this period was the declaration of Martial Law by President Marcos on 21 September 1972. By the end of the sixties, poverty in the country had reached all-time lows, prompting a resurgence of the Communist insurgency in the countryside. Student demonstrators had taken to the streets, and unrest was brewing not just in the remote provinces but also in the urban centers. In response, Marcos declared Martial Law, dissolving the legislature and imprisoning key leaders of the political opposition. Marcos then set about implementing his "New Society" program, which promised the establishment of law and order, the alleviation of poverty, the restoration of democratic structures, and once these were in place, the lifting of Martial Law. As it turned out, however, Martial Law would remain in place until 1980, and many of the problems that it promised to alleviate would only take a turn for the worse.

Through all this, the clear stance of the Catholic Church through the hierarchy was, as Hanson (1987: 254) points out, a restrained one, approving Marcos' measures while decrying potential abuses, and thus implying critical collaboration. Beginning with the "Statement of the CBCP Administrative Council on Martial Law" (26 September 1972), the bishops would take this guarded stance of affirming the reasons given for declaring Martial Law while cautioning against human rights violations.

The same attitude will be evident in other statements by the Catholic hierarchy during the Martial Law period, especially during various plebiscites called by the Marcos administration (in 1973, 1975, and 1976) to consult the populace on the continuation of Martial Law. For these plebiscites, the bishops basically exhorted all citizens to offer their critical participation. The same encouragement towards critical participation was given by the bishops during the 1978 election for members of the legislature even as many leading candidates who ran for this election were imprisoned or in exile. While the bishops were not exactly supporting Martial Law overtly, it is evident that the Catholic hierarchy was not yet ready to confront the Marcos regime for its authoritarian conduct, the abuses of which would become clear once Marcos was ousted in 1986. This stance of critical collaboration was not shared by other members of the Catholic Church, however, with not a few priests and religious adopting the Communist cause (Fabros 1988: 175-176) or other less contentious forms of dissent.⁷ It would take the tumultuous events of the early eighties to galvanize the hierarchy and the rest of the Catholic Church against the Marcos regime.

1983 to 2000: Public religion

The beginning of the end for the Marcos regime started in 1983, with the assassination of ex-senator Benigno Aquino, Jr., the leading opposition leader. Aquino was shot upon his arrival from exile in the United States, and his death brought to a boil the opposition against Marcos and the military abuses, corruption, and economic hardships that were associated with his regime. Bowing to popular pressure, Marcos called "snap" presidential elections in 1986, running against Aquino's widow, Corazon Cojuangco Aquino. Marcos was declared winner despite allegations of massive cheating, leading to a civil disobedience campaign and a failed military coup attempt. In the peaceful "People Power" uprising that followed, Corazon Aquino was swept into power and Marcos forced into exile in Hawaii (ref Mercado 1987).

With these developments the stage was set for the Catholic Church to take on fully its role as public religion. The period starting from 1983 up to this writing has perhaps been the most productive time in the CBCP's history. During this period, the bishops have exercised their pastoral and teaching authority on a wide range of issues in behalf of a public religion, cognizant of its limited powers within the secular sphere.

Assessing the snap elections

After the assassination of Benigno Aquino, a number of CBCP statements became more and more critical of the Marcos administration, which the bishops scored for suppressing basic freedoms. The most ringing condemnation of the Marcos regime came, however, after the presidential elections of 1986. Confronted with evidence of massive electoral cheating, the bishops issued their now famous "Post Election Statement" (13 February 1986). In this statement, the bishops declared the elections invalid because of many irregularities, and declared in no uncertain terms that "a government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis." This statement contributed immensely to the impetus leading to the ousting of Marcos.⁸ And although the CBCP was unable to convene once again by the time the People Power revolution broke out, individual prelates (led by Archbishop of Manila Jaime Cardinal Sin) called on all Catholics to mobilize in support of the peaceful revolution.

The precedent has thus been set for the Philippine Catholic Church as a public religion confronting authoritarianism. The bishops would take on the same public role once again, most notably in 1997 with their "Pastoral Statement on Charter Change" (20 March 1997). Here the bishops condemn attempts made by President Fidel Ramos to pursue amendments to the Constitution which could have extended his term. The bishops also mobilized the faithful against this charter change initiative, leading to some of the biggest demonstrations since the 1986 peaceful revolution.

On politics, economy, and culture

There have also been numerous occasions in which the bishops have taken on the public role of commenting on what Casanova has termed the lawful autonomy of institutions or systems in the secular sphere, questioning their moral basis (Casanova 1994: 57). This is in continuity with the approach ushered in by Vatican II, which entails a systematic analysis of the "signs of the times."

The most notable example of these are the pastoral exhortations on Philippine society issued by the bishops in preparation for the celebration of the Christianity's jubilee year 2000. From 1997 to 1999, the bishops issued annual letters, first on politics, next on the economy, and finally on culture. These pastoral exhortations on Philippine politics, economy, and culture were truly epic in scope, written after much consultation and research, and representing the most detailed and exhaustive pastoral analysis yet of Philippine societal ills. These exhortations were issued not so much to espouse a particular economic or political program, but to emphasize the importance of justice, equity, and other values in the economic, political, and cultural order – an acknowledgement, again, of Catholicism's new role within the prevailing ideological structure.

CONCLUSION

Looking then at the influence of the Philippines' colonial past on the episcopate's confrontation of various societal issues, it is evident that the long period of conquest under Spain, and later under the Americans made the Philippine bishops reckon for many years with its lost power and with concerns (e.g. education, evangelization) high in its hierarchy of issues. Only in the seventies, with the onset of the Marcos regime, would the bishops become increasingly focused on the abuses of an authoritarian regime, although even this would be gradual in its unfolding. While one may argue that the slow but eventual "conscientization" of the Philippine hierarchy received much impetus because of the forces of change unleashed within the Catholic Church by the Second Vatican Council, it is clear from the content of the bishops' pronouncements from the mid-forties to the late sixties that a restorationist agenda was at work.

How does the trajectory followed by the Philippine bishops' compare with the experience of other formerly colonized countries where the Catholic episcopacy would eventually adopt progressive and activist stance. Hanson (1987: 253-254) notes that in Brazil, Chile, and the Philippines, the onset of authoritarianism in the sixties and seventies was met with reserved judgments by the hierarchy which would lend some moral legitimacy to what would later be harsh and abusive regimes. What this case study of the Philippines has shown, however, is that the "delay" in confronting authoritarianism can at least be partly attributable to vested interests in a colonial past. Whether the same can be said of Brazil, Chile, and other nations with similar experiences is a fruitful area of inquiry. In both Brazil and Chile, for example,

the *Patronato Real* (*Padroado* in the case of Brazil) was passed on from Spain to the new sovereign state upon independence, and initially at least there was none of the anticlerical rhetoric experienced in the Philippines. Only later when religious freedom would be a political issue (in Chile) and Rome would assert its power (over the Brazilian Catholic Church) would state-church conflicts erupt (LCCS 1998). What effect these conflicts had on the pronouncements of local Catholic hierarchies in the intervening period – from the assault on traditional Church authority to the onset of authoritarian regimes in the latter half of the twentieth century, can be the subject of future research.

More than forty years ago, Carroll (1969) described the Catholic Church in the Philippines as working in an “unfinished society.” Similarly, the transformation of Philippine Catholicism is an unfinished process. In 2001 for instance, the bishops took up the cudgels once again, publicly condemning the corrupt leadership of President Joseph Estrada, leading to his ousting in a second peaceful revolution and the swearing in of Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. As with 1986, it was a concerted effort, with the Catholic Church joining forces with the judiciary, the military, people’s and non-government organizations, as well as other religious denominations. Through these and other events within the arena of civil society, the character of Philippine Catholicism as a public religion serving as a wellspring of disruptive activism within a changed ideological structure will continue to be formed.

POSTSCRIPT

The ideas for this article were consolidated under the shadow of the passing of a great Philippine bishop and anthropologist, Francisco F. Claver, S.J. (1929-2010). As the acknowledged author of the “Post-Election Statement of 1986” cited above, Bishop Claver played a crucial role in the Philippine Church’s engagement of social and political realities. As both scholar and leader, his words and deeds spoke to the highest ideals of justice, development, and peace. His life is a testament to how the social sciences are ultimately at the service of societal transformation. To him, this work is humbly dedicated.

NOTES

- 1 This paper was first publicly presented at the North Central Sociological Association convention in Indianapolis, Indiana, 23 March 2006.
- 2 The author would like to acknowledge Dr. Kevin Christiano (University of Notre Dame) and Dr. David Yamane (Wake Forest University) for their invaluable comments and suggestions for this paper.
- 3 An administrative unit for the purpose of exacting tribute, under the supervision of the encomendero, who in turn has to protect the people and support missionaries under his jurisdiction (ref Constantino, 1975: 43-44).
- 4 In referring to the various Philippine bishops' documents, the title and exact date of issuance of the statement will be provided whenever possible. The complete set of Philippine bishops' statements from 1945 to 2000 can be found in <http://www.cbconline.org/documents>. A more limited collection of recent Philippine bishops' statements is in Josol's Responses to the Signs of the Times (1991).
- 5 This was the designation of the official organization of the hierarchy at that time. In 1968, there would be modifications in the bishops' organization, giving rise to the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP).
- 6 Known as "Huks" for short, the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon or People's Anti-Japanese Army was a guerilla group active during World War II. After the war they refused to disband, carrying on the struggle in search of redress for peasant agrarian grievances. Coming under the influence of Communism, they would be defeated in 1952, but would be resurgent again in the late sixties (de la Costa, 1965: 291-294; Fabros, 1988: 125).
- 7 In an interesting study, Barry focuses on how many Filipino female religious in this Martial Law period adopted a unique "religious language" culled from both political education and psycho-spiritual inputs, allowing them to emerge from their traditional "docile" mode to become among the most outspoken critics of the Marcos regime (1996: 264-303).
- 8 Hanson (1987: 331) notes how First Lady Imelda Marcos herself implored the two leading Philippine prelates, Ricardo Cardinal Vidal and Jaime Cardinal Sin to prevent the release of the letter, but to no avail. Jaime Cardinal Sin was an especially forceful leader during this crisis, enjoying as Hanson points out the personal trust of Pope John Paul II and saving the United States from "an immediate diplomatic debacle" (1987: 340).

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On Deviance and Loving Nature: A Case Study of the Ecological Activism of Greenpeace Philippines

Maria Khristine O. Alvarez

This paper examines notions of deviance by looking at the strategy of direct action employed by Greenpeace Philippines in its environmental activism. The environmental movement is often considered a more peaceful social movement. However, in the West, where direct actions by radical ecological grassroots movements are sometimes violent, environmental activism has come to be synonymous with eco-terrorism. While the methods employed by Greenpeace are always nonviolent, this deviant identification is nevertheless retained. Such a stigma is prevalent mainly in North America and Western Europe, but has not been as readily extended to Greenpeace Philippines. This paper shows how the organization has actually been repeatedly forgiven for its deviant direct actions, as evinced, for instance, by the rarity of legal action filed against Green Peace Philippines and its activists. This research in progress puts forward a more positive understanding of deviance – as an expression of agency and a concrete manifestation of love for nature. As a strategy, deviance has been crucial to the transformative character of Greenpeace as an organization.

Keywords: agrarian reform, social movement organizations, collective action theory and nonviolent direct action

“...We must not say that an action shocks the conscience collective because it is criminal, but rather that it is criminal because it shocks the conscience collective. We do not condemn it because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we condemn it.”

Emile Durkheim, 1893/ 1947

In June 2008, six Greenpeace activists in the United Kingdom were brought to court for allegedly causing GBP 30,000 worth of property damage to the Kingsnorth coal power station. They had painted on the property's chimney and temporarily shut down the station to protest plans of building a successor to the plant and to signify the ignored threat of global warming. Only two days later, the Kingsnorth Six, as the activists were subsequently known, were acquitted by the jury, effectively upholding the defense of "lawful excuse," and conferring legitimacy to an otherwise illegal direct action undertaken in good faith and in the interest of the public good (Greenpeace International 2008).

The not-guilty verdict may be an early signifier of a changing ethic that decriminalizes traditional notions of deviant behavior carried out for a larger social good. Deviance, in this context, facilitates the "clarification... of ambiguities" (Rock 2002: 69) or the re-evaluation of society's idea of crime – as in what constitutes crime and what makes an otherwise illegal act excusable. In this instance, crime may be perceived as "system-threatening" (Rock 2002: 70) in that it threatens to reconfigure, not only the notion of "lawful excuse," but of crime in general. But as in the case of Greenpeace Philippines, where there is no incident of acquittal to concretely indicate the reconsideration of the notions of crime and lawful excuse, this changing ethic may be measured in terms of the extent to which they are forgiven for engaging in direct actions that, though always nonviolent, are nevertheless perceived as deviant and often in contravention of the law.

As such, this paper (1) interrogates the extent to which Greenpeace Philippines is forgiven for engaging in deviant acts in their various campaigns, (2) attempts to explore the link between loving nature and deviance, and (3) examines the organization's transformative character. In this study, I traced the history of Greenpeace, located the idea and practice of *direct action* in the organization's core value of *bearing witness*, and discussed its evolution as an "icon" of the environmental movement (Zelko 2004: 127). I also extended David Aberle's classification of social movements to social movement organizations (SMOs), and showed how Greenpeace is of the transformative kind. I then proceeded to discuss the habitual violation of the legal assembly, anti-trespassing, and anti-vandalism laws as a requisite to the success and authenticity of every direct action. Likewise, I explored the legal troubles that confront Greenpeace activists, and, using Edwin Lemert's labelling theory, examined the extent to which Greenpeace Philippines' unlawful acts are forgiven by law enforcement authorities. In closing, I

considered how the noble endeavor of loving nature has come to be labelled *deviant*.

GREENPEACE: THE EARLY YEARS

Greenpeace is an independent international environmental campaigning organization “that acts to change attitudes and behavior to protect and conserve the environment and to promote peace” (Greenpeace International, n.d.). It uses research, lobbying, creative communication, and nonviolent direct action (NVDA) “to expose global environmental problems and to promote solutions that are essential to a green and peaceful future” (Greenpeace USA, n.d.).

Greenpeace’s roots may be traced to the *Don’t Make a Wave* Committee, a group¹ formed in 1969 by Quaker-influenced antinuke and antiwar activist-ecologists, whose sole objective was to stop the nuclear bomb testing on Amchitka Island, Alaska, scheduled in the fall of 1971.² The founders’ commitment to the Quaker tradition of *bearing witness* (peaceful protest) culminated in the sensational voyage of the *Greenpeace*,³ a chartered fishing boat, from Vancouver to Amchitka on 15 September 1971 (Weyler 2007). However, the plan to sail right into the testing zone to prevent the detonation of the nuclear bomb was frustrated by the news that President Nixon had moved the test to a later date. With their mission now off course, the crew decided to head to the port of Akutan Island to discuss their next steps (Mulvaney 2007). They had just docked when the United States Coast Guard arrested them for illegal landfall and escorted them back to Sand Point, where they were fined and subsequently released⁴ (Weyler 2007). It was there that the activists learned, not only about the media buzz surrounding their voyage, but also of the accumulation of public dissent, and the escalation of protests in major Canadian cities (Weyler 2007).

The groundswell of support eventually led to a second attempt to sail to Amchitka to obstruct the rescheduled test, but only after the *Greenpeace*, whose lease expired at the end of October, headed back to Vancouver (Weyler 2007), and the committee had chartered a bigger and faster support vessel they called *Greenpeace Too* (C. Baclagon, personal communication, August 2010 and Weyler 2007). The activists never reached the island, and the test proceeded as planned. On 6 November 1971, the US government conducted “the largest underground nuclear explosion in American history” (Weyler 2004: 59) with the detonation of the Cannikin, a 5-megaton nuclear bomb

1791 meters below sea level (Powers 2005). When the bomb was dropped and protests soared, nuclear testing on the island ended,⁵ and Amchitka was later on declared a bird sanctuary (Greenpeace USA n.d.). The voyages were successful.

THE EVOLUTION OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION

The political capital that the Amchitka campaign amassed resonated deeply with the activists that they decided to pursue the antinukes campaign on a global scale. In January 1972, the group made a protest to demand the inclusion of nuclear testing on the agenda of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment scheduled that summer. It was around this time that the activists decided to call themselves *The World Greenpeace Foundation*. Four months later, on 2 May 1972, they officially adopted the name, *Greenpeace Foundation* (Weyler 2007).

Greenpeace continued to champion the antinukes campaign.⁶ It was, after all, the organization's only focus until 1973, when it took up the antiwhaling cause (Weyler n.d.). Though Greenpeace activists were all ecologists in their own right, Dr. Paul Spong, a brain scientist who studied whales and advocated their protection and the release of captives into the wild, had a difficult time convincing the group that getting involved with the whales was worth it. This is especially curious when one considers the group's commitment to nonviolence, and the belief of some of its founders in the interrelatedness of all life forms and the role of the individual as "custodian of the earth."⁷ Bob Hunter—who, from the start, was not particularly adamant to Spong's proposition—helped him convince the group to adopt his cause after having personally experienced the remarkable intelligence and sensitivity of Skana, the orca Spong worked with, and the first captive whale at the Vancouver Aquarium (Weyler 2007).

Spong's entry to the organization put the *green* in *Greenpeace*. His idea of consciousness as "a quality of nature" encouraged the group to "look beyond the purely human realm," (Weyler 2007) and understand ecology from a "biocentric" perspective (Zelko 2004:130). In April 1975, Greenpeace launched its first antiwhaling campaign.⁸ A year later, it took up the antiseal hunting cause.

By 1977, 15-20 Greenpeace groups had emerged across the globe, acting independently of each other. By 1978, Greenpeace had won its battles: nuclear testing in the South Pacific had ended; a moratorium on pelagic

whaling was granted; and the Canadian Seal Hunt was halted (Weyler 2007). Successful campaigns meant that the group could now turn their attention to growing organizational problems.

Greenpeace was, at this point, threatened by debt, rivalries, splinter groups,⁹ and fraud.¹⁰ Though the headquarters had, from time to time, managed to obtain money to pay off loans and other liabilities (Weyler 2007), by 1978 it had accumulated so much debt from years of little financial administration amidst fervent campaigning that it became financially dependent on the wealthier San Francisco office to subsidize its important campaigns (Zelko 2004). When the Vancouver office drafted an affiliation contract and held meetings to create an international constitution in 1979, the San Francisco chapter, whose representative demanded autonomy, protested and walked out of the negotiations, prompting the Vancouver office to sue the San Francisco division to protect the Greenpeace trademark (Weyler 2007). Tense relations between the Vancouver and San Francisco offices led to the relocation of the Greenpeace headquarters to Amsterdam,¹¹ and the establishment of *Greenpeace International* on 14 October 1979¹² (Weyler 2007).

Over the years, Greenpeace International would establish a global presence in 42 countries.¹³ From a loosely knit, flat organization, Greenpeace developed “a complex hierarchical structure with multiple administrative bodies” located in regional offices around the world (Zelko 2004: 128). Greenpeace International facilitates the “development and coordination... of global campaign strategies,” “coordinates worldwide campaigns,” and oversees the development and performance of its satellite offices. It also performs a host of administrative functions, such as providing financial support to its branches, drafting financial forecasts for the entire organization, setting up new offices, maintaining contact with supporters and donors in countries where Greenpeace does not have offices, overseeing the maintenance of its ships, and guarding the Greenpeace trademark (Greenpeace International 2008).

Decision making processes at the international level are said to be consultative (Greenpeace International 2008), but national and regional offices have very minimal leeway in taking up local issues that are outside the scope of the global framework on which the organization’s campaign is based: renewable energy, oceans, forests, disarmament and peace, toxics, and sustainable agriculture. Pursuing pertinent local issues that Greenpeace

International does not have an official stand on thereby entails tying these to existing programs.¹⁴ The developments following the consolidation of offices under an international office paved the way for the transformation of Greenpeace from just a part of the broader antiwar and later on, ecological movement to that of a social movement organization (SMO) advocating “a green peace.”¹⁵ Traversing both categories has been particularly helpful in cementing the organization’s position in the ecological movement so that it is, today, the movement’s “great icon” (Zelko 2004: 127). Whatever status Greenpeace occupies at present owes much to its consolidation into a global entity as to its campaign strategies, particularly the *media mindbomb*, or the use of “consciousness-changing sounds and images to blast around the world in the guise of news” (Greenpeace USA 2005). It seems doubtful that Greenpeace would achieve the fame and influence it now enjoys had it not consolidated. While local chapters under a loosely controlled Greenpeace would indeed adopt the campaign strategies that the Vancouver office had pioneered and that had captured the minds of people, lack of cohesion of worldwide campaigns and campaign strategies would not permit the same level of success. Focus, consistency, and cohesion are equally decisive factors that helped catapult Greenpeace to its current iconic status.

ABERLE’S CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

While many classifications of social movements exist, David Aberle’s (1966) is particularly interesting as it interrogates the concept of *change* – a constant feature of proactive social movements. Aberle bases his typology (Figure 1) on two dimensions: the *locus* and the *amount* of change sought. Locus pertains to the site or the subject of change, which may be on the individual or supra-individual level, while amount refers to the scope of change, which may be partial or total (1966: 316).

Figure 1. A Classification of Social Movements

	Locus of change	
	<i>Supra-individual</i>	<i>Individual</i>
Amount of change		
<i>Total</i>	Transformative	Redemptive
<i>Partial</i>	Reformative	Alterative

At the locus of the individual, movements that seek partial change are alterative, while those that work towards total change are redemptive. At the supra-individual level, those that endeavor only a partial change are reformative, and those that aim for a total change are transformative (Aberle 1966).

While this classification is particular to social movements in general, no explicit proscription exists as to its application to social movement organizations (SMOs). Likewise, there is no fundamental difference between social movements and SMOs that would invalidate or render the adaptation incommensurate, hence the extension of the typology to the latter category.

A TRANSFORMATIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENT

When Greenpeace says it “acts to change attitudes and behaviors” (Greenpeace International, n.d.), it pertains to governments, intergovernmental organizations, international financial institutions, corporations, and individuals (B. Baconguis, personal communication, August 2010). It means changing governments and intergovernmental organizations’ destructive and unsound environmental policies,¹⁶ corporations’ unfavorable environmental, and unsustainable business, practices, and individuals’ resource consumption and involvement in environmental issues.¹⁷ Thus, while Greenpeace is understood, foremost, as a reformative organization, it is in fact transformative as it aims to change society’s attitudes and behaviors towards the environment.

Although Greenpeace does not endeavor to alter structures in government the way some transformative social movements do, it nevertheless intervenes in issues that heavily impinge on the way government conducts business or organizes the economy. Energy, for instance, determines the functioning of economies. Unprecedented economic growth since the Industrial Revolution has been built on, and is currently sustained by, cheap energy sources such as coal, oil, and gas. Greenpeace’s *Energy [R]evolution* roadmap, which demands the replacement of ecologically harmful fossil fuels and nuclear power with renewable energy¹⁸ and energy efficiency, threatens the massive infrastructure of the global cheap energy industry on which entire economies are organized. But governments are reluctant, not only because of the substantial investments it entails at the expense of already existing expensive infrastructure, but more importantly, because of the framework’s restrictions on economic growth. As the renewable energy campaign is inextricably tied to the climate change problem, it has the intended effect of cutting down carbon emissions¹⁹ on a global scale. This translates into a 40

percent cut on 1990 carbon emission levels by 2020 for developed countries, and a 15-30 percent decline in emissions growth by 2020 for developing countries, carried out with the support of industrialized nations (Greenpeace International n.d.). One can only imagine what kind of economy that would be.

But whether or not what emerges approximates, or is in fact, a *steady state economy* (Daly 1991), is not the question. The fact of the matter and the point of interest is that Greenpeace's vision of "a green and peaceful future" (Greenpeace International, n.d.) involves drastic changes in the economic order – changes that are a tad too revolutionary for a mainstream organization that scholars like Frank Zelko (2004: 128) consider part of the "environmental establishment." So while it never points to *capitalism* as the culprit of environmental crises, Greenpeace's perpetual attacks on corporations and its endless barrage of criticisms against corporate extraction, production, distribution, consumption, and disposal practices, are in fact, tacit attempts to transform the entire materials economy.

Thus, while Greenpeace may seem reformative because of its emphasis on legislation and policy, its demands are nothing short of multifarious. Its reformative image is in fact strategic, as one of the most effective, albeit gradual ways of approximating the transformative change it desires is by gradually and surreptitiously instituting reforms.

NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION

Though Greenpeace's practice of nonviolent direct action (NVDA) was inspired by the post-World War II American radical pacifism (Zelko 2004) and influenced by Mahatma Gandhi's teachings of nonviolent resistance (*Satyagraha*), it is in fact rooted in the Quaker tradition of peaceful protest. The founders' rootedness in the principle of active nonviolence consolidated the role of nonviolent direct action in the organization's work, so much so that it has become a cornerstone philosophy. So while Greenpeace engages in more conventional ways of campaigning, such as research, education, and quiet diplomacy, and asserts that direct action is but a minor component of their activities, it has nevertheless built its reputation around its often dramatic, outrageous, unorthodox, yet peaceful modes of protest.

Greenpeace's core value of "bearing witness" to environmental destruction (Greenpeace SEA n.d.), or exposing environmental crime as it happens, is inextricably linked to direct action. Exposing environmental

injustice as it unfolds is not sufficient, especially when one has the means to oppose the crime and prevent it from happening (C. Baclagon, personal communication, October 2009). To bear witness, therefore, is to take action. Bearing witness to an injustice demands action as it holds the bearer “morally accountable” to act on it (C. Baclagon, personal communication, October 2009).

The ethic of moral responsibility and the assertion of human agency partly explain the resonance of direct action despite it being a mere recourse when political pressure or negotiations fail (Greenpeace Australia Pacific n.d.). But its prevalence is perhaps more indicative of the ineffectiveness and inadequacy of traversing official and traditional channels of communication. Nonviolent direct action then, in the words of peace advocate, Martin Luther King (1963), forces a community to confront an issue that is constantly ignored by creating crisis and tension. Thus, the intent to shock the sensibilities of society and provoke the collective consciousness to demand action on exigent yet ignored issues is ever present in every nonviolent direct action. The drama, humor, and madness in every performance help win over the public when facts do not (Weyler 2004).

Inspired by Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) idea that the medium is the message, Bob Hunter, one of Greenpeace’s founders, developed the concept of the *media mindbomb*. Conjuring up powerful images to mirror creative expressions of peaceful dissent is therefore embedded in Hunter’s idea of a storming of the mind that would transform public perception (Hunter 1971), and so is the notion that the participants themselves become the media, though the latter in particular, would later on be supplanted by mass media invitations to direct actions to create a more theatrical spectacle. This approach of making powerful statements and transmitting them has since informed the conduct of Greenpeace’s direct actions. Such process is crucial since the social visibility of deviation compels reaction. Indeed, the deviant act itself is not the sole or “direct determiner” of societal reaction (Lemert 1951: 53). Edwin Lemert’s ideas on the social visibility of deviation, and how societal reaction reciprocates “in intensity the degree, amount, and visibility of the deviation” (Lemert 1951: 54) is an important consideration for an organization that aims for the creation of *mindbombs*.

DIRECT ACTIONS OF GREENPEACE PHILIPPINES

Greenpeace Southeast Asia, of which the Philippine office is part, was officially established on 1 March 2000 with a particular mission to “safeguard

environmental rights, expose and stop environmental crimes, and advance clean development” Bottom of Form (Greenpeace Southeast Asia n.d.). In the Philippines, Greenpeace’s work is structured around four campaigns: (1) climate change mitigation and adoption of clean, renewable, and sustainable energy; (2) genetic engineering ban; (3) toxics elimination; and (4) ancient forest protection (Greenpeace Southeast Asia n.d.).

Since its establishment, Greenpeace Philippines has engaged in a number of non-hostile direct actions that include picketing, peaceful demonstration, silent protest, sit-down, stand-in, delivery of symbolic objects, return-to-sender, trespassing, nonviolent occupation, nonviolent obstruction, and blockade. While banner hangs and sign posts technically fall under direct communication—a strategy which, as the name suggests, involves directly communicating to the target audience the action Greenpeace demands of them—they are however, often used as “tools for intervention,” or as supplements to direct actions (C. Baclagon, personal communication, April 2010). In such cases, these types of direct communication become direct actions. In becoming so, they blur the divide between direct communication and direct action. Banner hangs and sign posts in fact lend drama to trespassing, where breaking into the facilities of any target is not the ultimate goal, but is instead a necessary undertaking for the completion of a certain direct action such as an occupation.

Greenpeace’s nonviolent direct actions are more often than not, carried out in the premises of those they identify as environmental criminals. Direct actions therefore require that participants gain entry to private property such as pollutive factories, logging sites, coal-fired power plants, government buildings, government-owned landfills, corporate headquarters, multinational corporations’ country offices, and international financial institutions’ regional headquarters, among others. Thus, no matter how peaceable an activity is, nonviolent direct action always entails the violation of The Public Assembly Act (Batas Pambansa Blg. 880) and the law against trespass to dwelling (Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code), since Greenpeace’s tradition of flashmobs or spontaneous protests organized in secret essentially ignores the requisites of legal assembly.

HABITUAL VIOLATION OF LAWS IS CRITICAL TO DIRECT ACTION

The habitual violation of the anti-trespassing and legal assembly laws, however, is critical to any direct action. It is worth considering that in order to be effective, and in order to advance the desired impact on the audience,

direct actions must be carried out in all their spontaneity. Moreover, no direct action requires permission, for it is the nature of direct action to surprise and arrest the consciousness of the audience. In fact, the very term, direct action, implies agency. The concept of obtaining permission is so extraneous to direct action that it betrays its essence, as direct action is “any action that sidesteps regulations, representatives, and authorities to accomplish goals directly” (CrimethInc. Workers’ Collective n.d.:12). Contravention of the law is therefore characteristic of direct action and even a requisite to achieve political goals that are repeatedly ignored and stunted – goals that are not attainable through official and conventional parameters.

Break the law only when necessary

However, breaking the law happens only when Greenpeace thinks “it is necessary” (C. Baclagon, personal communication, October 2009). This is why direct actions remain an option or a last recourse rather than standard procedure. They are not taken very lightly because Greenpeace respects the rule of law, as evinced by its faith in legislative mechanisms, and its appeal to conscientious enforcement of sound environmental laws and policies. Thus, contrary to popular belief, there is no wanton disregard of the law, as law-breaking is contingent on the organization’s analysis of the detrimental nature of the law, which, when established, justifies the violation in defense of the environment and in the interest of the public good. Direct action in contravention of the law is believed by Greenpeace activists to be justified only when it seeks to expose and act on an environmental crime that puts people, ecosystems, and other living things in harm’s way, and when official channels of communication had already been exhausted but had failed to produce just action. Through this we understand how fighting for a larger social good becomes a “lawful excuse” for carrying out direct actions that, regardless of their nonhostile nature, violate certain laws.

The risk of direct action

Risk is a fact of direct action. The illegal nature of Greenpeace’s direct actions, regardless of the absence of violence, certainly makes the participants vulnerable to legal trouble, even to violent attacks by their targets. To illustrate, on 21 July 2002, a warning shot was fired by a security guard of the Sual coal-fired power plant in Pangasinan as a threat to Greenpeace activists assembled in peaceful protest. On 10 November 2005, five of the twelve participants in the direct action at the state-owned Masinloc coal power plant

in Zambales, where activists unfurled “No More Coal” banners on the plant’s boilers, were violently beaten, pelted with stones, and repeatedly hit with a metal bar by the facility’s security personnel (Greenpeace International 2005). And on 23 August 2006, a Greenpeace activist was abducted and detained by the Philippine Navy for obtaining water samples from the mine mouth of the Australian-owned mining firm, Lafayette, on Rapu-Rapu Island (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2006).

But where there is no violence against Greenpeace Philippines, lawsuits have been filed against its activists. In 2000, 30 activists in the return-to-sender action that transported hazardous wastes from residential areas in Clark Air Base to the US Embassy were arrested by the police and prosecuted by the City of Manila. In 2002, biotech giant, Monsanto, filed a trespassing case against Greenpeace for hanging a banner on their building in Paranaque. In 2005, several activists were arrested for trespassing during the occupation of the Mirant country office, operators of the Sual and Pagbilao coal-fired power plants. And in the same year, police pressed charges against twelve foreign and local activists in the Masinloc action, to which Greenpeace responded with a countersuit before the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) for the violent attacks against five of its activists.

Most of the cases filed against the organization were initiated by private entities whose premises have been trespassed. The police or the local government do not actively file charges against Greenpeace except in extremely embarrassing and high profile cases such as the Masinloc Coal Power Plant and US Embassy direct actions. To date, no progress is known of the lawsuits that remain pending before the courts because legal matters, including those that pertain to the development of cases filed against the organization and its activists, are not divulged to nonconcerned personnel and volunteers. Only individuals and units involved in the campaign are advised of legal details.

THE CASE OF TOLERANCE AND FORGIVENESS

Greenpeace and corporations

It is not only the police that exhibit tolerance of Greenpeace’s direct actions. In some instances, lawsuits are not pursued by corporations and local governments, even those who are repeat targets such as the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), because direct actions are seen as opportunities for dialogue.

In August 2006, Lafayette threatened to file charges against Greenpeace for trespassing and sabotage (Mines and Communities 2006) after the environmental group's ship, MY Esperanza, led a flotilla, collected water samples, and unfurled a banner, on Lafayette Mine's conveyor belt to demand the stoppage of mining operations on Rapu-Rapu Island. Despite separate investigations by the government and by Greenpeace that corroborate the continuous release of extremely toxic chemicals into Albay Gulf, the Australian mine was allowed to reopen in July of that year – an event that served as an impetus for Greenpeace's direct action against Lafayette (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2006). Though staunchly supported by then Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee, the mining firm did not pursue the case as their financiers started withdrawing their funding (C. Baclagon, personal communication, October 2009).

Likewise, no charges were pressed against Greenpeace for occupying the front of the main building of the Department of Agriculture in Quezon City to denounce the use of genetically modified Bt Corn by Monsanto (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2007), or for blocking and picketing at the exit gate of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) on 8 November 2005 to protest the financing of coal-fired power plants (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2005), and for once again protesting on its premises from 16-17 June 2009 during a high-level climate meeting (Baclagon 2009).

Similarly, no cases were filed against Greenpeace for holding a demonstration at the DENR compound in Quezon City on 14 June 2006 to protest Lafayette's polluting operations in Rapu-Rapu, Albay (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2006); for unfurling a banner in the same agency's main building on 10 August 2006 to object the conduct of a 30-day test run granted by the DENR to Lafayette (C. Baclagon, personal communication, October 2009); for dumping half a ton of charcoal at the entrance of the Department on 17 April 2008 to demand the immediate rejection of the plan to construct a coal-fired power plant in Iloilo City (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2008); and for blocking the entrance gate of the Department on 21 April 2009 to call attention to the continued issuance of Environmental Compliance Certificates (ECCs) to coal power plants, collectively responsible for a third of global carbon dioxide emissions (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2009).

Likewise, cases were not filed against Greenpeace for dumping two dozen sacks of charcoal at the entrance of the provincial capitol of Negros and for unfurling huge banners on the building's rooftop on 30 March 2001 to signify

their opposition to continuing efforts of constructing coal-fired power plants in the country (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2001). Charges were not pressed for occupying and labelling as *illegal* a one-hectare field of genetically-engineered Bt corn in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro on 10 May 2006 to protest the repeated and deliberate disregard of the province's ban on genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) [Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2006]; for blocking the entrance to the compound of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) in Taguig on 29 June 2006 to denounce PNOC's plans for a coal mine and mine-mouth power plant in Isabela – an action that eventually led to the withdrawal of the proposal (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2006).

Oil giant, Petron's threats to file a lawsuit against Greenpeace for publicly shaming the company and for delivering to its corporate headquarters a container drum of oil from the two-month old spill on Guimaras Island, did not materialize (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2006). On 11 October 2006, in an attempt to highlight the irresponsibility of Petron in retrieving the remaining bunker fuel that continued to spill out of MT Solar 1, two months after it sunk, Greenpeace volunteers dumped a barrel of collected split bunker fuel from the Guimaras oil spill on Petron's corporate headquarters in Makati. One week later, messages demanding Petron to "stop the spill" were projected on billboards along Metro Manila's main thoroughfares (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2006).

In Iloilo, several local government officials' attempts to call an investigation into the Greenpeace occupation of a future coal-fired power plant site in Barangay Ingore did not materialize (C. Baclagon, personal communication, October 2009). Furthermore, instead of pressing charges against the illegal entry and the blockade of Greenpeace Water Patrol activists at the 13-hectare dumpsite in Barangay Muzon, Taytay, Rizal on 23 June 2009 to demand the proper clean up of the waste facility, the municipality of Taytay pledged to adopt stringent procedures on dumpsite closure to avoid the release of toxics that threaten to contaminate water for 30 years (Greenpeace Southeast Asia 2009).

Greenpeace and the police

In its blockades and occupations, and its habitual trespassing and illegal assemblies, Greenpeace is more often than not, let off the hook. Except for the Masinloc incident where the local police were insistent on filing a case against activists despite the plant administration's disapproval, the police have generally been nonhostile to the group and disinterested in seeking

legal action. In fact, Beau Bacongus, Greenpeace Philippines Toxics Campaigner, reveals that some are sympathetic and even supportive of the group's cause. Such an uncommon relationship between protesters and the police is a product of the organization's liaison with the police force. Greenpeace is different from other social movement groups in that they actively engage law enforcement authorities in dialogue. Apart from having negotiators in every direct action to talk to police officers onsite and explain to them their action, Greenpeace had also set up a meeting with the Quezon City Police District officials to introduce the organization and talk about the purpose of their direct actions and other activities. The effort to arrive at an understanding, and the police force's firsthand experience with Greenpeace protestors, have been particularly instructive in creating a favorable image of the organization so much so that police do not even consider them activists (B. Bacongus, personal communication, August 2010).

Beyond informing the police's lenience with Greenpeace protestors, the label, "*hindi aktibista*" (not activist) (B. Bacongus, personal communication, August 2010) creates a chasm between Greenpeace protestors and all other activists, in which the latter is lumped into the violent or potentially dangerous category. Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward write that "the view of the mob as normless and dangerous" may be behind "the common but false association of lower-class protest with violence" (1977: 18). However, it is not only that view that informs such an association. The case of Greenpeace underscores the importance of history, particularly of law enforcers' experience with certain protestors. Poor people's protests are perceived negatively because of their history of violence. While many contemporary social movements have become less violent over the years, they have nevertheless retained their aggressive streak. The tone and the impression that a protest gives off are likewise important considerations. While other social movements may have retired from stone pelting, among other forms of mob attacks, the disgruntled cries and the copious insults hurled at their adversaries do not dispel the prospects of violence that law enforcement authorities are sensitive to.

RESPONSE TO DEVIANCE

Indeed, some forms of Greenpeace's nonviolent direct actions almost always compel aggrieved parties to threaten legal action. Most notable of this is trespassing on high security areas that are never open to the public, such as coal-fired power plants. When one looks at the experience of

Greenpeace in other countries, particularly in the United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark, and Thailand, the occupation of coal power plants and other facilities, regardless how short-lived, costs the activists lawsuits.

Then again, in the Philippines, not all instances of trespassing generate the same response, for there are those of the same nature where the deviant act was responded to with greater lenience. This echoes Lemert's theory on signification that "the degree to which other people will respond to a given act as deviant varies greatly" (Becker 1997: 12). This variation is apparent in the example of the occupation of the proposed site of a coal power plant in Iloilo, where the conflict was settled amicably because the direct action opened up the space for dialogue. Though not apparent to aggrieved parties, one of the reasons for engaging in direct action is to demand direct dialogue because past requests made through traditional and official channels had been ignored. Direct action is, in fact, used by Greenpeace to "raise the level and quality of public debate" (Greenpeace European Unit n.d.) on the issues they campaign for, but it has unfortunately been reduced to environmental terrorism.²⁰

Despite its habitual illegal assemblies, Greenpeace Philippines is seemingly tolerated by the police as its activists are hardly dispersed, much less arrested. But whatever tolerance the group enjoys could be understood in terms of the prestige that the name Greenpeace carries with it. It is not just any environmental organization – it is the most prominent one. It is not a nuisance, in the way that other environmentalist groups that engage in the same direct actions are conventionally thought of, because Greenpeace likewise traverses official channels, and therefore operates within the conventionally rational framework. Its somewhat radical²¹ strains and its quirky ways of exercising agency when all else fails do not alter the fact that it is a mainstream organization. And as in any organization operating within the formal system, Greenpeace seeks to "influence policy by talking to elected politicians and government officials either through official channels of communication or informally through personal contact" (Milton 2002: 133). It invokes national and international law to dispute "questionable decisions," conducts research and bases its statements on "respected scientific knowledge" (ibid.), and even employs celebrities to campaign for its causes. Thus, the reputation of Greenpeace and the way it projects itself as a prominent international environmental campaigning organization inform the more venerable treatment it receives from authorities despite its habitual violation of certain laws. Indeed, it is treated more favorably than local interest groups

that protest against the same issues and that violate the same laws. Greenpeace, in fact, enjoys the right, or perhaps more appropriately, the privilege, of maximum tolerance that is often denied of local groups that employ the same tactic of spontaneous action. Indeed, "consequences... flow from naming," and naming certainly "creates a self" (Rock 2002: 71).

Moreover, the apparent tolerance for some forms of Greenpeace's nonviolent direct action provides a space for testing the boundaries of permitted action (Covington 1999). We can then posit that direct actions carried out in the premises of highly guarded, secluded, or unfamiliar facilities, especially those of coal-fired power plants, are dealt with more decisively than direct actions carried out in other premises. The fact that reactions to Greenpeace's deviance range from indifference to strong disapproval (Lemert 1951) help us understand how direct action renegotiates the law (CrimethInc. Workers' Collective 2004). The re-evaluation of permissible action and "lawful excuse" extends the notion of deviance such that what brings actors into "public focus as deviants" is contingent on what they do or fail to do (Lemert 1951: 30). While such a notion of deviance does not appear to threaten to reconfigure the idea of crime in the Philippines, because of the absence of a concrete indicator such as the acquittal of the Kingsnorth Six in the United Kingdom, it nevertheless opens up the space for the exploration of more creative forms of dissent with maximum impact but minimum repercussion. Yet, the activists are unperturbed by the seeming re-definition of what is deviant because they do not consider direct action as such. This irrelevance gains more lucidity when the basis for the activists' actions involves a love of nature.

WHY TRULY LOVING NATURE ENTAILS DEVIANCE

Many environmental activists may take offense at the idea of labelling 'loving nature' *deviant*. However, it is not the author's intent to reproach such an endangered compassion, or to suggest the nonviolent environmentalism exercised by Greenpeace as a form of ecoterrorism. Instead, what is being argued is that loving nature is deviant because love can compel certain actions that are often unpopular.

The selflessness that shines through direct action is a signifier of the activist's love for the defended. Indeed, Greenpeace's direct actions are ultimately an expression of its activists' love for the environment. As a feeling that begs to be expressed, love gains personality in action, particularly in

direct action – in “cutting out the middleman” and taking an active role in defense of that which is held sacred. Loving nature then entails deviance because truly loving something requires one to fight for it and to constantly navigate mechanisms that make this defense possible when traditional channels are blocked, or when the defense itself is proscribed by law.

While Greenpeace’s mainstreaming has been particularly instructive in achieving its goals, it has, at the same time, left the organization struggling with its radical past. Then again, it cannot afford to cling to its previously radical image as it needs to nurture its reputation as a reliable environmental authority. The exigencies of loving nature do not only compel bold environmental action, but entail behaving like a mainstream organization because it is only through engaging the system and working within the system that it can win its battles. Shifting to renewable energy, for instance, cannot be facilitated without the support of the government and the compliance of the energy sector. Likewise, coal mines cannot be shut down by occupations and blockades alone. Apart from being sincere expressions of concern, the direct actions of Greenpeace are strategies to get their audience—usually governments, intergovernmental organizations, and corporations—to listen. Greenpeace can only agitate so much in the same way that direct action can only achieve so much. Ultimately, Greenpeace’s success relies on the powerbrokers in society. At the end of the day, the decision to change rests with supra-individual entities. So, becoming “part of the environmental establishment” (Zelko 2004: 128) is a necessity – an unfortunate compromise that is crucial to the achievement of the transformative change Greenpeace yearns for. While Greenpeace, today, is “not necessarily the kind of organization its founders had in mind” (ibid.), it nevertheless makes up for this disappointment by achieving what its founders had hoped for.

NOTES

- 1 The Don’t Make a Wave Committee was originally a committee of the Sierra Club British Columbia that had taken up “ad hoc status” when the organization refused to assume responsibility for the publicized plan to sail a boat to Amchitka and stop the nuclear testing. Despite this refusal, the Sierra Club supported the plan, and the group unanimously endorsed the action (Weyler 2004: 67). However, when the San Francisco chapter learned about the announced Sierra Club action on Amchitka, and the senior leadership declined their support, the committee decided to formally rescind its ties to the Sierra Club (Weyler 2004). On 5 October

- 1970, Don't Make a Wave Committee was formally incorporated as a non-profit society in British Columbia (Weyler 2004).
- 2 Amchitka is one of the islands that make up the Aleutians, a string of islands scattered between Russia and Alaska, in a region that scientists have identified as both volcanic and earthquake-prone. Though uninhabited by humans at the time of nuclear testing, Amchitka is only over 200 miles away from Adak, the nearest human settlement populated by the Aleut people who consider Amchitka one of their ancestral homes (Kohlhoff 2002 and Powers et.al. 2005). The island supports abundant and diverse ecosystems and boasts a high biodiversity of marine and bird life. In spite of its ecological fragility, Amchitka was designated as an underground nuclear testing zone by the United States government. The first bomb, the 80-kiloton Longshot, was detonated on 29 October 1965, 710 meters below sea level. This was followed by the stronger Milrow, a 1-megaton (1000 kiloton) nuclear bomb, on 2 October 1969, 1219 meters below sea level (Powers et al. 2005).
 - 3 The name Greenpeace was suggested by Bill Darnell, a Canadian carpenter, union organizer, ecologist, and member of Don't Make a Wave. The words, green and peace were joined to fit the name in the buttons the committee sold to raise funds for the planned protest on Amchitka island. The Phyllis Cormack, the boat activists used on their maiden journey, was renamed Greenpeace for the voyage (Weyler 2007).
 - 4 In Weyler's website, an article entitled Chronology, the Founding of Greenpeace (n.d.), mentions that the activists were arrested on September 30, and charged with "customs infraction," and then asked to return to Sand Point to formally record their entry. It is uncertain whether the group was intercepted by the Coast Guard on the 30th as recounted in this post, or on the 26th as mentioned in *Waves of Compassion* (2007), a longer chronicle of Greenpeace history. Likewise, it is unclear whether the Greenpeace crew was charged with "customs infraction" or with illegal landfall. Whatever the technical violation was, it is interesting to note that no less than 18 crewmembers of the arresting Coast Guard vessel signed a letter in support of the protest.(Weyler 2007).
 - 5 Four more nuclear tests on Amchitka had already been scheduled prior to the United States government's decision to end nuclear testing on the Island in the face of massive protests catalyzed by the voyages (Mulvaney 2007).
 - 6 In the spring of 1972, Greenpeace finally managed to do what it could not in the fall of 1971 – sail right into a nuclear bomb testing zone. The activists were, however, unable to prevent the French government from detonating the bomb in the South Pacific Island of Mururoa (ibid.)

- 7 Bob Hunter, Patrick Moore, and Hamish Bruce founded The Whole Earth Church shortly after their first Amchitka voyage. Hunter, a newspaper columnist and author had an especially spiritual approach to ecology. Moore, then an ecology graduate student, is best remembered for his line, "A flower is your brother;" and Hamish Bruce, cofounded the ecological activist group, Green Panthers, with Hunter (Weyler 2007).
- 8 On April 27, The Great Whale Conspiracy was launched, and the Phyllis Cormack, renamed Greenpeace V for the mission, once again headed out of Vancouver, but this time in search of whales and whalers. While the voyager-activists were at sea, Spong was at the International Whaling Commission (IWC) meetings in London, lobbying with the ecological group, Friends of the Earth (FOE), for a ban on pelagic whaling. On June 27, exactly two months after the expedition had begun, activists confronted a Russian whaling fleet off the coast of California, and captured on film the harvest of sperm whale carcasses, the whale chase, and the attack against the human shield that protected the whales from being harpooned (Weyler 2007). The filmed encounter put the whaling issue on the spot, and placed Greenpeace at the forefront of the campaign.
- 9 In 1977, Paul Watson, among the first Greenpeace activists and a crewmember of the first antiwhaling voyage, left the organization to start his own ecological group, The Sea Shepherd Society (Weyler 2007).
- 10 The international recognition that Greenpeace had gained made it vulnerable to fraudsters who used the organization's name to swindle money from supporters (Weyler 2007).
- 11 In the summer of 1979, David McTaggart, captain of the Greenpeace 3, suggested moving the headquarters to Europe as the European chapters were better organized and partly insulated from the tensions between the Vancouver and San Francisco groups. His proposal for a Greenpeace International that accorded each member-country a vote was not well-received by the Vancouver group whose members thought of themselves as leaders, but the issue was resolved with Hunter's mediation (ibid.).
- 12 The following month, representatives from Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States held their first meeting as Greenpeace International in Amsterdam, where McTaggart was elected its first executive director (ibid.).
- 13 Greenpeace has offices in Africa, Argentina, Australia Pacific, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,

Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Greenpeace International 2010).

- 14 Mining is an issue that is particularly relevant to the Philippines, but that Greenpeace does not campaign for nor have an official stand on. Because the Philippine office could not ignore this issue, it took up the cause, but tied it to water pollution, an existing campaign (B.Baconguis, personal communication, August 2010).
- 15 Activist Bill Darnell's biggest contribution is naming the organization. He is most remembered for uttering the words, "Make it a green peace" (Weyler 2007).
- 16 The most prominent of these issues are energy and climate change, water, forests, toxics, sustainable agriculture, and disarmament. Greenpeace, for instance, advocates governments' adoption of its Energy [R]evolution framework, a viable blueprint that shows how renewable energy, together with improved energy efficiency, can reduce global CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels by half (Greenpeace International 2007 in Greenpeace International 2008). In the Philippines, Greenpeace was instrumental in the introduction and passage of the Renewable Energy Bill (C. Baclagon, personal communication, October 2009). Regionally, Greenpeace Southeast Asia, of which the Philippine office is part, had repeatedly challenged the Asian Development Bank on a host of issues, particularly the latter's attempts at greening coal (clean coal) and its funding of coal-fired power plants throughout Asia.
- 17 By exposing corporations' atrocities against the environment; ranking "green" companies; organizing boycott campaigns; and circulating petitions pressuring governments, intergovernmental bodies, international financial institutions (IFIs), and corporations to clean up their act, Greenpeace seeks to influence not only individuals' consumption choices and practices but also their perception and attitude toward the entities in question. These, together with circulated pledges to reduce individual carbon emissions or individual water use seek to influence individuals' resource consumption, involvement in environmental issues, and everyday environmental practices.
- 18 These include wind energy, photovoltaics, solar thermal electric, hydro, biomass, geothermal energy, tidal barrages, wave energy, and tidal stream energy (Greenpeace International 2007).
- 19 Coal, oil, gas, and nuclear power are not called dirty energy for no reason. Coal "is the most polluting energy source around and the dominant source of the world's carbon dioxide emissions." Meanwhile, nuclear power produces radioactive waste that is ecologically harmful and cannot be

- properly disposed of, while at the same time threatening global security (Greenpeace International 2009: 5, 88).
- 20 The notion of Greenpeace as a “terrorist” organization is especially prevalent in the global north, particularly in the United States (American Civil Liberties Union 2005), Canada, and Japan.
- 21 It is radical insofar as campaign strategies are concerned, but only progressive in terms of the issues they carry and the positions they advocate.

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1. Standard length of papers is 6000 words (approximately 20 pages typed double spaced with generous margins at the top, bottom, and sides of the page), but shorter contributions are also welcomed.
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 - a) The following examples illustrate the format for referencing in the text:

(Banzon-Bautista 1998: 21)
(Lynch and Makil 1968)
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For Filipinos, the "outside" world is "a place of power, wealth, cleanliness, beauty, glamour and enjoyment" (Cannell 1995: 223).
Source: Saloma 2001

"After all," he said, "*pinoy* can be seen along national lines."
Source: Saloma 2001

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Ma. Glenda Lopez Wui

The International Fellowship of Reconciliation and
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A Sociological Analysis of Philippine Catholic Bishops'
Statements, 1946 to 2000

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RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

On Deviance and Loving Nature:
A Case Study of the Ecological Activism of
Greenpeace Philippines

Maria Khristine O. Alvarez

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INTRODUCTION

Time and again, the aggrieved in society resort to collective actions which are outside the purview of the legal structure to change their current social and/or political conditions. Whether these take the form of spontaneous mob actions or organized social movements, these collective activities can exert significant pressure on the authorities to effect changes in the status quo.

This issue of the *Philippine Sociological Review* focuses primarily on how social movement organizations, both international and local, helped facilitate the opening of the democratic space in the country in the 1980s and since then, empowered the poor and marginalized sectors of society not only to check and balance the state but also promote corporate social responsibility; albeit through nonviolent means. Using a combination of political opportunity and resource mobilization models, the first essay, *Transnational Social Movement: Examining its Emergence, Organizational Form and Strategies, and Collective Identity* by **Ma. Glenda Lopez Wui** discussed how the phenomenon of globalization has led to the recent growth of transnationalization of political mobilization and changed the way that social movement organizing is undertaken. These led to the shift of the locus of protests from the local to the international arena as transnational entities and actors, including “transnational corporations, international non-government organizations, transnational banks, and global criminal networks, pose challenge to states as predominant players in the international arena” (Smith and Johnston 2002: 1-2 as cited by Wui). Wui further contended that the repertoire of protest activities have likewise expanded to include the use of communication technology and transnational media, which makes it easier for different international social movement organizations to engage in transnational activism. Nonetheless, she also acknowledged that while the protests have gone international, there is still a need to nurture the domestic arena since open political environment are important for the local social movement organizations (such as the civil society groups) which lend support to transnational activism to thrive. And here, the diffusion of ideas and values of transnational social movement organizations to the local social movement

organizations are crucial as they can also shape the repertoire of protest activities and their outcomes.

The second essay, *The International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) and the Anti-Marcos Movements* by **Arjan Aguirre** illustrates this. In his essay, Aguirre contended that the series of forums, seminars, and workshops on active nonviolence organized by IFOR from 1984 to the weeks leading to the 1986 EDSA revolution facilitated the diffusion of the principle and methods of active nonviolence to the anti-Marcos movements in the Philippines. Active nonviolence as a master protest frame resonated more effectively with the wide range of anti-Marcos groups and allowed for broader mass mobilization. This, in turn, led to the further opening of the domestic political opportunity structures that culminated in the EDSA Revolution of 1986.

Among those who have attended the lectures/seminars on nonviolence conducted by IFOR were the clergy, politicians, organizers, civic leaders, professionals, activists, academics, students and common folks. Some of them became the forerunners of a local nonviolence movement called AKKAPKA in 1984. AKKAPKA became instrumental in persuading the Marcos administration to conduct a Snap Election and in motivating the anti-Marcos movements to ensure a clean and honest election. It was also responsible for diffusing the growing tension between loyalist soldiers and rebel military men during the protest period that ensued after the election and have kept the EDSA Revolution relatively “peaceful.”

Active nonviolence as a protest master frame continues to be invoked by the more moderate social activists long after the EDSA Revolution has ended in 1986 until now. Since 1986, various strategies and tactics that subscribe to the active nonviolence frame have been employed by the organized marginalized sectors to call attention to their grievances. Among the more successful of these protest movements is Sumilao Walk of 2001 wherein farmers from Sumilao, Bukidnon walked 1,700 kilometers from their community to Manila to win back the 144 hectares of land that should have been distributed to them via the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This is discussed in the third essay, *WALK: Framing a Successful Agrarian Reform Campaign in the Philippines* by **Lennart Niemelä**. According to Niemelä, one of the factors that contributed to the success of the Sumilao Walk was the support of the Catholic Church leaders who provided the farmers with shelter and the opportunities to talk about their situation, and mediated on their behalf with the representatives of the state. This support nonetheless

was obtained through a conscious employment of frame bridging, frame amplification and frame transformation. Through “walking,” the Sumilao farmers were able to provide the symbolic link between the physical hardships of being a farmer with that of actively doing something about their grievance, thereby eliciting sympathy among their fellow farmers who knew the difficulties of tilling the land, and promoting the conscientization of the urban dwellers. Walking as a tactic of active nonviolence likewise amplified the social injustice committed against these farmers that it was transformed into moral concern which the Philippine Catholic Church has to address, if it was to live up to the role of “disruptive activism.”

In his essay, *Philippine Catholicism as Disruptive Public Religion: A Sociological Analysis of Philippine Catholic Bishops' Statements, 1946 to 2000*, **Fr. Robert Rivera, SJ** discussed how the Catholic Church, in dealing with the social realities of the Philippine society, facilitated the development of Catholicism as a “public religion,” albeit very slowly. By using its pastoral and teaching authorities, the Catholic Church has influenced not only the strategies and tactics of the Philippine social movements, but also helped the latter in confronting an authoritarian and/or corrupt state.

But even without support from a strong institution like the Catholic Church, social movement organizations do have certain advantage over other social institutions in pressing social concerns. This is because their expressions of grievance are tolerated even though they push the laws to their limits. To a certain extent, this is what **Maria Kristine O. Alvarez** argued in her essay, *On Deviance and Loving Nature: A Case Study of the Ecological Activism of Greenpeace Philippines*. In this work in progress, she examined the experiences of Greenpeace in “breaking the law,” albeit in nonviolent ways, in pursuing its environmental advocacy. Nonetheless, Alvarez pointed out that as experienced by Greenpeace, direct action in contravention of the law can be considered “lawful” when it seeks to expose and act against efforts that place people, ecosystems, and other living things in danger and when official channels of communication fail to produce just action. Barring these, extra-legal activities become merely just acts of “law-breaking.”

As it was decades ago, the Philippine society is still confounded with major social, political and economic issues and concerns that are left unresolved and/or unattended. This could only mean that some segments of the population who continue to feel marginalized or aggrieved will organize themselves and collectively clamor for and exert efforts aimed at bringing

large-scale changes. Depending on the political opportunities presented by their society, they will continue to mobilize support and engage in strategies and tactics that they hope will bring about change in their conditions. Understanding where this support would be coming from, how such support can be mobilized, and the extent to which they can push for their demands, will enable social scientists to rethink the process of social change in our society.

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