

Chapter 4

THE LEFT AND THE TRADITIONAL OPPOSITION

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Beneath the legalistic reasoning of conservatives and the ideological pronouncements of radicals, Filipinos are basically political realists. Whether they support President Marcos or oppose him, they expect the highly personalized system he created in twelve years of authoritarian rule to collapse with the passing of its creator but, at the same time, they find it difficult to envisage a smooth return to constitutional democracy. This has given rise to a pervasive sense of uncertainty which in turn evokes grim visions of the immediate future (Diliman Review (A. R. Magno) November-December 1983).

In this paper, I speculate on how the Left and the traditional opposition might respond to three possibilities: the establishment of a full-blown military dictatorship, an attempt to modify the authoritarian system, and the restoration of constitutional democracy. I also assess the probable consequences of the ensuing struggles and realignments. To spell out the bases of my conjectures, I begin with an analysis of the interests and the strengths and weaknesses of the forces behind current regime.

THE MARCOS STATE

In half a century of 'political tutelage', the US superimposed democratic institutions upon a grossly undemocratic Philippine society. Marcos therefore had good reason to disclaim that he destroyed a functioning democracy (Marcos 1977 and 1978). Indeed, the elections before martial law were widely perceived as a rich man's game rather than a structure for popular participation. The major parties - Nacionalista (NP) and Liberal (LP) - represented volatile alliances of landowning and bourgeois families who had amassed enormous wealth through colonial patronage. Consequently, in between elections the representative bodies were inaccessible to ordinary citizens. This instilled a cynical attitude, especially among those who grew up in the post-independence period, that often expresses itself in vigorous boycott campaigns. I argue, however, that martial law aborted a process of democratizing this patently oligarchic system.

The Americans

Between the first quarter of 1970 to September 1972 the Philippines witnessed an extremely interesting development. Spurred by the Left, the hitherto mute and powerless masses were learning to organize themselves and intervene in state affairs. Finding the representative institutions unresponsive, they had to devise new channels for interest articulation: what the militants called the 'parliament of the streets'. This democratizing process did not last long enough to bring about substantive reforms, but in shaking the ruling class solidarity, it eventually compelled even the established institutions to heed the pressures from below.

Paradoxically, the primary target of democratization was the US, the erstwhile colonizing power and self-proclaimed mentor in democratic politics. Policies prescribed by the US-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) could not get through the the Philippine congress, despite the strong endorsement of Marcos. The dockets of both houses of congress were filled with legislative proposals which categorically assailed American interests. The ongoing constitutional convention was working out a draft of the new constitution which also reflected these nationalist and reformist sentiments. In 1972 even the traditionally conservative Supreme Court rendered two precedent-setting decisions which placed in jeopardy the status of US investments upon the termination of the Laurel-Langley agreement (Shalom 1981).(1)

These developments were particularly disturbing not only to the US government but also to the local American business community. The Laurel-Langley agreement was due to expire in 1974 but the nationalist upsurge made its renewal seem improbable. Moreover, the Philippine-US military bases treaty was up for renegotiation while the Vietnam War was still in progress (Shalom 1981). In a remarkable display of political dexterity, Marcos turned these anxieties to advantage, invoking them to neutralize possible US resistance to his assumption of absolute power.

It is, of course, an accepted principle in American jurisprudence that states which believe themselves imperilled by war or insurrection have the right to declare martial law in order to save democracy. But Marcos in September 1972 used martial law to destroy what the Americans regard as essential to a democratic system. He disbanded congress and endowed himself with sole legislative authority. He also reduced the judiciary into a legitimizing instrument of the presidential will (del Carmen 1979). All this ran counter to the principles of separation of powers and checks and balances which are central to American political thought, and violated the 1935 constitution which the US government approved as the basis of Philippine independence. Marcos resolved the constitutional issue in a manner that the Americans would normally find offensive: he coerced the constitutional convention to adopt a draft which vested him

with the power to govern by decree and submitted this to a rigged plebiscite (Muego 1976).

To placate the US, Marcos unilaterally extended 'parity rights' and the military bases treaty. He also reversed by decree the two Supreme Court decisions. In line with World Bank and IMF policies, he shifted the thrust of national development from import-substitution to production for export (Bello and Rivera 1977). Reversing the nationalist tendencies in 1970-72, he opened up the Philippine economy and gave all sorts of incentives to multinational capital which even Taiwan and South Korea do not offer in their export processing zones.

The Left-wing publications assert that the US ordered Marcos to declare martial law. This is obviously an overstatement. In fairness to Marcos, there is no convincing evidence that he actually solicited prior US approval. What is incontrovertible is that the US did not raise a whimper of protest as Marcos dismantled the legacy of US colonial rule. Quite the contrary, US military and economic aid (not to mention the massive loans) multiplied several fold in the years immediately following the declaration of martial law (Bello and Rivera 1977).

The Military

To enforce these unpopular policies, Marcos had to build up the coercive apparatus. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was enlarged from 55,000 men in 1972 to 164,000 in 1977 and something like 250,000 today. The defence budget accordingly swelled from \$136 million in 1972 to \$420 million in 1977 (Diliman Review (Carolina Hernandez) January-February 1984; see also Far Eastern Economic Review (David Jenkins) 10 March 1983). Marcos also transferred control over the police from the local governments to the Philippine Constabulary (PC), one of the four major branches of AFP. Furthermore, the village bullies were armed and trained into para-military units called the Civilian Home Defence Forces (CHDF) under AFP supervision.

There is no way of calculating the size of two very important components of the coercive apparatus - the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) and the Civilian Intelligence and Security Agency (CISA) - whose budgets and personnel are kept from public knowledge. Although technically independent of the AFP, both are placed under General Fabian Ver who is also the AFP Chief-of-Staff and the effective commander of the Presidential Security Command. Ver is Marcos's most trusted henchman, being a close relative and long-time bodyguard (Far Eastern Economic Review 10 March 1983).

The multiplicity of Ver's functions indicates the extent to which Marcos distrusts the military, while using it to suppress real and imaginary foes. He has devised various means of keeping the military in check. For example, he requires them now and then to pledge allegiance to civilian

supremacy. (In the current context, however, this means allegiance to Marcos alone because military commanders are not obliged to heed the civilian officials at the sub-national levels.) This ritual is, of course, undependable. When generals and colonels plot against their Commander-in-Chief, they will take any number of oaths until they find a chance to move.

A more effective method is that of infiltrating NISA agents in all military units to spy on their superior officers. These agents report directly to Ver in his concurrent capacity as NISA director-general. Another control device is that of packing the AFP with 'integree officers' (2) who owe personal loyalty to the president. Many of these 'civilians in uniform' come from the Ilocos (the home region of Marcos and Ver), are members of the Vanguard Fraternity (graduates of the University of the Philippines Reserve Officers Training Corps of which Ver is the perennial president and Marcos is the most distinguished alumnus), or belong to political clans with a record of unflinching loyalty.

When there is widespread unrest and the legitimacy of the regime is questioned, these devices could backfire on the president. There are already signs of dissension among the 'regular officers' (i.e. professional soldiers who earned their commissions by graduating from military academies or scaled the ranks through sheer military prowess). The 'regulars' complain that the military profession is being degraded and 'politicized' by the influx of 'integrees'. While they must bear the burden of fighting the communist and Moro guerrillas, the 'integrees' get promoted faster while sitting on their swivel chairs. They are often stuck to the rank of colonel until they are just about to retire (interviews with a retired general, a retired colonel, and two colonels in active service whose names cannot be disclosed for obvious reasons).

The Technocracy

Another notable trend in the Marcos state is the emergence of the technocracy as a serious political force. This consists of former university academics and corporate executives whom Marcos has been recruiting as special assistants and advisors since he first became president in 1966, a practice which implies his innate distrust in the competence of career bureaucrats. While constitutional democracy was the prevailing system Marcos could not afford to make his fellow politicians feel insecure by admitting upstarts to the corridors of power. It was only with the advent of martial law that he elevated the technocrats to positions previously reserved for politicians. Today the cabinet - from the Prime Minister down - is filled with technocrats. He even created new agencies especially for them, like the Development Academy of the Philippines and the Ministry of Human Settlements. These technocrat-dominated

agencies which he endowed with generous budgets duplicated and later displaced the established government bureaux. Marcos needs their expertise to design 'fundable projects' and relies on their credibility to negotiate with foreign entities.

At the outset observers sneered at the technocrats as politically inconsequential experts with whom any dictator could feel safe. Hardly anyone considered them a threat to Marcos or a potential factor in the post-Marcos rearrangement. It seems, however, that they have since learnt the Machiavellian art while serving in Marcos's court. This emerged in abundant clarity in April 1983 when Prime Minister Virata (the most senior technocrat in the government) masterfully parried the blows from the First Lady, the New Society Movement (KBL) and the crony-owned mass media, not only to preserve his own position but also to enhance the power-status of the technocracy in general (Far Eastern Economic Review (Ocampo-Kalfors and Sacerdoti) 5 May 1983; and (Bowring and Sacerdoti) 9 June 1983).

What the technocrats lack in popular support is compensated for by the trust of the IMF, the World Bank and other international lending and aid agencies. It has become more evident since Aquino's assassination that they are the main conduits for international capitalism. As long as the Philippines retains its neo-colonial character, and especially if the debt problem goes from bad to worse, they will always be indispensable to a successor regime of whatever form.

Their significance owes to the fact that they are the natural allies of the regular officer corps should a power vacuum emerge after Marcos's departure. There is a marked ideological convergence and functional overlapping between the military and the technocracy. Colonels now sit with technocrats in government panels. Some technocrats have actually been integrated into the AFP and, at the same time, regular military officers are acquiring technocratic skills and values through the National Defence College. The two have more in common than the fact of serving the current authoritarian regime. Both are believers in a strong executive and disdainful of politicians. Their loyalty to the regime is institutional rather than personal. Both seem to be uneasy with Mrs Marcos's irrational priorities and overtly hostile to the crony-capitalists whose ill-managed business ventures thrive on presidential favours.

Cronies and Politicians

The status of the 'crony-capitalists' in the Philippine power structure is so dependent on Marcos's political fortune for them to be considered a serious factor in the post-Marcos reckoning. They are too implicated in corruption and mismanagement that they could just be the convenient scapegoats for a successor regime. With the exception of Eduardo Cojuanco, Roberto Benedicto and Antonio Floirendo,

they are too preoccupied with wealth accumulation that they have not bothered to build independent power bases. Rumours are rife in Manila that they have been investing abroad or smuggling their money to Swiss bank accounts, ready to evacuate the moment Marcos's regime crumbles.

Habitual opportunists, the majority of KBL politicians deserted the NP and LP when they realized that Marcos would have a monopoly of patronage for a long time. But their political allegiance is so mercurial that, should anything happen to Marcos, they will probably scamper like rats in a sinking ship. Some are beginning to make critical noises, and a few have actually joined the moderate opposition. They are unlikely to stand by Mrs Marcos or any chosen successor. Having lost their credibility with the masses and as thoroughly immersed in corruption as the crony-capitalists, it is doubtful if they will count in the politics of the post-Marcos period.

A sizeable part of the KBL rank and file, especially in the Ilocos region, are genuinely loyal to Marcos. There are also ordinary people, especially in the rural areas, who feel a genuine sense of gratitude for his social amelioration projects, no matter how limited their beneficent impact. It is not possible at this juncture to assess their readiness to fight for a legend, but we cannot exclude the possibility that they will evolve into a movement similar to Peronismo in Argentina.

To sum up, the Marcos state is analogous to what Marx called 'Bonapartism' (Marx 1977). It achieved 'relative autonomy' from the ruling class with the support of the army and a pliable mass organization. The circumstances which allowed Marcos to assume total power were remarkably similar to what created the opportunity for Louis Bonaparte to pose as the saviour of France: intense contradictions in the ruling class and a mighty challenge from below, resulting in the paralysis of the old state machine. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the breakdown of this personalized regime will also usher in a Filipino Paris Commune.

ENEMIES OF THE MARCOS STATE

While the legal/underground dichotomy is convenient for describing current opposition activities, it is unsatisfactory for speculating about their future roles. Many opposition groups, while operating legally, define their roles in the context of armed struggle; in other words, they perceive themselves as ancillary to the underground movement. In this paper I distinguish the 'Left opposition' (whether legal or underground) from the 'traditional opposition' whose goal is limited to the restoration of constitutional democracy. But it is necessary to stress the latter's growing ambivalence because, as the struggle gains momentum, those who initially clamoured for restoration could veer towards a radical posture.

The traditional opposition

Marcos himself is largely responsible for blurring the difference between the Left and the traditional opposition by indiscriminate repressiveness. Alleging that a 'Rightist conspiracy' abetted the 'Leftist rebellion' (Presidential Proclamation no. 1081, 21 September 1972), he ordered the arrest and detention of politicians, businessmen, landowners, and church people whom he perceived as potential objectors to authoritarian rule.

Had they the will to fight, this should have been a sufficient provocation. In the first few years of martial law when Marcos himself was uncertain of his control, they could have led the mass resistance. They had the financial capability, the political machinery and, above all, the aura of legitimacy. But they wavered. But they chose to sit idly by, while their peers were being persecuted and Marcos abolished the positions to which they were legally entitled.

The most plausible explanation for default was a deep-seated fear that the masses, once aroused and accustomed to extra-legal modes of struggle, would eventually assail the social system of which they are a privileged part. They may have applauded and perhaps even colluded with the fledgling Left soon after the fraudulent 1969 elections, but by September 1972 the Left had grown into such a formidable force that the traditional oppositionists themselves became apprehensive. Knowing this, Marcos capitalized on their apprehension just as he capitalized on the anxieties of US imperialism.

Instead of putting up a resistance, the traditional oppositionists hoped for the US to restrain the vindictiveness of Marcos and pressure him to restore the representative government. Senator Manglapus, for instance, sought political asylum in the US and devoted his energies to delivering lectures in Ivy League universities and lobbying in Washington. Ex-President Macapagal published a book wherein he raised the preposterous charge that Marcos was handing over the country to communism and insinuated that the US had a moral duty to rescue democracy in its former colony (Macapagal 1976).

With Jimmy Carter in the White House waving the human rights banner, the traditional oppositionists entertained illusions of the US liberating the Philippines for the third time in history.(3) All this fell to pieces with the ascendancy of Ronald Reagan. Only then did they start mending their political fences, a belated effort which culminated in the founding of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) in April 1982.

UNIDO collected the remnants of the LP, the Laurel faction of the NP, and ten regional parties and sectoral associations. It is essentially a loose coalition with no unifying principle other than a common hostility to Marcos. Its acknowledged leader, Senator Laurel, supported Marcos in the early phase of martial law and even won a parliamentary

seat in 1978 as a KBL candidate.(4) Having been out of power since 1966, the once formidable LP machine had been steadily eroded. The other affiliated groups regard UNIDO as an ad hoc structure from which they are free to withdraw at any time.(5)

Apart from UNIDO there is the People's Power Party (LABAN) that was hastily formed in 1978 to contest the Metro-Manila seats of the National Assembly (Batasang Pambansa). Since the LP then took the ambivalent line of officially boycotting the elections while allowing its members to run in their individual capacities, Senator Aquino (the LP Secretary-General) chose to campaign from his prison cell under the LABAN banner. The truth, however, was that the active apparatus of LABAN in 1978 consisted of communist and social democratic cadres. What remained after the latter withdrew were just a few high society figures with no visible following. Especially after his assassination, LABAN tried to capitalize on the Aquino mystique; obscuring the historical fact that, while exiled in the US, the slain senator judiciously dissociated himself from any particular opposition group.

Potentially the most significant organization of the traditional type is the Pilipino Democratic Party (PDP), founded in 1982 by the controversial mayor of Cagayan de Oro city Aquilino Pimentel. It has a more tangible machinery than LABAN. With a coherent programme that embodies some of the radical concerns, it is attracting the young militants of the non-communist Left. There is the possibility, however, that when the politicians in its central leadership begin to take a more pragmatic course, PDP (like LABAN after the 1978 elections) will lose its mass activists to the social democratic underground.

In 1983 PDP coalesced with LABAN, forming what is now popularly known as PDP-LABAN, the second major component of the traditional opposition. To a lesser extent than UNIDO, this coalition suffers from the disability of failing to adapt to the changes over the last decade. They are still oriented to the American style of politics which rely on theatrical antics, patronage and unprincipled alliances. The last elections proved that this is still effective for winning votes, but it is unsuitable for prolonged extra-parliamentary struggle. Moreover, it is repulsive to the young people who grew up under the dictatorship - the so-called 'martial law babies' whom Marcos tried but failed to depoliticize.

It is too early to write off the traditional politicians. The failure of the boycott movement last May indicated that they have a mobilizing capability for electoral purposes, even if the final outcome also demonstrated their incapacity to protect the ballot box. But one should be careful before drawing the conclusion that people still look for an electoral solution to the current crisis. A sizeable number voted for UNIDO and PDP-LABAN as a demonstration of protest, rather than an expression of faith

in the electoral process. The real test of strength between the Left and the traditional opposition will come after the elections. It is interesting to observe how effectively the Left can foment and sustain extra-parliamentary resistance to the IMF-imposed conditions which Marcos most probably accept.

The Left opposition

In this paper the term 'Left opposition' denotes an assortment of groups and individuals who can be distinguished from the traditional opposition by the following criteria: they want to get rid of US military bases and abrogate all 'unequal treaties' with the US; they oppose the massive and unregulated inflow of foreign investments and the heavy reliance on foreign loans; they advocate structural reforms, especially with regard to ownership and control of the means of production; they demand the dismantling - not just the modification - of the Marcos state; and they believe that these ends can be attained only through the mobilization of the masses and that armed struggle is a legitimate mode of political behaviour.

Sectarian elements on the Left may object to such a broad definition which lumps them with groups and individuals whose views deviate from their narrow conception of 'the correct line'. I believe, however, that to understand the inner workings of the movement and forecast its response to future crises, it is more useful to stress the 'polycentric' character of the Philippine Left rather than reiterate the legend of its 'monolithic solidarity'.

The Philippine Left today is divisible into three ideological streams: Marxist, Christian and Islamic. The Marxists represent pro-Chinese, pro-Soviet and a variety of independent tendencies. Christian radicals whose 'liberation theology' approves of collaboration with the Marxists are called the 'Nat-Dems' (National Democrats) as differentiated from the 'Soc-Dems' (Social Democrats) who distance themselves from Marxism while agreeing with the Marxists on all points enumerated earlier. I understand that the Islamic radicals are also divided into at least three recognizable factions. These trends clash and converge in the course of struggle, building up a body of common experience that serve as a basis and impulse for occasional dialogues. Beneath the appearance of diversity, however, there is consensus on a wide range of issues (Nemenzo 1984).

A major reason for this mixture of cohesion and plurality is the indisputable pre-eminence of one group, the new Communist Party of the Philippines [Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought] (CPP). Of the various groups that profess Marxism-Leninism, the old Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) is the only one which challenges the CPP's claim to the vanguard role. The rest acknowledge it as the effective leader of the revolutionary movement, notwithstanding their criticisms of its theoretical and strategic-tactical formulations. They generally choose areas of activity which

the CPP has neglected and they hope to prove in practice the correctness of their own ideas. The reluctance of these organizations to call themselves a party signifies an open attitude toward eventual unity, with the CPP as the core (People's Liberation Movement 1980; Solidaridad Dos 1980; and Socialist Republican Union 1982).

The PKP - the oldest Left-wing organization (founded in 1930) - has been literally consigned to the fringe of the movement it once led. It earned the contempt of other revolutionary groups by its brutal methods of handling internal disputes and its decision in 1974 to surrender and collaborate with the martial law regime (Ang Bayan 15 October 1979). Emasculated by a series of defections, the PKP now consists of a few dispirited veterans of the Huk rebellion. Even the pro-Soviet, pro-Vietnamese and Fidelista mavericks in the independent Marxist groups refuse to associate with the PKP.

In the days of Stalin and Pope Pius XII, the Filipino Marxists and Catholics regarded each other as implacable enemies. The Huks harassed the priests and the priests assisted the counter-insurgency operations (Pomeroy 1974). Even after the young Maoists broke with the PKP, they preserved this anti-clerical tradition. In fact, it was the CPP which popularized the term 'clerico-fascists' for the Christian reformers. The latter's efforts to 'contextualize theology' and redefine the social mission of the church in line with the new perspectives of Vatican Council II did not ease this historic tension (Yu and Bolasco 1981). It was Marcos who inadvertently radicalized this arch-conservative institution (Youngblood 1981) and made possible this odd marriage of clerics and cadres.

The indiscriminate repressiveness of martial law drove the Christian reformers underground. Since they were unprepared for this contingency, they had to seek refuge in the NPA areas. Many eventually reconciled with the CPP under the National Democratic Front (NDF) umbrella, while the rest formed their own underground network - the Philippine Democratic Socialist Party (PDSP) in 1973. At the outset PDSP was too weak and small to draw attention from the government or the CPP. It began to show signs of vigour only around 1978, when sympathetic bishops and religious superiors became worried about the growing number of priests, nuns and lay workers who joined the NDF in the absence of a Christian alternative to the Marcos dictatorship.

PDSP thus offered a third choice: revolutionary but non-communist. While renouncing the philosophy of dialectical materialism as incompatible with Christian doctrines, it borrowed liberally the Marxist analyses of secular problems as well as some Leninist organizational principles (NPDSF 1979). It also established its own military arm - the Sandigan - as the Christian equivalent to the communist-led New People's Army and Marcos's Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Alarmed at the prospect of competition, the CPP launched

a strident propaganda campaign against the PDSP, stigmatizing it as an 'imperialist trojan horse' and tracing its origins to the Jesuits and Jesuit-trained intellectuals in the 1950s who played an active part in the counter-insurgency operations (Philippine Resistance No. 2, 1980). But again, the indiscriminate repressiveness of the regime diffused this 'cold war' in the Philippine underground. A raid on the PDSP headquarters and the arrest of its leaders made the Soc-Dem activists realize that the struggle against the dictatorship must take precedence over the struggle against the CPP. In 1980 PDSP split on the issue of co-operation with the communists. One faction advocated affiliation to the NDF and another favoured the toning down of anti-CPP propaganda while maintaining organizational differentiation. Even the hard-core Soc-Dems have reportedly modified their rabidly anti-communist attitudes (Interview with the PDSP international representative).


The CPP itself is by no means monolithic. It accommodates divergent tendencies. While some remain unrepentant Maoists and others toe the Deng Xiaoping line, an increasing number of CPP members favour an independent stand on the Sino-Soviet dispute. Although the CPP official organ - Ang Bayan - still bears the phrase 'Guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought' in its masthead, it may no longer be accurate to describe the new communist party as Maoist. As Horacio Morales (the alleged NDF chairman and presumably a ranking CPP official) told the Far Eastern Economic Review (21 August 1981: 20):

The communist members of the NDF resent being called Maoist because of the derogatory connotation that they are subservient to a foreign power. They prefer to be known as Filipino communists. While it's true that NDF members study Mao's writings on the Chinese revolution, we also study the Vietnamese, African and Latin American writings.

Privately some leading CPP figures express disenchantment with the current Chinese foreign policy and the 'four modernizations programme.' While they remain critical of the Soviet Union, the virulent anti-Soviet, anti-Vietnamese and anti-Cuban epithets have completely disappeared from Liberation, the NDF monthly magazine. They have also become rare in Ang Bayan and in the recent party documents.

Since the second half of the 1970s party-to-party relations with the Chinese has been reduced to ritualistic exchanges of banal greetings on historic dates. Beijing has scrupulously honoured its commitment to the Marcos regime that it would cease all material aid to the Filipino rebels. The CPP now subsists mainly on local support and, to a minor extent, on assistance from non-communist sympathizers abroad. This has considerably facilitated the process of indigenization. Its political line is no longer a monotonous

NPA ACTIVITY



Source : *Liberation*, September 1982.

rehash of Chinese policy statements, especially on foreign affairs. For instance, the CPP implicitly rejects the underlying proposition in the 'three-worlds theory' that the USSR, rather than the US, is 'the most dangerous enemy'. In bold contrast to the Thai and Malaysian communist movements, the CPP has not been weakened by this alienation from its erstwhile mentor; quite the contrary, the overcoming of ideological dependence is a major factor in its phenomenal growth (Nemenzo 1984).

The CPP directs the two most dynamic underground organizations: the New People's Army (NPA) and the National Democratic Front (NDF). When the NPA was born in March 1969 it was nothing more than a rag-tag army with twenty automatic rifles and fifteen handguns. It had a very narrow operational zone in the southern part of Tarlac province. By the time Marcos declared martial law, the NPA armoury had increased to 350 high-powered weapons. Its operational zone already extended to the Cagayan Valley in Northern Luzon, and it had a few armed propaganda units, Bicol, Southern Luzon, Western Visayas, and Mindanao (Umali 1983).

Crushing the NPA was the avowed purpose of martial law. The result was the reverse. By destroying at the same time the bourgeois democratic system, martial law radicalized the Christian reformers and created favourable conditions for armed struggle. Today the NPA has at least 12,000 full-time guerrillas and 35,000 part-time militias. It is operating in 56 out of 72 provinces, and in 400 out of 1,500 municipalities. Lieutenant-General Fidel Ramos, the PC chief, admitted that at least 20 per cent of the barangays are controlled or infiltrated by the NPA (The Age 26 September 1983). As the attached map shows, the NPA is widely distributed throughout the archipelago, unlike the PKP-led Huks in the 1950s who were confined to central and southern Luzon.

The number of villages under effective NPA control at night time or what the NPA calls 'guerrilla fronts' is a more meaningful index of rebel strength. As of the end of 1983 thirty-six of these were located in all the major islands. Each covers several adjacent towns where mass support is so broad and stable that NPA units can move freely and strike with impunity. Within a guerrilla front local NDF committees function as the de facto government. They collect taxes, regulate trade, determine interest rates, administer justice, implement a land reform programme, run adult education classes, organize public health and provide paramedical services, and so on. In these areas the officials and policemen are either active sympathizers or reluctant collaborators of the NPA.

In the cities and the big towns where government forces are firmly in control, NDF cadres work inside the open legal organizations. Even the barangays, the local units of the Civilian Home Defence Force, and the KBL party branches are reportedly penetrated by them. Having mastered clandestine techniques in twelve years of practice under the worst

circumstances, they often succeed in steering these organizations along a radical course while leaving the formal leadership to non-party personalities. Whenever the government cracks down on the so-called subversives, the latter invariably get caught but the real NDF cadres often survive to resuscitate the mass organizations once the troops withdraw.

During that long period when the traditional political machines stayed dormant the NDF, PDSF and other Left groups had the field of mass organizing entirely to themselves. This is why the traditional opposition groups must call on the Left to provide the critical mass for the anti-Marcos demonstrations. Mass actions unilaterally called by the traditional opposition in which the Left did not participate attracted very few people. For instance, the UNIDO-sponsored airport rally to welcome Aquino on 21 August 1983 drew a small crowd of around 2,000 and the 'general strike' called by PDP-LABAN in November was a total failure (Nemenzo 1983).

The NDF is potentially the more powerful weapon of the communist party. Lacking an external supplier, the NPA's expansion is hampered by the arms it can procure through small scale encounters, supplemented of course by what can be purchased from drunken GIs in the American military bases. No matter how auspicious the political situation, the chances of military victory are slim. In the Philippine context the main value of guerrilla warfare is inspirational; without it the NDF and the national democratic movement as a whole cannot sustain the spirit of resistance. But the decisive struggles will most probably occur outside the battlefields. I therefore give little weight to estimates of the revolutionary prospects in the Philippines which are based on calculations of the military balance (e.g., Problems of Communism (Philip Dion) May-June 1982).

Unless the intelligence community can weed out the NDF cadres in all the key institutions and mass organizations, it is difficult to stage a repeat performance of events in September 1972. This is the basis for my assumption in this paper that the NDF will play a critical role in the post-Marcos rearrangement because it has the utmost capacity to destabilize the successor regime.

POST-MARCOS SCENARIOS

As argued earlier, what happens to Marcos will decisively affect the course of events because the present form of government is built around his person. This is not an institutionalized system in which the leader's physical and political health is of secondary importance. The Philippines's future depends, at least in the short run, on how and when Marcos leaves the presidency. Three possibilities may be considered in this connection: (1) he drops dead before a viable succession mechanism could be

installed; (2) he is forced to resign either by coup d'etat or by popular pressures; and (3) he stays in power long enough to successfully institutionalize the system.

Despite vehement denials, rumours of his failing health continue circulating in Manila. People in business and politics act on the assumption that Marcos cannot finish his current term. Since he had shirked the task of building up a successor or establishing a structure for succession while his authority was still firmly rooted, his death in this period of uncertainty will set the country in chaos. In that case a military takeover is the likely consequence. Even the most ardent anti-militarist will have to admit that the AFP is to date the only force capable of filling in a power vacuum.

Until the NPA can develop the people's war to the 'strategic stalemate' stage, Marcos can rule the country even without popular support, provided the AFP stands solidly behind his government. So far there are no symptoms of an impending coup. Factionalism in the officer corps (which I noted earlier) does not necessarily indicate a mutinous tendency. The disaffected officers generally aim their criticisms at Ver and Defence Minister Enrile, and seldom at Marcos himself. The internal tensions in the officer corps will become a crucial factor only if the opposition gets strong enough to force his resignation but not sufficiently strong to seize and wield power, or if Marcos's death becomes imminent before there is a widely accepted succession mechanism. In either circumstance it is possible for a clique of ambitious officers to execute a coup, with or without the complicity of civilian technocrats and politicians.

The response of US imperialism is, of course, a factor to consider. Even after granting formal independence in 1946, the US has been able to make and unmake governments in the Philippines. This interventionist capability was further enhanced under martial law because, by opting for an export-oriented development strategy and relying heavily on foreign investments and foreign loans, Marcos made the country more vulnerable to external economic pressures.

The US will surely search for a course of action that would ensure greater stability for the neo-colonial state. But its options are increasingly narrowed down by the radicalization of Filipino consciousness and the growth of the national democratic movement. Within this context I shall examine the three scenarios which are most widely discussed in Manila today.

Scenario No. 1: a military government

Beset with graver problems in Central America and the Middle East, the US will probably stave off a military take-over in the Philippines. Unlike Iran under the Shah and Nicaragua under Somoza, where even the moderate opposition forces had been totally crushed, the Philippines has civilian

alternatives to offer. For instance, the technocrats in the present government and certain elements in the traditional opposition are more than willing to accept vassal status. It therefore makes more sense from the standpoint of US economic and security interests to install civilian rulers. Military rule could further weaken the moderate forces and completely destroy people's faith in bourgeois democracy. If, however, the two circumstances cited earlier would suddenly create a power vacuum, the military may indeed intervene even without consulting Washington. The US may find this disagreeable but none the less accept the fait accompli as a short-term expedient.

In my first scenario the military stages a coup d'etat and decides to govern with an all-military junta. Depicting itself as a 'caretaker government', the junta promises 'free elections' as soon as normalcy is restored. Meanwhile, it imposes martial law to deal with the economic problems and the breakdown of law and order. Anticipating resistance from the Left, the church, the traditional opposition, and even the anti-militarist factions in the Marcos camp (e.g., the faction of Labour and Employment Minister Blas Ople), the junta enforces 'preventive detentions', night-time curfew, news blackout, and ban all strikes and demonstrations. To impress people with its iron will, it publicly executes the prominent dissenters.

Given the limited skill-structure of the Philippine military, the junta realizes it cannot govern alone. It needs the managerial skills and credibility of civilian technocrats who, at any rate, bear close ideological affinity with the professional officer corps. Its relations with the politicians are more problematic because militarists view them with contempt. The junta may wish to exclude them but the US will probably insist on their inclusion as a legitimizing factor.

If the military succeeds in normalizing the situation, the US (for reasons cited earlier) may pressure the junta to hold early elections and hasten the restoration of civilian authority. The regular officers who are anxious to keep their profession out of politics may also exert added pressures from within. Unless the junta has the nerve to purge the regular officer corps, it will be forced to make conciliatory gestures while stalling the actual transfer of power.

For example, it can start the process by holding elections for a constitutional assembly and allow the longest possible period for campaigning. The junta can rely on the politicians to quarrel on every minor matter in the convention. The longer and more vicious their squabble, the better for the junta. When a draft is finally adopted, there will be two more campaign periods - first for the plebiscite and then for the parliamentary elections. This whole process could drag on for years, giving the military ample time to entrench itself in the political structure. Unless a revolution overturns the entire system, the military will

continue to wield power even after the junta is dissolved.

The process just described can only be smooth if the military is able to establish and maintain a firm grip of the situation. This is difficult to achieve because, over the years of authoritarian rule, the organized Left has acquired the capacity to destabilize any regime. The CPP and the other underground groups will surely intervene at various stages in this process to prevent the junta from consolidating itself. They will try to foment contradictions within the military-technocratic complex, and between the junta and other political forces.

In the countryside, NPA units may launch tactical offensives to divert troops from the cities. And in the cities, particularly in Metro-Manila, the NDF may dip its feet in the water with a series of 'lightning rallies' (a technique it developed to near-perfection in the early years of martial law).⁽⁶⁾ If the popular response to such initiatives is positive, the NDF will try to escalate these into mass demonstrations. The military rulers will then have to face a major dilemma. If they tolerate mass demonstrations or fail to suppress them, people may lose respect for their most valued asset; i.e., a monopoly of violence. At the same time, a display of maximum force may trigger a nationwide upheaval reminiscent of the 'Bloody Sunday' in Tsarist Russia.

A mass demonstration is obviously more difficult to organize than a 'lightning rally', especially in a very tense and repressive atmosphere. Its success depends on the participation of the unorganized citizenry who are naturally cautious and more easily frightened. The martial law regime demonstrated in the early 1970s that crowds could be dispersed with minimum violence at the assembly points, but the radicals have also discovered ways to surmount this tactical problem. For instance, the demonstrations in Manila after Aquino's murder were mostly assembled in the three Catholic and one Protestant churches around the Quiapo area. They were usually preceded by a 'protest service' for which a sympathetic priest or minister devises an agitational liturgy. Once tens of thousands have congregated and their passions aroused, they will gain the courage to march out in open defiance of the riot police. It requires utmost violence to diffuse large and angry crowds. From the standpoint of the authorities, this poses an extremely delicate question: will the soldiers always obey an order to open fire? It is one thing to shoot peasants in some God-forsaken village and another to massacre middle class dissenters while the whole world is watching. But they can only prevent it by sealing off the churches and thereby risking confrontation with the powerful ecclesiastical hierarchy.

If the 'lightning rallies' elicit only a lukewarm response, the CPP will not push them any further. Filipino radicals today do not forget the 1950s, when the PKP urged the Huks to escalate the struggle before people were ready

for an all out clash with the state. Hence, the Left will probably bide its time until a real revolutionary situation emerges.

They will continue to pursue the strategy of protracted war but their mass organizations will also intervene at the various stages of regime consolidation. For sure they will not put up candidates in the elections because that will contribute to the legitimization of the military regime, but they will certainly take advantage of the electoral campaigns for propaganda and organizational purposes. Obviously, such interventions will not be sufficiently destabilizing. But the Leftwing groups have good reason to expect that the junta will not be able to solve the severe economic problems left behind by Marcos. Provided they can sustain the struggle in the countryside, conditions for simultaneous insurrections in the urban centers will inevitably mature. The notion of protracted war could mean a long wait for this decisive moment.

Scenario No. 2: modified authoritarian rule

Pressured by the US and the international banking community to establish a mechanism for succession, Marcos and his supporters are now working out their own scenario for the post-Marcos era. This entails modifications of the autocratic system to allow a degree of power-sharing with the moderate opposition while retaining its essential feature of a strong executive. The National Assembly (Batasang Pambansa) with 183 elective is its basic participatory structure.

Under the 1973 constitution, as amended and reamended to suit Marcos's volatile political strategy, the president has the powers to veto National Assembly bills and issue decrees which the National Assembly can neither repeal nor revise. In effect, Marcos remains the supreme lawgiver. The National Assembly can legislate only for as long as the president permits.

Should anything untoward happen to Marcos before his term ends in 1987, the speaker of the National Assembly will act as the interim head of state but he has to call for a presidential election within sixty days. Marcos has already made provisions to ensure a KBL victory in that election. The most important of these is to pack the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) with his loyal henchmen. In a country like the Philippines where frauds and terrorism are time-honoured practices, control of the COMELEC and its network of poll inspectors is crucial.

Today all the major print and electronic media are owned by Marcos's cronies. Since the death of Aquino, however, the audience of Radio Veritas (the radio station of the Catholic Church) has grown and the government has tolerated opposition newspapers like Malaya, Veritas, and The Philippine Signs. The weekly magazines, including the ones owned by the cronies, have also taken a mildly oppositionist posture. But

their editors, columnists and correspondents live under constant threat of detention since Marcos has not repealed decrees that were designed to curtail freedom of the press. Moreover, the government can always silence them by withholding the supply of newsprint. These anti-Marcos media exert an influence out of proportion to their circulation. They tend to be expensive because the big corporations find it imprudent to advertise in them, but those who can afford to buy usually pass them around to trusted friends.

Like all governing parties, KBL has the added advantage of access to public funds. It is to be expected that between now and 1987, Marcos will use all available resources to ensure his re-election or the election of his chosen successor. His immediate goal is to secure the political and economic future of his family, his cronies and his devoted followers after he leaves the presidency.

What are his chances in this endeavour? Mrs Imelda Romualdez Marcos is often mentioned as the strongest contender, but I doubt if she ever was a serious candidate (Nemenzo 1983). Marcos may have many faults, but we should recognize his acute sense of political realism. He must be aware that his capricious and extravagant wife will never earn the confidence of the US and the international banking community. The technocrats as well as the regular officer corps of the armed forces are also quite explicit in their rejection of her. She may have the initial support of the powerful General Ver, but it is doubtful that he could swing the entire military organization in her favour the moment Marcos departs.

Marcos has to explore other possibilities such as Eduardo Cojuanco, Defence Minister Enrile, Labour Minister Ople, UN Under-Secretary-General Rafael Salas, and Prime Minister Virata. Unfortunately, they all have tremendous disabilities. Despite the exposure of fabricated economic figures, Virata has retained his popularity in foreign banking circles, but his own people view him as the cause rather than a solution to the current economic crisis. In the tumultuous post-Marcos years, factions in the military will be manoeuvring for positions and popular support could then be a critical factor.

Since he resigned as Marcos's executive secretary, Salas has continued to command a following in the technocracy. He is probably as acceptable as Virata to the military, the US government and the international banking community. His ambiguous relationship with Marcos and his many years of absence from the country are both an advantage and a disadvantage. Marcos distrusts him but if the pressures for his resignation mount, Marcos may see Salas as the last hope for some continuity. Salas is more likely than those who were deeply involved in the regime to placate the radical opposition, or at least a segment of it.

Ople has been quite open about his presidential ambitions but he is the least likely contender. The military suspects him of Left wing sympathies while the Left despise

him as an opportunist. His supposed power base is a sector of organized labour which is too weak and unmotivated to be an effective counterforce to the Left and the military, potentially the most destabilizing forces in the post-Marcos era.

Enrile, on the other hand, prematurely began his campaign for the presidency and in the process acquired too many powerful enemies. He has a brighter prospect if the first rather than the second scenario materializes. His best hope of acceding to the presidency is to rally the regular officer corps against Ver and his cohorts, but even this is improbable unless he can persuade Lieutenant-General Fidel Ramos (AFP deputy Chief-of-Staff and Commanding General of the PC) to stage in a pre-emptive coup.

Of the crony-capitalists, Cojuanco alone has exhibited political acumen. Taking a very low profile for the greater part of the martial law period, he had evaded the pernicious controversies that ruined the reputation of others. He quietly built a following in the armed forces with the help of Enrile, but when the latter's efforts backfired, he defected to the Ver camp and continued carving out his own power base with the sufferance of this faction (Far Eastern Economic Review 7 June 1984). While the corporate empires of the other crony-capitalists have collapsed, Cojuanco not only retained his grip on the coconut industry but recently also captured the San Miguel Corporation (the largest business enterprise in the Philippines which used to be the financial backer of his late cousin and political adversary Benigno Aquino).

The fundamental question, however, is whether the structure of the Marcos state will survive his death or forcible withdrawal. Until the early months of 1984 political observers were predicting his downfall. Reagan cancelled his state visit to distance the US from his tottering regime. The IMF was not eager to bail him out. Ungrateful proteges were joining the opposition. Some military officers were voicing dissatisfaction. Meanwhile, the economy continued sinking and the mass movement continued mounting.

For the first time in a decade Marcos appeared vulnerable. The US congress ordered him in unequivocal terms to hold elections and secure the participation of the opposition parties:

It should be the policy of the United States Government to support genuine, fair and free elections to the National Assembly in May 1984 and, to that end, to urge the government of the Philippines to take the necessary steps to secure the full participation of the opposition parties in these elections, including the prompt reconstitution of an objective, impartial electoral commission and the restoration of full freedom of the press... (US House of Representatives,

Realizing that Marcos desperately needed to make the elections credible to the US, all opposition forces from the CPP and PDSP on the one hand, and the UNIDO and PDP-LABAN on the other held a people's congress (KOMPIL) in January 1984. They all agreed to boycott the elections unless Marcos would abdicate his power to rule by decree and turn the National Assembly into a real parliament. That was indeed a rare chance to extract meaningful concessions from a beleaguered dictator.

Unfortunately for Philippine democracy, the UNIDO and PDP-LABAN broke the agreement. After a secret chat with the US Vice-President, UNIDO chairman Laurel announced his party's intention to participate in the expensive farce. PDP-LABAN took an irresolute stand which unbarred its ideological confusion. While its opportunist leadership decided to participate, its militant rank and file opted for boycott. Once assured of 'full participation' as mandated by the US congress, Marcos resumed his adamant posture and refused to reconstitute the COMELEC or restore freedom of the press. The regime thus gained a lease of life not because of the legendary cunning of Marcos but because of the vacillation of his adversaries.

In the elections KBL lost massively in Metro-Manila and other urban centres, but managed to rectify the results in remote areas. Despite numerous instances of blatant frauds and 200 political murders, the foreign press declared the elections to be a historic landmark. Marcos is reported to have regained control while the revitalized opposition supposedly gained a stronger position to check the government party. On the other hand, the radicals are said to have suffered a major setback because a high percentage of voters ignored their boycott call (e.g., Newsweek 28 May 1984 and The New Republic 11 & 25 June 1984). Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick even described the elections as a major step toward 'the perfection of your democracy'.

The celebration might have come too soon. One consequence of the elections was to alienate the traditional opposition from the militant masses. With the continuing decline of the economy, the symptoms of social unrest manifest themselves everywhere. Demonstrations now occur even in hitherto placid towns and industrial strikes are becoming more violent. Meanwhile, the traditional oppositionists who constitute one third of Marcos's rubber stamp parliament are dramatizing their own impotence. If this trend drags on and the locus of decisive battles shifts from parliament to the streets, there is good reason for the US to fear that the militant masses will rally behind the CPP as the only force capable of armed resistance.

Scenario No. 3: constitutional democracy restored

If the CPP can galvanize the extra-parliamentary

struggle and the National Assembly loses its last remaining credibility, the US might persuade Marcos to resign. He and his family will be offered asylum, with the amenities and protection normally accorded to fallen despots. A denial of loans by the IMF will help, and if all this fails, the pro-American officers of the armed forces can make a few threatening gestures. Being so dependent on the military, Marcos will have to yield rather than risk the dreadful consequences of scenario no. 1.

In this third scenario the military decides not to govern but asks the technocrats to constitute a civilian provisional government with acceptable members of the traditional opposition. This government tries to shake off the Marcos stigma and appeals for national reconciliation. The 1973 constitution and all presidential decrees are nullified. The most notorious Marcos henchmen are put on trial. The Bill of Rights is restored. A general amnesty is proclaimed and the underground organizations allowed to surface. A constituent assembly is convened and its draft submitted to a plebiscite without delay. Members of the provisional government inhibit themselves from running for elective office. Free and honest elections are held and the provisional government readily cedes power to the elected government.

Since this arrangement conforms to popular sentiments, it would be foolhardy for the Left to oppose it. The Left will probably reciprocate the gestures of reconciliation, even as it remains vigilant knowing that the military is lurking in the shadow of the provisional government. The NPA will refuse to disarm but agrees to a truce. The NDF will also preserve its clandestine network while taking advantage of every occasion for propaganda and organizing work. While abstaining from outright attacks on the provisional government, the CPP and its associated organizations will keep a political distance. Should the sectarian elements in its leadership foolishly oppose the provisional government at the outset, the CPP will be isolated and this will be the chance for PDSP to seize the initiative.

Like the modified authoritarian rule envisaged in scenario no. 2, the restored constitutional democracy will have to settle the dreadful legacy of the Marcos years: uncontrollable inflation, a staggering balance of payments deficit and a huge foreign debt. Unless the US will commit as much economic aid as it did in 1950 (an unlikely prospect in this epoch of global recession), the newly-elected government will have to keep wages down and enforce a severe austerity programme. Such measures, no matter how rational, will be difficult to bear by the millions who live below or close to the poverty line.

Once the euphoria of Marcos's downfall wears out, there will be a resurgence of industrial strikes. The students will return to the streets. Some members of parliament will champion their cause and constitutional democracy will again be reduced to a 'democracy of stalemate'. The contradictions

of 1970-72 will resurface, perhaps in more vicious forms. These will be the cues for the NPA to resume the armed struggle. The politicized military officers will also find their backstop role increasingly intolerable. Then another Marcos, a new 'man of destiny' (iginuhit ng tadhana) will come forward to snatch the republic from the brink of disaster.

Conclusion

This exercise in political speculation presupposes a time-frame of seven years. It assumes that Marcos will not last until the end of the 1980s: either his government is toppled or his kidney is consumed by lupus erythematosus. But a revolution is unlikely to be the immediate outcome. Even the CPP, with its predilection for extravagant optimism, does not expect that to happen in the near future. The death or downfall of Marcos will only give rise to an extremely volatile situation wherein the military-technocratic complex and the traditional opposition will try to work out a mutually acceptable arrangement.

On its own, the traditional opposition is incapable of capturing power. Its mobilizing capacity is limited to gathering votes and does not even extend to effectively protecting the ballot box. Despite the outburst of anti-Marcos feelings after the Aquino assassination, there is little chance of the traditional opposition parties rebuilding their shattered political machines in time for the next presidential polls.

UNIDO is alienated from the young militants who are in the forefront of extra-parliamentary struggle. While PDF-Laban is somewhat more alluring, tension exists between its leadership and its militant rank and file. Thus, if Marcos hangs on for some more years the traditional opposition might be consigned to oblivion. At the moment their prime value is that of a legitimizing factor, but this too is dwindling as fast as the Philippine currency. The last elections reduced rather than enhanced their potential for constructive intervention. In the long run it is the historic confrontation between the Left and the military-technocratic complex that will decide the Philippines's future.

Although the Left will neither be a contender for power nor a participant in a ruling coalition in the next seven years, it can influence the course of events by the skilful use of its enormous capacity for political destabilization. Whatever the form it takes, the post-Marcos regime is going to be more vulnerable than the Marcos state because it will inherit a severe economic crisis while consolidating itself.

The prospects for a national democratic revolution in the 1990s depend to a large extent on how correctly the Left analyzes and responds to the fluid situation in the next seven years. Imbued with an overwhelming self-confidence

that borders on arrogance, some CPP leaders are not beyond committing fatal errors that could wipe out their phenomenal gains during the Marcos years. At the moment the CPP appears to be preparing only for scenario no. 1. It is interesting to observe if the CPP leadership can transcend its dogmatic tendencies and execute a strategic switch should scenario no. 2 or scenario no. 3 materialize. What happened in the 1950s (when the PKP plunged the Huk movement to a colossal debacle) may happen again if at a critical juncture in the immediate post-Marcos period the CPP misjudges the real situation and drives the movement along a disastrous line of march.

The non-CPP elements of the Left (Soc-Dems and independent Marxists) have much to contribute in this enterprise. Free from a centralized party discipline, they are exploring other dimensions of the Philippine reality and trying out alternative modes of action. Rather than regard them as foes to be discredited, isolated and eventually crushed, a mature vanguard party would encourage these tendencies and establish channels for continuing dialogues. Their reflections and experiments will probably help in evolving a truly Filipino radical perspective that grasps the present reality and the future prospects in their fullest complexity and dynamism. But an arrogant party leadership that claims a monopoly of wisdom and righteousness, a bureaucratic centralist leadership that stifles critical thinking and muzzles debate, is doomed to waste a historic opportunity.

FOOTNOTES

1. In a constitutional amendment extracted by the US from a fledgling Philippine republic in 1947, US citizens and corporations were granted 'parity rights' in the exploitation of Philippine natural resources and operation of public utilities. This was spelt out in a treaty known as the 'Laurel-Langley agreement' that was due to expire in 1974.
2. 'Integree officers', as distinct from 'regular officers', obtained their commissions by going through a four-year Reserve Officers Training Course (ROTC) as part of their regular university education. During martial law thousands of these ROTC graduates were called to active duty and conferred high military ranks.

3. An allusion to the conquest of the Philippines in 1898 and the reoccupation in 1945 which the US justified as a liberation.
4. The bulk of the pre martial law NP politicians joined Marcos's KBL party, while another faction identified with Senator Roy played the role of 'loyal opposition'. When the traditional and Left opposition groups decided to boycott the 1981 presidential election, for example, Marcos asked the NP-Roy faction to put up a token candidate against him.
5. Interview with leaders of two UNIDO-affiliated regional parties who eventually broke with UNIDO just before the May 1984 parliamentary elections.
6. A 'lightning rally' is a technique developed by student activists in the late 1970s to embarrass the martial law authorities. Briefly, it consists of blocking the traffic at two points in a busy street (an easy thing to do in Manila at certain times of the day) so as to keep the police mobile patrols from moving swiftly to a preselected area. Several activists with their faces covered would then appear in this area, chanting slogans, waving placards and distributing leaflets. Before the policemen are able to reach the area on foot, the activists merge with the milling crowd. This usually provokes them to arrest the wrong people. Such forms of mass action proved to be very effective in reviving the spirit of resistance. Their immediate tactical objective is to demonstrate the impotence of the coercive apparatus against people who 'dare to struggle and dare to win', and their ultimate goal is to help the citizenry recover from the initial shock. Aside from testing the clandestine network's operational capability after the first round of arrests, these 'lightning rallies' also measured the people's readiness for higher forms of urban struggle.